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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with multi-media performance and installation art 
practices which foreground the live body in combination with mediatized 
images. The research is conducted through the making and examination of 
a number of the researcher’s own art works. Practical multi-media 
performance and installation projects are analysed within the context of 
specific performance and visual cultural theories in order to advance their 
contribution to critical and cultural fields.
The research champions a symbiotic relationship between theory and 
practice. Practical works were undertaken and exhibited as solo or 
collaborative art projects. These works then formed the basis for individual 
‘case studies’ and were subjected to a critical review informed by a variety of 
theoretical frameworks including feminist, psychoanalytic and post-
structuralist philosophy. This practice-based methodology is contextualised 
by the mapping of historical and contemporary critical discourses for the 
field of multi-media performance. The ‘reflection-on-action’ results in an 
understanding of the mechanisms and effects of multi-media performance 
as a cultural practice. 
Specifically this thesis aims to answer the question as to whether multi-
media performance can form the basis for an ‘interrogation’ of our 
contemporary media dominated society? Through a practice-led enquiry it 
unpacks the dynamics between a meeting of live bodies and mediatized 
images, concentrating on the differences and similarities of their 
experiential sensory qualities. The research then extends these findings 
into social and political contexts through a comparison with other ‘reality’ 
and ‘identity’ re/producing cultural practices. The study concludes that 
cameras and recorded images used within live and/or time based art 
contexts can counteract the conventional constitution of mediatized images. 
To the extent that mediatized images can also be said to reflect and in turn 
constitute human subjectivity, multi-media performance, therefore, can 
provoke a re-evaluation of culture and its associated human activities and 
behaviours.
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NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS
This doctoral study has been conducted through my art practice, it therefore 
seems appropriate that my practical work should be represented within my 
doctoral submission. The integration of practical art works within a written text 
can present difficulties, particularly if that work is originally constructed, as mine 
is, for live and/or three dimensional spaces. The majority of my research 
projects have been documented on still and moving film and video, but this 
activity in itself is problematic and provokes a debate concerning 
documentation which forms a major part of my opening chapter. In order to 
present a thesis which also provides evidence of my art practice (as 
documentational video and stills), I have determined that the final written 
version of this thesis will be accompanied by a digital versatile disk (DVD). This 
disk can be played via a computer DVD Rom drive or dedicated DVD player 
and, unlike a video tape, will allow the reader immediate and precise access to 
individual video examples.
The DVD contains edited extracts of moments from my practical work; these 
extracts are used within the text to illustrate particular issues or arguments. In 
the text each excerpt is referenced by the abbreviation ‘Vid. no.’ followed by the 
title of the performance and/or installation and the name of the specific moment 
reproduced on the DVD. Also given in the text are small still screen-images 
which correspond to the number of views used to represent the particular 
moment on the accompanying DVD. For example:
Vid. 3. Constants II - Round the Walls.
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Each image in the text has a corresponding moving image found on the DVD. 
Within the DVD these three small screens play in sync providing three different 
‘versions’ or ‘angles’ of a particular moment from the performance. If the 
viewer/reader wishes to watch one of these ‘versions’ in more detail it is 
possible to click on the individual screens to see a full-screen version of that 
particular screen/angle. The DVD can be cross referenced with the text; 
preceding each video extract is a title screen giving the number of the 
sequence, its name and corresponding page number in the text;
This should enable the reader of the thesis to accurately locate the particular 
documenting video excerpt that accompanies the text. As my practical 
performance and installation work also forms a critique of the subjects under 
discussion in the thesis it is vital that the reader should engage with both the 
video and written text simultaneously; that is the text should be read in close 
proximity to a DVD playback device so that immediate cross referencing can 
occur insuring an interpenetration of the two texts.
There are also a number of still image illustrations within this thesis, these are 
referenced as ‘Fig. no.’. Within the body of the text these images are scaled to 
match the video stills, however, larger versions of these same pictures can be 
found in Appendix 4 beginning on page 274. Finally, due to the temporary 
nature of this paper-based document and heterogeneous nature of my 
illustrating references, I have determined that a ‘Table of Illustrations’ would 
serve little purpose and therefore each illustration encountered is thoroughly 
referenced within the body of the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
HISTORY & DOCUMENTATION
1.1 General Introduction
Because live performance is the category of cultural production 
most directly affected by the dominance of media, it is 
particularly urgent to address the situation of live performance 
in our mediatized culture. (Philip Auslander 2).1 
This study examines the relationship between live performance and the 
mediatized image.2  My investigation looks specifically at the cultural practice 
of multi-media performance, and in particular, focuses on a number of art 
works that foreground a dialectic between the live body and the mediatized 
image. The art works in question were undertaken during the course of my 
study as practical research projects and have been publicly exhibited in art 
galleries, museums and performance spaces.3  These works include The 
Turin Machine, a performance/photography installation in a giant pinhole 
camera; Constants: A Future Perfect, a work created in collaboration with the 
performance company Bodies in Flight which integrates both live and 
recorded mediatized images with performance; Looking Glass, an 
interactive mirror piece designed to be ‘hung’ on a gallery wall and 
1 All quotations from Philip Auslander in this text come from his book Liveness: 
Performance in a Mediatized Culture (apart from a quote in the conclusion which comes 
from “Liveness: Performance and the Anxiety of Simulation” a chapter in Diamond’s 
Performance and Cultural Politics).
2 The term ‘mediatized’ is used by Philip Auslander in Liveness: Performance in a 
Mediatized Culture “to indicate that a particular cultural object is a product of the mass 
media or of media technology”(5). Auslander acknowledges that the term “is borrowed” 
from Jean Baudrillard’s For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign where it carries 
a much more “expansive” definition; “What is mediatized [...] is what is reinterpreted by the 
sign form, articulated into models, and administered by the code” (qtd in Auslander 5). 
Within the context of ‘multi-media performance’ as a specific art practice I will use the term 
mediatized to refer to images that have been created using media and its associated 
technologies, that is, from the simplest image forming apertures to the most complex 
electronic image manipulation systems. The word mediatized also avoids any confusion 
that may arise with terms such as ‘mediation’ or ‘mediated’.
3 Not all the practical work that I undertook during my period of research has been 
included in my analytical writing although every piece has resonances with the subjects 
under discussion in this thesis. For a chronology of all the works completed during my 
doctoral study please refer to Appendix 1.
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Simulator, a small scale installation modelled on a war time building found 
at a Second World War airfield.4 
I will examine the ontological and phenomenological similarities and 
differences between ‘the live’ and ‘the mediatized’ within my work, in order 
to analyse an encounter with these two forms of expression. I wish to 
highlight various approaches and attitudes towards the live and the 
mediatized, and then speculate about what implications these attitudes 
might have within a wider cultural field and ultimately how these impact on 
our broader cultural, social and political interactions. This study proceeds 
through my own practical multi-media performance work, foregrounding the 
original working processes and exhibitions, documentational presentations 
and written critical analyses. Thus my enquiry looks to a practice-based 
methodology in order to create a productive synergy  between the processes 
of theory and practice within my chosen subject area.
1.2 Methodology
The philosopher and educationalist Donald Schön has identified the idea of 
“knowing-in-action” as essential to effective practice and it is this idea which 
is integral to the concept of a practice-based methodology: 
When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of 
the actions of everyday life, we show ourselves to be 
knowledgeable in a special way [...]. Our knowing is ordinarily 
tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and our feel for the stuff 
with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our 
knowledge is in our action (49).
In The Reflective Practitioner, Schön argues that intelligence and 
knowledge are embedded in our actions and that by thinking about and 
analysing action, information and understanding can be revealed. He calls 
this process “reflection-in-action”. Similarly, but without direct reference to 
4 Unlike the other multi-media performance works cited above, both Looking Glass and 
Simulator do not use a specific performing subject. That is, these works do not include a 
body, or bodies, who can be identified as the ‘professional’ performer(s) within the work. 
Instead, these ‘installation’ or ‘time-based art’ pieces reflect the interdisciplinary nature of 
my practice and extend out of my interest in performance and media to construct a 
particular live dynamic for their viewers in which the viewer becomes the ‘live performing’ 
element within a work. Therefore, to the extent that these pieces continue to foreground 
live performance in conjunction with media, I am happy to include them under the general 
heading of ‘multi-media performance’.
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Schön’s ideas, two Humanistic Studies scholars, Bruce Douglas and Clark 
Moustakas, outline a method for a ‘Heuristic’ inquiry in “Heuristic Inquiry: 
The Search to Know”. Their research proposes a number of stages which 
must be traversed in order to achieve an appreciation of the ‘tacit’ or the: 
“Subliminal, archetypal, and preconscious perceptions [which] undergrid all 
that is in our immediate awareness, giving energy, distinctiveness, form 
and direction to that which we know”(49).5  An understanding of the role of 
the tacit has particular relevance for practice-based research for art and 
design subjects, as Douglas and Moustakas point out, “The tacit dimension 
is the forerunner of inference and intuition [...]. In this sense, the tacit is 
visionary; it incorporates the aesthetic and artistic aspects of 
consciousness without neglecting the clues of cognition”(49). The American 
psychologist and inventor of ‘flow theory’, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, expands 
the terrain of a practice-based method and writes of the importance of 
contextualisation for studies centred round creativity: “We cannot study 
creativity by isolating individuals and their works from the social and 
historical milieu in which their actions are carried out”(325). 
Csikszentmihalyi identifies three main forces which he believes constitute 
this terrain, these are: a ‘field’ of social institutions, a cultural ‘domain’ and 
the individual.6 
Between them the aforementioned writers help to construct a theoretical 
basis for research conducted within and through practice. An exhaustive 
account of every influential aspect which has contributed to my practice 
would be an impossibility. But, I believe, that by scrutinising some of the 
working processes and end products of my artistic practice I will begin to 
reveal the tacit functions of my creative cognition. With this analysis, in 
combination with a contextualizing study of the history and theoretical 
concerns which relate to my field, I will be able to produce an interrogation 
of my individual motivations and the social, cultural and historical forces 
which impinge upon them. This interrogation will provide a number of 
5 These stages of a heuristic inquiry are described as Immersion, Focusing, 
Differentiating, Acquisition and Realisation. Douglas and Moustakas “Heuristic Inquiry: 
The Search to Know” in the Journal of Humanist Psychology Vol. 25. No.3 Summer 1985 
pp 39 -55.
6 See Csikszentmihalyi’s chapter “Society, Culture and Person: A systems view of 
Creativity” in The Nature of Creativity: Contemporary Psychological Perspectives Ed. 
Robert J Sternberg.
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knowledges, some quite personal and related specifically to my practice 
and its future possibilities and others of more academic purpose which 
progress thinking and observations of consequence to the field of multi-
media performance and related cultural and social practices.
Performance, as the subject of a practice-based investigation, has a 
pertinent relationship with the notion of “knowing in action”. The words 
performance and action are closely linked (as demonstrated by the above 
definition from Schön). Performance practitioners understand that through 
the repetition and ‘dramatisation’ of human actions a content and meaning 
is revealed. Behaviour is displayed and thus potentially subject to reflection. 
In performance, meaning comes from action and this is what makes it 
distinct from other forms of artistic expression. Performance, as an 
aesthetic cultural practice, manifests an understanding of the possibility 
and importance of “reflection-in-action”. There is, therefore, a direct link 
between performance and the notion of practice-based research which is 
located in the shared belief that through actions, knowledge maybe 
exposed for critical scrutiny.
Throughout my research I wish to avoid an illustrative relationship between 
theory and practice, or even an experimental relationship where the practice 
is used to ‘test’ theory. Instead, aware that both these fields infect one 
another in countless ways, I have ‘reverse engineered’ my theory as it 
develops from individual case studies written in response to my practice. 
During the course of my research I conducted practical projects and 
theoretical reading, initially independently of one another. After a public 
presentation of a particular performance and/or installation work, I then 
subjected the piece to detailed scrutiny in the form of a written case study 
which reviewed the development of the work and its final realisation.7  My 
theoretical reading was processed through comprehensive note taking and 
a variety of critical writings.8  The practical case study notes, in combination 
with my theoretical studies, form the basis for the individual chapters within 
7 Appendix 2 contains written case study reports for each practical project undertaken.
8 Appendix 3 presents one such ‘artists paper’ “Spectral Bodies” presented in various 
forms during 1998 to the Performance Theory Seminar, Lancaster University, Nottingham 
Trent University’s Open Lecture programme and Napier University’s Department of 
Photography, Film and Television Senior Seminar. 
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this doctoral thesis and thus, I believe, provide a point of synthesis between 
my theoretical and practical work. In this way I hope to sustain a more 
‘emergent method’ which continues to evolve in response to the differing 
demands of theory and practice as they manifested themselves through the 
course of my study. Such an approach ultimately preserves a symbiotic 
relationship between theory and practice which, I believe, operates at the 
heart of both my artistic and critical work.
This thesis represents the final phase of my evolving method. The 
document begins with an introduction to the subject area before moving on 
to examine the specific question of documentation in relation to mediums 
such as performance. Following on from this is an outline of some of the 
axial debates which impinge directly on my study. In three separate case 
study chapters I look at particular practical works in relation to a variety of 
pertinent theoretical discourses, in order to deconstruct my work and 
examine its specific effects and contributions, occasionally with the result of 
a reformulation of my work and these discourses. The document ends with 
a summary which revisits the axial debates and presents a series of 
conclusions formed in light of the research undertaken. Therefore this 
document does not primarily examine my working methods (details of 
which can be found in my initial case study notes provided in Appendix 2) 
but rather is concerned with the outcomes of this practical work, as it is here 
within public exhibition and/or performance, that the art work meets a wider 
critical context. My practical work will be present throughout the thesis in the 
form of still or moving image documentation; still images can be found 
within the body of the written text and in Appendix 4, moving images are 
provided on the digital versatile disk (DVD) which accompanies this Ph.D. 
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1.3 Terms and Definitions
The history of performance art in the twentieth century is the 
history of a permissive, open-ended medium with endless 
variables, executed by artists impatient with the limitations of 
more established art forms, and determined to take their art 
directly to the public (Goldberg 9).
Multi-media performance could be defined as a branch of the artistic 
discipline of ‘performance’ or ‘performance art’.9  The use of the word 
‘performance’ to reference a specific form of art practice originated in the 
early nineteen seventies to describe a variety of work taking place across 
America and Europe.10  This work is identified by Marvin Carlson as having 
”an interest in developing the expressive qualities of the body, especially in 
opposition to logical and discursive thought and speech, and in seeking the 
celebration of form and process over content and product”(100). However, 
the word ‘performance’ can be used to describe a wide range of cultural 
and social practices and is studied across a number of different disciplines, 
most notably Performance/Theatre Studies, the Social Sciences and 
Linguistics. The American anthropologist, Edward L. Schieffelin, 
paraphrasing the linguistic anthropologist Richard Bauman, writes in more 
general terms about performance as...
a display of expressive competence or virtuosity by one or 
more performers addressed to an audience. Such 
performances aim to evoke an imaginative reality or an 
9 Depending on the author and their time of writing a number of terms exist to describe 
performance which is integrated with visual media: Multimedia Theatre, Visual Theatre, 
Theatre of Mixed Media - (R. Kostelanetz), Intermedia Theatre - (Gene Youngblood),  
Filmstage - (Robert Whitman), Theater of Images - (B. Marranca) and Mixed Media 
Performance - (Auslander). I have chosen to use ‘multi-media performance’ as my 
preferred nomenclature for a number of reasons; ‘multi’ implies more than one and ‘media’ 
suggests, in a contemporary understanding of that term, visually orientated forms of 
communication technology including television, video, film, photography and personal 
computers, ‘performance’ identifies the work as having a lineage that pertains to, but is 
also different from, that of theatre.The hyphen in ‘multi-media’ identifies the term as 
distinct in meaning from the similar and predominate term ‘multimedia’ which is used to 
reference a particular form of computer based processing which can link video, audio and 
text information together. Lastly, and more personally, multi-media is the term that I first 
used to describe work that I began producing as an artist twelve years ago.
10 Performance is a generic term, other terms by which such works might be referred to 
includeTheatre, Performance Art, Performance Theatre, Experimental Theatre, Avant- 
Garde Theatre and Live Art.
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intensification of experience among the spectators, and bring 
about an altered awareness of their situation and/or a sense of 
emotional release (195).
Schieffelin’s broad definition allows a distinction to be made between 
performance as an “aesthetic” or “symbolic” activity, such as rituals and 
theatre, and the ‘performances’ of everyday life. Performances as specific 
cultural ‘events’ can be set apart from ‘performative’ actions, which 
Schieffelin characterises as expressive human behaviour in general.
The notion of the performative is of central importance to the study of 
performance and it originates from the work of the Oxford philosopher and 
linguist J.L Austin. The performative indicates a ‘speech act’ - “an utterance, 
such as ‘I promise’, which is itself the performance of an act [...] rather than 
a description of that act” (Flew 265). In this, performativity is centrally 
concerned with action and as such a performative utterance “does not refer 
to an extra-linguistic reality but rather enacts or produces that to which it 
refers” (Diamond 4). The notion of performativity, like performance itself, has 
been examined across a number of critical disciplines, and has, over time, 
moved from a specifically linguistic concept to be used in reference to many 
aspects of human interaction and behaviour. Although Schieffelin himself 
does not construct an overt difference between performance and 
performativity, some critics have drawn a distinction between the two. Judith 
Butler, writing about the performance of gender in Bodies that Matter, 
provides a different inflection on the idea of performativity which she derives 
from the Derridean idea of citation; “Performativity is thus not a singular ‘act’, 
for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms”(12).11  Thus, 
alongside Schieffelin’s ‘expressive human behaviour’, Butler introduces the 
idea that in order for performativity to be effective it must make recourse to 
certain “culturally intelligible grids” (Gender 135). Butler thus is able to 
identify a difference between performance and performativity;
performance as bounded ‘act’ is distinguished from 
performativity insofar as the latter consists in a reiteration of 
norms which precede, constrain and exceed the performer 
11 Derrida’s ideas on citation or “iterability” are to be found in his essay “Signature Event 
Context” in Limited Inc. where he states “Could a performative utterance succeed if its 
formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words if [...] [it] were 
not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model”(18).
7
and in that sense cannot be taken as the fabrication of the 
performer’s ‘will’ or ‘choice’ (Bodies 234). 
Yet both Schieffelin and the performance and theatre theorist Elin Diamond 
valorise inquiries that engage with performance and the performative on the 
grounds that these can produce wide ranging cultural and social insights. 
Schieffelin notes that it is through the study of performances and everyday 
performativity that it is possible to explore “the way that cultures actively 
construct their realities” (199-200) and Diamond further comments; 
When performativity materializes as performance in that risky 
and dangerous negotiation between a doing (a reiteration of 
norms) and a thing done (discursive conventions that frame 
our interpretations), between someone's body and the 
conventions of embodiment, we have access to cultural 
meanings and critique (5).
Therefore performance, as a specific artistic activity located around the self-
conscious staging of expressive human behaviour (performativity), could be 
seen as a form of cultural practice by which a society can examine itself. 
To return to the subject of performance as a particular art form. An 
awareness of the practice of ‘performance’ as a live, artistic event arose 
during the nineteen seventies due the work of art historians such as 
RoseLee Goldberg. In her pioneering history, Performance Art: From 
Futurism to the Present, she attempts to provide a definition for the form and 
notes that “By its very nature, performance defies precise or easy definition 
beyond the simple declaration that it is live art by artists”(9). The problem of 
creating an extensive definition of the form seems to be endemic. Diamond, 
in Performance and Cultural Politics, states “Performance describes certain 
embodied acts, in specific sites, witnessed by others (and/or the watching 
self)”(1). Therefore, in addition to Goldberg's liveness, Diamond pinpoints 
the importance of the body of the performer, performing in a particular place, 
watched by others. The isolation and identification of these three 
ingredients: performer(s), space, audience, combined in a live event, would 
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seem essential to any performance activity.12 
Another definition by the critic Richard Kostelanetz introduces the presence 
of technology into the performance equation. In what he coined ‘The Theatre 
of Mixed Means’ he states that this ‘new’ movement:13 
differs from conventional drama in deemphasing verbal 
language, if not avoiding words completely, in order to stress 
such presentational means as sound and light, objects and 
scenery, and/or the movement of people and props, often in 
addition to the newer technologies of films, recorded tape, 
amplification systems, radio and CCTV (Theatre 3).
While this does not provide an exclusive definition of performance, 
particularly because there are many examples of more recent work in which 
the spoken word forms a key element, nevertheless such a description is 
notable as it identifies a role for media technology within live events which 
are predicated on the presence of a performer or performers, in a specific 
space with an identifiable audience. Carlson however, following on from 
Goldberg’s observation that “performance defies precise or easy definition”, 
provides us with a useful conclusion to this hunt for a meaningful teleology; 
“if we consider performance to be an essentially contested concept, this will 
help us to understand the futility of seeking some overarching semantic 
field to cover such seemingly disparate usages”(5).14  
It seems to me that this difficultly in creating a definition for performance (or 
12 Other useful definitions of performance can be found in the article “Performance and 
Theatricality: The Subject Demystified” by Josette Feral in which she makes a comparison 
between the practices of performance and theatre identifying three characteristics of 
performance, similar to those cited by Diamond, as distinct from that of theatre. These 
concern “the manipulation of the body”, “the manipulation of space” and “the relation that 
performance institutes between the artist and the spectators, between the spectators and 
the work of art, and between the work of art and the artist”(171).
13 In his book of the same title, Kostelanetz provides a table of the four main areas of 
activity within this ‘new’ movement; Pure Happenings, Staged Happenings, Kinetic 
Environments, and Staged Performances.
14 Carlson takes the observation that performance is “an essentially contested concept”  
from the 1990 survey article “Research in Interpretation and Performance Studies: 
Trends, Issues, Priorities” by Mary Strine, Beverly Long & Mary Hopkins. It is in turn a 
phrase taken from W.B.Gallie’s Philosophy and the Historical Understanding which 
indicates “Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recognition of 
rival uses of it [...] as not only logically possible and humanly ‘likely,’ but as of permanent 
potential critical value to one’s own use or interpretation of the concept in question” (qtd 
in Carlson p.1).
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at least one that goes beyond the ingredients of the performance event as: 
liveness, body, space, audience) is, in itself, an indication of a defining 
property. As an art form predicated on the live human body in an evolving 
interactive encounter, performance can be characterised by an instability 
equivalent to the flux of life itself and therefore will, almost by default, 
necessarily exceed its definitions. To borrow from Jacques Derrida’s 
comment on Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty; “the theater of cruelty is not 
a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable: 
Life is the nonrepresentable origin of representation” (Writing 234). It is 
performance’s immanence with life which makes its definition so 
problematic, as a cultural phenomenon it is virtually ‘unrepresentable’. 
Having considered a number of general definitions for the concept of 
performance I will turn my attention briefly to the notion of ‘multi-media’ and 
the separate distinction of ‘media’.
Multi-media defined
According to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘multi-media’ is defined as 
“Designating or pertaining to a form of artistic, educational or commercial 
communication in which more than one medium is used”(82). Raymond 
Williams’ Keywords gives an interesting insight into the origins of the word 
‘media’ or ‘medium’ as “the sense of an intervening or intermediate agency 
or substance”(203). According to Williams it was during the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries that the term ‘medium’ began to signify a more 
contemporary understanding of this word in reference to newspaper 
journals. The plural form - media - is cited as a mid twentieth century 
development following on from the emergence of broadcasting which leads 
to the concept of a mass media or ‘the media’ as we would now collectively 
name newspapers, magazines, television, radio, video, film and other 
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elements of the ‘communications’ industry.15  However the word ‘media’ in 
my use of the term multi-media does not directly reference the institution of 
‘the media’ but rather the image orientated technological machinery by 
which ‘the media’ originates its mass communication specifically video, film 
and photography. 
‘Multi-media’ implies a combination of different media in one event or 
object. It is similar to the fine art term ‘mixed-media’, meaning a work that 
has been made using a number of different materials.16  The more common 
hyphen-less construction ‘multimedia’ refers to a specific form of computer 
based processing where video, audio and written material are linked by a 
‘hypertext’ to create a multimedia document such as a CD-ROM or web 
page. I have used the hyphenated form of the word in this document to 
distinguish between the more general sense of multi-media as pertaining 
to different, or many media and the more specific ‘multimedia’ which refers 
particularly to a digital, computer originated language. The computer 
orientated multimedia industries or ‘new media’ of virtual reality, the 
internet, interactive film, computer games etc. do impinge on this study to 
the extent that our attitudes towards media in general are in part shaped by 
both old and new technology. As Kevin Robins states in Into the Image 
“Virtual culture should be seen as continuing the modern struggle against 
the limitations of the actual world”(14). However, for the reasons given 
above, as well as the fact that the technical origins of my own practice utilise 
the ‘old media’ of video, film and photography, it is these forms which will 
constitute the basis of my arguments and observations.
15 Williams goes on to refine his definition of media into three parts:
(i) the old general sense of an intervening or intermediate agency or 
substance; (ii) the conscious technical sense, as in the distinction 
between print and sound and vision as media; (iii) the specialist capitalist 
sense, in which a newspaper or broadcasting service - something that 
already exists or can be planned- is seen as a medium for something 
else such as advertising (203).
In his subsequent exploration of the concept of ‘mediation’ Williams provides an 
interesting reflection back onto the idea of media or mass media “where certain social 
agencies are seen as deliberately interposed between reality and social consciousness, 
to prevent an understanding of reality”(206). The use and effects of media in relation to 
the concepts of reality and consciousness is one of the key ideas behind this study and 
will be explored at greater length later on in this document.
16 The Dictionary of Twentieth Century Art makes a distinction between multi-media and 
mixed media: “The terms ‘composite media’, ‘intermedia’, and ‘multimedia’ have sometimes 
been used more of less synonymously with ‘mixed media’, but they are more usually 
applied to works in which different forms of art (rather than different materials) are 
combined, for example installations with Performance art or Video art” (398).
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1.4 A History - Its Problems
Before embarking on a history of multi-media performance the processes of 
historicising should be subject to a brief examination. As has been 
demonstrated by Csikszentmihalyi the importance of establishing a context 
for studies of creative practice cannot be over emphasised. Similarly Jochen 
Schulte-Sasse, in the foreword to Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant Garde, 
states:
A literary or philosophical analysis that does not reflect its ties 
to history and society remains arbitrary. Even if such an 
analysis were ‘correct’ (in some sense) or ‘true’ to its object, it 
would still be important to recognise that the objects under the  
microscope of analysis and this analysis itself develop 
historically (xxxv). 
Therefore, as directed by Schulte-Sasse, the researcher has also to be 
aware of his or her own position and articulation within the discourse of 
history and the means by which such discourses are constructed and 
maintained. The particular difficulty for a history of performance as an artistic 
practice is its lack of an object; that is an ‘art-object’ as it has been 
conceived of in more ‘traditional’ fine art practices and discourses - a 
single, whole, material ‘thing’, which exists autonomously, in Michael 
Fried's terms in a, “timeless condition[s]”(124). Much performance work 
arises as a direct challenge to this conception of the art object and, as Nick 
Kaye notes, various practitioners have worked to disrupt or “reconceive the 
‘object ‘ in art” (Postmodernism 23). This reframing of the art object by early 
performance artists introduced a ‘theatrical’ (Fried’s term) sensibility into an 
understanding of the object of art and acknowledged the object as ‘in 
process’, and constituted by a series of ‘relations’ between object, viewer 
and context, all of which govern its ‘event’. The object of performance is “one 
that, by definition necessarily includes the beholder” (Fried 125) and thus 
cannot be determined as a stable, closed or autonomous entity. The 
pioneer performance practitioner and founder of Ontological-Hysterical 
Theatre Richard Foreman writes “I do think that some sort of dissolving of 
the object - which is invariably dishonest in its need to convince, is 
desirable” (qtd in Kaye Postmodernism 54). A discussion of this ‘object in 
process’ or ‘dissolving object’ forms the basis of the latter part of this 
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chapter. Yet, a key issue at stake in relation to historicisation is the lack of a 
primary text in the sense of a single, complete, persistent object which is 
the performance art work, and in which historical observations can be 
grounded. This then places, as it does with ‘historical’ events themselves, 
an emphasis on secondary documentational texts and these become the 
objects from which a history is constructed. In this equation history and 
documentation are seen as interdependent.
Because the idea of the inherently unstable ‘dissolving object’ of 
performance necessarily conflicts with any notion of a single ‘definitive’ or 
‘accurate’ account of performance(s), I believe it is necessary for me to 
describe the means by which I have derived an ‘authority’ for my narrative. 
My history of multi-media performance is constructed from attending certain 
performance events, first and second-hand accounts of performances, 
‘official histories’, photographs, set plans and the occasional video. This 
reliance on forms of documentation (in the forms of written accounts, visual 
records etc.) raises practical technological problems. For example, prior to 
the advent of the Second World War only a limited number of multi-media 
performance events appear to have taken place in Europe. The lack of pre-
Second World War multi-media performance may not reflect an absence of 
work during the period 1920 to 1939, rather, it might be due to a lack of 
adequate documentation. That is, during the intervening years accounts 
have been either lost or, due to certain technical limitations, such as the 
speed and availability of film stock, documents of this early work just do not 
exist. It is hard to prove this absence, nevertheless, it does have 
implications for any history of performance work. Though there maybe no 
evidence for a particular work this does not mean to say that the work did 
not exist or, indeed, form part of the overall development of multi-media 
performance. Therefore, taking into account both the practical and 
theoretical limitations of the notion of a ‘history’ of multi-media performance, 
shadowing my whole historical account is the potential for an alternative 
history, consisting of undocumented and irretrievable performances - an 
invisible history full of infinite possibilities.
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A history of multi-media performance
Although the term ‘performance’, with reference to a specific art form, only 
emerged into current usage during the 1970s, it is possible to trace a 
history of this work which begins with the early modernist avant-gardes at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, most performance histories, taking 
their lead from Goldberg, trace approximately the same trajectory beginning 
with the Italian and Russian Futurists, moving through Dada, Bauhaus and 
Surrealism, disappearing with the Second World War and reappearing 
across the Atlantic in the American Happenings movement and later in the 
Conceptual Art experiments of the sixties and seventies. Carlson, however, 
broadens this conventional genealogy by looking further back in time. He 
cites mimes, jugglers, rope walkers, troubadours, minstrels, mountebanks, 
gleemen, dancers, posturers, tumblers, circuses, jesters, storytellers and 
monologuists as all precursors of modern day performance work. Quoting 
Goldberg, he justifies their inclusion as historical examples of “’a presence 
for the artist in society,’ a presence that can be variously ‘esoteric, 
shamanistic, instructive, provocative or entertaining’“(81).
Specifically, in relation to the development of multi-media performance, 
certain nineteenth century preoccupations can be identified. The first would 
be the notion of ‘gesamtkunstwerk’ attributed to Richard Wagner, and the 
second, appearing later on in this same period, is the Symbolists’ interest 
in synaesthesia - a confusion of the senses. Gesamtkunstwerk, translated 
as a “unified art work” (Warrack & West 276), proposes “that poetry, music 
and painting achieve their complete fulfilment and true significance only 
through being united in musical drama” (Sadie 122-123).17  According to E.T. 
Kirby in Total Theater this idea of the dramatic arts as the meeting place of 
separate art forms developed into the later twentieth century concept of ‘total 
theatre’, a notion expounded by many leading avant garde figures; Filippo 
Tommaso Marinetti, László Moholy-Nagy, Erwin Piscator, Walter Gropius 
and Antonin Artaud.18
17 Wagner wrote about his theory of Gesamtkunstwerk in Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft (The 
Artwork of the Future) and, according to Sadie, it is a concept “that claims to restore the 
idea of Greek tragedy”(123).
18 Kirby expresses this meeting as “a place of convergence of the arts as sensory 
modalities” (xxi).
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The Symbolists, directly influenced by Wagner, believed in a reciprocity 
between the senses and hence a ‘correspondence’ between the arts.19  
This led to a desire to create the ‘total artwork’, which manifested itself, with 
regard to theatre, in the theories of Stèphane Mallarmé and Adolphe Appia.20 
Kirby draws parallels between the Symbolists and the later Surrealist 
movement, united in the figure of Antonin Artaud and his ‘cruel theatre’ 
which purported to use “all the means of expression open to theatre”(34). 
However, prior to Artaud and the publication in 1938 of The Theatre and its 
Double it is possible to find other examples of a developing multi-media 
sensibility in the performing arts.
Pre war Europe
The Italian Futurists were enthusiastic about the cinema, finding in it an 
ideal form for the expression of movement and speed which preoccupied 
their aesthetic; “one runs, navigates, flies, takes voyage, lives intensely 
while resting comfortably in an armchair [...] it is necessary to add to theatre 
everything that is suggested by cinematography” stated Fortunato Depero in 
his 1916 Notes on the Theatre (Taylor 654-5). Prior to this, in their 1913 
Variety Theatre Manifesto, the Futurists proclaimed “The Variety Theatre is 
unique today in its use of the cinema, which enriches it with an incalculable 
number of visions and otherwise unrealisable spectacles” (M.Kirby Futurist 
179). Yet even though the new medium of cinema was enthusiastically 
espoused by the Italian Futurists, there is little evidence of any ‘cinematic’ 
performances. The only example of a multi-media Futurist performance I 
have traced is a presentation made by Valentine de Saint Point at the 
19 Symbolist poetry exploits this synaesthetic belief, for example the second verse of 
Baudelaire’s poem  “Correspondences” in Les Fleurs du Mal.
as the long echoes, shadowy, profound,
Heard from afar, blend in a unity,
Vast as the night, as sunlight’s clarity,
So perfumes, colours, sounds may correspond.
(The Flowers of Evil Trans. James McGowan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. p. 19).
20 Appia proposed solid stage sets that had a mathematical correspondence to musical 
forms, a means of lighting actors which revealed their object-like sculptural qualities and a 
style of performers movement which “would provide an integrated, plastic and visual 
equivalent to music”. Mallarme proposed a total artwork that used ‘emblematic’ rather than 
representational dance as a sort of “nonrepresentational form of drama” (Kirby xxii). 
However, as Kirby points out, in reality Symbolist theatre “was far from being a theatre of 
effect” and was predictably very much dominated by the spoken word as a literary form 
(xxiii).
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Comedie des Champs-Elysee in December 1913. Saint-Point performed a 
number of dances (Poems of Love, Poems of War, Poems of Atmosphere) 
in front of cloth screens onto which coloured lights were projected while 
mathematical equations where projected onto the walls. Descriptions of 
other pieces of performance which used film or photography to depict 
“battles, riots, horse races, automobile and airplane meets, trips, voyages, 
depths of the city, the countryside, oceans, and skies” (M.Kirby Futurist 179), 
as suggested in the Variety Theatre Manifesto, are not, however, to be 
found.
In 1933, Marinetti, the leading figure of the Italian Futurist movement, 
published his vision for a ‘Total Theatre’ which consisted of eleven small 
stages interspersed around the audience, a larger central stage and a 
circular perimeter stage. The audience would sit on revolving chairs and 
watch a combination of film, television, poems and paintings projected on to 
the curved walls of the theatre, while action took place on the stages around 
them.21  Unfortunately, like the other Futurist allusions to a multi-media 
theatre, the project was never apparently realised.
The Russian Futurists and Constructivists were conducting similar 
aesthetic experiments in the period of intense artistic activity that followed 
the Russian Revolution. The theatre was a key player in this invigorated 
cultural scene and particularly the type of theatre that wished to mix and 
integrate other forms. “In the early 1920s theatre showed a vigorous 
tendency to take over other aesthetic territories. The theatre was ‘music-
hallized’, ‘circusized’ and ‘cinematographized’” (91) states Konstantin 
Rudnitsky in Russian and Soviet Theatre 1905-1932: Tradition and the 
Avant Garde. Cabaret became the defining form for much post-revolution 
cultural activity, particularly in the Agit-Prop performances of Vladimir 
Mayakovsky and the Blue Blouse Group, a political theatre movement set up 
in 1923 which organised performances involving up to 100,000 people in 
city clubs through out the Soviet Union. Photography and film media played 
a role in these events. Mayakovsky, following on from his sloganeering 
poster work with ROSTA, the Russian Telegraph Agency, used projected 
title slides which were then illustrated by other static slide images at the 
21 This description is based on a report by Christiana J. Taylor in her book Futurism: 
Politics, Paintings and Performance p. 72. 
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beginning of his agit-theatre performances. The cabaret evenings of the 
Blue Blouse Group featured short films as well as acrobatics, dancers, 
gymnastics, skits and sketches. The influence of this revolutionary cabaret 
form is most noticeable in the early theatre work of Sergei Eisenstein who, 
perhaps because of his later work in the cinema, is sometimes associated 
with the use of film in theatre. Goldberg quotes Alexander Ostrovsky’s Diary 
of a Scoundrel staged by Eisenstein as utilising twenty five different 
‘attractions’ including film, clowns and sketches.22  However, it seems that 
this one show, which used a short film sequence of stunts titled Glumov’s 
Diary, is the only example of Eisenstein combining film with theatre and 
then only as a separate projected sequence at the end of the play. 
In his 1930 lecture “Reconstructions of Theatre” the revolutionary theatre 
artist Vsevolod Meyerhold stated that “using every technical means at its 
disposal (theatre) will work with films, so that scenes played by the actor on 
the stage can alternate with scenes he has played on screen” (qtd in 
Kostelanetz Theatre 24). Although I can find no evidence that Meyerhold 
realised this particular idea, he was clearly aware of the potential of 
projected film via his earlier use of slides in his theatre productions. In 1923 
he produced The Earth in Turmoil, designed by Liubov Popova, with a set 
that included a large central screen called a ‘machine - photo - placard’ 
showing slide photographs and slogans. This was followed in 1924 by D.E. 
(Give Us Europe) which used one central screen and two others on either 
side walls. The walls moved and slogans and intertitles were projected 
onto the screens in an attempt to compete with the dynamism of cinema.
In the same year as Meyerhold’s lecture, film was used in the play The First 
Cavalry Army by Alexander Diky. This play formed part of the contemporary 
Soviet documentary theatre movement. The director, Vsevolod Vishnevsky, 
used newsreel footage from the First World War, the February Revolution, 
the October Revolution and the Civil War to illustrate a soldier’s life in this 
“drama without a hero”.23  The inclusion of slide photographs became 
increasingly sophisticated and in Nikolai Pogodin’s My Friend, directed by 
Alexei Popov, giant ‘photo-placards’ designed by Ilya Shlepyanov were 
22 It seems that this work is rather confusingly referred to as Enough Stupidity in Every 
Wise Man in Konstantin Rudnitsky’s book.
23 This phrase is taken from Rudnitsky page 281.
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used. In this 1932 production large projection screens formed a spectacular 
backdrop illustrated by various aerial photographs of building construction 
sites superimposed by a faint picture of Lenin. 
According to RoseLee Goldberg, it was Germany that saw the first true 
integration of performance with film as early as 1922. In Berlin, Fredrick 
Kiesler, an artist not directly associated with any of the early avant gardes, 
produced a version of Karel Capek’s R.U.R (Ronsoms Universal Robots) at 
the Theater am Kurfurstendamm.24  Kiesler explained, “The R.U.R. play was 
my occasion to use for the first time in a theatre a motion picture instead of 
a painted backdrop” (Goldberg 115). The stage set included two screens, 
one of which received images of performers backstage reflected by mirrors, 
and the other, a circular screen revealed by a diaphragm, showed a film of 
the interior of an enormous factory full of workers. The film did not merely 
‘illustrate’ an environment but went further than that; the camera ‘walked’ 
into the factory and this ‘subjective’ view was intended to create the 
impression that the actors on stage were, like the camera, entering the 
factory.
Returning to the Surrealists, however, it is possible to find another example 
of early multi-media performance in Francis Picabia’s Relâche (1924), a 
ballet with music composed by Erik Satie. The piece included performances 
by Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp as well as films by René Clair. The work 
began with a prologue on film, and in the interval the audience were shown 
the film Entr’acte written by Picabia and shot by René Clair. The film ends 
with a coffin falling from a hearse and bursting open after which the cast on 
stage broke through the projection screen’s ‘End’ title to begin the second 
act. This action of stepping through the screen and onto the stage marks a 
significant moment as it is evidence of a momentary link between the 
screen and stage ‘worlds’. Until now the majority of the evidence seems to 
suggest that moving film images, with the exception of R.U.R, were most 
often used as a separate element within a live performance. The 
24 In a picture caption which accompanies a set illustration of Kiesler’s production 
Goldberg states that R.U.R was “the first time film and live performance were combined” 
(117). However, in order for Goldberg to make such a proclamation she must be making a 
distinction between work which specifically used film coterminously with performance and 
the earlier work of people, such as Eisenstein, who had used film and/or slides as a 
discrete element within a live event. 
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simultaneity of this ‘break through’ moment represents a different approach 
to the medium where the two elements of film and theatre are seen 
momentarily to coexist. This heterogeneity of performing elements was 
acknowledged by Ferdinand Léger who declared of the work, “The author, 
the dancer, the acrobat, the screen, the stage, all these means of 
‘presenting a performance’ are integrated and organised to achieve a total 
effect” (qtd in Goldberg 95).
It is interesting to note that the Bauhaus movement, another prewar 
modernist avant-garde that worked extensively with performance, seems to 
provide no known examples of film combined with live performance, and 
that this is despite its well known preoccupation with art and technology. 
Moholy-Nagy declared in his 1924 essay “Theatre, Circus, Variety” that, 
“Nothing stands in the way of making use of complex APPARATUS such as 
film, automobile, lift, aeroplane, and other machinery, as well as optical 
instruments, reflecting equipment, and so on” (qtd in Goldberg 116-7). In 
1927 Walter Gropius the ‘architect’ of the Bauhaus movement designed a 
‘Total Theatre’ for the director Erwin Piscator which again, like Marinetti’s, 
was never built. Piscator was an artist associated with another German 
avant-garde movement - Dada. Following on from his earlier contribution to 
Dada cabarets in Berlin, Piscator continued Kiessler’s example and 
combined film with theatre in a 1926 production of Sturmflut by Alfons 
Paquet. In this production the set was backed by a large screen with a black 
frame which opened and closed to form apertures of various sizes. Film 
from four projectors was back projected onto this screen. In 1928 Piscator 
directed The Good Soldier Schwejk by Jaroslav Hasek and it could be said 
that this work forms the apotheosis of prewar multi-media experimentation. 
The show is famous for its use of two conveyor belts which allowed the 
actors to be perpetually in motion, walking throughout the play, this effect 
was enhanced by the use of a filmed landscape back projection which filled 
the end wall of the theatre and moved behind the performers. The film used 
location shots of landscapes taken from life but also included animated 
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cartoons by George Grosz.25 
It is perhaps interesting to reflect for a moment on this catalogue of pre-
Second World War multi-media performances. What strikes me is the 
relative paucity of examples; with the exception of a handful of productions 
(R.U.R, Relâche, Sturmflut, Schwejk, The First Calvary Army) I have been 
unable to trace any other examples of work which simultaneously combine 
moving images with live stage action. This is particularly telling if one 
considers that by the early decades of the twentieth century photography 
was a well established medium and moving image film processes were 
becoming cheaper and more accessible. These facts, combined with art 
movements who professed to champion new forms over old, celebrated the 
liberating power of technology, and wrote a great deal about the use of filmic 
media in theatre make this poverty of examples all the more inexplicable. It 
could, of course, be accounted for, as previously observed, by an absence 
of documentation and it is worth noting that all the above examples I have 
traced were major productions which took place in established theatres and 
therefore remain relatively ‘visible’ in terms of documented events which go 
to make up a history of the avant-garde. This is in comparison with the less 
formalised performances of the cabaret scene held in the bars and clubs of 
prewar Europe.
This lack of prewar multi-media performance experimentation could, 
however, also be accounted for in a number of different ways. One could 
speculate that it is perhaps a reflection of the fact that film and photography 
were still not genuinely considered to be ‘artistic’ media and that therefore 
an inclusion of these more ‘popular’ forms, associated with news and 
entertainment, did not necessarily follow on from the avant-garde’s 
vehement antipathy towards past artistic traditions. The predominant 
deployment of media in prewar theatre/performance took place in the 
creation of a ‘context’, as misc-en-scene, and was mainly confined to 
25 This description is given in Huxley & Witts:
The grouping of the action could follow Hasek’s original closely, and the 
only problem left was how we could adequately stage Schwejk’s 
environment, which had a decisive effect on him. And as usual Piscator 
solved this question with film, but here with the difference that he had an 
animated cartoon made. At the beginning of every chapter where Hasek 
made direct general comments on his theme, Piscator projected cartoons, 
drawn by George Grosz (Gasbarra, Welt am Abend, January, 1928) 
(286).
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producing backdrops and stage settings, albeit moving ones. This use of 
film as ‘moving scenery’ indicates an uncomplicated understanding of the 
relationship between ‘reality’ and the photographic image, as the lens is 
used to facilitate the unproblematic transfer of images from the ‘outside 
world’ into the theatre. Therefore one could conclude that a sense of 
photography and film as a ‘reality creating’ rather than merely ‘reality 
reproducing’ artistic media was not perhaps established in the sensibilities 
of most prewar European artists (and by extension the population as a 
whole?). If this is indeed the case then the explosion in multi-media 
experimentation which followed the Second World War is not just an 
indication of an increasing technological sophistication, but also a more 
complex understanding of the operations of media products within culture at 
large. Post war artistic experimentation, particularly in America, is informed 
by and in turn forms part of, the increasing penetration of mediatized forms 
into everyday life, social and cultural. In much of this work media, in 
combination with other elements, becomes the ‘text’ of a performance and 
not just a scenic back projection. In this way postwar multi-media 
performance can be seen to play with an understanding of mediatized 
forms as a constituent force of ‘reality’, in a way unprecedented by earlier 
prewar work.
Post war America
America is often seen as the locus for performance work particularly by 
critics who are perhaps unaware of earlier European traditions. To some 
degree, however, this emphasis is justified as America has been the site of 
much innovative post war performance. The Untitled Event at Black 
Mountain College in 1952 is frequently cited as the reemergence of 
performance practice after the war and the origins of performance in the 
United States. The event featured the artists John Cage, Merce 
Cunningham and Robert Rauschenberg, all of whom went on to produce 
other American performance works, as well as their better known 
contributions in the fields of music, dance and painting respectively. Untitled 
Event used abstract coloured slides and film clips which were projected by 
Rauschenberg onto the ceiling and then moved down the walls while a 
variety of other actions took place at the same time, including the playing of 
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‘exotic’ instruments and a dog which chased Cunningham through the 
aisles between audience blocks. In this performance media does not play a 
‘supporting role’ to other, more dominant elements, but works in parallel 
with them. The casual and simultaneous use of media in this piece 
demonstrates an ease of integration which was to set the tone for the future 
works of the Happenings movement.
A leading member of the Bauhaus movement, Josef Abers, had moved to 
teach at Black Mountain College after the Bauhaus school in Dessau had 
been closed down by the Nazis in 1933. Abers was one of many artist exiles 
who had sought refuge in America from Europe’s oppressive war time 
regimes. Because of this migration some critics, such as the American, 
Douglas Davies, trace a direct line from the European prewar avant-gardes 
to the increase in artistic experimentation in post war America. Davies 
credits another Bauhaus exile, László Moholy-Nagy, as responsible for “the 
beginning of a long, fitful and inexorable rise in American artistic energy, 
much of it expressed through media generated by the new technology” (31). 
Despite this rather ‘Euro-centric’ and individualist interpretation of the 
history of recent American culture it would appear that, to some extent, the 
visions and manifestos of the prewar Europeans, including the dream of a 
‘total theatre’, were to be realised and elaborated on in post war America.
The work of the Happenings movement and its exponents, most notably 
Allan Kaprow, could be characterised by the frequent use of photographic 
and filmic media, often projected simultaneously with other actions and/or 
onto the bodies of performers. In Al Hansen’s Requiem for W.C. Fields Who 
Died of Acute Alcoholism (1960), Hansen recited a poem whilst film clips 
from W.C. Fields’ films were projected onto his shirt. Along with a 
proliferation in the possibilities of performance came a freeing of the 
boundaries of performance spaces, so works came to be staged in car 
parks, on ranches, in swimming pools, in people’s gardens and, in a 
strange inversion of the idea of multi-media performance, works were 
performed in cinemas on the narrow platforms in front of the cinema 
screen. Most notable of these is Robert Whitman’s 1965 production Prune 
Flat performed at the Filmmakers Cinematheque in New York. Prune Flat 
was originally subtitled a ‘film-stage event’ and Gene Youngblood refers to 
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Whitman’s work as ‘filmstage’. This performance used the film figures of 
two women projected directly onto the same two performers who were live 
on stage, the gestures and actions of the stage performers paralleled those 
on the film while other, larger images, formed a projected backdrop on the 
cinema screen which transposed the stage action. The high point of this 
synthesis between stage and film action came when one of the performers 
appeared to remove her clothes in sync with the projected film image but in 
actuality only the woman on celluloid had disrobed, however this created the 
illusion of nakedness on a fully clothed body. Kostelanetz observed of Prune 
Flat, “these strategies contribute to the pieces’ major theme, which is the 
difference between filmed images and live ones, or between kinetic activity 
and static information” (7). In its play between stage and film action this 
work signals a shift in the use of media to a more nuanced relationship with 
‘reality’ which provokes questions, as Kostelanetz notes, as to the 
differences “between filmed images and live ones”. In so doing Prune Flat 
begins to foreground issues which are at the root of much contemporary 
multi-media experimentation.
Another notable work from this period took place not in New York but in Ann 
Abor, Michigan. Unmarked Interchange was produced by the ONCE group 
on top of a car park and used a 26’ x 36’ projection screen to show the film 
Top Hat starring Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers. The spectacle was 
deliberately reminiscent of a drive in movie but with the vital addition of live 
performers. Built into the screen were a series of drawers, louvres and 
horizontal platform surfaces; using this stage set performers superimposed 
themselves on the film. The soundtrack for the piece included both the 
original sound from the film, mixed with the live sound from the 
performance.26  Unmarked Interchange signals another development in 
American performance in that media images and techniques are used not 
only as a formal device within a performance but become in themselves, as 
products of ‘the media’, a content for this work. Reminiscent of Al Hansen’s 
26 Gene Youngblood gives the following description of this piece in Expanded Cinema: 
while a couple dined by candlelight at a table in one corner of the screen, 
a man read into a microphone from the pornographic novel Story of O, at 
the opposite end of the projection space, periodically a girl walked across 
the catwalk in the centre of the screen and hurled custard pies in his face. 
In another opening a man played a piano. And over all of this Fred and 
Ginger danced their way through 1930’s Hollywood escapism (374).
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Requiem, media itself - in this instance Hollywood and its stars - become 
the new subjects for performance work. 
Artists in America had only just begun to explore the possibilities of film 
within a live setting when a new, more immediate and flexible imaging 
technology became available. Nam June Paik is the person most widely 
credited with introducing video into performance and art in general. 
However, prior to the possibility of recording electromagnetic signals on 
video tape and Paik’s infamous 1969 TV Bra for Living Sculpture with 
Charlotte Moorman, television had already entered the performance canon. 
The Nine Evenings series of performances which took place at the 69th 
Regiment Armoury in 1966 could be seen to be a pivotal moment in a 
history of multi-media performance. Most key practitioners of the day took 
part including Cage, Whitman, Rauschenberg, and Carolee Schneemann. 
Notably another participating artist, Oyvind Fahlstrom, declared “I think of it 
as initiation rites for a new medium, Total Theatre” (Davies 72). Nine 
Evenings was to be a celebration of ‘theatre and engineering’ and artists 
worked with specialised engineers in order to realise technologically 
complex performances. Two notable works emerged from these Evenings. 
Grass Field was a piece by Alex Hay in which Hay sat in front of a television 
camera which reproduced his face, live, on a giant screen behind him, 
across his body were electric pick up microphones which amplified his 
body sounds creating an involuntary sound track to accompany the piece. 
Robert Rauschenberg produced an even more technically demanding 
piece: Open Score involved 700 performers and much of the action took 
place in a darkened auditorium and was relayed to the audience via infra 
red cameras and television screens which surrounded the stage.27
As the sixties progressed into the seventies, television and video began to 
feature heavily in the work of American artists, particularly figures such as 
Vito Acconci, Les Levine and Adrian Piper. These works were often formally 
complex playing with the technologies’ ability to create loops and 
27 Open Score began with a tennis game by which each of the 48 lights illuminating the 
stage were turned off in turn as the ball hit the tennis rackets. Then, in darkness, the 700 
performers advanced across the stage speaking in muffled tones and once they had 
exited Rauschenberg appeared carrying Simone Whitman in a sack. He stopped in the 
light of a tiny spot centre stage and Whitman sang a song from within the sack which 
was, unsurprisingly, barely audible, they then both exited. 
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displacements in time and space particularly using live camera relays. An 
example of such work would be Dan Graham’s Present Continuous Past 
(1974) which used a mirror and a video relay with an eight second delay. 
The performers of the piece were the spectators themselves who watched 
their immediate actions reflected in the mirror but also transformed into 
past and future actions via delayed video imagery shown on surrounding 
monitors. Anne Wagner has written in her analysis of 1970’s performance 
and video work “Performance, Video and the Rhetoric of Presence” that; 
“What was performed in performance, what was observed in video, are the 
uncertainties that by 1970 or thereabouts had begun to accumulate around 
‘artist’ and ‘viewer’ as art’s two essential correlative terms”(60). The 
specular ‘feedback’ of the live video camera allowed an audience to 
become the ‘content’ of the performance art work, a position already 
encouraged by the reconfiguration and ‘theatricalisation’ of the art object by 
performance. This necessarily then reflects back on the position of the 
artist/maker in terms of the origins and site of meaning in a such a work. 
Wagner cites examples work of by Graham, Acconci, Joan Jonas, Lynda 
Benglis and Richard Serra in which the immediate presence of the 
performer and/or audience are displaced by their mediatized image. This 
leads Wagner to conclude that “Video and performance artists [...] do their 
utmost to invoke settings and artifacts and experiences that connate the 
problematic real of technologically mediated experience”(75-76). Therefore, 
in the light of Wagner, one could propose that by the 1970s American multi-
media experimentation had extended its inquiry from the difference between 
live performer and film image to include an interrogation of the audience 
itself as a live mediatized entity. Such multi-media work demonstrates a 
preoccupation with the possibilities of its self-reflecting form and the 
implications of this in terms of the ‘site’ of meaning for such work.  
Post war Europe
European performance practice had not completely ceased with the Second 
World War; alongside the American Happenings movement similar 
experiments were occurring in Europe as demonstrated by the actions of 
the Situationists and other Conceptual Art movements. Examples of 
European multi-media performance work, although harder to trace, have 
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been characterised by Günter Berghaus as distinct from the Americans in 
that “the affirmative attitude towards the artifacts of modern mass media that 
can be found among so many of the America artists was rarely shared by 
their European counterparts”(372). This view concurs with Douglas Davies’ 
observations on the subject; “The situation in Europe between the end of 
the war and 1965 was vastly different from that in the United States. The rate 
of progress toward a symbiotic mixture of art with technology was faster, as 
well as more self conscious”(52). If, by more self conscious, Douglas 
means to say that this work took an ideological position with regard to its 
materials and the culture they represented that, again, concurs with 
Berghaus, who notes that “Happenings and Pop Art in Europe contained a 
conscious sociopolitical critique of affluent consumer society as it had 
developed after the war”(372). On examination it does seem that much of 
the American work was aimed at presenting a multisensory spectacle to the 
point of sensory overload (something which Paik felt characterised 
American culture). In this way, the work could be said to have created 
something almost celebratory in its effect and self-reflective in its purpose, 
ultimately bound up with its own form. Oldenburg talked of his affection “for 
all these radiant commercial objects in my immediate surroundings” 
(Davies 39) and Jim Dine stated “Well if it’s art, who cares if it’s a comment 
[...] I’m involved with formal elements” (qtd in Berghaus 311). The European 
approach seems to have been more detached and at times took a distinctly 
critical position with regard to its media elements.
As early as 1959 Wulf Vostell had been working with the medium of 
television. He proposed a series of artistic events for television called TV-
Dé-coll/age Events and Actions For Millions. These consisted of a number 
of images that encouraged the viewer to interact with their television “e.g., 
kiss the person on the TV screen; sit in front of the TV and brush your teeth; 
press your belly up against the monitor; drink a can of Coca Cola, but think 
of the adverts of Pepsi Cola” (Berghaus 325). Unfortunately the proposal 
was never broadcast but it was turned into a later Happening. Vostell wrote 
of this work; ”The viewer who submits to the events or acts against them 
experiences the absurdity and the dubious quality of mass manipulation 
through the means of communication.[...] The absurd and critical game 
ought to produce consciousness of these facts” (qtd in Berghaus 325/6). In 
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1963 Vostell made No-Nine dé-coll/ages which took place over 9 sites in 
the city of Wuppertal, West Germany. The Happening began in a cinema 
where Vostell showed Sun in Your Head, a film made from ‘décollaged’ (a 
fragmented collage) of television programmes, in front of which Vostell 
performed mundane tasks such as brushing his teeth, vacuuming, leafing 
through a book. The audience were then moved, on buses, to a number of 
different sites including a quarry where a television played a popular quiz 
show which Vostell electronically ‘jammed’ altering the picture quality before 
blowing up the television. In America in 1964 he presented You a 
décollage/Happening. Apart from a large amount of animal bones and 
innards, this Happening also included three television sets placed on 
hospital beds all showing distorted pictures of the same baseball game 
with the instructions “Allow yourself to be tied to the beds where the T.V.s 
are playing....Free yourself....Put on a gas mask when the T.V. burns and try 
to be as friendly as possible to everyone” (qtd in Goldberg 133). Vostell, 
through this process of décollage, was attempting to demystify 
communications media in order to demonstrate that it could be a 
phenomenon which could be controlled and acted upon by the individual. To 
this end he built the Technological Happening Room in 1966; this room 
was full of items from the communications industry: T.V.s, film projectors, 
video recorders, telephones, Xerox machines, record players, epidiascopes 
and computers, all of which were operated from a central control box. As 
viewers entered the room, one at a time, their images and actions were 
recorded and immediately played back, “Sender and receiver of the 
information merged; (passive) watching of images turned into (active) 
producing of images” (Berghaus 326). In this way it is possible to see 
parallels between this work and the 1970s video relay work of American 
artists mentioned above.
The Theatre of Images
The performance experiments which took place in Europe and America in 
the sixties and seventies began to have an effect on more theatre-based 
practices. ‘The Theatre of Images’, as pioneered by directors such as 
Robert Wilson, Richard Foreman and Lee Breuer, is often also referred to 
as multimedia theatre, visual theatre or intermedia. Although these directors 
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staged large-scale visually spectacular work, it is difficult to find many 
examples of projects that actually featured mediatized images to create this 
effect. The same, however, cannot be said of Laurie Anderson who is the 
artist who is perhaps most famously associated with multi-media work due 
to her eight hour performance ‘portrait’ of a country - United States (1980). 
This work produced the popular music best seller O Superman and used 
film and slide projection, including images taken from television screens, 
alongside music, songs, performance and autobiographical stories from 
Anderson’s life and observations.
Another American company, the Wooster Group, can be noted for their 
sophisticated incorporation of media into performance. Beginning in 1978, 
according to Kaye, “the Wooster Group have combined excerpts from plays 
with images, actions, film and sound drawn from a variety of sources to 
produce often disruptive and alarming performance collages” 
(Postmodernism 11). Route 1 & 9 (The Last Act) (1981) used a 
reconstruction of an Encyclopaedia Britannica ‘teaching film’ to introduce 
the Thornton Wilder play Our Town which formed the basis of an 
examination of the racism implicit within the text and broader society. I saw 
the Wooster Group’s 1991 production of Brace Up, at The Riverside Studios 
in London. This reinterpretation of Anton Chekhov’s Three Sisters, used live 
and prerecorded video in a subtle and sophisticated mix. Parts of the text 
were delivered via cameras and monitors, and at times it was difficult to 
distinguish between a live or a recorded section as the stage action so 
carefully matched the television picture. The monitors could also track up 
and downstage performing a physical zoom in to close up, and bring the 
picture closer to the audience for particularly significant moments. The 
whole piece was fast-paced with live, mediatized and recorded performance 
intricately woven together.
Outside of America visually orientated theatre was named Nuova 
Spettacolarita (in Italy) or Media Theatre. In Italy the company Falso 
Movimento formed in 1977 and were intent on “turning the stage itself into a 
screen” (Goldberg 198). Their work was full of media references, using 
filmic references for stage imagery as well as using actual film clips from 
films such as Casablanca in their production of Otello (1982) and Gene 
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Kelly’s On the Town in Tango Glaciale (1982). Another leading exponent of 
this type of theatre, whose work I have also seen, is the Canadian Robert 
Lepage, but rather than working with existing film material Lepage directs 
his own. Lepage has toured extensively with his technically complex, media 
rich, brand of theatre. Needles and Opium (1991), one of his earliest works, 
blended film, slides, video and even an overhead projector with a solo 
monologue. So infused was this piece of theatre with media that there was 
barely a moment in which the performance occurred without some form of 
visual accompaniment. His later two part The Seven Streams of the River 
Ota (1994/96) blurred multiple time frames with distinct media sequences 
including a live/prerecorded video sequence in an onstage photo booth, film 
and video material and a low key acting style imported directly from film and 
television.28  There is something spectacular in Lepage’s manipulation of 
media and theatrical elements which verges on the magical, particularly 
when moments of the live blur indistinctly with the recorded. When watching 
Lepage’s work, part of its effect is derived from the technical ’trickery’ of his 
performances and in this way I find the experience similar to my enjoyment 
of the Wooster Group. Together these artists’ productions combine media 
with performance to create a unity of effect to the extent that no separation 
between its constituent elements can be perceived. 
Multi-media Britain
Yet Britain's representation in my history of multi-media performance is 
minimal. Davies notes that Britain “had not participated fully in the esthetic 
revolution launched during the prewar” (59) and “British art lagged behind 
the continent in terms of its interest in new media and processes” (62). 
Davies, following Nikolaus Pevsner, attributes this lack of aesthetic and 
technological experimentation to the legacy of William Morris in British 
culture. Davies quotes Morris at the beginning of his book Art and the 
Future; “As a condition of life production by machinery is evil” (17). Indeed 
the ‘populist’ circus and carnival based performance/theatre work by 
companies such as The People Show and Welfare State in the sixties and 
seventies seems to be infused with Morris’ sentiments; “what is the use of 
28 This production was shown in Britain in two stages: Part One was shown at the 
Edinburgh Festival in 1994 and the complete two part version was played at The Royal 
National Theatre, London, in 1996.
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making art unless everyone can share it” (qtd in Davies 59). And, despite 
the strength of the Pop Art movement in Britain, this interest did not really 
extend to the use of media in performance and “confined itself largely to 
pigment and canvas” (Davies 62). However the artist Mark Boyle “developed 
a special brand of experiential art, recorded and transformed through 
contemporary media” (Davies 65) by producing images of micro-organisms 
on video tape, slides and film. These images were then projected with 
dance and music events, and in 1969, accompanied Soft Machine at the ICA 
in London in a show titled Journey to the Surface of the Earth. It seems 
something of an anomaly that a performance movement engaged with the 
’popular’ aesthetics of carnival and pop music did not interact more with the 
equally ‘popular’ mediums of television, film or video. Perhaps uniquely in 
Britain, as well as the shadow of Morris, media, and television in particular, 
was seen as an institution of the state and therefore not a potential tool for 
radical and experimental art work. However this distrust of media 
technology is certainly no longer a feature of British performance work which 
has experienced a burgeoning of multi-media experimentation in the past 
two decades, accompanied by and developing alongside a dynamic Video 
Art scene.
I am able to make these observations based on my own experiences of 
seeing and working with multi-media performance events which began with 
watching the work of Hidden Grin theatre company and their 1987 
production Suburbs of Hell at the Arnolfini in Bristol. Forkbeard Fantasy, a 
company lead by ‘The Brittonioni Brothers’ manages to combine the surreal 
aesthetics of Britain’s ‘alternative theatre’ such as puppetry and mechanical 
sets, with projected film blurring stage and film ‘worlds’ to great comic 
effect, in work which they describe as “crossing the Celluloid Divide”.29  
Forced Entertainment Theatre Cooperative have incorporated televisual 
elements into some of their productions such as their use of ‘tv angels’ in 
200% and Bloody Thirsty (1987). The director Pete Brooks who originally 
made work with Impact Theatre has also produced a number of works with 
his company Insomniac, including Clair de Luz, (1994) a play set in a 
cinema featuring film and sound work by Towering Inferno. More recently 
29 This quote is taken from documentation provided by the British Council web 
site:http://www.britishcouncil.org/arts/theatredance/companies/theatre4_009.html
11/8/00
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Blast Theory have extended multi-media performance experimentation into 
three dimensional VR space in their production Desert Storm.
At the present time the distinction between performance (theatre, live art, 
performance art) and multi-media performance appears to have become 
almost redundant. In the Arnolfini’s 1998 autumn/winter season, for 
example, three out of five companies describe themselves as multi-media. I 
also produced work for this season in collaboration with the company 
Bodies in Flight, and we were the third company in sequence to use video in 
our performance. The use of media is now so prevalent in performance that 
its integration need no longer be a point of remark or discussion, in much 
the same way that media in general has become immanent within everyday 
life. However, it is precisely because of this incorporation of media into all 
aspects of western society and culture that a deconstruction of multi-media 
performance as an art form is urgently required. To echo Schieffelin’s 
sentiments, it is through an examination of performance that it is possible to 
determine “the way that cultures actively construct their realities” (199-200) 
therefore a study of the specific form of multi-media performance may be 
able to deduce the role media plays in this construction.
Reviewing my history
Upon reviewing this history of multi-media performance I am able to 
establish a number of preoccupations which are resonant within my own 
practice and the interests of this study. Beginning with Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk and developing throughout the twentieth century there 
seems to be an interest in the mixing or merging of art forms. 
Accompanying this flourishing interest in interdisciplinarity is the 
synaesthetic understanding of the ‘reciprocity of the senses’. Therefore, just 
as it was it no longer possible, or indeed desirable, to maintain a 
separation between art mediums, this notion of integration extended into a 
cognition of the very receptors of art work - the senses themselves. 
In terms of the specific medium of film, it was the Italian Futurists who first 
seem to have been alive to the possibilities that this form presented for 
theatre, identifying in film something that could ‘describe’ the ‘modern 
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experience’; “we are convinced that mechanically, by force of brevity, we can 
achieve an entirely new theatre perfectly in tune with our swift laconic 
Futurist sensibilities” (qtd in Taylor 47). Perhaps these “swift laconic 
sensibilities” were formed by (and in turn informed) changes to a western 
experience of time and space determined, in part, by technological changes 
that had begun at the latter part of the nineteenth century. This is certainly 
Stephen Kern’s thesis in The Culture of Time and Space. For Kern 
simultaneity is a defining condition of modernity and one created by the 
‘new’ electronic communications industries. Though interdisciplinary, some 
early multi-media work seems not to have embraced this additional sense 
of simultaneity, Eisenstein’s ‘attractions’ or Relâche, for example, maintain 
a separation of their performing elements, however, other works projected 
film and/or slides concurrently with live stage action.
The combined effect of simultaneity and interdisciplinarity was an inevitable 
fracturing and collapsing of sensory experiences, particularly that of vision, 
across the space of the performance. The presentation of an excess of 
visual and performative practices can be seen at work in the anarchic 
seratas and cabaret evenings of the Futurists and Dadaists. In addition, 
various prewar accounts of ‘total theatres’ describe numerous screens and 
stage platforms simultaneously active within a larger performance space. 
This proliferation of visual and performative information within one 
performance event provokes a reconfiguration of ideas and assumptions 
concerning spectatorial positioning. In these events not only was there ‘too 
much to see’, but no one version or viewing position could claim superiority 
or authority over another. In this way multi-media performance had 
abandoned a single authorial or spectatorial perspective and it is this idea 
that can be identified most readily in post war American and European work. 
In these performances not only was a multiplicity of expressive information 
projected and performed across multifarious spaces and surfaces, these 
spaces and surfaces themselves were in flux, either transferred out from 
conventional ‘theatre’ spaces or, more literally, moving within the 
performance event itself.
As ‘the media’ expanded in terms of discourses, sites, power and influence 
across western society, the texts and conventions of these industries 
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inevitably become the subjects of an art form concerned with the 
examination of society; hence the use of televisual or filmic rhetoric or 
actually material extracts in multi-media performance events. In contrast to 
film processes, the technological apparatus of television and video provided 
the ability to produce an instantaneous image from a lens and this live 
camera relay was used, often in direct combination with the human body. 
The body seems to become a major site of exploration and interrogation in 
much art work of the latter half of the twentieth century and the body as a 
sign of instability and process becomes the prime ‘material’ in performance 
work. In combination with the electronic lens much 60s and 70s multi-
media performance implicitly or explicitly questioned the ontology and 
constitution of the body, its relationships and behaviours. To this end later 
work exhibits a blurring of the difference(s) between the live body and the 
mediatized or recorded body. The live camera relay also provided a visual 
metaphor for a changing understanding of the role of an audience with 
regard to an art work - able to transform an audience into the subjects or 
performers of a piece, the viewer becomes literally central within the 
construction of the work. Meanwhile other, more theatre-based multi-media 
performance practices, create a sense of the visually spectacular and/or 
‘magical’ and humorous through their work.
Many of the above observations made in relation to multi-media 
performance; interdisciplinarity, simultaneity, multiple perspective, body 
orientated, viewer foregrounding, visual spectacle have also been the 
concerns of other twentieth century artistic experimentation. I have chosen to 
emphasise these particular elements because they are also aspects of my 
own practice and history. Much of my early multi-media performance, 
although it was constructed in ignorance of the ‘history’ of multi-media work, 
resembles elements found in the descriptions of that history. In 
collaboration with other artists I used multiple screens, some of which 
moved, and a combination of film, video and slide material in live events 
often on a ‘spectacular’ scale. The media consisted of a collage of many 
different types of material; abstract images, found footage, specially 
constructed films and videos, classic film material, parodies of film and 
television forms, actual television programmes. This material was 
performed with and/or shown as discreet elements within a performance. 
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More recently, and coinciding with the focus of this study, I have developed 
an interest in the body as a subject and started to use self-built live 
cameras in my performance work. I have also expanded a practice as a 
solo video and installation artist and this work, which often pivots around the 
activity and ‘performance’ of an audience, is informed and influenced by my 
understanding and practice of live performance. Having established a 
context and ground for my own work I would now like to return to the 
particular question of documentation and the issues it raises for a study of 
performance.
1.5 The Trouble with Documents
in contrast to traditional art performances do not contain a 
reproduction element [...]. Whatever survives of a performance 
in the form of a photograph or videotape is no more than a 
fragmentary, petrified vestige of a lively process that took place 
at a different time in a different place (Herbert Molderings).30 
The preceding history exposes a difficulty in relation to the act of 
historicising performance, and echoing Foreman, I have named this 
difficulty the problem of the ‘dissolving object’. Performance does not 
produce a definitive object. As a consequence of this apparent lack there is 
no primary source, or original object, in which to ground an historical 
account of performance work. The discourses of painting, sculpture and 
even traditional theatre (as literary art) all maintain a form of integrity with 
their histories via their original objects which persist and continue to be a 
presence in the present day. Yet a history of performance has no such 
contingent, it has no one decisive object which remains to inform such a 
history, only disparate material traces and individual memories.31  Therefore, 
within this equation, documentation takes on new and important 
dimensions, replacing the absent primary text. In this cultural constellation 
documentation equals a visibility within the discourse of history.
30 Quoted in Auslander, Liveness p 41.
31 I use the word contingent in the sense of a touch or a close connection in the same 
way that Roland Barthes uses it in Camera Lucida to describe the photograph’s 
relationship to the object it depicts: “the sovereign Contingency...in short what Lacan calls 
the Tuché” (4).
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If performance is to have any presence within a history of culture it is 
necessary for it to be subject to forms of documentation. However this 
raises a spectre which haunts much performance debate; the impossibility 
of effectively translating a live form, constructed in contradiction to ‘the 
object’, into a document. Herbert Molderings’ above comment neatly sums 
up this problematic position. Elsewhere other commentators have noted the 
impossibility of capturing the live. Carlson refers to the performance text as 
a “text without trace” (qtd in Melzer 2:259) and Annabelle Melzer herself 
states; “The performance text leaves no replicable artifact for analysis” 
(1:148). However, it is Peggy Phelan’s assertion in Unmarked which is 
perhaps most poignant in relation to this impasse;
Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot 
be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in 
the circulation of representations of representations; once it 
does so it becomes something other than performance” 
(146).32  
It seems that the quality of ‘liveness’, which is deemed to be the defining 
nature of any performance event, is exactly what cannot be reproduced in 
any form of documentation.
It is possible to construct a schema which contrasts various characteristics 
of ‘liveness’ as opposed to those displayed by recorded forms. Patrice 
Pavis has drawn up just such a comprehensive table in Theatre at the 
Crossroads of Culture in which he makes comparisons between the forms 
of Theatre, Radio, Cinema, Television and Video.33  My own table outlined 
below represents a more general comparison between the live and 
recorded as a series of dialectical oppositions.
32 All quotations from Peggy Phelan in this thesis come from her work Unmarked.
33 The table can be found on pp.104-5 of Pavis’ book.
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Table 1. Temporal and Spatial Oppositions as Figured by Live and Recorded Forms
LIVE
Immediate    Continuous Space     Actual    Subjective  Changing     Unique       Temporary 
Distanced    Space Fragmented  Realistic Objective      Fixed     Repeatable  Permanent
RECORDED
This table is constructed from observations made while working with and 
documenting performance and a number of these binary oppositions will 
become the focus of my later case study chapters. When confronted with 
the practicalities of representing a performance work on, for example, video, 
a number of these oppositions become very real. While documenting the 
work Constants II I was struck by the impossibility of representing 
simultaneity within a linear form such as video. Principally, the difficulty 
occurred in showing actions that took place simultaneously in two different 
places within the same performance space. There seemed to be no 
satisfactory equivalent for such coexistence within the language of the 
screen. Film and video information is presented sequentially via montage; a 
hard cut indicates consecutive actions while a dissolve or wipe transition 
implies a larger separation in time between the events depicted. One way I 
could overcome this segmentation of time was by superimposing one 
picture over another to show two events as having coexisted.
Vid. 1. Constants II - Camera Dance
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This proved to be visually effective but created a new image which 
presented a confusion of two spaces that had not originally taken place in 
the performance. It was also a strategy with limitations. Had I wanted to 
include other actions that took place concurrently (as had indeed occurred 
in the performance) the picture plane became cluttered and all the images 
became unreadable. Whilst this layering provided a form of equivalence it 
was at best a partial solution to what proves to be an intractable difference 
between performance and recording forms.34
Time and space
The dichotomy between recorded mediatized forms and performance 
originates in the different relationships these two phenomena have with 
time and space, as illustrated by the contrasting temporal and spatial 
elements presented in Table 1. Performance practice, indeed its ‘ontology’ 
as Phelan suggests, is predicated on a singular, momentary and therefore 
unique existence in time and space. This contrasts fundamentally with the 
function and purpose of a record, designed to persist, ideally unchanged, 
through temporal and spatial dimensions.
Concerning time, as a live event, performance can only exist in the present 
moment. This is unlike the event depicted in a document which has always 
already occurred, it is of the past and can only reoccur in the present. 
Subsequently, time in a record can be subject to the ‘external’ 
manipulations and adjustments of editing and omission, controls which are 
not possible in time as experienced in the living present. In parallel with the 
realm of its production, similar relations with time exist in the realm of 
reception. A performance can only be watched once in a specific time and 
space and, furthermore, the time, in terms of the occasion of this 
performance is determined by its producers, the performers. (The same 
performance might be repeated over a number of nights, however, it will 
never be exactly the same in the way that a film would be, for instance). 
34 It is interesting to note that a convention for presenting concurrent action occurring in 
two different places does exist within film rhetoric, this is the device of the split screen, 
commonly seen used to present two characters who are in conversation with one another 
over the telephone.
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Conversely, a record has been constructed for ease of consumption, and it 
maybe experienced any number of times often in a variety of different 
places. It has a general, reproductive relationship with time and the time of 
its reception (occasion) is usually determined by the viewer.
The differences in relation to time between performance and records are 
inevitably intertwined with differences in space. These could be examined 
as a series of contrasts between ‘stage’ space (not necessarily a literal 
stage but any space in which a performance takes place) and in the terms 
of visual records, ‘screen’ space. The space presented on a screen is a 
fragmentary one, it has been delineated by a camera and positioned in time 
and in relation to its other spaces by an editor. The space of a performance 
is continuous; although a spectator’s view might be restricted by limitations 
in vision and position, this is not the same as the a priori selection and 
restriction that a camera delivers - the space is still experienced as a whole. 
The camera, as the instrument of recorded media and the messenger for 
the screen, also obliges an audience to remain remote. This effect might 
seem paradoxical in certain film and television genres which presume to 
transport a viewer into the presence of the event represented, but this 
metaphysical transport is very different from the actual bodily immediacy of 
a performance event which normally occurs in a space shared by both 
performers and audience. Moreover, like time, the space of the visual record 
has already been determined by the camera lens and editorial 
juxtapositions. Although a performance may have been rehearsed, planned 
and practised it still remains fundamentally undetermined in that at any 
moment during a performance change or difference could occur. These 
sentiments are exemplified by Allan Kaprow:
The dividing line between art and life should remain as fluid 
and indistinct as possible and time and space should remain 
variable and discontinuous so that, by continuing to be open 
phenomena capable of giving way to change and the 
unexpected, performances take place only once (qtd in Feral 
175-176). 
A performance bears the potential for difference and this is not possible in a 
recorded document.
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The document object
One could conclude, therefore, that the record, or document, operates in 
contradiction to a perception of time and space as framed by performance; 
that is time and space as singular and unrecoverable. The document 
undermines this privileging of the present and therefore the potency of 
performance and its potential efficacy. This then begs the question: what 
can a performance document hope to represent? The performance now 
seen on the documenting video has become reproducible, accessible, 
multiple, severed from a particular time and space and these are all 
elements which are at odds with the performance in its original 
manifestation. They are also elements which confer on the performance a 
type of objecthood, the performance as represented is no longer confined to 
a particular time and space and appears to reoccur in the time of the 
present. As Josette Feral observers in “Performance and Theatricality”; 
“Indeed, it is interesting to note that every performance ultimately meets the 
video screen [...]. There, performance once again encounters 
representation, from which it wanted to escape at all costs and which 
marks both its fulfilment and its end”(173). This is the trouble with 
documents, as Kaye writes in “Live Art: Definition and Documentation” 
performance “arises as a challenge to the ‘object’ in art and documentation 
can reestablish these stabilities and terms” (90). To present a ‘true’ record 
of a performance one would have to produce a document that did not have a 
stable, reproductive relationship with time and space and this is clearly in 
contradiction to the nature and purpose of a record. In the face of this 
temporal and spatial paradox the logical option would be to admit that 
performance operates beyond the realms of a record and visa versa. 
However Feral notes: 
the theatrical experience is bound always to escape any 
attempt to give an accurate account of it. Faced with this 
problem [...] performance has given itself its own memory. 
With the help of the video camera with which every 
performance ends, it has provided itself with a past (175) 
and it is this, above all, that the performance document represents - the 
performance as past. 
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Ulay/Abramovic
Interestingly it was exactly this documentational dilemma that was staged 
(perhaps unintentionally) by the 1998 Ulay/Abramovic exhibition at the 
Tramway in Glasgow. This exhibition consisted entirely of film and video 
documentation of performance work made between 1976-1988 by the 
artists Ulay and Marina Abramovic. Much of this work was extremely 
physical; for example in Expansion in Space the artists repeatedly walked 
into giant pillars moving the structures further apart with the force of the 
blows from their naked bodies; in Light/Dark they knelt opposite one 
another and slapped each others faces repeatedly; for Rest Energy Ulay 
and Abramovic held a bow under tension between them - the arrow inches 
from Abramovic’s heart. Most of the work represented in the exhibition 
created its intensity via the repeated, often painful subjections of the 
performers’ bodies. Because, however, the exhibition was staged from 
moving image records it constructed particular relations between the work 
and the spectator. One could move away, watch another recording of a 
different event, then return to watch the same moment or a different one. In 
this way a spectator did not experience a single piece of performance 
accumulating in one time and space. When watching the documented 
version of the work time and space could be fractured, interrupted and 
returned to in ways that would have been impossible in the original live 
performances. Subsequently the audience was never obliged to experience 
a concentration of this stark, often brutal physicality other than by a partial 
viewing of it. In the recorded document, we only see the blows against the 
body, we do not experience them in the way we would if they accrued, 
repeatedly, in front of us or rather, with us. Therefore the performances 
represented in this exhibition could be seen as equivalent to a series of 
specimens in a jars, available and on display but isolated and made 
remote by their protective glass screens. Furthermore, an exhibition 
constructed around documentation of this type of ‘body performance’ 
seems to be fundamentally at odds with the meaning of the original work. 
Ulay and Abramovic’s performances foreground the body, a body which is 
inseparable from its manifestation within living, present time and space. It 
is this encounter of flesh persisting through time and space which defines 
what it is to be a body and the sharing of this manifestation by an audience 
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creates the ‘content’ for this type of performance. The record severs this 
connection with immediate time and space and represents bodies locked 
in a cycle of inhuman repetition which occurs irrespective of its witnesses. 
The meaning of the work - the living body - can still be perceived but it is 
depicted at a distance and thus the implications for the bodies of the 
audience dissipate. The recorded performances retain echoes of what had 
once made them powerful but are also rendered impotent by their re-
presentation. This re-presentation shifts the emphasis of the original 
spectacle from all bodies to the two bodies displayed in the record; in this 
sense the exhibition transfigures the meaning of the work from what it is to 
be embodied, to the act of watching another's embodiment.
1.6 The Live/Mediatized Dilemma
the notion of the live is premised on the absence of recording 
and the defining fact of the recorded is the absence of the live 
(Steve Wurtzler).35 
Any discussion of the issues concerning documentation and performance 
clearly foregrounds differences between the two forms of expression. 
These differences extend into wider debates respecting comparisons 
between live and mediatized forms. These debates are premised around 
the singular existence of performance in relation to the reproductive nature 
of a mediatized document or recording.36  The live/mediatized discussion 
has become principally polarised between two theorists, Peggy Phelan and 
Philip Auslander, where Auslander has developed an argument in 
response to Phelan's analysis in Unmarked.
Phelan’s position identifies performance as constructed in opposition to the  
logics of reproduction, “Performance in a strict ontological sense is 
35  Quoted in Auslander Liveness p. 3.
36 It should be emphasised that throughout this section the mediatized is assume to be a 
recorded product. Later, in chapter two an important argument will be made for the 
contribution of live camera images as used in performance. These live mediatized images 
are ‘screen performances’ and could be seen to form an interstitial moment between the 
poles of the live and the recorded. 
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nonreproduction”(148).37  These logics, as exemplified by mediatized 
culture, are symptomatic of capitalism itself; “The production and 
reproduction of visibility are part of the labor of the reproduction of 
capitalism”(11) and performance’s rejection of reproduction “clogs the 
smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the 
circulation of capital”(148). Thereby Phelan creates an opposition between 
performance and capital, however, her argument takes performance 
beyond economic theory;
Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot 
be saved, recorded, documented or otherwise participate in 
the circulation of representations of representations: once it 
does so, it becomes something other than performance. To 
the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of 
reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own 
ontology. Performance’s being [...] becomes itself through 
disappearance (146).
Disappearance is seen as the fundamental quality of performance which in 
turn allows the form to possess a certain powerful radicalism. “Without a 
copy, live performance plunges into visibility - in a maniacally charged 
present - and disappears into memory, into a realm of invisibility and the 
unconscious where it evades regulation and control” and it is this ontology 
of performance which allows performance ”its distinctive oppositional edge” 
(148). 
Phelan’s argument utilises linguistic and psychoanalytical theories, 
particularly those of Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, to explain how, in  
patriarchal culture, the feminine is always inscribed through the masculine, 
and thus female subjects remain ‘unmarked’ or invisible. Performance’s 
potential lies in its ability to expose this process of erasure by privileging the 
invisible or disappeared. Therefore “Performance is the attempt to value 
that which is nonreproductive,[...]. The promise evoked by this performance 
then is to learn to value what is lost, to learn not the meaning but the value 
37 Phelan’s specific chapter heading is “The Ontology of Performance: Representation 
without Reproduction”, Unmarked pp 146-166.
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of what cannot be reproduced or seen (again)”(152).38  This idea has 
significance not only in terms of seeing ‘the female’ within culture but also 
with regard to ‘seeing’ and notions of ‘the self’, as it emphasises the 
“political dimension of the encounter between the self and the other”(11). 
“Performance uses the performer’s body to pose a question about the 
inability to secure the relation between subjectivity and the body per se” 
(150-151). Like the invisible female, the self is seen as ultimately lost and 
“in that disappearance we are made to feel again the grief of our own 
essential absence from our deepest selves”(35). The ‘disappearance’ of 
performance is constructed as an equivalent to the nature of subjectivity. 
This self-absence becomes important in our relations with others as it is an 
acknowledgement of this lack which can construct a different 
(intersubjective) relationship between self (looker) and other (image). As 
Phelan observes;
This new relation between the looker and the image of the 
other requires more attention to communicating nonvisible, 
rhetorically unmarked aspects of identity, and a greater 
willingness to accept the impotency of the inward gaze. If we 
could accept that impotency and loss, we would not have to 
press quite so hard on the visible configurations of the other. 
We might be able to give up [...] the particular configurations of 
power and desire which inform and infect our external gaze 
(26-27). 
In Unmarked Phelan provides a variety of aesthetic, economic, social and 
cultural critiques via an analysis of live and mediatized forms, including that 
of multi-media performance. Extending from this analysis, as Auslander 
suggests, Phelan could be seen to invest in live performance “as a social 
and politically oppositional discourse [based on] ontological differences 
between live and mediatized representations” (159).
Auslander takes up an antithetical stance and claims that Phelan’s attempt 
to isolate performance from mediatized culture is based on a tautology; “To 
the extent, however, that mediatization, the technology of reproduction, is 
embedded within the language of live performance itself, performance 
38 This sentiment has resonances with my earlier observations with regard to constructing 
an invisible history of multi-media performance consisting of undocumented and 
untraceable works.
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cannot claim linguistic independence from mass reproduction”(40). In 
Liveness he identifies a number of writers who appear to valorise the 
liveness of performance as separate from media orientated forms: 
“performance theory continues to characterise the relationship between the 
live and the mediatized as one of opposition, despite the erosion of 
differences between them”(11). Auslander goes on to provide a number of 
examples which, he feels, demonstrate the elisions and similarities 
between performance and mediatized works. He cites the use of media in 
live events such as pop concerts and big sporting occasions, Broadway 
theatre and, in a less commercial context, experimental multi-media 
performance. 
Auslander’s argument examines the confusion of rhetorics between live 
and mediatized forms. He reports, as have others before him, most notably 
Raymond Williams, how television maintains the illusion of liveness 
despite the majority of its output being prerecorded. He also quotes the 
practice of replicating the effects and scenarios of pop videos in the live 
stage shows of pop acts. He references Michael Kirby’s notion of ‘non 
matrixed performance’ and deems this to be a performance style 
originating from the technical demands of film acting which has been 
adopted by performance practitioners.39  He also identifies the obscure 
practice of interactive or franchised plays in which spectators follow a 
particular character through a narrative. This same play or performance text 
is franchised out to theatres and can be experienced in a number of 
different venues across the globe, a phenomena that Auslander sees as 
equivalent to mass production. These examples all demonstrate a 
contraction between the live and the mediatized where performance mimics 
the qualities of media or visa versa; “Whatever distinction we may have 
supposed there to be between live and mediatized events is collapsing 
39 Michael Kirby wrote about his theories of matrixed and non-matrixed performance in 
relation to the work of the Happenings movement. He proposed that the performance 
style utilised in Happenings could be termed non-matrixed as opposed to the ‘matrixed’ 
style employed in conventional theatre works where the meaning of the work is created 
through a matrix consisting of notions of character and text in order to create the fictional 
‘other’ world of the play. Performance uses no such construction and often relies on 
staging the actual body and/or self of the performer for its ‘dramatic’ effect. These 
observations are very much a product of their time as nowadays these more theatrical 
constructions of text and character are frequently utilised or alluded to in performance 
work albeit often in a deconstructed fashion. Furthermore it is interesting to note, as 
Auslander himself acknowledges, that Kirby considers film acting to be a matrixed form of 
performing, a position which contradicts Auslander’s.
44
because live events are becoming more and more identical with mediatized 
ones”(32). This supposition leads him to conclude; “thinking about the 
relationship between live and mediatized forms in terms of ontological 
oppositions is not especially productive because there are few grounds on 
which to make significant ontological distinctions”(51).
By dismissing Phelan’s ontological premise which identifies performance 
as distinct from mediatized forms Auslander can then go on to claim that 
“Disappearance, existence only in the present moment is not then an 
ontological quality of live performance that distinguishes it from modes of 
technical reproduction. Both live performance and the performance of 
mediatization are predicated on disappearance”(45). In order to establish 
this disappearance of the mediatized, Auslander recalls the electron scan 
of the tv screen and the minute erosion of magnetic particles that take place 
each time a video tape is passed across a playback head. Once Auslander 
has abolished disappearance as an exclusively performance phenomenon  
he is then able to question Phelan’s ideological stand point; “I doubt very 
strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the 
ideologies of capital and reproduction that define mediatized culture or 
should be expected to do so, even to assume an oppositional stance”(40). 
This undermines, therefore, Phelan’s assertion which positions 
performance as a socially and politically oppositional force, oppositional in 
that through its disappearance it resists certain reproductive laws of 
patriarchal capitalism.
Whilst I acknowledge that in modern day culture it is indeed difficult to 
distinguish between the live and the mediatized I am not convinced that 
Auslander’s primarily technological arguments justifies his dismissal of an 
ontological difference between live performance and the mediatized record; 
the notion that imperceptible fragments of metal particles are erased each 
time a video tape is watched is clearly very different from the moment by 
moment ‘disappearance’ experienced while watching a live event which can 
never be reproduced identically in the future. However I would also like to 
believe that the reductive stabilities invoked by recorded forms can, to some 
extent, be diffused or put to productive use within cultural contexts in similar 
terms to Phelan’s championing of performance. Moreover I suspect that 
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multi-media performance, because it combines the different treatments of 
time and space afforded by the two mediums of expression, the live and the 
mediatized, can provide insights into and a critique of a contemporary 
culture and society which lives in and through media.
The Auslander versus Phelan debate clearly impacts upon the specific 
subject of multi-media performance where the two potentially divergent 
forms of the live and the mediatized are worked in close association with 
one another. If we are to accept Auslander's interpretation, multi-media 
performance is a manifestation of the absorption of all aspects of life into a 
mediatized culture and, therefore, an example of the impossibility of 
existence or expression outside of this culture and the wider ideologies that 
this culture represents of capital and reproduction. Similarly, if we are to 
follow Phelan, due to its incorporation of reproductive media, multi-media 
performance might “betray[s] and lessen[s] the promise of its own ontology” 
partly depriving performance of its defining quality of disappearance and 
therefore its ability to expose and critique the all-encompassing rules which 
determine visibility in a patriarchal capitalist society. This then, I believe, is 
the particular challenge for multi-media performance, what interrogation, if 
any, can it supply of contemporary, media driven, society? As a form which 
plays with the meeting of two potential opposites can it provide an 
intervention into the languages and consequences of this mediatized 
culture or is it merely doomed to repeat its logics?
1.7 The Undocumentable Event
When attempting to answer this question a dilemma is encountered which 
feeds back into the argument concerning performance documentation. As 
Phelan observes “To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of 
performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter 
the event itself”(148). A piece of writing can operate in much the same way 
as any visual record; it is not context specific, it can be returned to time and 
again at the will of the reader, it does not and will not change, like visual 
records, “Writing is an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same” 
(Phelan 149). The written word persists through time and space and, when 
employed as a form of performance documentation, potentially neutralises 
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the ingredients which give performance its efficacy: presence, risk, 
interaction, context.40  More challenging still, in relation to performance and 
its documentation, is the particular form of multi-media performance. This 
work often pivots around precisely the difference between the live 
phenomenon and the recorded or mediatized one. Once this work is 
documented on video tape, or other recording media, this dialectic has 
been reduced to a monologue, all actions are represented as records and 
therefore the difference, as experienced in the live multi-media 
performance, is no longer present, is no longer perceivable and therefore 
cannot be effective. However, if some form of analysis is to be made of 
multi-media performance a strategy must be devised to work within this 
documentational stalemate, as Phelan says;
It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about 
performance because of this inescapable transformation. The 
challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for 
writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of 
writing itself (148). 
In this sentiment Phelan is echoing that of Roland Barthes who calls for a 
performative ‘Text’ in response to the changes made to an understanding of 
writing by the work of authors such as Mallarmé, Valéry, Proust, the 
Surrealists and linguistic theory:
The fact is that writing can no longer designate an operation of 
recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’; rather, it 
designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford 
philosophy, call a performative, a rare verbal form in which the 
enunciation has no other context than, the act by which it is 
uttered (Image 144-145).
These observations concerning the impasse of performance 
documentation and the need for performative records/writing clearly have 
consequences for this study. Just as the discourse of my ‘history of multi-
media performance’ was problematised by performance’s destabilisation 
of the art object, likewise any descriptive and analytical writing of my own 
40 These are four experiential qualities of performance which are often described as ‘lost’ 
in subsequent documentation. This was the subject of Nick Kaye’s keynote address 
“Resisting the Document” delivered to the “Documentation and Devising” conference 
organised by the Centre for Performance Research in Cardiff, February 1993. A response 
to some of the issues raised at this meeting were published in The Drama Review in 
“Theatre/Archaeology” written by Mike Pearson and Julian Thomas, 38.4. 1994.
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practice is conditioned by its performative origins, as Schieffelin writes “It is 
precisely the performativity of performance for which there is no analogue in 
text”(198). Phelan has declared “the interaction between the art object and 
the spectator is, essentially, performative”(147). This interactive exchange is 
privileged and foregrounded by the practice of performance itself and it is 
also the reason why the ‘theatrical’ was so despised by critics such as 
Fried, as it demonstrated the myth of the autonomous art object they 
valorised. By emphasising the art encounter as performative and thus ‘in 
process’, determined in part by the subjectivity and context of individual 
spectators, performance disrupts notions of a ‘true’, ‘real’ or ‘accurate’ 
meaning of a work as these terms now become varied and unstatic, subject 
to different individuals and contexts. Therefore, for my document to engage 
productively with the medium of multi-media performance as a form of 
academic research some form of documentational position must be 
devised to overcome these performative problems.
As has already been stated by Feral, the video document provides 
performance with a past and thus makes performance available for 
scrutiny. What must be achieved, however, is a sense of both the expense 
and the benefit of the document, what has been lost and what gained, in the 
words of Barthes, a text “which goes to the limit of the rules of enunciation” 
(Image 157). A performative document may reveal the limitations of and 
differences between the form of performance and the form of the record by 
placing the performative ‘now’ in the ‘recovered now’ of the document. In 
this sense this document becomes akin to the original project of my art 
work which, through a synthesis of performance with media, aims to 
introduce the performative into the mediatized. Therefore in order to 
progress my project I have devised a form of presentation for this research 
which, I hope, goes some way towards maintaining a vital synergy between 
my multi-media performance and its analytical document.
In her article on documentation, “Best Betrayal” Melzer quotes Danielle 
Sallenare, “One must accept that that which is lost, is lost in order to 
produce something completely different, a new artistic object, a creation” 
(2:266). Both my practice and my theory are my study or my art  - which term 
is used in what context is merely a question of semantic emphasis. 
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Foremost, as a Ph.D. by Practice document I wish my multi-media 
performance work to be present within this text, partly to illustrate particular 
arguments but partly because the work itself contains a critique of the 
issues under examination. Restaging every work would not be practical, nor 
could it genuinely be included into the body of this text and remain a multi-
media performance. Therefore I have relied on video documentation to 
provide at least some visual and aural continuity with the live performances. 
And this video documentation is integrated into my writing via the 
technologies of multimedia presentation in the form of a digital versatile 
disk. A DVD is a multimedia solution to a multi-media problem. By using a 
DVD, unlike a linear medium such as video tape, a reader/viewer is able to 
locate precisely individual video examples and is therefore allowed to move 
more easily between the text and the video and more quickly amongst the 
video examples themselves. Furthermore, on a DVD I am able to present, 
simultaneously, different ‘versions’ of the original performance as 
documented which prevents the view of the performance being reduced to a 
unitary representation and thus problematises the omnipotent gaze of the 
documenting camera in sympathy with the fractured spectatorial position of 
much performance work. Through the use of such technology I am 
attempting to suture my performance documentation with my writing in such 
a way that the reader cannot avoid the combination and dissonances of the 
discourses.
I will not pretend that this document provides a complete vehicle back to the 
meaning and intentions of the work as originally performed, as Phelan 
observes performative writing “can broach the frame of performance but 
cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive”(149). Nor is this DVD and its 
synchronous screens the perfect solution to the documentation of multi-
media performance, or the integration of text with moving images for the 
purposes of reflective practice presentations. In Melzer’s article on the 
documentation of performance Mario de Marinis says “I will be subjective, 
partial, elusive and incomplete” (2:263) and I aspire to do likewise in the 
belief that it is in this realm of the unresolved that certain relations can be 
revealed. In this thesis presentation I am interested in establishing a way of 
interacting with information: linguistically, rhetorically and visually, which 
throws into relief some of the issues that underpin this research; namely 
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the consequences of the live and/or mediatized experience, its differences 
and its effects. Indeed it is this issue that I believe is figured in the meeting 
of performance and mediatized moments. Admittedly, studies and/or art 
works which confess to being “subjective, partial, elusive and incomplete” 
may engender frustrations in their audiences. However, in an age of ‘liquid 
information’, determined in the most part by the ubiquity of media 
operations, the acceptance that some information will just not transfer, that 
it is as context-dependent as a fish is to water, may be enlightening, 
particularly if it is just this fantasy of omnipresence that is potentially 
deconstructed by one’s chosen research subject.
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CHAPTER TWO
ON TIME AND SPACE 
CONSTANTS: A FUTURE PERFECT 
2.1 Constants: A Future Perfect
The multi-media performance Constants: A Future Perfect was produced in 
collaboration with the performance company Bodies in Flight. The 
collaborating team consisted of a writer, Simon Jones; a choreographer, 
Sara Giddens, and a sound designer, Darren Bourne.1  I was responsible 
for initiating, developing and realising the multi-media element of the 
performance. The work was funded by The Arts Council of England and was 
presented at the Arnolfini, Bristol and The Bonington Gallery, Nottingham. 
Constants II was concerned with the subject of time and specifically old 
age; an experience embodied by one of the performers of the piece, the 
seventy four year old Sheila Gilbert. Text, movement and media elements 
were used to establish a dialogical relationship between Sheila and a 
young, twenty two year old, performer Patricia Breatnach. The interaction 
between the bodies of the performers, spoken dialogue and mediatized 
imagery provoked a consideration of the encounter with old age while 
engaging the audience in a consideration of these events in relation to their 
own lives.
Constants II is a performance work in the sense outlined by Feral in that it 
foregrounds the body of the performer and makes it the subject of the 
performance.2  The two speaking protagonists represent first and foremost 
themselves, that is the fact of their bodily existence and it is this that is 
performed in a specific, non-fictive time and space. Feral observes that:
Performance rejects all illusion, in particular theatrical illusion 
[...] and attempts instead to call attention to certain aspects of 
1 The full title of this multi-media performance is Constants: A Future Perfect. Throughout 
this chapter I shall refer to the work as Constants II in order to distinguish it from an earlier 
single screen video work of the same title which I completed in 1994 and from which the 
title of this performance piece was taken. Constants II also indicates that this work took 
place in two stages, the first stage, Constants I resulted a work-in-progress production 
performed at the Bonington Gallery in July 1998.
2 Feral’s words are “performance subjects the performers body” (171 my emphasis).
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the body - the face, gestural mimicry, and the voice - that would 
normally escape notice. To this end, it turns to the various 
media - telephoto lenses, still cameras, movie cameras, video 
screens, television - which are there like so many 
microscopes to magnify the infinitely small and focus the 
audience’s attention (171). 
One of the functions of the mediatized elements in Constants II was to 
facilitate a form of visual scrutiny, creating images which dwelt upon the 
texture of elderly flesh and which permitted detailed close ups. Yet, the 
media in the performance did not merely provide a visual means to “focus 
the audience’s attention”. The media apparatus constructed a sense of the 
human as a mediatized entity and furthermore pointed towards the 
consequences of this in terms of our perceptions in and of mediatized 
culture in general. The performance was worked in three ‘parts’ or sections 
and the media in Constants II traced a trajectory through the performance 
working from live images to recorded ones via four stages, or ‘orders’, of 
mediatization. 
The performance space was divided into three areas: four walls and an 
empty perimeter ‘track’ enclosing a circular cluster of audience, monitors 
and operators in the mid part of the space, all of which were grouped round 
an empty circular hub.
Vid. 2. Constants II - Audience enters. 
  
Eight small television monitors were dispersed amongst the audience who 
sat isolated on separate chairs facing the televisions. The performers 
moved around the perimeter walls of the performance space, in and 
amongst the audience and finally into the empty central area. During the 
performance identical images were shown across the eight television 
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screens, each image corresponding with one of the four preordained 
‘orders’ of mediatization. The first order was of live images produced by 
miniature, portable black and white cameras; the second order were 
recordings of these images made during the show; recordings made with 
the same cameras prior to the start of the performance constitute the third 
order; and the fourth order was prerecorded material originated on DV 
(Digital Video) which had been treated in post production prior to the 
performance. There were therefore varying degrees of separation in time 
between the production of a particular image and its reproduction on the 
screen, ranging from the instantaneous live-relayed camera images 
through to pictures played back minutes after their origination, hours, days, 
or even months. The use of these four ‘orders’ did not follow a uniformly 
linear trajectory from live through to recorded within the show, but circled 
back and repeated elements while progressing from one order to the next.
The simultaneous production and reproduction of live camera images 
immediately complicates the live/recorded paradox outlined in the opening 
chapter by providing a version of a mediatized image, via the live camera, 
that is not directly bound up with reproduction. A camera image does not 
automatically designate a recorded image and not all camera images are 
records (for example the images seen in a camera obscura or on live 
broadcast television). In Constants II, as with all multi-media performance, 
the media creates part of its effect by the different treatment it affords of time 
and space. However, in its use of live cameras Constants II introduces an 
alternative to the diametric differences in time and space effected by live and 
recorded modes (see table 1.). The products of cameras in Constants II 
display a certain ‘liveness’ and therefore emphasise attributes normally 
associated with performance. 
The live
The show begins with Sheila walking slowly around the perimeter of the 
performance space, supporting herself on the walls. At first she moves 
clockwise and then changes direction, as she does so images appear on 
all of the television screens. These images are produced by four black and 
white miniature cameras placed in each corner of the room.
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Vid. 3. Constants II - Round the Walls.
  
These cameras render the figure constantly visible and form an electronic 
panopticon. At the moment when Sheila passes beyond one camera’s point 
of view, the image is modified by a cut to the next camera in the circuit, and 
Sheila begins her journey from long shot to close up all over again. These 
pictures, with their sequential switching and grainy black and white tone 
deliberately allude to the all pervasive images of closed circuit television 
surveillance (CCTV). Using cameras in such a way conforms to the 
powerful cultural conception of the camera as omnipotent and more 
specifically the gaze of the camera as an all-seeing entity, as John Berger 
observes in About Looking “Has the camera replaced the eye of God?”(53). 
This sense of technological scopic dominance provides any image 
produced by a camera lens with a certain powerful status. As Constants II 
continues, this notion of the camera as omnipotent is problematised when 
the performers begin to handle the cameras and manipulate the images 
they produce. This action draws the omnipotent gaze of the camera toward 
a more partial and subjective version of vision.
As Sheila makes her way around the performance space she does not 
acknowledge the presence of the cameras which track her every move. 
Towards the end of the opening sequence, however, she addresses her 
speech to one of the corner cameras.
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Vid. 4. Constants II - “To not be...”
  
This direct address demonstrates a marked shift in attitude towards the 
mediatized elements within the performance; firstly it acknowledges the 
cameras as operating within the space and contributing to the overall 
performance through their display of images; secondly, and more 
importantly, it collapses the performer into their screen representation as 
the performer now seems to address the audience directly from the 
television thus suggesting some form of effective equivalence between the 
screen image and the performer. Sheila has become mediatized, and 
instead of turning to face the audience or her fellow performer Patricia, she  
addresses them via the intermediary device of the television screen. In turn 
Patricia chooses to answer via the same ‘medium’. Each audience 
member is figuratively ‘faced’ by Sheila and Patricia as they stare into the 
camera and deliver their lines. This is in stark contrast to the two performers 
actual physical positioning within the performance space as they stand in 
opposite corners with their backs to the audience. The contraction of the 
physical space into the mediatized space indicates yet another collapse, in 
this case, of the camera into the screen. Although the image displayed is 
separated in space from its bodily source, this spatial distance is 
obliterated by the live camera’s instantaneous relay which electronically 
repositions its subject/object into the television screen.
Interestingly the performers’ appeal to - or rather through - the cameras 
establishes a definite viewing hierarchy for the first time in the multi-media 
performance. The ‘CCTV’ cameras provide an uninterrupted view of Sheila 
as she moves around the walls; the audience is able to watch this action as 
her unmediatized figure passes near or in front of them. Therefore, despite 
the omnipotent gaze of the cameras, the audience can also experience this 
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performance by looking directly at the live body. This arrangement 
encourages a comparative equivalence between the two different views of 
the same live action, one direct, the other mediatized. However, once the 
performers have their backs to the audience, the images produced by the 
cameras supersede the bodies of the live performers. The screen is 
therefore privileged as it appears to provide ‘more information’ - a 
facial/vocal encounter - in the absence of any direct performance. In so 
doing, a hierarchy of viewing is established where the screen performer 
takes precedence over the embodied one. Consecutively, as soon as the 
screen begins to be utilised as a surrogate performer, another sequence 
follows which complicates this notion. Patricia picks up the camera from its 
corner fixing and begins to move with it.
Vid. 5. Constants II - Camera Dance
  
The ‘Camera Dance’ immediately marks the space of the camera lens and 
the space of the performer as once more distinct, opening out the 
differences between camera, screen and body which had previously been 
conflated. While we watch Patricia dance we see her whole body move, and 
at the same time, she points a camera back at herself. Between Patricia’s 
dancing figure and the seated spectator, a screen, or number of screens, 
provide a view of the mediatized version of the dance. In this scenario the 
previously ‘invisible’ omnipotent camera becomes another object in the 
performance; it also allows the screen image to become a variation of this 
performance. The difference between the mediatized version and the activity 
of the live body within the performance space also establishes the 
performing body extended in three dimensional space as a distinct and 
separate entity from that pictured on the screen. These separations 
encourage a different perspective on mediatized images from those 
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previously figured in the work. The coexistence of the two different versions 
of the dance, the body and its mediatized image, provoke a comparison and 
through this comparison expose the action of the lens upon the body. The 
moving body that is watched directly is seen as a whole. This sense is 
derived from an understanding of space as described by Henri Bergson in 
Matter and Memory; “space, by definition, is outside us [...] a part of space 
appears to us to subsist even when we cease to be concerned with it”(206). 
Even though the eye may shift and concentrate its gaze upon particular 
features of the body, this does not exclude the body in its entirety. The 
camera performs a similar selection and prioritising of vision as the eye, but 
what it ‘sees’ is determined by its operator and the angle of its lens which 
can at times exclude the whole body from the frame. The body delivered to 
the screen has been severed from its space; when the body is converted to 
a mediatized image it becomes partial and fragmented and that which is 
excluded by the lens becomes extraneous, no longer present to any sense. 
The camera in the Camera Dance becomes a butcher that visually 
dismembers the performer. This has, of course, always been characteristic 
of the lens; however it is the immediate juxtaposition of the live mediatized 
image with the performing body, contained within the performance space 
which makes this characteristic so distinctive. In this context these camera 
images are seen as partial and specific and furthermore they can be 
identified as the products of a human operator. The establishment of a 
more ‘subjective’ identity for the camera once more allows a parity of views 
to be constructed between the mediatized and the unmediatized and neither 
version can be said to be have ascendancy over the other. This lack of a 
viewing hierarchy does not automatically denote similarity between the 
screen image and the performer, indeed, these two views are radically 
different from one another and therefore do not facilitate a conflation of 
performer with screen image. This more subjective camera functions in 
contrast to the apparently robust totalising camera figured in the opening 
sequence.
57
Vid. 6. Constants II - Camera Dance End
  
The preceding extract (see Vid. 6.) demonstrates a departure from the 
strictly ‘live’ quality of the mediatized images in Constants II and marks a 
liminal moment between the live mediatized image and its recorded 
reproduction. During the show a number of different video effects are 
generated by a vision mixer and are occasionally added to the live 
mediatized images. These effects mediate between the signal from the 
cameras and the signal that is sent to the television screens, and in so 
doing, problematise the notion of the camera as a neutral conduit of visual 
information. When the light reflected by an object is interrupted by a camera 
an ‘interpretation’ occurs. In the case of an electronic camera, the object is 
translated into a flat grid of pixels with various electronic charges and these 
charges relate to the light and dark areas reflected by the object, with the 
brightest portions provoking the highest electric charge. In this sense light 
is transformed into electricity and thus becomes a malleable medium which 
can be altered and changed at will. A vision mixer acts as a nexus for 
camera signals, it facilitates smooth transitions between disparate sources 
and also allows changes to be made to these signals on an electrical level.
In the previous sequence a strobe effect was applied to the images 
produced by Patricia’s camera at the end of her ‘Camera Dance’. A strobe 
effect alters the output of the mixer; instead of outputting one new frame 
every 1/25th of a second as determined by the standard PAL video signal, 
the effects board in the mixer momentarily captures a single frame and 
outputs the same image repeatedly until the next frame is captured and 
held. This freezing and updating can continue indefinitely and the length of 
time each still image is displayed may be altered on a sliding scale which 
is determined by the internal strobe rate of the particular mixer. The strobe 
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gives a jerky, interrupted appearance to movement and thereby creates a 
separation between the screen’s representation of movement, in this 
instance Patricia’s dance, and the smooth flow of her actual body. This 
electronic intervention, like the ‘Camera Dance’ itself, prevents the simple 
collapse of performer into the screen because the mediatized image is so 
clearly divergent in its movements from the image the audience 
experiences of the unmediatized body. Furthermore the strobe effect 
disrupts the performance on more than just an imagistic level, it also alters 
a sense of performance time. As Phelan has noted performance privileges 
the present yet in this mediatized performance micro moments of the 
present are caught by the strobe and stopped, like temporary records which 
immediately implicate the present into the past.3  Another mixer effect 
emphasises this dynamic even more vividly - the freeze frame.
Vid. 7. Constants II - “full of it”
  
Once more this hiatus in the mediatized image disrupts the unity between 
the performer and her screen representation. After delivering her line 
Patricia moves away from the camera, however her image remains fixed on 
the screen. Unlike the time of performance, which will always run on, 
‘mediatized time’ gets stuck. This difference in mediatized time and 
performance time is encapsulated in the body of the performer herself. A 
performer can create a frozen moment by holding a static pose, but this 
stasis can only ever reference a pause in time - it can never be one. 
However proficient the performer’s freeze, even in stillness, the body 
pulsates with life and every body knows/feels this to be true via their own 
visceral, corporal experience. Electronics, like photography, can create 
pauses and freezes which are altogether more convincing because these 
forms of image making are precedented upon a certain control of time and 
3 “Performance’s only life is in the present” (Phelan p. 146)
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space and convert light into electrical or chemical data for just this purpose. 
When a freeze frame is activated on a vision mixer it holds 1/25th of a 
second’s worth of time and repeatedly sends out the same frame through 
its circuitry in a configuration of frequency which has originated in a past 
moment. Although this image is ‘created’ by a scanning electron beam on 
the back of a television screen once every 1/25th of a second, this image 
has its origin in a past moment and allows no signs of life such as 
movement or change.
The vision mixer was also used for another purpose in the composition of 
the multi-media contribution to the show Constants II. As well as providing a 
variety of visual effects, the primary function of a vision mixer is to switch (or 
mix) between source input signals. The shifting between different camera 
views in the opening ‘Round the Walls’ sequence was achieved by live 
cutting, selecting different camera signals for output, the sequence and 
timing of these cuts were dependent upon Sheila’s progress around the 
room. However, a vision mixer can also facilitate a change between different 
inputs over time, these are called transition effects and most commonly 
take the form of a dissolve or a wipe. Instead of creating an abrupt change 
from one source image to another (a cut) a transition effect allows two 
source pictures to coexist together on the screen over a period of time, 
thereby softening the shift from one view to another. A wipe moves a new 
picture to cover and ‘wipe over’ a preexisting one, but a dissolve blends two 
signals together across the whole picture surface and allows an operator to 
determine how much of each signal is ‘output’ at any one moment in time. 
Because transition effects occur through time this allows, at the level of the 
screen, a merging between two spaces which would be impossible in the 
undifferentiated three dimensional performing space. Thus space as 
mediatized is able to contradict Bergson’s observation on space; “there 
cannot be in the same place several things at the same time”(139).
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Vid. 8. Constants II - Sitting, Faces
  
  
In both the above examples the vision mixer allows a merging of bodies to 
occur on an imagistic level. The layering of space afforded by the media 
apparatus now causes a core metaphor of the piece to be illustrated. A 
central axis of the work is the young and old in relation to one another. This 
association suggests a mother/daughter relationship, but there is also the 
implication that the performers represent the same person at different 
stages in a single life span. The images of the two women are merged by a 
partial dissolve, and their bodies momentarily inhabit the same space at the 
same time. In this way the mediatizing elements of the work are able to 
make graphic a suggestion that is already present via the bodily 
coexistence of young and old in the same performance. By layering space 
and time mediatization is performing a physical impossibility and breaking 
the performance away from a notion of a singular time and space.
A vision mixer is also able to develop this idea beyond just layering one 
body with another; it also has the ability to select particular luma (light) or 
chroma (colour) frequencies within individual source inputs and substitute 
this part of the picture information with images from another source input. 
This is called keying. Towards the end of the show, for example, Sheila 
tracks a camera across her face, body and hands while Patricia speaks into 
another lens. These two pictures are combined causing part of Sheila’s 
image to show through the dark areas of Patricia’s mouth and face. At the 
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level of the screen, parts of Sheila have merged with Patricia. Both bodies 
are seen as one entity and are incorporated.
Vid. 9. Constants II - End Key
  
The live recorded
As has already be seen, Constants II opened with the performer, Sheila 
Gilbert, walking around the walls of the performance space watched by four 
video cameras. Whilst these images were being outputed to the television 
screens they were also sent simultaneously to a digital video recording 
deck and recorded onto tape. At a mid point in this opening sequence the 
live surveillance camera images were substituted for the recorded video 
information which had been stored only seconds previously.
Vid. 10. Constants II - Round the Walls II
  
Because the space and image quality of the recorded version was identical 
to the mediatized live version and because the action was repetitive, it was 
difficult for an audience to deduce that a split had been made between the 
live action previously seen on the screen and the screen image as a 
recorded playback. The spectator had to alternate his or her attention 
between the screen and the performer to ascertain a difference. This action 
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was made all the more problematic because the operations of the 
technology had, prior to the moment of playback, encouraged an audience 
to see what occurred on the screen as live and equivalent to the 
performance. The audience’s attention is diffused by the ‘stage’ 
configuration and the movement of the performers; crossing in and out of 
sight-lines the performers move around the perimeter walls and disappear 
behind the audience. Within this dispersal the screens provide, via the 
surveillance cameras, a fixed and continuous view of the performance 
which is visible to the whole audience. An exchange of focus from the live to 
the mediatized is encouraged by the understanding that the images on the 
screen are congruent with the action, they are live images and present the 
same space and time. This allows an audience to substitute their 
immediate, unmediatized and incomplete view of the action for the 
apparently superior, complete version offered by the camera/screen. Thus, 
when the image as a video playback is finally, if ever, perceived, this acts as 
a warning about particular assumptions and investments of equivalence 
made in the screen. Just as a mixer effect can freeze a moment in time, a 
recorded moving image can cause time to loop in a way that is not possible 
in day to day existence, as Sheila says “You were in some groove and you 
got stuck” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye) and her image endlessly 
repeats her walk around the walls. 
Media apparatus permits the reproduction of time. A loop is caused by 
committing a portion of time, in the form of moving action or sound, to a 
recording carrier base and then repeatedly playing this back.4  A form of 
doubling then occurs in our experience of time within the performance. 
Whilst we perceive the loop from moment to moment in the present, the 
object of our attention is not progressing through the same temporal 
dimension, thus time is seen (or heard) as repetitive. In Constants II this 
characteristic is utilised to provoke a realisation about the consequences of 
mediatization upon experiences of time and space. The ‘Round the Walls’ 
playback appears to maintain a continuity of space and action between the 
screen image and the performance and therefore a continuity of present 
time is also assumed. It is only when the stage action radically departs from 
4 Carrier Base is a term used by Roy Armes in On Video and refers to any medium which fixes and 
records information such as images or sounds. Armes also cites examples of clay tablets, engraved 
stones, papyrus, parchment, paper prior to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries invention of 
gramophone records, celluloid film and electromagnetic tape (16).
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that represented on the screen that a difference between the two can be 
identified. This separation then allows the performance to claim a privileged 
relationship with live, present time and exposes the duplicitous nature of the 
recorded image which has disguised its detachment from time by 
presenting a spatial and rhythmic continuity with the live event. The recorded 
camera image, in this instance, is shown to approximate space. This is 
possible because a lens simplifies space and reduces it to a flat visual 
representation devoid of colour and without detail. Because the recorded 
representation bears some of the same marks as the live manifestation of 
the space, its image becomes an acceptable substitute for the original 
three dimensional room and no significant difference is perceived between 
the two. It is only when the live diverges from the screen image that the 
mediatized is understood as reproduction and a difference is perceived. 
Therefore, recorded moving images could be said to masquerade as a 
form of life or liveness and this masquerade is exposed when records (as 
reproductions) are placed in close proximity to the progressive flow of their 
original live objects.
The only other time that a show recording was played back in Constants II 
was towards the end of the piece, thus forming a transition into the final 
sequence. After the ‘Round the Walls’ playback, recording of the vision 
mixer output recommenced, in effect committing all the mediatized images 
seen on the screens to digital video tape. As the work moved from part two 
into part three, this recorded show tape was rewound at high speed and the 
resulting images were relayed to the television screens.
Vid. 11. Constants II - Rewind
  
All of the past moments of the performance (or at least those which had 
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been mediatized) are now shown to the spectators. Again this replaying of a 
recording made during the show produces a double layering of time. Like 
the strobe effect before it, present moments are thrown into the past. The 
speed of this replay contains an element of quasi violence; the moments of 
the performance which had, until now, only occurred in present time now 
reoccur and become concretised, identified as past. The multi-media 
performance is pulled inexorably back to its beginning moments and, as it 
returns, its images break up and fragment. The violence of this action lies in 
its destabilisation of the present, it shows the present now to be the past, 
and instantly asserts the authority of the record which can capture the 
present and re-present it. Therefore present time is figured as insubstantial, 
and the record claims a securing power which offers a stable, fixed 
past/present colonising the ephemeral lived present. The present of this 
performance is effaced as it is re-membered by the record. However, as 
has been emphasised in earlier sequences, the mediatized version of the 
present is not an equivalent of the live, unmediatized, present, it has been 
reduced to a two dimensional black and white movie by the action of the 
camera lens and, within the record itself, the speed of the tape transport 
system which carries the time/tape back over the playback head omits and 
erodes details of the recorded spaces and actions.
The recorded live
The third order of mediatization consists of a recording that was made in the 
performance space prior to the audience’s arrival. Called ‘Ghost Sequence’, 
a camera was used to provide a subjective point of view shot which 
represented a person who was absent from the space but whose presence 
was recalled by dialogue between Sheila and Patricia. This televisual 
spectre was sutured into the live mediatized performance image by means 
of a moment of video feedback which provided a section of indistinct visual 
imagery at which the live camera images could be substituted for the 
prerecorded material. The audience only became aware of this alteration 
when the images shown on the screen become ‘impossible’ in relation to 
the live performance.
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Vid. 12. Constants II - Ghost
  
The movement of the camera in the ‘Ghost Sequence’ is erratic and manic; 
the sequence thus uses the rhetoric of mainstream horror films to reference 
a ‘haunting spirit’. However, the consequences of these images in relation 
to the live performance take the sequence beyond pure trickery and 
spectacle. Significantly the camera presents a novel point of view. 
Previously the camera images have either been controlled by the 
performers and/or have been inhabited by the faces and bodies of the 
performers. Hovering many metres above the ground the new camera 
images are severed from the bodies - disembodied - and therefore, without 
a material body, now indicate an immaterial presence. Not only is the 
camera transformed into an absent performer in this sequence, the 
audience is also made absent, disembodied by the mediatized images 
which show a performance space complete with performers, furniture and 
operating hardware but no audience. Because these images have been 
deceitfully inserted into a mediatized space in which a sense of the live has 
prevailed, the first reaction to the new order is not to sense it as a record but 
to feel one’s self as absent from the scene. 
The ‘camera spirit’ appears to share approximately the same space as the 
audience and it is therefore possible to construct ‘the spirit’ as the present 
manifestation of a past body. This interpretation is supported by Sheila’s 
dialogue, “You know, he is here now, with me” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and 
Rye). There is, however, in the televisual absence of the audience, a 
palpable difference between the stage space and the screen space which 
threatens to disrupt our understanding of this image as a live presence in 
the present time of the performance. Nevertheless, I believe that this 
contradiction is resolved by a variety of logics which are constructed through 
66
the multi-media performance. In the ‘Ghost Sequence’ the mediatized 
images make a claim to represent a reality as they present similar spaces 
and actions to those performed live and perceived by the audience. The only 
inconsistency between the screen and stage space lies in the absent 
figures of the audience. This absence can be accommodated by an 
understanding of the psychological functioning of the individual as 
spectator, a description of which is provided by John-Paul Sartre in Being 
and Nothingness. Sartre describes ‘the voyeur’ peering through a keyhole, 
immersed and preoccupied by what he sees, he is utterly unaware of 
himself. As the feminist film theorist Kaja Silverman notes in her analysis of 
the psychology and politics of vision, The Threshold of the Visible World, 
“This ‘nothingness’ is paradoxically synonymous with a certain 
transcendence - a transcendence of spectacle, of the body, and, ultimately, 
of self”(164). I do not believe that the audience of a multi-media 
performance work is able to easily occupy this position of ‘the voyeur’ (as 
the act of watching is foregrounded in this multi-media performance as I 
shall argue later on in this chapter). However, I do think that an audience 
may well have an understanding of this form of spectatorship which stems 
from other modes of viewing initiated within more dominant forms of visual 
culture, such as television and film. Using these dominant spectatorial 
positions which function in relation to a screen, a spectator is able to 
construct a rationale for his or her disappearance within the multi-media 
performance event. The familiar position of the voyeur accounts for a lack of 
presence for an audience who are immersed in a visual spectacle. In this 
sense the image on the screen during the ‘Ghost Sequence’ illustrates the 
effect of the screen. The event, however, is not reduced to a purely visual 
encounter and the performance also maintains an awareness of a 
multisensory liveness through the bodily presence of the performers. This 
rationale allows two spaces, one prerecorded, the other live, to coexist as 
equally plausible with the present of the performance.
Another more historical and technically oriented argument could also be 
mobilised to explain the audience’s absence from the screen without 
disrupting the present presence of the ghost in Constants II. Since the 
earliest days of photography the camera has been utilised to see what the 
eye alone cannot perceive, Edvard Muyerbridge's photographs of a 
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cantering horse provide the most famous example of this application. For 
over one hundred and fifty years the camera has been proved to ‘see’ 
differently from the human eye. Camera images can be automated and 
provide sight and pictures beyond the limitations of our physical bodies, and 
for this reason these images are sometimes seen as superior and can 
position the camera as a device that supersedes so-called ‘natural’ vision. 
The idea that the camera can operate beyond the eye infuses present day 
formations of visual culture and is one reason for the characterisation of the 
camera as ‘omnipotent’. These cultural assumptions are reinforced by the 
rhetoric surrounding, for example, virtual reality devices. As Kevin Robins 
observes “New technologies are not only amplifying the powers of vision, 
they are also changing its nature (to include what was previously classified 
as invisible or unseeable)”(156). With an understanding of the vision of 
cameras as different from humans it is possible to construct a rationale in 
which the ‘technological’ view of the ghost camera can show a different 
version of reality from that perceived by the eyes of the audience. This 
similarly allows a sense of two versions of the same space, or realities, to 
coexist in present time.
The transformation of recorded time and space into the present time and 
space of live performance inverts the action of the mediatized record as 
figured in the rapid rewind section. Here the present was subsumed into 
the past with a violence that made it difficult to conceive of present time as 
significant or robust in any way. In the ‘Ghost Sequence’ recorded 
mediatized images are used to create the opposite effect. What was 
recorded in the past is now reinvoked in the present. This is reminiscent of 
the reproductive power of records, particularly of the still photograph as a 
means of summoning objects out of the past. This desire to relive the past 
is most poignantly demonstrated by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida. In 
this book he searches for a photograph of his dead mother, a photograph 
which will cause him to ‘announce’ her in the present with the cry - “there-
she-is!”, an exclamation that simultaneously maintains the photograph’s 
evidential position “that-has-been” (113). This contradictory co-existence of 
past and present tense makes recorded media analogous with ‘pure 
memory’ as described by Bergson; “pure memory [...] interests no part of my 
body. No doubt it will beget sensations as it materializes, but at that very 
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moment it will cease to be a memory and pass into the state of a present 
thing, something actually lived”(139).
The prerecorded
The fourth order of mediatized material in Constants II was originally 
created for the first work-in-progress stage of the piece and was recorded 
months prior to those performances. The material was shot on a colour 
digital video camera which produced a superior image quality from the 
cameras used in the show. It was then treated and edited in post 
production. Two prerecorded sequences were used; the first was a ‘Hand 
Sequence’ which was shown in the middle part of the work. Sheila and 
Patricia sat opposite one another across the empty central circle each 
facing a television, and as the screens showed a prerecorded 
choreography of Sheila’s hands, Sheila echoed these moves, and Patricia 
performed a larger sequence of movements, whilst remaining seated.
Vid. 13. Constants II -Hands Sequence
  
The prerecorded hands introduce a new element within the multi-media 
performance by foregrounding Sheila’s elderly flesh. Although Sheila moves 
in close proximity through and around the audience, the clinical nature of the 
camera allows a study of the surface of the recorded performer not possible 
in a live encounter. A detailed look at the image is encouraged; the hands 
move in slow motion, disembodied by the tight framing of the shot and are 
isolated against a black background. The flesh is marked by age, and the 
images themselves fragment, blur and disintegrate, emerging and 
disappearing into the dark. Prior to this sequence of images Sheila has 
announced “Where does time go. It vanishes and stretches. In my bones. 
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And very soon that’s all there’ll be left of me. Which will be not me” (Bodies 
in Flight, Bourne and Rye). The disintegrating, disappearing images of 
Sheila’s hands suggests the fragility and mortality of the body. In this way 
the recorded past performs a different function in relation to time than those 
figured at other points in the show. Now the recorded image, instead of 
referencing the past into the present, represents the future, when the body 
of Sheila, as an old woman, will be made absent through death.
Constants II concludes with a long prerecorded sequence which plays 
across the television screens while Sheila sits in the empty circular ‘hub’ of 
the performance space. The end sequence begins with the layering of 
Sheila’s face with Patricia’s face to form a conglomerate identity using a live 
partial dissolve (see Vid. 8.). This visual material then blends into similar 
prerecorded images, blurring the transitional edge between the live and the 
recorded material. These images resolve into a picture of Sheila’s face 
which then begins to merge and disappear in a manner reminiscent of the 
earlier hand sequence. As if she can guess what these pictures presage, 
Sheila holds her hand up to me, the video operator, and with this gesture 
pauses the tape.
Vid. 14. Constants II -End Pause
   
By pausing the video tape Sheila has exerted one final moment of control 
over the mediatized images which have concluded their trajectory from the 
performers’ live cameras to a prerecorded source. But even as she delivers 
her penultimate speech, the relentless progression of time, or, as Bergson 
expresses it “The essence of time is that it goes by”(137) is manifest in the 
form of colour which slowly bleeds into the black and white image of 
Sheila’s frozen face. The addition of colour to the still image repeats the 
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dual experience of time. Although time as action/movement has been 
temporally arrested in the mediatized image, present, lived time is insistent 
and continues. The paused image is, in this configuration, more akin to the 
paused body of a performer where, despite a freeze, signs of the 
progression of time (in this instance, the addition of colour) work across the 
surface of the image, moving Sheila, and all of us, closer to the moment of 
disappearance. The forward motion of time is pictured as unstoppable and 
brings with it the suggestion of the inevitability of death. The mediatized 
elements in this end sequence affect this inevitability but also represent a 
consideration of the recorded image in relation to this equation with death. 
Vid. 15. Constants II -End Fade
  
The persistent properties of light have been contrasted with human frailty in 
a previous speech by Patricia; “But us. We are the inconstant, fragmentary 
things. We bleed. We spin and burn. And give everything to light, unstinting. 
Its lustre. Its hues. Its dusks and its dawns. Its loveliness to behold” 
(Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye). Sheila now sits alone in the slowly 
fading light as her image repeatedly fades from the screens. The recorded 
material metaphorises her disappearance through death (mirrored by her 
disappearance at the performance’s end) but also demonstrates her 
continuation in light. The end of Constants II signals the moment at which 
the image can supersede its referent. Sheila seated, with her eyes closed, 
is virtually no longer present in the performance space, instead she is 
represented by her image. Trapped in light, this is the relationship that the 
bodies of the nearly dead have with the photographs, films and videos that 
will outlive them. However the body represented is not the body, hence 
Patricia’s observation “The light is cruel. Not as life is cruel. That harbours 
malice. Whereas the light is without heart. Even a negative one. Cos light is 
71
constant” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne and Rye). It is ironic that, as the work 
comes to an end, the mediatized images acquire a ‘life-like’ colour. In 
contrast to the previous monochrome these recorded images heighten the 
visual rhetoric at the moment in the performance when life becomes life-like 
(as representation) and the image supersedes its object. In this way 
recorded images are constructed as equivalent to the ‘future perfect’ tense 
when human temporality is transformed into an idea of immortality by 
becoming a recorded image. The record possesses a certain mobility and 
persistence in relation to time that is impossible for live performance yet 
within live performance is able to stage the consequences of this trapped 
light. Most recorded images, like the ‘Ghost Sequence’, act to summon a 
past into the present; in this configuration, however, like the ‘Hands 
Sequence’, the recorded image is used to predict a future where Sheila will 
be replaced by her recorded image. The record, so often associated with 
the past, is now used to invoke a future state where we are all preserved, 
outside time, in the perfected form of our recorded image - a future perfect.
2.2 On Time and Space
The preceding pages form a detailed description of the mediatized 
elements used in Constants II, as well as offering an analysis of the 
media’s contribution in terms of some of its meanings and effects. As I have 
proposed, the mediatized aspects of the work derive their effect from the 
different experiences of time and space which they promote and which run 
counter to those framed by non mediatized performance work. These 
mediatized effects can also appear, at times, to shift and contradict one 
another. What I believe this collaboration with performance affords is a 
perspective on the separate dynamics of the live and the mediatized which 
would otherwise remain hidden in the individuated practices of the two 
mediums. The shifting configurations of time and space in multi-media 
performance shapes not only performance, but also cameras and their 
mediatized images, in counter-conventional ways.
Stephen Kern explains how an analysis of time and space exposes “the 
essential foundations of experience”(5) for a particular epoch. Time and 
space as experienced in multi-media performance is complicated, thus 
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destabilising some of the conceptions that we may have of these 
dimensions and perhaps enabling us to draw conclusions concerning our 
broader experiences within modern mediatized culture. Time is shown to be 
malleable: repeated through the loops, strobes, freezes, pauses and 
replays of the mediatized. Space is also reconfigured as overlapping and 
transferable by keys, dissolves and screen/camera collapses. In a purely 
mediatized form, for example a music video, these effects may only be 
perceived as a witty technological play - entertainment for the eyes. 
However, when these ‘tricks’ are presented in a space which privileges the 
live experience, the experiential present time of the viewer, his or her 
embodied time, is also foregrounded. This produces a dual experience of 
time and space; recorded mediatized - time and space as it is re-presented 
via the screen - versus living time and space - the moment by moment 
experience of the object, performer or mediatized image, as it emerges in 
the present. This dual experience of multi-media performance time equates 
with Bergson’s description of time as experienced by a person on the edge 
of sleep; “Do we not sometimes perceive in ourselves, in sleep, two 
contemporaneous and distinct persons one of whom sleeps a few minutes 
while the other’s dream fills days and weeks”(207). The same duality of 
experience could be said to occur in perceptions of space which, despite a 
physically limited visual field, are sensed as whole but simultaneously re-
presented by the screen as once more partial, yet different again from the 
individual’s immediate view.
In our day to day existence we may not consider time and space to be 
transferable or reproducible. Qualities of time can be either ‘fixed’ by a 
notion of what Bergson calls “physicists time” - the homogeneous time of 
clocks or, in contrast to the imposition of an external rationale, derived from 
the internal biorhythms of the human body. Paul Virilio, taking into account 
Einstein’s contribution to the philosophy of time, details this second 
proposition in The Vision Machine;
In short, if the Theory of Relativity maintains that the intervals of 
time properly supplied by clock or calendar are not absolute 
quantities imposed throughout the universe, the study of 
biorhythms reveals them to be the exact opposite: a variable 
quantity of sensa (primary sensory data) for which an hour is 
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more or less an hour, a season more or less than a season 
(26).5  
Bergson, however, also suggests a less absolute, more subjective 
experience of time
This imaginary homogeneous time is [...] an idol of language 
[...]. In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to 
imagine many different rhythms which, slower or faster, 
measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds 
of consciousness and thereby fix their respective places in the 
scale of being (207). 
What Bergson proposes, therefore, is that there can be no collective 
overarching totality of time, neither an internal or external one, but that time 
is determined by the specific condition of consciousness of each individual 
(no doubt informed, but not completely determined by, clocks and 
biorhythms).
Nevertheless, in a culture saturated by media we frequently experience time 
and space as an ever enfolding phenomenon; Kern observes that 
“electronic communication made it possible for the first time to be in a 
sense in two places at once”(88). Kern’s book concerns the period 1880 - 
1918 and in it he claims to be able “to identify a single thesis that properly 
encompasses all changes in the experience of time and space that 
occurred during this period” and he names this thesis “the affirmation of a 
plurality of times and spaces”(8). Kern ascribes this change partly to the 
influence of Bergson’s philosophy whose “affirmation of private time 
radically interiorized the locus of experience”(314).6  And he also writes 
much about the effect of simultaneity induced by communication forms such 
as wireless telegraphy and the telephone and later the influence of cinema 
and the ‘contrast’ editing effects of film directors such as D.W.Griffith who 
were “able to slice open a moment and insert a number of simultaneous 
activities”(71). These ideas of the plurality of modern time contrast with a 
notion of time as a one dimensional linear progression, but interestingly 
Bergson’s analysis also seems to privilege elements of this latter type. In 
5 All quotations from Paul Virilio in this text are taken from The Vision Machine.
6 Bergson’s book Matière et Mèmoire was originally published in France by Presses 
Universitaris de France in 1896
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Matter and Memory Bergson makes a sense of the present dependent 
upon,
the consciousness I have of my body. Having extension in 
space, my body experiences sensations and at the same time 
executes movements. Sensations and movements being 
localized at determined points of this extended body, there can 
only be, at a given moment, a single system of movements 
and sensations [...] this system is determined, unique for each 
moment of duration (138/9).
Therefore there seem to be two conflicting descriptions of time arising from 
Kern and Bergson; the simultaneous mediatized time of ‘electronic 
communication’ and the singular, unique moment of time rooted in the body 
in space. It would seem that multi-media performance places these two 
experiences in direct proximity and thus contrasts the experience of time 
dictated by our individual bodies with mediatized time which exerts a control 
over time and space which supersedes the human and transcends the 
body.
Past, present, future
Multi-media performance is also able to stage the conventional (assumed) 
relations that visual records and performance have with notions of past, 
present and future, and to reconfigure some of these assumptions. Outside 
of a multi-media form, records (and I am thinking particularly of 
photographs, but the same could be true of any ‘documenting’ image) 
project a piece of the past into the present, as Dia Vaughan states in On 
Documentary they function “as witness borne to the having-been”(184). 
Inversely, performance, because it has no life other than in the present, 
could be said, perhaps slightly paradoxically, to be concerned with the 
future; “could I fix this indivisible present, this infinitesimal element of the 
curve of time, it is the direction of the future that it would indicate” (Bergson 
138). These two experiences, brought together in multi-media performance, 
exactly constitute Bergson’s description of present time; “What I call ‘my 
present’ has one foot in my past and another in my future. In my past, first, 
because ‘the moment in which I am speaking is already far from me’; in my 
future, next, because this moment is impending over the future”(138). Kern 
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has observed that Bergson’s ideas, accompanied by late nineteenth century 
electronic technological invention, had the effect of ‘thickening’ the present; 
“the present was no longer limited to one event in one place, sandwiched 
tightly between past and future and limited to local surroundings. In an age 
of intrusive electronic communication ‘now’ became an extended interval of 
time”(314). It is this modern sense of a ‘now’ of extended duration 
constituted by both past and future that multi-media performance produces. 
The recorded and the performative in Constants II provide these elements 
of past and future in the ‘extended present’ of the multi-media performance 
event.7  
These dialectics of the past as immanent within the record and the future as 
implicit in performance, can, however, at times be surprisingly reversed. 
The rewind sequence in Constants II shows the present/future time of 
performance to be an illusion as it vigorously spools back through the 
performance, now shown as nothing but the past. Conversely the 
technicolour finale of the present/past now alludes to a future moment of a 
recorded Sheila, while the present performer Sheila disappears into the 
past. In these moments of the performance the sense of a stable present is 
eroded by the mediatized which threatens to crush or envelop it between 
pasts and futures. Interestingly Bergson describes the present as “a thing 
absolutely determined”(138) a sense which is created by his body extended 
in space, however, when the body is overwritten by media this provokes, at 
times, a more unstable, less determined present. This undetermined state 
Bergson equates with the past but equally it could also be described as the 
condition of the future.
The erosion of present time which is threatened in multi-media 
performance also creates an effect in terms of present space. This is 
illustrated most graphically by the ‘Ghost Sequence’ where the recorded 
mediatizing camera recreates an absent presence whilst simultaneously 
making those who are present - the audience - absent. Such an equation 
could be used to describe the viewing relations that occur whilst watching 
7 The ‘extended present’ is a phrase which is also used by Helga Nowotny in “From the 
Future to the Extended Present” in Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience, pp. 
45-74. She uses the term to describe the ways that various social institutions and 
technologies are engaged in predicting future trends thereby producing the effect of an 
‘extended present’ where the future is absorbed and colonised into the present.
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some more conventional mediatized forms such as certain types of film or 
television where the spectator becomes a voyeur lost in the spectacle of the 
mediatized performances. However, this sense of the absent body is not 
hidden in this cultural practice, but emphasised as another mediatized 
effect.
The live mediatized
Constants II does not concern itself exclusively with the recorded image. A 
good part of this chapter outlines the effects of a live camera within the 
performance setting. The live camera acts as a liminal mode between the 
live performance and the mediatized image as resolved in the form of a 
record. The live camera also serves to expose a live/recorded dialectic 
within the mediatized part of the work itself by setting up a live form of the 
mediatized image which exhibits different properties from the mediatized 
image as a record. There is therefore a doubling within the multi-media 
performance whereby the live performers are not just contrasted with their 
recorded equivalents, but the mediatized itself is treated as a ground on 
which to contrast the difference between live mediatized bodies and 
recorded ones. This double deliberation exposes the differences in not just 
two but three forms of address within the multi-media performance: - the 
live unmediatized - the live mediatized - and the recorded. These three 
modes of address point to moments at which the body beneath the live lens 
shares more qualities with the live performing body than a prerecorded one.
The live camera is a performative medium, it places the body in close 
proximity to the lens through which it enacts a reality. It is performative in that 
it is the mediatized equivalent of the first person present tense of spoken 
language and, as such, it privileges the originary moment of the image 
placing it firmly within the domain of the acting body; either as a body 
pictured or as constructed by the body, or both.8  As has been demonstrated, 
the recorded camera is capable of evacuating the body or the human from 
the equation of image making. As Virilio states “the series of visual 
8 In his early work on performative utterances J.L Austin believed that the first person 
present tense of the verb form was what characterised a performative utterance, but in 
his later work Austin dismantled this condition. However Emile Benveniste has reasserted 
this distinction and states the performative “must conform to a specific model, that of the 
verb in the present and in the first person” (qtd in Carlson p 62).
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impressions become meaningless. They no longer seem to belong to us, 
they just exist, as though the speed of light had won out”(9). The 
‘autonomous’ recording camera transcends the body by exerting a control 
over time and space which in turn determines the experiences of a body. 
This leads to a fantasy of power most clearly figured in the camera as 
omnipotent which denies the instrument of the camera and its products a 
human dimension. The autonomous camera begets the autonomous 
image and thus displaces any notion of a direct, effective relationship 
between the human and mediatized images, negating agency, control and 
ultimately responsibility for such images. Multi-media performance 
operates in opposition to dominant mediatized culture by functioning 
against the fantasy of technological anonymity, by staging the original 
moment of the mediatized image as coexistent with and determined by the 
human.
The sovereign contingency
Frank Lentricchia’s statement: “Art is, one of the powers that creates us as 
sociopolitical beings”(192) demonstrates the importance of art and culture 
for a society. The mediatized image in a multi-media performance setting 
exposes mediatized culture as subject to human operations. Such 
constructions are significant as they indicate that the origins of mediatized 
discourses extend from the interests and beliefs of particular (dominant) 
articulate groups. Likewise, Lentricchia’s statement also indicates that art 
has the power to help constitute a sense of ourselves, what it is to be 
human and thus also extends to determine, in part, our intersubjective 
behaviour as social beings. Not only does multi-media performance create 
a direct link between the mediatized and the body, it also demonstrates, via 
the screen, the action of the camera/media upon the body. The two 
phenomena; mediatized body/performance body are placed in close 
proximity thus facilitating a constant comparison between the two versions 
of the same body. What is demonstrated, almost immediately within 
Constants II through the use of the live cameras, is the way that the body 
can be substituted by its image. This succession of image over object has 
been taken up by numerous theorists, amongst them; Paul Virilio, Jean 
Baudrillard, Susan Sontag and Roland Barthes who observes “the 
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Photograph always leads the corpus I need back to the body I see; it is the 
absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency” (Camera Lucida 4). What is 
interesting about the mediatized body/performance body of multi-media 
performance is that despite the obvious differences between the two 
‘versions’ of the body this substitution (image for object) is still acceptable 
and it is made acceptable because the live camera images maintain a 
direct relationship with the body. A body reflects light so that it can be 
apprehended; the body can be made to equal light, (the complexity of that 
light in terms of its differing colour spectrums are an extraneous detail 
which is why a black and white image can still represent a body), it is light 
that maintains the “sovereign Contingency” of any mediatized image, 
recorded or not. 
The body’s dependency on light for its apprehension is not just operative in  
mediatized images but in all our visual perceptions. Thus the mediatized 
image plays through its technology an operation which is already 
functioning at the heart of our sensory existence - that of sight. Lacan uses 
the camera as a metaphor for the signifier of the gaze;
What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, 
is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter 
light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it 
comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which 
light is embodied and through which [...] I am photo-graphed 
(Four 106). 
Therefore, as bodies are already perceived through light, why should a 
distinction necessarily be made between the different mediums that that 
light passes through, atmospheric, chemical, electrical, and which facilitate 
that encounter? Much has been written about the objectifying power of the 
lens, for example, Moholy-Nagy’s statement; “Thus in the photographic 
camera we have the most reliable aid to a beginning of objective vision” (qtd 
in Sontag 203).9  Lacan’s camera/gaze reminds us, however, that the action 
of the lens plays out what is also a psychological function at one remove. By 
its very nature the visual encounter objectifies, and the body becomes an 
9 Almost all film theory deals in part with this aspect of the camera, and it forms a central 
theme of feminist film criticism and the theories of realism. It has been written about by, 
amongst others; Laura Mulvey, Andre Bazin, Walter Benjamin, Colin MacCabe, Berthold 
Brecht, Györg Lukàcs, Terry Lovell, John Ellis, Roland Barthes and David Bordwell.
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object of scrutiny. The lens merely doubles this process by allowing a 
further, alienated scrutiny.
Vid. 16. Constants II -”Here I am - the object”
  
What is, perhaps, unusual about multi-media performance as a cultural 
practice is that, through its combination of cameras and bodies, it restages 
this psychical process of vision and emphasises the ‘objectness’ of being. 
When Sheila presents herself through the live screen, she is also 
highlighting the presentation she already makes of herself as an 
unmediated performer in a performing space - “Here I am. The object”. Via 
the use of the prosthetic camera, multi-media performance stages this act 
of looking, and it is also able to draw attention to the consequences of 
perceptual processes. Paradoxically, as well as working with the mediatized 
image as an acceptable body substitute, by performing the body in close 
proximity to the lens, the difference between the two is also constantly 
foregrounded. The mediatized image is displaced in time and space from 
its body origin and can be frozen, fragmented and misplaced. In effect the 
camera is simultaneously embodied but also disembodies, severing the 
performer’s ties with a specific temporal and spatial dimension and 
transferring parts of bodies to screens and showing bodies to be where 
they are not. The foregrounding of this displacement reminds us that the 
mediatized (light) version of the body may not always be the same as the 
body possessed by the performer, and that the “sovereign Contingency” of 
light is not, in itself, a guarantee of equivalence. In this sense some aspects 
of multi-media performance refuse the substitution of the signifier for its 
referent, and because it purports to play out the psychological conditions of 
the perceptual process, suggests that the act of looking is itself some form 
of mediatization, or at least negotiation between the subject and object. This 
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work therefore suggests that even the apparently ‘unmediated’ operates 
through a signifier which screens the referent. In the light of this realisation 
concerning bodies, a similar scepticism could be extended toward the idea 
that vision ‘delivers’ an empirical, a priori, ‘real’ world, and instead, like the 
object body, this is actively subjectively constituted.
Embodied/disembodied
The intervention of the mediatizing camera on the body clearly changes the 
nature of the body as well as aspects of time and space. However, this is 
not a one way process, and the presence of the live body can also be seen 
to alter some aspects of mediatized images. In contrast to the majority of 
mediatized forms the omnipotence of the camera in multi-media 
performance is problematised. The mediatized image is given a body by 
using a direct address to the camera which then allows the media to act as 
a conduit to present the performer to the audience. In this way the live 
camera/screen represents ‘subject’ and likewise functions as partly 
subjective. The mediatized image in multi-media performance can also be 
disembodied, but this view is not constructed as omnipotent. The camera in 
the ‘Ghost Sequence’ is not an automaton, even through it presents a 
physically impossible point of view, its movements and the way it is 
addressed create a sense of a presence without a body, a spirit or an 
absent presence. In this way the camera/media still remains a subject, 
albeit one without a body, as opposed to the conventionally objective, 
omnipotent lens which operates beyond the subjective.
In terms of the table of oppositions proposed in chapter one which 
separated the temporal and spatial characteristics of live and recorded 
forms, some of these proposed binaries have become particularly 
problematic, not least due to the use of the third, liminal mode, of the live 
camera.
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Table 1: Temporal and Spatial Oppositions as Figured by Live and Recorded Forms
LIVE
Immediate    Continuous Space     Actual    Subjective  Changing     Unique       Temporary 
Distanced    Space Fragmented  Realistic Objective      Fixed     Repeatable  Permanent
RECORDED
Multi-media performance complicates these separations and forces a 
distinction to be made between recorded forms per se and the mediatized 
in general, some forms of which display qualities of liveness. For example, 
although space can become distanced and fragmented by a lens, when 
cameras are used in live performance, spaces, which are normally remote 
from the viewer, can actually be made visually more immediate. Live close 
up cameras can also provide a form of visual continuity which cannot 
physically be experienced by the audience, (in the opening ‘Round the 
Walls’ sequence, for instance, where all aspects of Sheila’s action can be 
seen and relayed by the ‘CCTV’ cameras). In terms of positioning the body 
and the camera in a relationship of mutual dependency, multi-media 
performance also allows the lens a much greater degree of subjectivity; 
whilst its doubling of the spectatorial act through the use of a lens 
emphasises the objectifying effect operating in all visual encounters. The 
mediatized becomes associated with those qualities of partiality and 
subjectivity normally reserved for intersubjective human encounters, and 
certainly a live unrecorded camera shares the unique, temporary and 
changing qualities of a live human body. By placing such an emphasis on 
the originary camera/body axis, multi-media performance constructs the 
image and its referent as co-dependent and therefore prevents the 
succession of one by the other. This then qualifies the notion of a future 
perfect (a record) and delays it until a moment of death or absence of the 
living occurs. 
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Spectatorial positions
Throughout this analysis I have occasionally described or assumed a 
particular audience response to Constants II. I would now like to direct my 
attention to this aspect of spectatorial positioning so that I can discuss how 
the above statements and observations directly impact on audience 
perceptions. The physical arrangement of an audience in relation to the 
performance clearly plays a vital role is shaping an engagement with the 
performance. The staging configuration shown in Vid. 2. establishes an 
unusual set of viewing circumstances, isolating each member of the 
audience and creating individual viewers rather than a massed community 
of spectators. The performance is still apprehended visually and aurally, but 
the space and action has been arranged to problematise aspects of these 
activities. Performers walk and sit down next to audience members; they 
disappear behind sections of spectators and reappear to others; individuals 
interrupt one another's view of the action and no intrinsic separation is 
made between a stage space and an audience space. The emphasis is 
one of inclusion. Likewise, due to the live cameras, the audience can also 
see themselves pictured alongside the performers on the television 
screens. 
As has already been discussed, the multi-media form of the performance 
causes a disjunction in conventional ideas of time and space to the extent 
that these phenomena become manifold. Disruptions, both literally in terms 
of interruptions in the field of vision and psychologically in terms of a 
disjunctive or overlapping sense of time and space, cause an audience to 
become aware of these conditions of time and space which govern their 
perceptions. Such a spatial configuration in combination with mediatization 
caused one such spectator, Guy Undrill, to observe “the piece realises 
Lacan’s comment that ‘I see from one point but in my existence am looked 
at from all sides’. When Patricia says ‘we are the inconstant fragmentary 
things’, for once in the theatre, this ‘we’ feels genuinely inclusive” (Bodies in 
Flight, Bourne and Rye). This awareness is driven by a bodily repositioning 
of the audience in relation to the performance which in turn marks a 
repositioning or reemphasis on the role of the body in relation to the 
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mediatized. The audience literally embodies this argument as their own 
viewing positions become complicated and highlighted as dependent upon 
their individual bodies (this construction is similar to the emphasis placed 
on the interdependent relationship of cameras to bodies). From within this 
new position questions are asked, questions which can no longer be 
confined to the bodies of the performers; namely what is the relationship of 
the body to the live, the mediated live and the recorded, and which version 
takes precedence and in what circumstances? Multi-media performance 
problematises any simple equation which might identify either the body as 
the source of an ‘objective reality’ or, similarly, the pictures created by a 
camera lens. In Constants II each version of the body, live, live mediatized, 
recorded, is seen as effective within certain specific constellations, and any 
totalizing epistemic claims made by one particular version are undermined 
by the alternative versions on offer. Just as the bodies of the performers 
become more complicated by the intervention of mediatizing elements, an 
audience understands, in a corporeal sense, that the same could also be 
said of their own bodies.
Within multi-media performance this complication of the body occurs first 
and foremost on a visual level, but because of the powerful role that the 
visual plays in the construction of a sense of self, the consequences of this 
complication extend beyond the immediate environs of the performance 
space. A conventional proscenium arch theatrical setting privileges an 
audience’s view of the stage action and, like similar film, television and 
video screen arrangements the action is unproblematically ‘given to be 
seen’. A multi-media performance such as Constants II inverts this status 
quo and as Undrill has previously remarked, an audience becomes aware 
of being both looker and looked at. In this sense the audience in such an 
event does not resemble Sartre’s initial voyeur but instead conforms to a 
further stage of voyeurism - that of the self conscious viewer. Silverman, 
paraphrasing Sartre, describes a voyeur who, while peering through the 
keyhole hears footsteps or the rustle of leaves and the extraneous sound 
makes the voyeur aware of himself; “The voyeur now vibrates with an 
awareness of himself-as-spectacle, and through that awareness a 
consciousness of self is produced” (Silverman 164). In the specific context 
of this performance a self consciousness is brought about by the 
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problematic viewing positions detailed above, and most particularly by 
confronting the audience with their own watching images shown to them on 
the television screen.
Vid. 17. Constants II -Audience
The experience of self-consciousness is brought about by the sense of 
being perceived by others who are exterior to the self and in so doing being 
placed within the spectacle. Just as the audience see the performers made 
into representations, they themselves experience the same transference 
into the representational image. In this way they understand that even if they 
do not present themselves as performers they cannot escape the 
constituting vision of others who surround them in the performance space. 
Each individual spectator becomes, like the performers, the object of 
another’s gaze. Until this moment of self-consciousness the self has been, 
in Sartre’s terms, a nothing, a blank, a void. Self awareness obliges an 
individual to construct a sense of his or her self out of this void, and vision is 
seen as one of the prime constitutive forces in the construction of that 
identity.
2.3 Summary
Constants II is concerned with the nature of what it is to be human and 
particularly the effect of time upon that experience; it stages two female 
bodies which present two polar opposites of a ‘life-span’ and introduces a 
mediatizing influence into the performing event. As has been demonstrated, 
both live and recorded mediatized material construct experiences of time 
and space which are, in some ways, contrasting to those delivered by the 
live human body. Because the mediatized products of cameras are rarely 
seen juxtaposed with their original live moments these differences are 
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rarely perceived. This allows camera images to become acceptable 
substitutes for live experience and furthermore, at times, asserts the 
camera’s view as ‘superior’ to that of the live body. This superiority, 
omnipotence and objectivity is sometimes used within the multi-media 
performance, but it is also countered by another more ‘subjective’ figuring of 
the camera and its image. Such imagery plays directly with the difference 
between the two forms of experience - mediatized and unmediatized - and 
foregrounds ruptures and discontinuities in their temporal and spatial 
frames. Neither framework is ‘resolved’ in the performance both coexist and 
sustain one another's contrasts; and thus multi-media performance is able 
to describe an experience equivalent, or similar, to that of living in a 
mediatized culture. Because this work takes place within a performance 
aesthetic which foregrounds the body, the consequence of the similarities 
and differences between the live and the mediatized are relayed directly to 
the bodies of the performers. These bodies are altered by the intervention of 
the lens, but are also figured as active and partly determining these 
manifold temporal and spatial frameworks. And because of the ‘inclusive’ 
staging of the piece with its indiscriminate live cameras, these 
consequences are not merely isolated to the bodies of the two female 
performers but extend outwards toward the audience and beyond. 
Thus, through this detailed case study of one of my multi-media 
performance pieces, I have been able to identify areas of equivalence and  
disparity between live and mediatized moments. Therefore, I have begun to 
intervene in the Phelan/Auslander debate. Auslander declares that “there 
are few grounds on which to make significant ontological distinctions” 
between the live and the mediatized. However, in analysing my material I 
have found numerous phenomenological differences (as well as some 
similarities), and these in turn would seem to hint at underlying ontological 
characteristics of the two forms. Lens-based media can affect and present 
an alternative relationship with time and space, and this is explicable when 
one considers that these media have developed (mostly) for the purposes 
of recording, they are predicated upon a control of time and space and this 
is their ontology. Performance (and the performative) can only occur amidst 
the flux of time and space as an expression within the unregulated passing 
moment. The ability to regulate and reproduce aspects of time and space in 
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turn inflects our understanding and experience of concepts such as the 
past, the present and the future, elements which determine the notion of a 
life-span and inevitably what it is to be a human body/being existing within 
these formulations. Ultimately I am convinced of the separateness of the 
two moments of the live and the mediatized because, although the two 
maybe elided as they are in multi-media performance, I realise that much of 
the effect and meaning of my work relies on and is sustained by a play on 
their differences.
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CHAPTER THREE
REALITY AND DEATH
SIMULATOR
3.1 Reality and Death
Simulator is an installation work made in response to a disused Second 
World War building in an airfield in Crail, Fife. The installation was 
constructed and presented as part of a group exhibition titled ‘The Shed’ at 
the Collins Gallery, Glasgow in June/July 1999. This work represents part of 
an ongoing research project and marks therefore an intermediate stage 
within a process, rather than a definitive response to the building.
One mile north east of the village of Crail lie the remains of H.M.S. Jackdaw, 
an airfield used to train navy personnel for the Fleet Air Arm. The airfield is 
now largely abandoned but retains a number of its original buildings 
including (set slightly apart from the rest of the camp) a bombing simulator 
or Torpedo Attack Trainer (TAT). The ‘bombing simulator’ is housed in a 
large brick barn and its exterior appears utterly nondescript, however, inside 
the building is a vast 340’ concrete cyclorama. The cyclorama and a few 
pieces of twisted metal are now all that remain of an ambitious training 
device which aimed to replicate the experience of torpedoing enemy ships. 
                  
Fig. 1. Exterior and Interior Stills of TAT, Crail Airfield, 1999a
 a Larger reproductions of all still images can be found in Appendix 4. (p.274)
The TAT at Crail was the first prototype trainer to be built in Britain and its 
purpose was to familiarise airmen with the conditions they would 
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experience while tracking, diving and torpedoing shipping traffic. The 
original device consisted of a cyclorama painted with a sea horizon line, the 
cockpit of an aeroplane in which the trainee sat and an epidiascope which 
projected the image of a moving ship onto the cyc in front of the airman. A 
number of different times of day and night, as well as a variety of different 
weather conditions, could be simulated using various lighting techniques. 
After the trainee had sighted and identified the class of enemy ship, he was 
required to dive toward his target before levelling up and releasing a 
torpedo. The TAT was able to replicate this sequence of movements, 
altering the perspective and position of the ship in relation to the pilot’s 
operation of his aeroplane controls. When the pilot released his torpedo, 
the simulation was stopped and a calculation for speed and distance was 
made. The TAT was then restarted and the ship continued to sail on to 
determine whether the torpedo (represented by a line of light on the 
cyclorama) would meet its target .
Fig. 2. Diagram of Second World War Torpedo Attack Trainer
At first sight a torpedo attack trainer may seem to have little relevance in a 
study of multi-media performance, yet, I believe that the device and its 
architecture illustrates a meeting between performance and media imaging 
technology, which, in turn, illuminates a number of preoccupations within 
my field of multi-media performance. 
The TAT exhibits a connection with the interests of performance somewhat 
tangentially through its use of theatrical scenic ‘effects’. The bombing 
simulator was designed, at military request, by two theatre specialists, 
Percy (Peter) Corry and Humphrey Watts, who owned a theatrical 
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contracting firm, Fitups, later called Watts and Corry, based in Manchester. 
Corry provides this description of the prototype trainer sited in Crail:
The complete installation consisted of a solid circular 
cyclorama 44 feet in diameter and 23 feet high, curved inwards 
at top and bottom. Substantial timber formers created the 
basic shape. To this structure extruded metal sections were 
attached, concrete being applied to create the cyclorama, 
which was plastered to a smooth surface and painted at the 
lower portion to represent the sea. The upper portion was off-
white to allow projection of sky effects. [...] In planning the 
visual effects we had resorted to theatrical lighting techniques: 
by mixing primary colours (red, green and blue) flooding the 
cyclorama, with still clouds (fleecy and stormy) projected, we 
were able to suggest a variety of sky effects (sunny day, stormy 
day, moonlight, dark night, sunset etc). [...] Special lanterns, for 
projection of horizon effects at night, and other projections to 
suggest movement over the sea were designed. A 
complicated epidiascope projector, suspended above the Link 
Trainer created an image of the target ship on the cyclorama, 
which varied in size and inclination according to range and 
bearing (39).
In the preceding passage it can be seen that many of the techniques 
incorporated in the Crail trainer: the use of a cyclorama, scenic paint effects, 
projected and coloured lighting, were adopted straight from technical 
theatre practices of the day. Indeed Corry describes his work on the trainer 
as the “adaptation of theatre techniques to the less congenial process of 
ensuring destructive efficiency”(36).
Of prime importance to Watts and Corry in their work on war time simulators 
was an accurate depiction of reality;
We found that many of these [Synthetic Trainers] were more 
concerned with mechanical operation than with realistic 
effects [...]. Our own theatrical experience made it obvious that 
[...] it was essential to suggest reality as effectively as possible 
to enable the pupil to suspend disbelief (37).
The ‘realism’ of the Crail installation is affirmed by Dunstan Hadley who 
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trained in it during 1943 and records his experiences in Barracuda Pilot:
They installed a Link Trainer in a round building which had the 
walls painted in a seascape. Some of it was with a calm sea, 
a blue sky and a horizon and some rough and foggy. It was 
illuminated to simulate various times of day [...]. The 
movements of the silhouette [of the ship] gave a very realistic 
illusion as the pilot flying his Link, without its hood of course, 
made his attack [...]. We cheerfully sank the Bismark the Tirpitz 
and a number of Japanese aircraft carriers several times a 
week (86).
Therefore, despite the prevalence of other mediums more directly 
associated with the creation of a ‘reality effect’, such as film and 
photography, in the specific instance of the TAT, theatrical techniques were  
considered to be effective in producing a “realistic illusion”.
Daguerre’s dioramas
In its use of a cyclorama, stage lighting and painted scenery, the TAT 
displays all the conventional techniques for creating a theatrical ‘scene’. 
Many of these same scenic techniques were developed during the 
nineteenth century by theatre designers and one notable exponent was 
Louis Jacques Daguerre, the inventor of the diorama, and, more famously, 
the Daguerreotype. Daguerre studied as a stage designer and specialised 
in scenic and lighting effects; he was renowned for creating magnificent 
‘realistic’ spectacles for Parisian theatre audiences. In The History of the 
Diorama and the Daguerreotype, Helmut and Alison Gernsheim provide a 
record of Daguerre’s 1819 production of La Foret de Sénart in which, critics 
claimed, he had used real streams, trees and grass, however, these were 
all the product of scenery, skilful painting and variable lighting from oil 
lamps. Daguerre went on to use his theatrical skills to produce dioramas, 
large back-lit scenic paintings which altered through changes made to their 
illumination. 
Dioramas were a popular Victorian diversion which developed from the late 
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eighteenth century tradition of ‘panoramic’ paintings1. Large, semi-
transparent linen cloths were painted front and back to depict a chosen 
scene and exhibited in purpose-built buildings. These cloths were then lit 
from behind and above by natural light which entered via large windows and 
skylights, some of which could be covered by coloured screens. By using a 
variety of shutters, the diorama artists were able to change the illumination 
of the painted cloths, thus creating the effect of different weather conditions 
and times of day. In The Vision Machine Virilio provides this description 
written by Daguerre;
Only two effects were actually painted on - day on the front of 
the canvas, night on the back, and one could shift from one to 
the other by means of a series of complicated combination of 
media the light had to pass through. But these produced an 
infinite number of additional effects similar to those Nature 
offers in its course from morning to night and vice versa (41). 
The coloured screens, what Daguerre calls ‘media’, acted like coloured 
gels and filtered out either the colour red or green from the painting, in this 
way the painters were able ingeniously to ‘animate’ their scenes causing, 
for example, the sun to rise or the candles to appear to light in a church 
scene.2  Dioramas also used another form of animation in their 
presentation; the Regents Park diorama consisted of two screens with an 
auditorium which pivoted an audience approximately 80’ to see two 
contrasting scenes (see Fig. 3.). In Paris Daguerre built a diorama in 1822 
which Virilio describes as “a veritable sight travelling machine [...]. The 
viewers’ room was mobile and spun round like a one-man-operated merry-
1 Helmut and Alison Gernsheim provide this description of a panoramic painting in The 
History of the Diorama and the Daguerreotype, its similarity to elements of the TAT 
(painted scene,controlled lighting and a curved surface extending beyond peripheral 
vision) is notable:
The general enthusiasm for panoramas in England, France and other 
countries was caused by the astonishing illusion of reality of the depicted 
scene. Placed in semi-darkness, and at the centre of a circular painting 
illuminated from above and embracing a continuous view of an entire 
region, the spectator lost all judgment of distance and space, for the 
different parts of the picture were painted so realistically and in such 
perfect perspective and scale that, in the absence of any means of 
comparison with real objects, a perfect illusion was given (5).
2 Contemporary descriptions of these weather and lighting effects in dioramas are given in 
Gernsheim, (pp. 14-17, 23-24, 28-29) including a remarkable description of A Midnight 
Mass at Saint-Etienne-du-Mont were the light wanes, candles are lit, a congregation 
arrives, a mass is sung, dawn breaks, the candles are extinguished and the congregation 
leaves p 32. 
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go-round. Everyone found themselves carried past all the paintings on 
show without apparently having to move a muscle”(40). By setting the cloth 
screens at a distance from the spectators and maintaining a low level of 
light within the auditoria the dioramas created spectacularly ‘realistic’ visual 
scenes. Most dioramas were accompanied by music and/or sound effects 
and some were supplemented by the presence of actors and even animals 
representing the ‘inhabitants’ of the scene.
                
Fig. 3. Ground Plan of the Diorama, London 1823 and a typical Diorama scene
Key to the diorama experience was the way that these painted scenes 
aimed to achieve a life-like depiction of their subjects using changes of 
lighting and the illusion of movement to heighten their reality. One unnamed 
critic quoted in Gernsheim wrote of The View of Mount St. Gotthard in 1824;
This beautiful representation of one of the grandest scenes in 
nature has the effect of bringing the reality before the eye so 
vividly as to excite those emotions and raise up those 
associations which a contemplation of the actual scene would 
produce in the mind; such truth, force and feeling is there in 
the picture (24).3  
Another critic from a contemporary magazine of the day wrote; “The View of 
Brest Harbour is not a vain representation - it is reality itself” (Gernsheim 
23). Although the dioramas created their effect primarily through an appeal 
to the visual sense it is worth remembering that the events also used sound 
effects, music, choirs, actors, animals and even occasionally smells. Thus 
the dioramas appealed to a variety of senses beyond the purely visual, and 
in this way are more akin to a type of visual theatre and come close to 
producing the nineteenth century equivalent of an ‘immersive’ environment.
3 All quotations from Gernsheim are taken from The History of the Diorama and the 
Daguerreotype.
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Interestingly Virilio makes the point that both panoramas and dioramas 
“brought a pictorial work and an architectural construct together”(39). He 
says of Daguerre; 
We are not interested here in Daguerre the scenery-painter, 
doing sets for the Paris Opera or the Ambigu Comique, but 
Daguerre the lighting engineer, the master technician, whose 
application of the image to an architectural construct used 
absolutely realistic and totally illusory time and movement 
(41).
This description could apply equally well to the work of Watts and Corry a 
century later who used similar techniques of paint, coloured light and 
movement in their bombing simulator. Indeed the TAT could be seen as a 
direct descendant of Daguerre’s dioramas and although both devices make 
use of current theatre technologies both also function in ways which are 
distinct from that of theatre. The diorama and TAT wish to create an 
immersive realistic spectacle, and to this end both forms use an enlarged 
visual field which accommodates even the peripheral vision of any potential 
spectator. Much more than just large realistic paintings, however, both 
devices are housed in purpose-built auditoria constructed in order to 
facilitate their illusion without distraction from extraneous detail or 
decoration. These buildings allow an unprecedented control over the light 
which falls on the all-encompassing painted scene and it is through the 
careful manipulation of this light that both the diorama and the TAT are able 
to perpetrate their unique forms of realism. These paintings are animated 
by light, brought to life by the movement of light and this provides a realism 
of a new order - the realism of passing time. Gernsheim identifies the 
diorama as the precursor of cinema and these expansive visual spectacles 
unfolding in time are more akin to the moving recreations of ‘life’ afforded by 
film, than the concerns of graphical accuracy which have been the 
preoccupation of much pictorial representation. An emphasis on movement 
is further accented in some dioramas by the bodily repositioning of the 
spectators in order that they can see two scenic canvases in one visit or the 
continual motion of a canvas passing before spectators moved on giant 
upright rollers. This motion is drastically extended in the TAT into a complex 
and sophisticated alteration of the visual spectacle in relation to the various 
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bodily actions of the spectator/pilot. Therefore both the TAT and dioramas 
combine elements of painting and theatre to move toward a type of realist 
spectacle which, seen from a contemporary perspective, seems somewhat 
more aligned with the interests of forms such as cinema and virtual reality.
The concerns of theatre, pictorial representation and realism are linked in 
the figure of Daguerre not least as he went on to market successfully the 
Daguerreotype, an early type of photographic process which used mercury 
vapour and an iodine-sensitized silvered plate to present a fixed image. His 
interest in creating realistic images persisted and in 1838 he wrote; “The 
Daguerreotype is not merely an instrument which serves to draw nature [...] 
[it] gives her the power to reproduce herself” (qtd in Sontag 188). However, 
resonances between the two practices of theatre and realistic pictorial 
representation, including photography, reverberate beyond the individual 
figure of Daguerre and many are manifest in the work of Watts and Corry 
and the fabric of the TAT. The TAT uses lighting, paint and architectural 
construction to create an environment which simulates an ‘external reality’ 
in which people may act out in present time the concerns and 
preoccupations of the day. In its creation of a simulated world Watts and 
Corry’s TAT meets theatre once more but this time not through a direct 
technical connection but in a shared intent. The trainer, like the theatre, 
recreates a ‘life-like’ live arena in which specific socio-political 
preoccupations are revisited and interrogated. Both the theatre and the TAT 
operate by creating a ‘model world’, a limited but nevertheless recognisably 
‘exterior’ environment in which their performers may rehearse and act out 
their desires and fears. The advantage that theatre has over film and 
photography for these purposes, despite the superior ‘realism’ of these 
later forms, is that, as a live medium, it can adapt and evolve to a degree in 
a spontaneous relationship with its performer. Film or photography, as fixed 
media, cannot respond to a performance such as that provided in the TAT 
by the moment to moment decision-making executed by the 
spectating/performing pilot.
War and photography 
The influence of film and photography and other lens-based media can also 
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be observed in the TAT. Most obviously the device uses a projecting lens, in 
the form of an epidiascope, to reproduce the presence of an enemy ship 
moving across the sea’s horizon. An epidiascope, like a film or slide 
projector, projects an image across a space and onto a screen, unlike 
these other projectors, however, it does not require its image/object to be 
based on transparent film. An epidiascope projects an image from a solid 
object, which, in the case of the TAT, was a scale model of a war ship. The 
bombing simulator exhibits other similarities with imaging technologies 
primarily through a shared taxonomy with photography and the operations of 
the camera. In an unpublished memoir of H.M.S Jackdaw, an unnamed 
individual who was responsible for Civilian Transport Maintenance during 
the war refers to a ‘camera gun’ used by the pilots training in the simulator. 
The details of the recollection are somewhat inaccurate as the speaker 
never actually saw the TAT in action and no such ‘camera gun’ existed, 
however, the name given to this fictitious object indicates a confusion of 
activities which are indeed played out in the operation of the simulator.
Both Sontag in On Photography and Barthes in Camera Lucida write about 
the similarities between the language of war making and image taking: 
Sontag notes “we talk about ‘loading’ and ‘aiming’ a camera, about 
‘shooting’ a film. [...] the camera is a sublimation of the gun, to photograph 
someone is a sublimated murder”(14/5). Barthes names the subject of the 
photograph “the target”(9) he writes about the camera shutter as “the trigger 
of the lens”(15) and, more abstractly, he writes of “an intense immobility: 
linked to a detail (to a detonator), an explosion [which] makes a little star on 
the pane of the text or of the photograph”(49).4  The actions that the pilot 
rehearses bear a likeness to those of the photographer; they must first 
‘sight’ their ‘target’ by ‘aiming’ the ‘cross hair’ of the ‘camera/gun’ (bomb 
sight); they must then ‘shoot’ the ‘target’ by releasing a ‘trigger’ and the final 
moment of capture is signalled by an ‘explosive/exposive detonation’ or 
‘flash’ of light which reveals as it obliterates. It is in this explosive/exposive 
moment that Berger in his book About Looking, like Sontag, identifies the 
‘violence’ of photography; 
The camera which isolates a moment of agony isolates no 
more violently than the experience of that moment isolates 
4 All quotations from Barthes in this chapter are taken from Camera Lucida.
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itself. The word trigger, applied to a rifle and camera, reflects 
the correspondence which does not stop at the purely 
mechanical. The image seized by the camera is doubly violent 
and both violences reinforce the same contrast: the contrast 
between the photographed moment and all others (39).
Berger’s idea, which corresponds with Sontag’s, compares the violence of 
war with that of photography. He believes photography performs a kind of 
violence upon its object and its viewer by removing an image from the 
temporal flow of life - Barthes’ “intense immobility”. The discontinuity of the 
photograph’s relation with lived time in turn affects, in the viewer of the 
photograph, an alienated apathy, so, just as “the person who is recording 
cannot intervene” (Sontag 12), the person who views is paralysed like the 
petrified image itself; “Images transfix. Images anaesthetize” (Sontag 20). 
This leads to an ethical and moral dilemma. Sontag declares “The ethical 
content of photographs is fragile. [...] The particular qualities and intentions 
of photographs tend to be swallowed up in the generalised pathos of time 
past”(21) and Berger writes of the particular ‘contradiction’ of war 
photography;
its purpose is to awaken concern. The most extreme 
examples [...] show moments of agony in order to extort the 
maximum concern. Such moments, whether photographed or 
not, are discontinuous with all other moments. They exist by 
themselves. But the reader who has been arrested by the 
photograph may tend to feel this discontinuity as his own 
personal moral inadequacy. And as soon as this happens 
even his sense of shock is dispersed: his own moral 
inadequacy may shock him as much as the crimes being 
committed in the war. [...] the issue of the war which has 
caused that moment is effectively depoliticised (39/40).
Berger, Sontag and Virilio have all written specifically about photography’s 
relationship with war. Sontag notes “War and photography now seem 
inseparable”(167) and cites Félix Tournachon Nadar‘s realisation in 1855 of 
the benefits of aerial photography for war makers. Virilio writes of the 
importance of British and American photographic propaganda to the 
success of the Second World War and the inversion of this during the 
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Vietnam conflict. He also describes the effect of the First World War on the 
physical and psychological environment of the western world and makes a 
direct comparison between guns and cameras
it [is] the environment which is constantly targeted, intercepted 
by an optical arsenal going from the ‘line of sight’ of the 
firearm - cannons, rifles, machine guns, used on an 
unprecedented scale - to cameras, the high-speed equipment 
of aerial intelligence, projecting an image of a de-materialising 
world (13).
And Virilio claims that from this time on ”the visual field was reduced to the 
line of a sighting device”(13). Virilio puts forward a thesis that sees the 
depersonalised distanced vision of photography, exemplified in military 
imaging technology, as the key to an understanding of our contemporary 
relationship with the image/world. 
War and photography provide numerous examples of practical connections 
as well as analogies to describe one another and elements of modern day 
existence, dominated as it is by the mediatized image. The TAT forms a 
small part of this constellation in that although its use of actual 
photographic technology is minimal (it can only really be associated with 
imaging optics in general via its epidiascope) the function of the TAT does 
parallel uses of the camera in war time, particularly that of aerial 
surveillance as predicted by Nadar. Here images are removed from the front 
line, the actual arena of war, by reconnaissance photographers and these 
pictures are then used, in the secure environment of a command centre to 
prepare and plan future attacks. The TAT is also a visually orientated 
representation which has been removed from the unpredictable context of 
the battlefield in order to facilitate and prepare for a future encounter within 
this unstable actuality. Both the TAT and photographs act to separate 
experience from an immediate, volatile context and resituate it in a safer, 
more predicable environment as a form of reflection and preparation. Thus 
both forms construct, through vision, a distanced, alienated relationship - a 
world at one remove - what Virilio calls “a certain teletopology”(7) which he 
notes is “marked by its remote beginnings in war”(6). Virilio describes this 
phenomena as contrasting with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s proposition 
“Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my 
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sight, marked on the map of the ‘I can’”. Virilio notes “The bulk of what I see 
is, in fact and in principle, no longer within my reach. And even if it lies within 
reach of my sight, it is no longer necessarily inscribed on the map of the ‘I 
can’”. Virilio names this modern remote imaging “the logistics of 
perception”(7). 
To continue with this military metaphor, I would like to equate the moment at 
which a photograph is taken to a moment of detonation, a detonation which 
Barthes recognises later in a detail on the surface of the photograph. This 
‘explosive/exposive’ moment is particularly recognisable in flash 
photography accompanied, as it is, by a bright burst of light caused by a 
‘charged’ release of energy from a ‘flashgun’; it is repeated in the TAT by a 
flare effect which lights up the miniature model ship and the beam of a 
spotlight which traces the path of the virtual torpedo; ultimately it is resolved 
in the moment at sea when the charged projectile meets its target thus 
causing an explosive detonation which is accompanied by a blaze of 
dazzling light. I am particularly interested in this moment as it seems to be 
the point at which photography meets performance; it is a time of cleaving 
when life binds to the image and, simultaneously, the image splits from life 
in the stasis which Berger finds so violent. In “A Small History of 
Photography” Walter Benjamin calls this moment - the “Here and Now” of 
photography - which Benjamin claims causes the viewer “to search such a 
picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which 
reality has so to speak seared the subject”(243). In photography this 
‘searing’ of the particular ‘here and now’ is often signalled by the shocking 
flash of an excess of brilliant light which marks the origin of photography’s 
claims for realism.
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Real language5
Theatre, Performance, Photography, and by extension the TAT, all have 
similar and competing relations with notions of ‘reality’. Theatre seems to 
exhibit, at best, a tenuous relationship with the concept of a real. Theatre, 
particularly Naturalist and Realist theatre, may attempt to construct, through 
scenography (and the work of people like Daguerre and Watts and Corry) 
the sense of a ‘real space’ in which the action of a play takes place. 
However, framed, as it is, by the architecture of the theatre itself, such a 
strategy will always end when the scenery meets the proscenium arch. The 
‘frame’ which contains the play, like the frame of a photograph, indicates a 
border where one reality stops and another starts. Inside the stage space 
the reality of the play, in terms of theatrical setting, becomes the domain of 
painting and sculpture, carefully constructed sets and props which 
reference parts of a recognisable environment. In its overt reproductions of 
an exterior environment the theatre, in some senses, always remains a 
fictitious space. As Schieffelin has noted;
In Euro-American (basically Aristotelian) tradition this divide is 
[...] a metaphysical, even ontological, one between a world of 
spectators which is real and a world conjured up by 
performers which is not, or more precisely, which has another 
kind of reality: a virtual or imaginary one (200).
I would argue, that the “virtual or imaginary” realism of theatre is met in 
another, more cerebral encounter via its deployment of live human bodies 
performing human behaviours. Through its use of actors working as 
individual characters, theatre dramatises fundamental human fears and 
desires and these ‘plays’ are the source of its comedy and its tragedy. 
Realism in theatre comes from its representation of intersubjective 
behaviour and human psychology, much of which, though perhaps 
exaggerated by the demands of narrative fiction, is recognised and also 
‘performed’ by its watching audience in the wider world.
5 The discussion that follows is not intended to reference The Real in the specific 
psychoanalytical Lacanian sense (ie the third order of subjectivity which lies beyond 
symbolisation) but to the many ‘reals’ constructed by discursive practices which offer 
representations of worlds/situations intended to represent and conform to a consensual 
notion of ‘reality’ and which, in so doing, make recourse to epistemic claims of truth. 
However arguments concerning forms of representational expression which make 
recourse to a realist aesthetic do impact upon The Real in the sense that they invoke the 
Imaginary and masquerade as expressions made ‘outside’ of the symbolic. See footnote 
7.
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Performance, as an extension of and reaction to theatre, provides a more 
definite relationship with an idea of reality in that it presents an ‘actuality’. 
Philip Monk writes “The early history of performance distinguished between 
theatre as representation and performance as the literalization of event - 
where the meaning was inscribed from outside through the material and 
context, in the real time and space of the artist’s actual body”(163). Chantal 
Pontbriand has also recognised this quality of “literalization” in 
performance; “performance unfolds in a real time and a real place without 
any imaginary or transcendental space-time a priori, performance 
actualizes time and place”(155). Pontbriand traces this “actualization” back 
to the influence of photography and cinema in modern culture. Quoting 
Benjamin she notes that performance, like a mechanically reproduced work 
of art, arises from “the desire of the contemporary masses to bring things 
‘closer’ spatially and humanly” (Illuminations 216/7) and she continues; 
“[mechanical] Reproduction techniques invest art with a proximity or 
immediacy, a presentness, and a materiality, previously unthinkable”(156). 
Thus, in an attempt to present reality, performance operates without the 
overt codes and signs of theatre (fixed character, costumes, scenery etc.) 
and “withdraws from representation into simple presentation [...] into simple 
actuality”(156). This means performance purports to be ‘signless’, or to 
work through what Pontbriand calls “the transparent sign” and, in so doing 
therefore, “performance introduces the function of the index”(157). Here, 
once more, we find a meeting between photography and performance in the 
shared “transparent sign”. The means by which performance “aims to show 
the real without mystification”(157) is more aligned with photography, and 
the products of lenses, than theatre and leads Pontbriand to conclude “A 
consequence of mechanical reproducibility is performance”(157).
In concert with Pontbriand's observations on performance Barthes notes the 
‘signless’ quality of the photograph; “A specific photograph, in effect, is 
never distinguished from its referent (from what it represents) [...] it is not 
possible to perceive the photographic signifier [...] a photograph is always 
invisible”(5/6). In fact a photograph straddles two of the three orders of 
signs identified by semiology, according to C.S. Peirce (paraphrased by 
Lapsley & Westlake) it “is both icon, in that it is similar to its objects, and 
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index, in that it is an effect on photographic emulsion of light interacting with 
the object”(36). An icon functions, as its name suggests, through displaying 
a resemblance to the object it signifies, an index operates through a causal 
relationship, “by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object did 
not exist” (qtd Lapsley & Westlake 35). Both orders lessen the gap between 
the object and its sign, between signified and signifier, and their 
representations can therefore, to a lesser or greater degree, become 
synonymous with that object. This process is encouraged more significantly 
by the index than the icon however. The index, because of its causal 
dependence on the object, cannot have an origin independent of the object 
it signifies, and this contingency assures that, as the signifier is (was once) 
one with the object, it disappears. As the photograph seems to function 
without a code, mark or language, it appears to be the material object, as 
Barthes states “the photograph always carries its referent with itself”(5). 
This realisation provokes Sontag’s oft quoted assertion of the photograph 
as “a trace, something directly stencilled off the real, like a footprint or a 
death mask”(154). Through its causally dependent signifier the photograph 
bears no sign of the re-presentation of its object and as Westlake and 
Lapsley have noted the ‘reality effect’ is dependent partly on “effacing all 
signs of [...] production”(161) Therefore, because “a photograph is always 
invisible” it makes a particularly strong claim in terms of reality for the object 
it depicts. This claim is further strengthened by the automated nature of its 
production, to quote Andre Bazin from “The Ontology of the Photographic 
Image” in What is Cinema,
For the first time, between the originating object and its 
reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a 
nonliving agent. For the first time an image of the world is 
formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man 
[...]. The objective nature of photography confers upon it a 
quality of credibility absent from other picture-making [...] we 
are forced to accept as real the existence of the object 
reproduced (13).
Therefore, unlike a painted image for example, a mediatized image, such 
as a photograph, is never tainted with the suggestion of human intervention 
and thus subjective interpretation - you see what was there.
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Photography and performance appear to abandon the third signifying order 
of the symbol, which is the domain of character-based literary theatre. The 
symbol “is arbitrarily linked to its objects by means of an association of 
ideas or habitual connection” (Lapsley & Westlake 36) prime examples of 
such codes being spoken and written languages. As this signifying system 
is abstract and based on societal conventions, the relationship between its 
signifier and signified is not conditioned by a dependent or resemblant 
union between sign and object; “Because it is not a case of a one-to-one 
correspondence, language does not therefore reflect reality” states Susan 
Hayward in her book Key Concepts in Cinema Studies. However we must 
be careful here not to dismiss language’s allegiance with reality, (or indeed 
to assume that, inversely that the other orders of signs can ‘reflect’ reality). 
As Hayward goes on to explain, “Rather, language becomes a signifying 
system that sets ‘reality’ before the ears. It constitutes, mediates 
reality...”(309). This notion that the concept of reality is constituted by 
language arises from the work of Lacan who famously declared “It is the 
world of words that creates the world of things” (Écrits 65) and thus deemed 
reality and ‘real’ objects, to be dependent upon language. Because all 
experience (expression and perception) is mediated by language, reality 
can never be pre-discursive. Adrian Heathfield has succinctly expressed 
this; “reality cannot possibly be perceived outside of, and is always already 
enmeshed within, the linguistic”. What is important in this context, however, 
is that photography and performance seem to make an appeal to a different 
real from that of symbolic language, an empirical, external, preexisting 
reality of the objects and beings around us ‘presented’ through the 
‘transparent sign’ in indexical images and photographs of the camera.6  
This is a more powerful ‘real’ because it seems to extend beyond the 
control and influence of the symbolic with its (somewhat hidden) 
6 Whereas by Lacan’s formulation the index is subordinate to the symbol - “It is the world 
of words that creates the world of things” (Écrits 65).
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associations of arbitrary and culturally determined signification.7  This is why 
performance and photography, unlike theatre, only seem concerned with 
presentation (and its associated actuality) and not representation with its 
associations of arbitrary signification, subjectivity and ‘human’ language.
The here and now
The TAT, like a photograph, makes its appeal to a reality via a 
representation which operates through the visual sense, however it veers 
towards the iconic rather than the indexical sign in that its reproductions of 
this ‘external’ reality occur through painted and modelled ‘resemblances’ to 
sky, sea, ships etc. and are not of the dependent order of the photographic 
index. As these resemblances are worked by the human hand, 
approximations and interpretations are seen to occur and these elements 
constitute a form which drifts towards an overt ‘language’. However it is 
interesting to note the function of light within this context as it is the action of 
light on a painted scene which draws the representational form back to a 
more indexical type of reality. Light in the diorama allowed for an animation 
of the scene and this was the source of its successful illusion of reality. 
When Daguerre used specific lighting with his stage settings he was 
acknowledged to have transfigured ‘real’ scenes. The TAT also uses 
controlled lighting to give motion to its simulation and this motion gives the 
appearance of a life-like reality. Light is ubiquitous and all pervasive, it 
therefore carries with it a powerful realism. ‘Natural’ light would appear to 
be beyond manipulation and control and thus changes to this light must be 
of a ‘natural’ order which is not of human origin. Although an audience (or 
7 The symbolic carries with it a sense of its arbitrary relation between signified and signifier 
in the form of the condition of lack. In a Lacanian/Freudian description of the formation of 
the ego the child’s entry into the Symbolic occurs with the acquisition of language and 
the acceptance of social laws and codes. This progression occurs at the expense of a 
‘unity’ experienced in the earlier, prelinguistic Imaginary. Throughout our conscious 
existence in the Symbolic a sense of the lost unity of the Imaginary remains as something 
to be returned to and this sense is described as the condition of lack, just as we are born 
into language we are inevitably also born into lack. The gap between signified and 
signifier exemplified by the symbolic code of spoken and written language acts as a 
constant reminder of this lack, whereas with the iconic and indexical codes of images, 
particularly mediatized ones, the gap between signified and signifier is lessened or 
effaced. In human subjectivity for this reason images can be more aligned with the unity 
of the Imaginary. This is where realism meets The Real as that which is beyond 
symbolisation although in the final analysis images cannot escape the trap of the 
symbolic conditioned as they are, along with all aspects of existence, by the linguistic.
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the pilot) might be well aware of stage lighting as artificial, it cannot prevent 
a powerful association with reality occurring when presented with a scene 
animated and transformed by changes in light. Beyond the theatrical arts it 
is possible to identify the ‘reality effect’ which light brings as it works directly 
on the light sensitive material used in still and moving cameras to create its 
indexical images. In these representations light is the causal agent and it is 
through light that these images present a strong sense of reality. In this 
sense the photographic arts, as is suggested by the figure of Daguerre, can 
be seen as a development of earlier theatrical traditions concerned with the 
control and manipulation of light. Photography just achieved the logical 
extension of this project in that it perfected this control in an ability to trap 
and capture light.
There is another feature of the TAT however which manoeuvres it away from 
photographic realism and back toward theatre and performance and this 
occurs through its interest in the body. Even though the TAT emphasises 
the visual, the experience of training in it is not an exclusively visual 
encounter, indeed crucially it is the relationship between the body of the pilot 
and the visual depictions of an external reality which gives the TAT its 
particular effect. It is the bodily presence and actions of the pilot which 
manipulate these realistic images and in so doing create the simulators’ 
overall reality effect, an effect which is a combination of a bodily reality with 
an imagistic one. The introduction of the body into the representational 
equation of the real, aligns the TAT with the modern day simulations of 
virtual reality (VR), and indeed, as an early example of a flight simulator the 
TAT is clearly a pioneer in this field. Within the technical limitations of the 
day (primarily in this instance theatrical) the TAT attempts to construct an 
analogue model of an external world which, when ‘performed’, responds 
much like that external reality. The report from the ‘Barracuda Pilot’, Dunstan 
Hadley, of “a very realistic illusion” testifies to its success. Therefore the 
TAT, as an early form of virtual reality, appears to be interested in recreating 
a reality in much the same way as performance is by appealing beyond the 
purely visual (like the dioramas) to a multisensory experience involving the 
body of the operator as well as his eyes. The position of the pilot who 
operates in the TAT has similarities with both the performer and spectator of 
a performance, because through the body the TAT tries to conjure up an 
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actuality that performance also aims to provide. 
Performance, theatre, photography and virtual reality all create competing 
and contradictory versions of the temporal and spatial conceptions of a 
‘here and now’ and it is via these different constructions that each of these 
forms maintain a relationship with notions of reality. For example, as 
previously quoted, Benjamin named the “here and now” of photography its 
“spark of contingency” and hence saw it as the origin the reality of a 
photograph. Performance is totally concerned with the ‘here and now’ of 
present time, as Pontbriand states “what is involved [in performance] is 
indeed an obvious presence, not a presence sought after or represented; 
this desire to discover, then, a here/now which has no other referent except 
itself”(157). Theatre is a live event and as such maintains the ‘now’ potency 
of present time, however, by making a physical and rhetorical separation 
between its ‘representational’ stage world and the ‘real’ space of the 
auditorium and its audience, theatre reconfigures the ‘here and now’ into an 
alternative sense of a ‘there and now’. Barthes talks about the represented 
present when he notes that “Every photograph is a certificate of presence” 
(87) but what is significant in this construction is the word “certificate” as 
this indicates the ‘here and now’ that really concerns photography is the 
‘here and now’ of the past,- an ‘I was here’. Barthes again acknowledges 
this by naming the “noeme” as photography’s “essence”, its identifying 
principle, “the thing that has been there”(6). Virtual reality and its 
accompanying utopian rhetorics as identified by Robins seem at times to 
allude to the third tense of future time;
Mundane realities and experiences seem to pale in 
comparison to dreams of virtual life and cyberculture. Have 
faith in these technologies of the future, the techno-visionaries 
exhort us, embrace the emancipatory potential of the new 
technoculture. Invest your trust and optimism in this brave new 
vision. What we have in this idealisation of image 
technologies is the basis of a new utopianism (3). 
However, in (virtual) reality these simulations are constructed in the more 
negative space of a never ‘here and now’ - or as Robins points out the 
‘nowhere’ of Thomas More’s original utopian vision. 
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The TAT exhibits a connection with each one of these ‘here and nows’ and 
in so doing manages to share elements of the realism provided by each of 
the forms. As has been demonstrated the TAT uses the signs of theatre’s 
‘representational real’ (scenery, stage lighting, character acting in the role of 
‘the pilot’) to present its ‘theatre of war’; however through the body of the 
pilot, who also is a pilot, it includes performance’s ‘bodily real’. Like a 
photograph the TAT is a displacement of a specific visual segment from an 
external reality, but unlike a photograph this displacement does not occur in 
time; therefore it is the contemporary TAT, an historic building, which is 
more akin to a photograph in that it references a reality which has passed. 
Virtual reality, like performance, is interested in the bodily real, but it places 
that real within a multisensory responsive array; the TAT executes a 
primitive version of this virtual reality by working the body in combination with 
a visual which is responsive to the actions of that body. Yet all these reals 
are superseded and placed into perspective by a socio-political one - the 
reality of the war. The event the TAT recreates, that of warfare, is contiguous 
with its simulation and gives a present urgency to its function as a training 
environment. The phenomena of the TAT is charged by the proximity of the 
war, and the time of the TAT is an explosive ‘here and now’ beyond that of 
performance, theatre, photography or VR. Its simulation of reality touches a 
real by the very immediacy of the war, which lies in attendance beyond its 
brick skin. After training in the simulator the pilot steps out to replay his 
actions in the real arena of life and death. Nevertheless this intensifying 
historical real is what, in the final analysis, also exposes the TAT as 
ultimately a simulation of reality just like all the other cultural forms. Like the 
fantasy of VR of which it is a precursor, the TAT omits a vital constituent of 
that reality which is pre-eminent in wartime - the reality of death. Virtual 
reality as a ‘nowhere’ space ultimately denies this encounter with death, but 
paradoxically it is through its proximity to the possibility of death that the TAT 
achieves its unique sense of realism. We define a form as realistic when it 
creates “the representation of reality which a particular society proposes 
and assumes as ‘Reality’” (Heath 20) yet one crucial element to the ‘reality’ 
of life is its accompanying inevitability of death. Upon considering the TAT in 
relation to its context - the Second World War - the absence of death in its 
simulation of reality is exposed and such reflection might provoke further 
questions about the presence of death in other, so called, realistic forms.  
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Margaret Iversen in “What is Photography” puts forward the thesis that 
Barthes’ hunt for a photograph of his dead mother in Camera Lucida is a 
commentary on Lacan’s 1964 seminar (published as Four Fundamental 
Concepts...) and asserts that; “its underlying theme is taken from Lacan’s 
account of the encounter with the Real which is ultimately an encounter with 
the persistently denied fact of one’s own mortality’”(451). I would like to 
expand on this notion and suggest that all cultural (artistic) practices could 
be viewed in terms of the degrees by which they deny mortality, and thus, 
the ways in which they establish alternative, death-defying realities to efface 
this ultimate Real.
Death-defying simulation
The phenomenon of death is perhaps the single most powerful force in the 
constitution of western culture. In “Facing the Other: The Performance 
Encounter and Death” Heathfield quotes a number of studies, including 
Zygmunt Bauman’s Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies which 
“share the understanding of cultural production and its social organisation 
as originating in a defensive reaction to the threat of mortality”. Heathfield, 
working from Baudrillard, also proposes that in a sense “our society stages 
a failed collective repression of death which necessarily returns to haunt us 
in the symbolic sphere” hence Baudrillard’s assertion “we live in a culture of 
death”. How is this ‘haunting’ manifest within culture? Heathfield 
paraphrases Baudrillard from “Symbolic Exchange and Death”; “For 
Baudrillard, all forms of reproduction, whether intellectual, industrial or 
biological, arise from the attempt to ascribe absolute value to life in the face 
of its negation through death”. Heathfield goes on to make a connection 
between the notion of reproduction as an “exclusionary protection against 
the force of death” and Freud’s thinking on repetition detailed in “The 
‘Uncanny’”; “He [Freud] saw repetition as the ego’s attempted protection 
against death and related this to the figure of the double, exemplified 
through the ‘immortal soul’”. Thus reproduction and repetition are tactics 
mobilised in order to achieve a form of continuation or transcendent 
immortality in the face of our inevitable annihilation through death. Robins, 
writing specifically about digital technologies, suggests that “Death defying 
simulation is linked to powerful fantasies of rational transcendence”(161) 
108
and this is a project he identifies as operating within culture centuries prior 
to contemporary imaging technologies; “Images have always been linked 
with death”(160) he says. In the light of Heathfield I would extend this idea to 
include all forms of cultural repetition not just those of the image: just as the 
photograph visually ‘repeats’ a segment of a material reality, the theatre 
‘repeats’ human environments and behaviour and the TAT ‘repeats’ a 
particular battle scenario. The repetition of elements from life that these 
forms execute, are also the basis of their claims to ‘realism’ in all its 
guises, and repetition and its attendant realism can now be seen as an 
aesthetic practice provoked by a fundamental desire to escape from death.8 
Perhaps the photograph, of all cultural forms, can most clearly be construed 
as an escape from death. The photograph, as a visual repetition of the 
object/self, is an attempt to defy death by preserving the object/self in a 
cryonic photographic image. This repetition, once again, originates in a 
human necessity, in the words of the American poet Thomas Lynch, “we 
want and crave as humans some measure of immortality”. The immortality 
delivered by the photograph works through its frozen image, it succeeds 
because it removes its object from the mortalising effects of time,or what 
Jonathan Dollimore terms “the tyranny of time” (Lynch). Heathfield cites 
Bauman’s idea of “object-hood” as a form of “survival strategy” within culture 
which fixes “that which eludes [...] into identifiable and knowable objects”. 
This objecthood means culture “embodies a certain substantiality which 
seems to escape life’s transience, and thus attains a kind of 
‘extemporality’”.9  This extemporality is exactly the effect of photography 
which immortalises through its reproduction and repetition of life. 
Paradoxically, however, although reproduction and repetition are mobilised 
as escapes from death, they also deliver death; “repetition can summon 
death as an immanent power” states Heathfield. Heathfield continues 
“Although it is designed to shore up the psyche, the compulsion to repeat is 
based on a need for stability and stasis, a halting of temporality; it is a 
8 Repetition is also death-bound, in that as well as acting as an escape from death it also 
paradoxically functions as a desire for death. This idea forms the basis of my argument 
later in this section.
9 Heathfield takes this term from Bauman’s Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies       
  p.31.
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retrogressive movement which seeks an earlier condition without time and 
division and is thus, paradoxically, a movement towards death”. Repetition 
therefore is also death-bound. This observation in terms of photography 
has, as I have already outlined, been forcefully made by both Sontag and 
Barthes and relates directly to objecthood and its associated 
“extemporality”. Barthes titles photographers “agents of death” and on being 
photographed states, “I am neither subject nor object but a subject who 
feels he is becoming an object: I then experience a micro-version of death 
(of parenthesis)”(14). Likewise Sontag observes;
All photographs are memento mori. To take a photograph is to 
participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, 
vulnerability, mutability. Precisely by slicing out this moment 
and freezing it, all photographs testify to time’s relentless melt 
(15). 
This extemporality is the origin of photography’s violence as identified by, 
amongst others, Berger and it is a moment which is sometimes signalled 
by a shocking flash of light which marks this moment of separation from 
time.
But what of the other cultural forms which concern us here? Barthes also 
makes a useful observation on the relationship of theatre to death which 
allows him to construct a connection between photography and theatre. He 
posits that photography relates to art not through painting, (which is a 
connection traced by most conventional histories of photography via the 
camera obscura) but through theatre whose masked and/or made up body 
of the actor denotes the performer as “simultaneously living and dead: [...] 
Photography is a kind of primitive theater, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a 
figuration of the motionless and made-up face beneath which we see the 
dead”(31/32). Barthes cites theatres’ origination in death rituals exemplified 
by the use of the mask or make up which allow its actors to stand in for the 
dead. Theatre, in its origins therefore, acts like photography, as through its 
masked performer it signals both life and death. In a sense both theatre 
and photography contain the paradox of repetition as representations of life 
delivered through a kind of death, thus not only could they be seen as both 
agents of death but also, more practically, as rehearsals for the moment of 
mortality. 
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I have not yet discussed performance in relation to repetition and death in 
many ways because it forms a somewhat different equation with these 
phenomena from photography and theatre. Previously I outlined a 
separation between performance and theatre in respect of the overt uses of 
codes of representation, and concurred with Pontbriand’s conclusion that 
performance, like photography, functions through the use of the transparent 
sign. Death in theatre is delivered by its overt signs of representation, 
principally that of the mask. Death in photography, which is without sign, is 
manifested instead by its extemporal stasis. Both deaths are delivered 
through repetition. Performance contains neither mask nor stasis, it 
attempts to penetrate to the Real by being real rather than repeating it, 
therefore through its staging of actuality it could be seen to elude death by 
avoiding repetition. However, as we have already demonstrated, culture in 
general is constructed as a defence against death’s alterity and therefore 
performance, as a cultural construct, cannot avoid death. Thus it is 
necessary to seek out the presence of death in performance. Performance 
cannot avoid repetition in as much as consciousness cannot; “no one is 
ever anything but the copy of a copy, real or mental” states Barthes (102). 
Performance, (like photography), may attempt to do away with the signs of 
repetition, but these signs are merely secondary manifestations of a 
process which has already occurred with consciousness’ entry into the 
Symbolic via the acquisition of language. Therefore in order to ‘make sense’ 
or ‘be understood’ even as actuality or the pure present of the ‘here and 
now’, performance still has to operate through language, through signs, 
signs of actuality. As Derrida states in Writing and Difference “Presence, in 
order to be presence and self-presence, has always already begun to 
represent itself”(249). These signs of actuality are invisible because, like 
photography, they are signs which conform to a seen, felt, sensed, tangible 
reality, but even though they do not signal representation they cannot be 
beyond it. Therefore repetition in the sense of the representational may be 
invisible in performance but in order to have meaning and be constituted as 
such, performance must operate through signs and a sign, even an 
indexical sign, is a repetition. 
Photography affects its repetition through extemporality by removing an 
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image from time, it then doubles this repetition by re-presenting this frozen 
past time in present time. As a live medium, performance occurs in present 
time and therefore remains, to some degree, in flux; it thus escapes the 
double repetition of time afforded by the static photograph. However some 
performance work can exhibit extemporal qualities and it does so via forms 
of repetition. Heathfield cites the work of companies such as Forced 
Entertainment and Goat Island as examples of “performance as repetition” 
in that their work presents “a re-staging of events which, for the acting 
subject, persistently evade explanation and conscious mastery”. 
(Interestingly these elements of the performances are often modelled on 
photographically derived sources such as cinema and television 
sequences). These companies then “present to us a body that is falling out 
of linear time. Physical action [...] is non-progressive”. The ex or atemporal 
body in these performances becomes like the photographic or (recorded) 
mediatized body. Yet a significant difference still exists between the 
performing body and the recorded body in its relation to time. The time of the 
recorded image is essentially one of recovery, recovery of a past 
moment/event into the present and this executes a form of resolution for the 
image. In non progressive time, which is signalled by the performing body, 
actions are repeated but these are not past actions and are only similar to 
the actions of the moments before.10  Performance, because it has not fixed 
the past like photography, is a form which can never deliver this resolution 
when past meets present. Therefore there can be no overall mastery or 
recovery of time in this type of repetition and for this reason time, in this form 
of cultural expression, can only be experienced as loss.11  Is this where the 
repetition of performance meets death through its staging of time as loss? 
“Temporal progress, which held death in a suspended future, is replaced by 
an experience of time constituted as loss” states Heathfield. Could it be that 
performance does not constitute quite such an impervious barrier against 
the notion of death as the other reality-substituting forms of culture we have 
examined? Through its experience of time as loss, performance presages 
death and figures death as the imperative. Even in the most death-defying 
10 I made similar observations in relation to the freeze in the case study Constants II in 
chapter two.
11 Heathfield also comes to a similar conclusion though not through a comparison with the 
time of photography; “This body in extremis is locked in a non generative movement, 
never fully surpassing or recovering the absent originary event which it evidently repeats”.
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(ie most life-like) repetitions, death is paradoxically present, and if all culture 
is ultimately death-bound then each temporary escape also forms a 
rehearsal for it. This is what is uniquely acknowledged by performance; 
performance, unlike other forms of cultural repetition, stages the fallacy of 
immortality and the inevitability of death.
United in death
Death is also, by force of circumstances, acknowledged in the TAT. The TAT 
is both a denial of and a rehearsal for death. The skilful execution of the 
codes of theatre attempt an exact replication of a torpedo attack and through 
this realism, like the photograph, the TAT suggests the possibility of 
mastery, as if by endless repetition the pilot could ensure that he will 
successfully deliver death and evade his own. But unlike the photograph, 
the TAT separates from reality spatially rather than temporally - it is exspatial 
and therefore the real it mimics is not in the past. It is a ‘real time’ event like 
theatre and similarly establishes its coterminous reality through 
reproductive codes. Thus like theatre, the TAT provides a replication of an 
environment which differs from its original mould in that it is determined and 
controlled. Here, surrounded by the representations of that environment the 
pilot rehearses his actions while escaping from war’s attendant mortality. 
But this escape is only a temporary one. Through this repetition he delivers 
death by rehearsing the moment when the torpedo meets its target, but the 
proximity of the war beyond the architecture of the TAT should serve to 
remind the pilot that death, in this configuration, is not merely metaphorical. 
The body of the pilot unites the world of the simulation and the world of war, 
and the intense socio-political reality of the war shifts the codes of the TAT 
from theatre towards the immediate here and now of performance. Like 
performance, death is immanent within the TAT, death enters with the pilot’s 
performance. Despite the TAT’s fixed codes of representation any resolution 
within this secure environment can only be temporary, death will not be 
assuaged.
This discussion has dealt with issues pertinent to both performance and 
media but the bombing simulator brings the two dynamics into relief. The 
live body of the pilot is the performing body; the fixed image-based 
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representations of reality animated by light are recorded media; the TAT is a 
multi-media performance event. The complete scenario is intensified by the 
attendant reality of the war just, as the invisible signs utilised in media and 
performance charge their presentations of reality. However, via its 
combination of the body and the ‘recorded image’ the TAT manifests a 
paradoxical relationship with the notion of death. The TAT is constrained by 
its fixed representations which function to exclude death, but as a training 
device it is necessary for the TAT to facilitate some degree of play within its 
fixed representations, which must remain, in part, spontaneously 
responsive to the actions of the pilot. These actions are live and although 
perhaps repetitious are never fully resolved until the pilot or his target meets 
his/its disappearance in death (signalled by an obliterating flash of light). 
The TAT therefore, combines performance and its associated implications 
of death with fixed representational images which exclude death, and thus 
within the TAT death is both immanent and deferred. This is what the TAT 
demonstrates for the contemporary project of multi-media performance 
which similarly combines these two principal elements of performing body 
and fixed image. The deferral and immanence of death has been seen to 
be a constituent factor in all repetitious aspects of culture, but it is multi-
media performance and its collision of both parts of this dialectic which 
exposes this as a dynamic of culture rather than other cultural practices 
which exclude or hide this paradox. 
3.2 Simulator
In my response to the TAT and some of the issues it raises, I constructed 
an installation around a meeting of theatre (performance) and photography 
(mediatized image).12  The ideas for this work developed alongside my 
historical and technical research, and it is interesting to note how the work 
evolved in relation to my understanding of the original torpedo attack trainer. 
This installation was completed for an exhibition deadline, and in analysing 
this work it is also possible to see how concepts and ideas are resolved in 
12 The structure of this chapter might suggest that the conclusions I express in the first 
section “Reality and Death”. had been realised prior to the making of my installation 
Simulator detailed in the case study section. However, as I stated at the beginning of this 
chapter this research is ongoing, I have continued to make observations and connections 
concerning this work and this is a process which extends into this writing. The chapter 
structure is intended to enable both me and the reader to make reflections upon the final 
installation in the light of the prior theoretical discourse.
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relation to this imperative. 
I was principally interested in the TAT as an architectural phenomenon and 
found it difficult to work beyond it. As the possibility of presenting a site-
specific work was not a practical option I was obliged to consider ways to 
realise the piece whilst maintaining the impact of the physical reality of the 
building. Originally I intended to make a large time-based installation that 
reflected the actual scale of the bombing simulator. It would use a 
combination of still and moving images, a live presence - possibly a 
performer, an explosive moment to cause a white-out and a sense of past 
time in the form of a soundtrack made up of aural histories. I wanted to 
recreate the curved screen and project onto it in an enclosed space, in 
which a blinding flash would be triggered by audience members entering 
the room, causing an image of the same audience to be projected onto the 
screen. This basic idea continued to be modified; the cyclorama was 
replaced by four separate screens in cube arrangement, four CCTV 
cameras and a hidden vision-mixer operator. The screens would display 
black and white archival war footage and this would be interrupted by a flash 
of light triggered by the operator, in the aftermath of the flash these images 
would be replaced with frozen pictures of the audience which would 
gradually fade back into the war time footage. The flash which exposed the 
viewing audience to themselves was intended to insert a frozen image of 
that audience into the historical continuum as represented by the film, 
thereby collapsing the audience into an event and eliminating separation 
and distance on an imagistic level. This construction of implication through 
the image seemed simplistic, and so I considered replacing the archive 
footage with the actual training films that I erroneously thought had been 
used in the TAT. In this equation the audience would have been brought into 
a more immediate contact with an historical event by witnessing their own 
image inserted within the actual footage used in the trainer, rather than by 
the more general anonymous representations of ‘history’ as signalled by 
standard war time archival footage. 
The project continued to develop throughout 1998. I recognised that the 
importance of the original structure as an architectural space had to be one 
of the key factors of interest in the piece, and revised my plans to include a 
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curved projection surface. The phenomenon of the space seemed so 
powerful that creating a work outside of the original seemed potentially 
pointless, yet the difficulties of gaining public access to the TAT were 
insurmountable. Nevertheless I wanted to create some indication of the 
shocking contrast between the anonymous barn-like exterior and the 
carefully crafted ruined interior. This contrast I thought would emphasise the 
space of the TAT as being of a separated representational order and 
therefore aligned with the project of realism and other representational 
forms of culture. I tried to imagine ways of transposing the building into 
other spaces by using 1:1 scale photographic projections; it is notable that 
the photographic medium provided the means by which to maintain a 
sense of integrity with the original, no doubt due to its invisible index and 
therefore the strong transfer it facilitates of original object through an image. 
I also intended to use location sound recordings for much the same reason 
as they would ‘transparently’ reproduce the sound of the original, and in 
combination with the photographic image provide a powerful sense of 
actuality. These recordings were to be intermingled with fragments of 
testimonies from people who worked at Crail during the war to maintain the 
effect of the historically real within the piece. Initially an audience would be 
presented with an exterior view of the trainer projected onto a curved screen 
and only when a flash went off would the image change to the interior, 
temporarily granting the audience access into the space. These interior 
images would be layered to include theatrical sea and sky effects, a ship 
silhouette, archival footage, as well as pictures of the audience. Therefore in 
this scenario access to the interior triggered by an explosive moment would 
be equivalent to access to the past.
The scale of the project posed a problem for its realisation. On the basis of 
my interest in the building I had been asked to contribute to a group show 
called ‘The Shed’. When confronted with the need to realise a piece of work 
with a limited production budget in a shared space I was obliged to modify 
my plans yet again. I was not able to enclose a part of the gallery to produce 
a separate dark space suitable for projection, yet still wished to make a 
distinction between the interior and exterior spaces of the TAT in, order to 
enforce a sense of schism between its representational space and the 
world beyond which it mimicked. However if the phenomenon of the building 
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was of prime importance, any reproduction of it would potentially render the 
power of the space impotent - what was needed was a simulacrum. 
As part of a theatre production process a designer often builds a model of 
the set enclosed in a ‘model box’ which is constructed to represent the 
wider architectural environs of the theatre. These scale models, sometimes 
referred to as a dioramas, show the set in its extended context and are also 
used by directors with miniature models of characters to block stage action. 
The idea of a scale model of the space appealed on a number of levels; first 
it doubled the abstraction of space which occurred in the original TAT 
between the actual encounter at sea and its representation as a training 
scenario but, by extension, the model also emphasised a function of all 
cultural artifacts that operate through repetition. Photography, theatre, film, 
television, are all, to greater or lesser degree, abstractions from the world 
which, depending on their degree of realism, either hide or emphasise their 
forms as representations. Susan Stewart writes about the model; “as the 
word implies, it is an abstraction or image and not a presentation of any 
lived possibility”(133); by producing a model of the TAT I hoped to be able to 
implicate more general cultural forms within the work and also point to the 
exclusion of aspects of the lived body from the model world. It is this lived 
body in performance which maintains the experience of time as loss and 
paradoxically therefore represents the possibility of death, or as Stewart 
states, “In contrast to this model body, the body of lived experience is 
subject to change, transformation, and, most importantly, death”(133).
More practically, a device such as a model placed the trainer on a more 
manageable scale whilst maintaining an integrity with the original space, as 
well as providing a suggestion of the theatre which had already been 
demonstrated to be a determining factor within the construction of the 
bombing simulator. By Spring 1999 I had established the idea of producing 
an ‘identical’ working model of the TAT enclosed within a model box. The 
outside surfaces of the box would be covered with photographic images or 
projections of the present day exterior of the trainer, whilst inside the image 
of a model ship would travel around a miniature curved surface. An 
individual spectator would be obliged to open a curtain that covered the front 
of the model box, much like the curtain at the front of a stage, in order to see 
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the simulator inside. After looking in for a moment, the viewer would be 
blinded by a flash, which would cause the lights in the model to dim, and 
reveal on the small screen their own face staring back at them frozen in time 
in a picture of temporal death. 
I finally came to construct Simulator in May and June 1999, by this time the 
idea had changed once again. The structural similarities between a model 
box and an old fashioned box camera occurred to me, both seemed to be 
devices constructed to contain ‘model worlds’. In addition, it is also 
necessary to peer inside both devices, partially inserting one’s head, to see 
an image. These similarities allowed me to place more emphasis on the 
connections that I felt existed between the bombing simulator, photography 
and model worlds. Therefore instead of referencing the exterior of the 
building with images on the sides of the model box, I decided to make the 
box resemble a large wooden camera positioned on a tripod with a black 
photographers cloth (like a stage curtain) covering the front. Inside the box 
was a simplified version of the TAT; I constructed the touroidol shape of the 
cyclorama by resin casting around a tyre inner tube; after this was finished it 
was painted with a sea horizon line like the original and fixed to a miniature 
planked floor with supporting struts. Through a gap in the miniature 
cyclorama, a viewer would then look directly across to a spot-lit silhouette 
projection of a warship shining down from a simple projector consisting of a 
zoom lens and low wattage light mounted on the lid of the box. Out of sight 
behind the cyclorama were hidden two speakers and a Metz photography 
flash gun. A soundscape had been constructed from long durational 
recordings made on location in the trainer, and this played on a long loop 
cycle, so that when a viewer inserted their head into the Simulator they were 
surrounded by sounds heard in the actual simulator.13  After a period of 
approximately six seconds the flash gun would go off triggered by a 
pressure pad located under a mat in front of the Simulator which a spectator 
was obliged to stand on. The flash gun was located directly behind the 
warship silhouette on the screen, and the flash was masked with the shape 
of a cross hair gun sight. When the flash went off, if the viewer was looking 
13 It is interesting to note in this context that recorded sound functions similarly to the 
recorded image in that its fixing onto a repetitious carrier base (in this instance a digital 
mini disc and CD) affords a sense of indexical actuality to the reproduced sound. The 
replay transfers qualities of the real space that the model Simulator tries to invoke.
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directly at the boat, they would be temporarily blinded and this cross hair 
image would be left as a retinal after-image. On exiting the Simulator this 
impression might remain, temporarily overlaying their normal sight with a 
small floating cross-hair image. 
  
Vid. 18: Simulator - 3 viewsb
b This documentation exposes problems which occur when working with 
physiological elements of vision such as the use of retinal after-images or, in the 
case of The Turin Machine discussed in the next chapter, low light. Due to a 
limited shutter speed and lack of sensitivity to abrupt changes in light a 
documenting video camera is unable to record the moment of bright flash in any 
detail and therefore is unable to reproduce the effect of the cross hair retinal 
after-image.
The major change in this version of Simulator is in its use of a cross-hair to 
create a retinal after-image which replaces the idea of presenting a viewer 
with a frozen image of themselves. I discarded this mirroring idea after 
considering its technical and artistic implications; the electronics within the 
Simulator were already surprisingly complicated, since the flash had to be 
adapted to work from a mains power unit, the trigger and delay were 
temperamental and although I built miniature amplifiers to power the 
speakers, these never functioned without an interfering mains hum and had 
to be replaced with a standard amplifier. To project a picture of the viewer 
would have involved a camera, a video projector, an image grabber (either 
installed on a computer or within a vision mixer) and a dimmable lighting 
system all which would have had to work from the same and/or a related 
triggering system. Lack of time and resources made this idea difficult to 
realise, but ultimately I discarded it because I did not like the relationship it 
established between the trainer and the viewer; it seemed too simplistic. I 
was unsure if people would be able to make any productive connections 
between the projection of the boat followed by that of their own face, and the 
narcissism of the encounter seemed cyclical and enclosed, and only 
suggestive of the act of looking without any consequences which might 
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have suggested broader historical or cultural implications for the work. 
After images
The cross-hair retinal after-image had the advantage of being technically 
simpler to realise in a short space of time but, more positively, it created a 
literally active relationship between viewer and object. Retinal after-images 
had been a phenomenon which I had been considering for sometime prior 
to my encounter with the trainer.14  They interested me as they seemed to 
represent another moment where performance meets photography as the 
body’s biological equivalent of a (temporarily) recorded image.15  The means 
by which an after-image is created also has similarities with processes of 
photography, and indeed all mediatized images, in that light is converted 
into a malleable representational image.16  In flash photography the process 
by which an image is burnt, (Benjamin uses the word “seared”), onto the 
photographic emulsion is made particularly noticeable by the excessive 
amount of light needed to produce that image. The flash emphasises a 
process which is normally discreet and hidden because it occurs through 
available light; the shock of the flash carries the potential to jolt our 
perception out of this norm and into a realisation of the mechanics of 
photography (and mediatized images in general). An after-image figures a 
‘branding’ of the retina by light similar to that of photographic emulsion. The 
retina retains a stimulus from the light once it has ceased to have contact 
with the retina, and in an extreme case, like a flash of light, overloads the 
retina and causes temporary blinding. I would argue that there is a similarity 
between photography (mediatization) and the act of looking itself through 
shared responses to light, and I locate this similarity within the explosive 
moment of the TAT which, within the actuality of war, obliterates as it is 
seen. The spectator is physically implicated in the functioning of the 
Simulator and an equivalence is drawn between the pilot sighting his target 
14 The phenomenon of retinal after-images form an important strand of Jonathan Crary’s 
argument in his book Techniques of the Observer as they indicate the increasing 
awareness of the physiological aspects of vision which developed during the nineteenth 
century. 
15 Phelan makes a similar argument for after-images as an indication of the “optical 
unconscious”. This is an idea which will be developed in the following chapter.
16 A similar point was made in chapter two regarding the transformation of light into 
various electrical charges by the video process.
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and the spectator’s act of looking. The flash provoked by this looking 
causes the obliteration of the image, suggesting the destruction of the 
object by the gaze. The protagonist in this obliteration, the gaze, is revealed 
as a cross-hair impression which remains after the explosion of light. The 
spectator, in the rupturing moment of the flash, becomes simultaneously 
the gunner-pilot-photographer and the target as their vision is annihilated by 
the blinding flash of light. This dualistic positioning remains for a short time 
outside of the model, as the spectator moves around the gallery bearing a 
cruciform impression on their retina which obscures their ‘normal’ vision.
        
 
                        Vid. 19. Simulator - Walk In               Fig. 4. Simulator cross-hair
Therefore, in an encounter with the Simulator installation a number of ideas 
are activated. Shock, originating in the experience of war (the Great War) 
has long been seen as a condition of modernity, as Susan Buck-Morss 
notes in “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered”; “Benjamin claimed this battlefield experience of shock ‘has 
become the norm’ in modern life”(388).17  In its miniature replay of this battle 
shock via the photographic flash(gun), Simulator attempts to attach itself to 
the reality of war and also to a reality of modernity. According to Buck-Morss, 
Benjamin, following Freud, also notes that “consciousness is a shield 
protecting the organism against stimuli - ‘excessive shock’ - from without, 
by preventing their retention, their impress as memory”(388). Simulator 
reproduces this ‘excessive shock’, but also signals the memory protection 
mechanisms of consciousness by affording only a temporary bodily record 
in the bright, but disappearing, after-image. By mimicking the mechanics of 
photographic image-making, the Simulator also alludes to modernity’s 
alternative forms of memory which are not originated in the body, but a 
function of external cultural practices, in particular those of mediatized 
17 All quotations from Buck-Morss in this chapter are from “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics”.
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images; “What served in the place of the photograph; before camera’s 
invention? The expected answer is the engraving, the drawing, the painting. 
The more revealing answer might be: memory”(50) states Berger and he 
goes on to note that; “The camera relieves us of the burden of memory. It 
surveys us like God, and it surveys for us. Yet no other god has been so 
cynical, for the camera records in order to forget”(55). But the shock of the 
flash can also be equated with a moment of revelation, a ‘Road to 
Damascus’ type of vision wreathed in light - which in turn ‘enlightens’. I 
wanted the unexpected flash of light occurring in close proximity to the 
spectator’s eyes to literally ‘illuminate’, to resituate shock back into 
photography and to provoke a moment of understanding as to the 
extemporal qualities of image making. In this sense the flash was to act like 
Berthold Brecht’s ‘Verfremdungseffekt’ or Viktor Scholvsky’s ‘Priem 
Ostranenniya’ - ‘the device of making strange’ sometimes defined as 
alienation and described by John Willet appropriately as a matter “of 
perception and understanding: or gaining new insights into the world 
around us by glimpsing it in a different and previously unfamiliar light”(220). 
In the case of the TAT it was the relationship of war, vision and mediatization 
that I wished to ‘bring to light’.18 
I was aware, however, that this unexpected flash of light also perpetrated a 
form of violence upon the viewer which I felt drew a comparison between the 
viewer, the pilot and the photographer, the act described by Sontag as 
“sublimated murder”(14). In the TAT/Simulator configuration, by substituting 
the look of the photographer/pilot for the look of the spectator, ‘looking’ is 
made active rather than passive. This vitality of vision is short lived however, 
as the viewer is simultaneously blinded by the light, which echoes Virilio’s 
understanding of “[the] constant straining after ‘more light’” (which he sees 
as the sociopolitical project of increasing control over space) and which 
leads to “a sort of precocious disability, a blindness”(9). Virilio, quotes from 
J.P Vernant’s La Mort dans les yeux; “When you stare at the Gorgon, the 
18 Interestingly Berger cites Brecht’s theories as the means by which photography might 
be delivered into a more socially and politically responsible dimension: 
“If we want to put a photograph back into the context of experience, 
social experience, social memory, we have to respect the laws of memory. 
We have to situate the printed photograph so that it acquires something 
of the surprising conclusiveness of that  which was and is. What Brecht 
wrote about acting [...] is applicable to such a practice” (61).
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sparkle in her eye dispossesses you, makes you lose your on sight, 
condemns you to immobility”(41). In Virilio’s analysis the blinding effects of 
light, “which has no image and yet creates images”(9) is, by extension, the 
effect of all photography and mediatized images. Therefore between Sontag 
and Virilio we find the annihilation of the object of the photograph and its 
subject the viewer, which returns us to a moment of death, which both 
subject and object have strived to evacuate from the representational 
equation.
In the light of my analysis I am able, however, to identify a number of 
weaknesses within my installation. Although Simulator seems to 
satisfactorily inculcate elements of theatre and photographic practice into 
the formation of simulated model worlds it is, as a work, unable to progress 
beyond demonstrating these technical dependencies and therefore make 
active the consequences of certain forms of cultural expression. The 
difficulty originates in the pivotal moment of the flash which is intended to 
replicate the obliteration of subject and object founded in the viewing 
exchange. On a purely practical level, if the spectator’s attention was not 
centred directly on the spot-lit silhouette of the ship the cross-hair matte of 
the flash was undetectable, and all that was sensed was a bright flash 
which caused no after-image. In addition after the flash gun had fired, the 
image of the ship remained resolutely unchanged, not in fact ‘disappeared’ 
by the action of the flash nor ‘over written’ by a cross hair image. Therefore 
the ‘explosive/exposive’ moment affected no radical difference or change 
either in the object of vision, the ship, or the subject, the viewer. However, 
even if a spectator had looked directly at the flash at its moment of 
detonation and thereby received the retinal effect, I believe this in itself did 
not sufficiently progress the viewer into the wider repercussions of image-
making that I had identified as resonant within the original torpedo attack 
trainer. In my exhibited installation I had replaced the earlier idea of a 
photographic image of the viewer with the flash-induced retinal after-image. 
This flash, along with a camera-like exterior construction, was intended to 
be sufficient to signal a comparison between looking, mediatization and 
acts of war. Unfortunately the pivotal moment of the flash was not, in itself, 
suggestive enough of the act of photography (mediatization) to continue a 
metonymical chain through to the original trainer and its attendant overtones 
123
of death.
Whilst reviewing Simulator in preparation for this writing it has become 
apparent to me that the idea that I had discarded as a narcissistic 
simplification - the photographic mirror image of the viewer - was exactly the 
component the work required to trigger its broader considerations of 
imaging culture. The static portrait of the spectator would have provoked the 
radical change the work was precedented upon, particularly if combined 
with the retinal after-image and a moving ship silhouette which had 
disappeared after the flash, to be temporarily replaced by a frozen face. This 
static image would have introduced the extemporality of photography and 
provoked a moment of alienation (Ostranenniya) between the vital body of 
the viewer and his or her mortified representation. Therefore, such an 
image would have stated the ‘presence’ of photography as well as the 
contrasting ‘presence’ of performance and returned the act of looking to a 
more nuanced condition. The use of a static image of the viewer would have 
emphasised the trajectory present in the act of photography: that the act of 
looking causes the ‘death’ of the object and the continuation of the subject 
at the cost of a certain blindness and petrification. Perhaps it is contradictory 
to suggest that the image of a frozen face would have brought the living body 
back into the representational equation, but this stasis would certainly have 
acted as a microcosm of death just as the model Simulator was intended to 
do in relation to the original TAT. 
The static photograph could have complicated the installation in a 
productive manner by reversing the role of the spectator within the viewing 
equation. Within such a configuration the subject, conventionally the viewer 
of the art object, becomes another object through the petrifying effect of the 
recorded image. The subject is transformed by the glare of the flash gun 
into the object and as object therefore becomes an ‘other’. By presenting a 
static image Simulator thus emphasises part of the ego forming process by 
presenting a viewer with an image that is simultaneously of the self but not 
the self (the frozeness enforcing an alienation from the body and 
emphasising this self as an object/image). Robins cites Philip Dubois’ idea 
of the figure of Narcissus as symbol of ‘our psychic investment’ in the 
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image.19  Narcissus, who fell in love with his own image represents a desire 
for unification with the image, a prelapsarian unity which is infantile in origin 
and ultimately leads to Narcissus’ death by drowning. Narcissus meets 
death through his failure to recognise himself as different from his image. 
The failure to recognise the image as an image is precipitated through a 
narcissistic longing for fusion which is ultimately destructive and leads to 
the death of the self. Though presenting a spectator with an image of 
themselves, might have appeared at first to replicate a reductive narcissism 
in the installation Simulator, I would now speculate that this could have 
triggered a number of productive aftershocks from the work, possibly 
leading back to a consideration of the dynamic of death within contemporary 
visual culture.
The reflective image of the viewer experienced in the installation might also 
maintain a consideration of the duality of the self founded in the self 
sameness and self otherness paradox at the centre of identity, provoked, as 
it might be, by the similarity and difference between the live spectator and 
his or her frozen image.20  Here the subject transformed into object looks 
back at the subject in a blind stare, an endless reflective feedback 
suggesting the negotiation of these two positions operating at the heart of 
our sense of identity. In its revised state, the Simulator installation will stage 
the live body as concurrent with the body as image, and neither version of 
the self will be resolved or absorbed by the other. We are simultaneously 
subject and object, and it is this operation of identity that multi-media 
performance, and indeed any work precedented upon a coexistence of body 
with image, realises within a cultural sphere.
19 This is not only Dubois’ idea. Narcissus and the love of self-image that this myth 
symbolises is used by both Freud and Lacan in their descriptions of the formation of the 
ego. Lacan’s description of the three orders of subjectivity begins with the Imaginary and 
the Mirror Phase which describes its development. The infant sees his image in a mirror 
and experiences jubilation at the image which offers an impression of completeness and 
unity - this is described as a narcissistic moment which informs the Imaginary. Dubois’ 
“psychic investment” can also be termed the libidinal drives at work in human subjectivity 
which desire a return to this unified, pre-linguistic Imaginary state represented by images 
of the self.
20 This paradox of the divided self also originates in the Mirror Phase where the image of 
the infant is at once the same as but also different from the image (see previous 
Footnote).
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Death and the other
One important aspect of this realisation lies in our encounter with ourselves 
as ‘other’ because it as other that we can grasp the reality of death. Robins 
cites Emmanuel Levinas in this context;
Levinas in fact traces a correlation between the human 
confrontation of death and confrontation with the Other. Death 
is unknowable, it is what marks ‘the limit of the subject’s 
virility’, it is where ‘the subject loses its very mastery as a 
subject’. [...] Death exists and exerts its force over our lives as 
an imperative, and it is through the Other that we experience 
that imperative force (25/6).
Thus transformed by the camera into objectness and other we can 
understand the morbidity of photographs - Sontag’s “memento mori”, and 
hence the potential power of this photographic object when placed within 
the intensive space of the Simulator. In a revised form, which included the 
viewer’s static image, subject and object would meet, face to face, in the 
blinding/binding revelation of an explosive/exposive moment. Robins 
continues Levinas’ observations on death; “it is this encounter - in which we 
are exposed to, and afflicted by, the vulnerability and mortality of the Other - 
that is the basis for our moral and ethical relations”(26). It is notable that it 
is exactly these moral and ethical dimensions that Sontag and Berger felt 
were evacuated from the photographic encounter. The ‘face to face’ 
confrontation with the other, as Robins acknowledges, raises “the 
fundamental question of how we experience and relate to the world”(26).
Beyond the Simulator
In the light of Robins’ “fundamental question”, what are the consequences 
for a type of cultural practice which stages a meeting between subject and 
object such as that figured by the combination of performance and the 
mediatized image? Is multi-media performance of any social or political 
import beyond being a specialised subsection within a sphere of 
performance/media culture? The TAT, as an historical object of war, 
provides the possibility of suggesting a broader territory for any work which 
takes it as its subject. Simulator, an installation that would ideally play 
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between the difference of the recorded and living body, illustrates the 
possibility that issues contained within these dynamics can also extend into 
other types of work undertaken within the field of multi-media performance. 
Recent visual theory has traced a trajectory which links the scopic regimes 
of the film and media spheres with developments in military imaging 
technology, examples would be Virilio’s Vision Machine, Baudrillard’s The 
Gulf War Did Not Take Place; Robins, in particular, bases part of his 
analysis of virtual reality in this comparative trajectory. He charts the 
technological phenomenon of virtual reality as an extension of the western 
rationalist/enlightenment project of absolute control over environments 
realised in the construction of micro worlds. These worlds are either 
approximations of a reality and/or idealised in some form to allow an 
exploration of the simulacrum without encountering any genuine threat, 
particularly the threat of pain or death. In this way Robins accuses 
technologically created ‘worlds’ of operating like a narcotic in order to 
‘neutralise experience’. Model worlds are a distantiation from and 
distillation of the world which facilitate a limited form of experience and 
hence a total control of the substitute environment. Buck-Morss sees this 
limiting of experience accompanied by an illusion of total control as the 
project not just of virtual reality but of much modern visual culture, and she 
also accounts for this via the influence of rationalist and enlightenment 
philosophy figured in “the motif of autogenesis”(379).21  Buck-Morss 
continues “What seems to fascinate modern ‘man’ about this myth is the 
narcissistic illusion of total control. The fact that one can imagine something 
that is not, is extrapolated in the fantasy that one can (re)create the world 
according to plan”(380). Like Robins, Buck-Morss adopts the notion of a 
narcotic to metaphorise aspects of nineteenth and twentieth century visual 
culture. She states; “Beginning in the nineteenth century, a narcotic was 
made out of reality itself. The key word for this development is 
phantasmagoria. [...] It describes an appearance of reality that tricks the 
senses through technical manipulation”(394). In the nineteenth century 
these phantasmagoria are typified by Parisian shopping arcades and 
21 Buck-Morss provides footnote for her idea of “the motif of autogenesis” which in turn 
indicates a meaning for the word “autogenesis”. She writes “The birth of the Greek polis is 
attributed precisely to the wondrous idea that man can produce himself ex nihilo. The 
polis becomes the artifact of ‘man’ in which he can bring forth, as a material reality, his 
own higher essence”(379).
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notably panoramas and dioramas “that engulfed the viewer in a simulated 
total environment-in-miniature”(394). Although she does not specifically 
reference virtual reality Buck-Morss goes on to note that these 
phantasmagoria “are the precursors of today’s shopping malls, theme 
parks, and video arcades”(394). All are examples of “technoaesthetics” 
employed to provide a fantasy of control while providing a buffer against the 
shocks of modern day experience; “The goal is manipulation of the 
synaesthetic system by control of environmental stimuli. It has the effect of 
anaesthetizing the organism, not through numbing but through flooding the 
senses”(394) and she concludes “Sensory addiction to a compensatory 
reality becomes a means of social control”(395). 
The TAT can be seen as an exemplar phantasmagoria, a micro world 
based on “an appearance of reality that tricks the sense through technical 
manipulation”, but as a war simulation the TAT also potentially exposes the 
limits of its particular representation of reality by necessarily restricting its 
operations to a limited field of experience i.e. one that excludes war’s 
attendant reality - death. This is what makes the TAT a particularly fertile 
subject for work which wishes to discuss the broader implications of Buck-
Morss’ ‘technoaesthetics’. Robins, following Levinas, has already raised 
the possibility of ethical and moral imperatives as deriving from an 
encounter with death, and Buck-Morss now adds the implication of “social 
control” in work which creates autogenetic micro worlds which logically 
exclude or deny an encounter with death. Heathfield has also noted that 
death-defying cultural formations are “founded on the maintenance of an 
absolute and binary distinction between death and life” and quotes 
Baudrillard “All the agencies of repression and control are installed in this 
divided space”. Therefore these writers provide evidence that devices such 
as the TAT precipitate social and political consequences which extend 
beyond their immediate function as war simulating machines.
The bombing simulator demonstrates better than most this fantasy of 
control present in much visual representation. The pilot exerts a control over 
an apparition of an external reality which transcends his human and mortal 
being and protects him from the experience of death. The TAT, like much 
visual culture and particularly media culture, establishes its immortal world 
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by replicating, primarily through the visual sense, realistic images of the 
mortal world. Realism is a vital component to these micro worlds because 
in making recourse to realist aesthetics these representations claim to 
‘reflect’ and ‘replicate’ an actual, a priori, exterior world - life as it is 
experienced and understood. Thus these representations assert an 
epistemic truth; via their ‘accurate replication of life’ these products wish to 
acquire a status that is equal to life. However this visually mastered reality 
leads Robins to observe that a consequence of this is that “Vision is 
becoming separated from experience”(11) - imaging technologies 
increasingly produce visions of the world which belie their difference and 
detachment from the world. Robins’ observation concurs with Virilio’s 
earlier refutation of Merleau-Ponty; “The bulk of what I see is, in fact and in 
principle, no longer within my reach”(7). It is the separation of vision from 
experience which is the precedent for much military imaging technology and 
in turn permits a form of alienation which allows for behaviours which had 
previously been unavailable either physically or morally. Robins provides 
the bleak example of the shooting down in 1988 of the Iranian Airbus flight 
655 at the cost of 290 lives by the USS Vincennes, where the America war 
ship used a targeting system unable to distinguish between military and 
civilian aircraft. Interestingly these imaging technologies form a contrast to a 
belief articulated by Bergson in his work Matter and Memory; “distance 
represents, above all, the measure in which surrounding bodies are 
insured, in some way, against the immediate action of my body”(20/1). The 
intervening one hundred years since Bergson wrote his philosophy has 
seen the collapse of physical distance as a form of protection between 
peoples who are now brought into one another's immediate spheres of 
influence by the technology of ‘Mechanical Reproduction’ and its associated 
desire for proximity as originally identified by Benjamin. These technologies 
paradoxically create simultaneously both a proximity and a distance and 
alienation which make them particularly suitable for applications in the 
military domain, which is where, according to Virilio, they originate from; 
“The panoply of acts of war thus always tends to be organised at a distance 
[...] the teletopological phenomenon remains heavily marked by its remote 
beginnings in war”(6). This has led Virilio to observe;
paradoxical logic emerges when the real-time image 
dominates the thing represented, real time subsequently 
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prevailing over real space, virtuality dominating actuality and 
turning the very concept of reality on its head. [...] a paradoxical 
presence, the long-distance telepresence of the object or 
being which provides their very existence, here and now (63).
Time and particularly the speed of light wins out over space; “The time 
frequency of light has become a determining factor in the apperception of 
phenomena, leaving the spatial frequency of matter for dead”(71). In Virilio's 
analysis therefore here and now (time and space) has become purely the 
preserve of light (time) transposed by the “paradoxical logic” of the 
teletopological domain.
This form of visual and spatial alienation extends beyond that of the 
operator of specific imaging technologies, and towards anybody who 
partakes of looking within the particular scopic regime enforced by 
‘technoaesthetics’. The pilot training in the TAT is able to sever any 
emphatic feelings he may have for his human targets through the alienation 
and distantiation afforded by his model environment. Likewise any 
spectator of media images of atrocities is able to bear such witness due to 
the protection and separation induced by the forms of their reproduction; 
“The feeling of being exempt from calamity stimulates interest in looking at 
painful pictures”(168) states Sontag. Robins terms this condition “the 
disidentification with actual existence”(16). It is precisely this 
disidentification which allows repetitious images to become the means of 
waging modern warfare as well as the images provided by ‘the media’ 
which can then transform the event of war into a morally and ethically 
vacuous spectacle.22 
Many of the writers quoted in the preceding pages express a dissatisfaction 
with this technoaesthetic condition on the grounds of its implications for 
social and political interactions. In particular it is certain types of experience 
which are left out of the technoaesthetic exchange. This can be seen in 
early forms of this encounter in media such as photography; “The powers of 
photography have in effect de-Platonized our understanding of reality, 
making it less and less plausible to reflect upon our experience according 
to the distinction between images and things, between copies and 
22 Virilio quotes Admiral Gorchkov’s assertion “The winner of the next war will be the one 
who made the most of the electromagnetic spectrum”(71).
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originals”(179) states Sontag, and Berger asks for a return of the 
photograph “back into the context of experience”(61). In terms of more 
recent developments in visual culture Robins states “What is at stake, then, 
is the question of experience: we are contemplating the denial and 
disavowal of experience in modern culture, and the implication of vision 
technologies in this attenuation of modern experience”(22). Robins then 
goes on to quote Thomas Ogden who talks of “substitute formations, which 
involve turning the condition of non-experience into the illusion of 
experiencing and knowing”(23). The TAT, virtual reality simulations, 
photography, indeed any form which is precedented on a realistic 
reproduction of the idea of ‘the world’, could be identified as one of these 
substitute formations which, via their ‘realism’, provide an illusion of 
experience. Both Robins and Buck-Morss agree that what is needed in 
order to alter this condition of visual culture in a productive way is a 
reconnection of experience and vision;
I believe that it is through what is denied or disavowed in the 
dominant, rationalistic culture that we can find the basis of real 
cultural experience. [...] This is what must be recognised [...] by 
whoever seeks to reaffirm the transitive dimension of visual 
culture and to reconnect image and experience (Robins 11).
The body can be seen as the locus of experience; “If we experience the 
world, it is because we are bodily present in it: experience is inherently 
embodied”(30) states Robins. It is this body which is evacuated from most 
technoaesthetic exchange, as Robins notes, “The world of simulation is a 
world without bodies”(20) and “We have come to the point of inhumanising 
and dehumanising ourselves when we no longer recognise and 
acknowledge the significance of embodied involvement in the world” 
(29/30). Working from Benjamin, Buck-Morss calls for a return to the 
aesthetics of the body; “that is, to undo the alienation of the corporeal 
sensorium, to restore the instinctual power of the human bodily senses for 
the sake of humanity’s self-preservation, and to do this, not by avoiding the 
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new technologies, but by passing through them”(377).23  This is the project 
that I would like to propose is initiated by multi-media performance 
emphasising, as it does, the body in relation to the technologically 
mediatized visions of our world. Part of this work -performance - as an 
incarnation of the actual body in a specific time and space is exactly that 
which is disavowed in a culture which is dominated by technologically 
derived visual images, hence Phelan’s description of performance as “the 
runt of the litter”(149). But performance’s body can signal and thence 
reactivate exactly those qualities of experience excluded from mediatized 
technoaesthetics and it does so by “passing through” new technology in the 
interdisciplinary mix of multi-media performance. Buck-Morss notes that as 
part of its narcotic effect phantasmagoria tends to appeal to one sense, 
normally the visual, above all others; “It is significant for the anaesthetic 
effects of these experiences that the singling out of any one sense for 
intense stimulus has the effect of numbing the rest”(396). Although a multi-
media performance might be visually complex it cannot be reduced to this 
single dynamic using as it does the spoken word, mediatized images, 
physical action, sound and combinations of these. Neither does it attempt 
to present a unity of these disparate influences unlike Wagner’s 
‘Gesamtkunstwerk’ which is sometimes cited as the precursor of 
interdisciplinary performance work.24  Instead, by presenting the body in 
close proximity to its mediatized image, multi-media performance is able to 
stage the reconnection of vision and experience. The ‘here and now’ in this 
equation is of an earlier order, and dependent upon a coexistence of time 
and space which is different from Virilio’s teletopology based as it is on a 
reality defined only by the time of light and not physical matter or space. 
Berger specifically writes of the need to provide the photographic image 
with a “context of experience”, “so that it maybe seen in terms which are 
23 Buck-Morss notes that the original meaning of the word aesthetics refers to the body;   
The original field of aesthetics is not art but reality - corporeal, material 
nature. As Terry Eagleton writes: ‘Aesthetics is born as a discourse of the 
body’” and only later “’aesthetics underwent a reversal of meaning so that 
by Benjamin’s time it was applied first and foremost to art - to cultural 
forms rather than sensible experience, to the imaginary rather than the 
empirical, to the illusory rather than the real (378/9).
24 Buck-Morss quotes Adorno “Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, ‘intimately related to the 
disenchantment of the world’ is an attempt to produce a totalizing metaphysics 
instrumentally by means of every technological means at its disposal”(397).
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simultaneously personal, political, economic, dramatic, everyday and 
historic”(63). The mediatized images used in multi-media performance are 
seen within a context, albeit perhaps not so extensive as the one advocated 
by Berger but nevertheless a context which places images into an 
immediate relationship with both performing and watching bodies. 
Therefore the distance and separation traditionally invoked by the 
photograph, or more recently the micro worlds of virtual reality, is not easily 
sustained in these images as they become situated back into the domain 
of Merleau-Ponty’s “Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least 
within reach of my sight, marked on the map of the ‘I can’” (qtd in Virilio 7). 
With the reintroduction of the body and hence experience back into the 
scopic regime, multi-media performance is able to activate some of the 
social and political dynamics which are negated in other mediatized forms 
of alienated/alienating visual culture. 
3.3 Summary
At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that the TAT functioned as a 
meeting between performance and the mediatized image, and as a war 
time training simulation acted to provoke a number of ideas and 
assumptions pertinent to the discourses and practices of these forms. I 
began by making comparisons between the TAT and the technologies 
operating in dioramas and theatre techniques which shared an interest in 
producing ‘realistic’ environments. These live spectacles were, to varying 
degrees, both immersive and responsive. I then followed a trajectory 
principally prescribed by Berger and Sontag which mapped out a degree of 
interconnectivity between the practices of war and recorded media, 
particularly photography and the effect on our experiences and conceptions 
of reality derived from these practices. I also noted Pontbriand's 
observations on performance as a response to these mechanical imaging 
technologies. However performance, like the earlier forms of live spectacle 
cited, is able to maintain a degree of reponsivity within its (re)presentations. 
I noted that the forms of performance, photography, theatre and the TAT (as 
virtual reality) all seemed able to construct different temporal and spatial 
relations with the concept of a ‘here and now’, and in so doing create a 
variety of interconnecting and contrasting ‘reals’ including the dual realities 
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of the body and the representational image.
The TAT is less a cultural practice than a specific historical technological 
and aesthetic object and its ‘real’ existence as a war time device provokes a 
very immediate and tangible relationship with the notion of death. In turn 
this extends into a consideration of the configuration of death within the 
other representational practices utilised by the TAT. Heathfield’s analysis of 
death (working from Bauman) contrasts two trajectories operating through 
repetition within culture; one death defying, the other death bound. It was 
possible for me to trace these at work in photography, theatre and 
performance. Through a direct comparison of the treatments of time and 
space afforded by photography and performance, I was able to conclude (in 
accordance with Heathfield) that in contrast to recorded mediatized images 
performance effected no overall mastery or recovery of its subject and thus, 
rather than working through indexical realism to exclude death, it presaged 
death and alterity. The TAT as a ‘multi-media performance’ with its dual 
body and mediatized realities also staged the two contrasting approaches 
to death and alterity - the recorded mediatized which fixes, controls and 
attempts to master and the alterity of the body, unstable and fundamentally 
undetermined.
After constructing this analysis I was then able to look back at my 
installation work Simulator. Extending from my understanding of the 
performative at work within the TAT, I had hoped to construct a work which 
activated a similar dualistic approach to the conceptions of reality and death 
figured in the original device. Working around the idea of shock and flash 
photography, I wanted to evoke an instantaneously dichotomous moment 
which referenced the conditions and effects of both performance and 
photography by imprinting with light onto the living body. In this way (though 
flawed in its execution) the installation was intended to act as a critique of 
both mediatizing and war-making processes which have, as referenced in 
my earlier writing, proved to be synonymous. In response to my critical 
reflections I was able to revise my ideas for Simulator and envisage a 
variation which would realise the efficacy of the human body more 
profoundly within the installation. By emphasising the body of the viewer as 
both subject and object (through the use of a still photographic image) the 
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work is potentially able to expose what is in turn effected by and evacuated 
from mediatized forms of encounter.
Mediatized images (and their confederate military technologies) are 
described by Virilio, Buck-Morss and Robins as driven by a desire for 
mastery and control over environments resulting in the creation of 
alternative, reality-substituting/escaping, autogenetic model worlds, 
exemplified by dioramas and VR installations. Such representations and 
environments are precedented upon a degree of sensory deprivation and 
alienation and include the exclusion of the imperative - death. These 
constructs in turn remove moral and ethical considerations from their 
predominantly visual interactions, and via their ‘realistic reproductions’ 
claim an empirical and omnipotent ‘truth’ for what are partial and specific 
cultural ‘constructs’. These conditions and the ideologies which determine 
mediatizing technology and its images are what make it so suitable for 
applications within the military domain. Yet Simulator and other 
performance related work is able to offer a critique of the practices and 
rationale behind the ‘camera/gun’. The body placed in proximity to a 
mediatized image experiences and references the heterogeneous nature of 
sensory experience, and reminds us of the consequences of the 
impoverished form of encounter propounded by the lens. The performing 
body of the spectator/performer is able to reactivate a conception of the 
codependent conditions of time and space, in which time - real time/body 
time - is always inscribed as loss. In this scenario there can be no mastery 
or transcendent disembodied fantasies of control - and after all it is exactly 
these fantasies that provoke a denial of alterity and demand its obliteration 
though violence and death.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VISION AND TOUCH
LOOKING GLASS & THE TURIN MACHINE
4.1 Vision and Touch
the repressed of today is the body, the sensory and motor 
body. In the era of the third industrial revolution, the revolution 
of information, nuclear energy, and the video, the repressed is 
the body. (Didier Anzieu).1 
At the end of the previous chapter I charted the consequences of so-called 
‘realist’ forms as substitutive forms of experience. Following a number of 
theorists (principally, Robins and Buck-Morss) I explained how certain 
scopic regimes and mediatizing technologies worked to displace or 
evacuate certain experiential qualities from the viewing equation, principally 
via an exclusion of the human body from these forms of representation. I 
also posited ‘the body’, as exemplified by the spectating/performing bodies 
of multi-media performance, as an antidote to and critique of, these 
practices and their effects. The body was figured as the locus of 
heterogeneous experience and, in accordance with the above theorists, I 
identified a need for a reconnection of vision with experience via a new 
‘aesthetics’ of the body.
Merleau-Ponty’s statement “everything I see is within my reach” (first cited in 
chapter two) establishes a concurrence between the two senses of touch 
and vision, and indeed in The Visible and the Invisible he suggests the two 
senses are transposable;
we must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut 
out of the tangible, every tactile being in some manner 
promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, 
infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, 
but also between the tangible and the visible [...]. Every vision 
1 From Anzieu’s A Skin for Thought: Interviews with Gilbert Tarrab. p. 64. quoted in 
Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies p. 27. All quotations from Grosz in this text are taken 
from Volatile Bodies.
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takes place somewhere in the tactile space. There is a double 
and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and the 
tangible in the visible (134). 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is important because, as Elizabeth Grosz 
explains in Volatile Bodies, he is one of a number of modern philosophers 
whose thinking goes some way to reformulating the position of ‘the body’ in 
western thought.2  Against this, Grosz charts a profound dualism operating 
at the heart of our ideas of the world and the human subject. This dualism 
is often described in terms of the Cartesian mind/body split but Grosz finds 
it operating in earlier Ancient Greek and Christian philosophy. What Grosz 
notes about this, (and the other oppositions founded in the mind/body 
binary) is that “Dichotomous thinking necessarily hierarchizes and ranks the 
two polarized terms so that one becomes the privileged term and the other 
its suppressed, subordinated, negative counterpart”(3).3  To this extent it is 
the mind which is framed as the superior term - the seat of learning, 
knowledge and reason and thus the body becomes at best a troublesome 
irrelevance;
Body is thus what is not mind [...]. It is what the mind must 
expel in order to retain its ‘integrity’. It is implicitly defined as 
unruly, disruptive, in need of direction and judgment, merely 
incidental to the defining characteristics of mind, reason or 
personal identity (3).
In traditional epistemological pursuits vision is associated with mind as the 
means by which to achieve understanding and knowledge. The close 
relationship of vision and knowledge is noted by both Grosz and Martin Jay.4  
In a footnote Grosz comments;
From the time of the Greeks, visual metaphors [...] have 
dominated conceptions of knowledge. Thought is regarded as 
2 It is important to stress that Grosz identifies that there is no such thing as the body 
“there is no body as such there are only bodies”(19).
3 Grosz provides a list of the associated mind/body oppositions, these are; “reason and 
passion, sense and sensibility, outside and inside, self and other, depth and surface, 
reality and appearance, mechanism and vitalism, transcendence and immanence, 
temporality and spatiality, psychology and physiology, form and matter, and so on”(3)
4 In the opening paragraph of Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth 
Century French Thought Jay uses twenty one visual metaphors to demonstrate the 
domination of the visual sense in Western culture. p. 1.
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speculative, imagistic: the visible coincides with the 
intelligible. Knowledge is ‘depicted’ as revelation, 
manifestation, or aletheia: [...]. These metaphors provide a 
series of usually unexamined presumptions governing the 
ways in which knowledge is construed; they are deeply 
implicated in the history of epistemology (220).
Thus vision becomes the sensory tool of the mind and reason and the 
means by which to understand and ‘master’ the surrounding world. In 
contrast to this, the sense most associated with the body is touch. Touch is 
the realm of feelings, emotions and the sensual and the body is interpreted 
as “a source of interference in, and danger to, the operations of reason” 
(Grosz 5). The body and its correlated touch are thus constructed in 
opposition to vision and mind as unable to provide an ‘objective’, scientific 
view (understanding) of the world. To this extent philosophy and associated 
knowledge seeking discourses have built a model of the dispassionate, 
detached inquirer observing the world around him in order to extract 
knowledge in what is ultimately a controlling endeavour.5  This is the model 
of vision Crary sees as exemplified by the camera obscura, and in such a 
conception for the purposes of understanding and knowledge, the mind has 
been separated from the body and vision as the servant of the mind has 
been similarly disembodied. In the light of Grosz’s analysis it is now 
possible to conceive of the rationale which limits the construction of 
‘experience’ to the visual in many scopic regimes, and particularly those as 
manifested by modern mediatizing technologies.
Therefore we can now see that Merleau-Ponty's conflation of touch and 
vision (mind/body) is indeed a radical departure, not only in terms of 
conventional inscriptions of the human senses as separate, but also in 
terms of a fundamental epistemic practises. In Merleau-Ponty’s description, 
vision is not a disembodied entity which allows a being to adopt an all-
seeing detachment from the world, and thus knowledge to be gained 
untainted by the body; “Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from 
above, and thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the ‘there is’ which 
underlies it; to the site, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as 
5 Phelan notes that this model is problematised by modern scientific understandings of 
vision stemming from quantum theory which determines the act of looking as influential 
over the phenomena observed.
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its is in our life and for our body” (“Eye and Mind” 281). Vision, alongside 
touch and all the other human senses, places us not outside but inside 
phenomena, at the centre of the world; “Here, where the world is sensible; 
here, where I am” (Phenomenology xx). In such a conception it is 
impossible for vision to remain detached from the body and Grosz has 
noted that Merleau-Ponty’s association of vision and touch, in contrast to 
traditional configurations, works to implicate the body of the viewer in what 
is seen; “While it is clear that in the case of touch, the toucher is always 
touched, in traditional understandings of vision, the seer sees at a distance 
and is unimplicated in what is seen”(101). Key to Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of vision and touch are his ideas on the “double sensation” 
or “reversibility”, and he extrapolates his observations from the realm of the 
tangible to the realm of the visible. In touch, he notes, it is impossible to 
touch without also being touched, hence the ‘reversibility’ of touch and thus, 
as Grosz acknowledges, “the subject is implicated in its objects and its 
objects are at least partially constitutive of the subject”(100/1). When a 
similar idea is applied to the more detached sensation of vision Merleau-
Ponty concludes:
As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as is so well 
indicated by the double meaning of the word) be doubled with 
a complementary vision or with another vision: myself seen 
from without, such as another would see me, installed in the 
midst of the visible, [...] he who sees cannot possess the 
visible unless he is possessed by it (The Visible 134).
What is attractive about Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is that by comparing 
touch to vision he works to demonstrate the interdependence of subject and 
object. Whereas in previous ocularcentric philosophies the subject has 
remained separate and unaffected by the object of his vision (a detached 
position of mastery) vision is now figured as co-relational. 
However, as Grosz goes on to recount, Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the 
interconnection between touch and vision is problematised by the feminist 
theorist Luce Irigaray. Irigaray proposes that the two senses are not 
equivalent in their reversibility and that in fact touch precedes and goes 
beyond vision; Grosz, quoting Irigaray, writes; “The tangible is the invisible, 
unseeable milieu of the visible, the source of visibility; it precedes the 
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distinction between active and passive and subject and object: ‘I see only 
through the touching of the light’”(106). Phelan in her work Unmarked, 
makes a similar point about an invisible that determines the visible, but 
makes her argument not in terms of touch but via the after-image as an 
indication of the ‘optical unconscious’.6  An object which has disappeared 
from the field of vision leaves a trace as an after-image and therefore 
indicates
a realm in which what is not visibly available to the eye 
constitutes and defines what is - in the same way as the 
unconscious frames ongoing conscious events. Just as we 
understand that things in the past determine how we 
experience the present, so too can it be said that the visible is 
defined by the invisible (14). 
The significance of this ‘invisible’ will be elaborated-on later in this chapter; 
in this introduction, however, I would like to consider the subject/object 
dissolution once more. Irigaray’s conception of the tangible which precedes 
vision problematises the idea of an easy reciprocity between subject and 
object in the visual field but it does not completely dismantle the notion of 
their inter-relational basis. 
Alphonso Lingis has also written about the subject/object interface in terms 
of touch, and figures touch as the conduit of the object/other; “to recognise 
another [...] is to be touched by a body” (qtd in Robins 30). In being touched 
by another we experience a direct contact with a force, a being or 
phenomenon, that goes beyond ourselves and our control; “as embodied 
beings we come upon others in their difference, others who extend our 
awareness and experience, but others who also frustrate our expectations 
or put demands on us” (Robins 30). This contact with the other is an 
inevitability of human interaction and an indication of our interdependence 
and the source of our learning, development and change as individuals. In 
this sense the object/other comes to stand for the unknown and Robins 
suggests we should consider “touch in terms of the experiential and 
transformational possibilities in the unknown”(30).7  However a 
6 Phelan acknowledges that this is Walter Benjamin’s phrase, Unmarked p 14.
7 This experience is similar to the notion of death detailed in the previous chapter, death 
was also posited as ‘the Other’ - the ultimate alterity. 
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psychoanalytically informed interpretation of subject and object 
acknowledges that both terms are conditioned and mediated by language, 
and that is is impossible to look directly at or view the object/other beyond or 
outside the screen of language. This screen determines the visible and 
invisible within culture and thus the transformative potential of the 
object/other is limited and determined by this screen, as Irigaray notes “If I 
cannot see the other in its alterity, and if the other cannot see me, my body 
no longer sees anything in the difference. I become blind” (qtd in Grosz 
106).8  Yet it would seem to me that Irigaray’s construction of a touch which 
precedes vision implicates and draws attention to the function of the screen 
in intersubjective and other subject/object encounters to the extent that it 
indicates the presence of the unknown other beyond language. 
Tangible performance
I would like to propose that multi-media performance acts as a direct 
intervention into the debates detailed above; by staging the live human body 
as concurrent with the mediatized image, multi-media performance 
implicates the mind/body dualism criticised by Grosz and Merleau-Ponty 
and its associated separations of touch and vision. The difference and 
similarities of these two senses is what is played out in the performance 
versus media exchange. 
In The Skin Ego Didier Anzieu has noted “The skin can judge time (less well 
that the ear) and space (less well than the eye), but it alone combines the 
spatial and temporal dimensions”(14), this sharing of time and space has 
been demonstrated to be a defining feature of live performance (in contrast 
to Virilio’s ‘teletopology’ where the light and time of the mediatized image 
reigns supreme). A live performance event is a ‘peopled space’, it takes 
place between performers and audience in a shared time and space and 
as such replicates a form of ‘touching’ which is absent from the 
disembodied mediatized visual encounter. To this end Robins’ description; 
“In touch, we are immersed in the surrounding world. In touch, there is not 
the possibility to be alone or to be above it. We are all involved and 
implicated in the reciprocity of contact. And in this we cannot be the sole 
8 I would like to reference Simulator once more in this context and the ‘blinding’ moment 
of the flash.
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initiators - we cannot escape from being touched by the other”(30) could 
well form the basis of a description for the performance encounter. This is 
the assumption I made at the close of chapter three and which I would now 
like to elaborate on specifically in relation to the notion of performance as a 
type of touch. This touch does not have to be literal, I would suggest that 
purely by staging and foregrounding the body in the way that performance 
does, touch is implicated into the parameters of sensational experience. 
Richard Sennett notes that there are “deepseated problems in Western 
civilization in imaging spaces for the human body which might make human 
bodies aware of one another”(21), possibly some performance bypasses 
this problem or indeed remedies it to some extent by placing an audience in 
direct and proximal alignment with performers’ bodies, thus ushering 
qualities of touch, including those of implication and the unknown cited 
earlier. 
Touch/touching
To return briefly to the subject of the case study in chapter two which 
concerned the multi-media performance Constants II. Touch provides an 
axial moment within this multi-media performance and foregrounds a 
disparity between the image and the body.
  
Vid. 20. Constants II - Ghost Touch.      
Media products operate by reducing the body to a visual image and 
simultaneously validate this image as an ‘equivalent’ which stands in for 
the body. Yet in multi-media/performance collaboration, types of sensory 
based interactions are enacted which cannot be reduced to a visual 
dimension by the watching cameras. The ‘Ghost Sequence’ illustrates this; 
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Sheila, deceived by the sight of Patricia’s image, attempts to touch her as 
she sits down on a chair, however, as this version of Patricia is only a 
recorded image Sheila’s hand passes straight through Patricia’s 
immaterial body. It is only when live, material Patricia approaches and sits, 
once more, in the chair that Sheila is able to make bodily contact with her. 
The television screen provides no discernible difference between live 
Patricia and recorded Patricia; both are represented by the same images of 
identical quality. Only through a sense of touch is it possible to distinguish 
one image as immaterial and the other as material. Because visual media 
is able to mimic elements of material bodies in present time and space, we 
are left with touch as the only means by which to determine finally a material 
embodied presence in the present. This sequence emphasises a lacuna 
between touch and vision and draws attention to components of sensual 
experience dispelled by visual images. Furthermore, due to the staging 
configuration of this performance (see Vid. 2.) no separation was made 
between the performance space and audience space, and at times the 
performers did literally touch the spectators as they moved around. 
However, this touch was not only a literal possibility throughout the duration 
of the show, but the shared space and time of the performance created a 
sense of proximity and inclusion for a viewer who could not remain 
distanced and detached from the events s/he was experiencing. This is 
evidenced in the testimony of one audience member, Guy Undrill, quoted 
earlier, “When Patricia says ‘we are the inconstant fragmentary things’, for 
once in the theatre, this ‘we’ feels genuinely inclusive” (Bodies in Flight, 
Bourne and Rye).
4.2 Looking Glass
The sense of touch in Constants II was used to mark a distinguishing 
moment between the live body and the mediatized and it also occurs 
elsewhere within my work. Looking Glass is an interactive installation which 
preceded the making of Constants II and was constructed in response to 
another earlier work The Turin Machine.9  I first became interested in the 
relationship between vision and touch while performing The Turin Machine; 
via the experience of performing in this installation I found that the quotation 
9 The Turin Machine is the subject of a separate, more detailed case study later on in this 
chapter beginning on page 156.
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in Barthes’ Camera Lucida; “the photographed body touches me with its 
own rays”(81) became particularly pertinent. The Turin Machine is a giant 
pinhole camera in which I use my live body as a performer to produce a 
photographic image. During this extended process (the performance lasts 
four hours) audience members are admitted into the camera one at a time 
to experience this moment of exposure in the form of a live image seen on a 
light sensitive screen. Within the giant camera and in the process of 
becoming a photographed body, light extends from my live body and 
physically imprints, or impinges itself, upon the cloth and also upon the 
viewer. To the extent that this reflected light constitutes an image of ‘me’ it 
seems to be a part of myself, albeit an immaterial one, that is reaching out 
and making contact with the viewer. Perhaps all human interactions and 
apprehensions could be figured in this way, as either a physical or 
metaphysical meeting or touch. One reason that this formula particularly 
appealed was because of the agency that this gave to the act of looking; 
without light, for example, there could be no looking and therefore if light 
behaved like a touch then the same could be said of looking. By equating 
looking with touching the passivity of the look is destabilised and looking is 
reconfigured as an active, constructing action.
Looking Glass was designed, however, to overcome a potential difficulty in 
The Turin Machine. If the mechanics of the pinhole camera installation are 
not wholly understood by the viewer a certain ambiguity can form around the 
viewing relations set up within the piece whereby, the presence of the live 
body is potentially effaced by its own image; people might imagine that what 
they see in the camera is solely a projected image without being aware that 
a live body, not some form of recorded playback, is the source of this 
image.10  I wished, therefore, to make a work where the fact of the live body 
would be inescapable in relation to its constitution as an image. Originally I 
wanted to stage this idea using a live camera relay to project my image as a 
performer entombed in a glass sarcophagus in a sort of electronic version 
of The Turin Machine. However this idea merely represented the body via an 
10 This misapprehension is occasionally reported by people who assist with the exhibition 
of the The Turin Machine. Prior to the performance I was aware that it was a possibility 
and published a programme distributed free at all exhibitions of the work which explains 
the operations of the camera (see Appendix 5.). I also have an assistant present at the 
entrance to the installation who offers visitors help and advice and answers whatever 
questions they might have. 
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image suffused with the qualities of the electronically mediatized. Due to 
this ‘video’ quality the origin of the image was redolent of recorded 
reproduction rather than an actual live bodily presence. Thus this 
suggestion of reproduction would, once more, allow the live body effectively 
to be replaced by its mediatized image. I then realised that by replacing my 
body, as the performer, with the body of the spectator the live coexistence of 
body and image would be undeniable. The spectator would become both 
the subject and the object of the work and undeniably embody this live 
presence. Describing Looking Glass as a multi-media performance is 
somewhat problematic as it is designed as a non-durational gallery 
installation without specific performer(s). It is possible, however, to identify 
a performing element in the work and a concern with the body and the 
picturing of the body. In the same way that Constants II, via its use of the live 
camera, collapses the distinctions between audience (as looker) and 
performer (as looked at), Looking Glass furthers this occlusion by reversing 
traditional distinctions and reconfiguring the audience as the performers of 
the piece. Thus viewing positions become transformed into performing 
positions. 
Looking Glass was presented as a work in progress piece at Napier 
University’s Department of Photography, Film and Television in May 1998.
Vid. 21. Looking Glass - Documentation 
The installation consists of an electronic ‘mirror’ that is activated by touch.11  
This idea is facilitated by the use of two cameras, a video projector and an 
MX50 vision mixer; the video projector produces a white light which back-
11 In the work in progress version of the work the actual stimulus which triggered the 
display of the ‘mirror’ image was not in fact the touch of the spectator’s hand. However, 
the prototype proved that the idea was technically possible and produced the desired 
images by approximate means.
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projects onto the glass ‘mirror’ screen, one camera looks at the face of the 
spectator while the other looks at the spectator’s hand against the glass. 
The silhouette of the hand on the bright screen creates a dark matte shape 
which is used as a luma key signal for the vision mixer, the dark space in 
the video picture can then be replaced by an image of the viewer’s face 
provided by the second camera. This combined key signal is then projected 
onto the mirror. Ideally the work should be realised as a wall mounted 
sheet of glass, which glows steadily in a darkened gallery space. The 
technical apparatus of the installation should remain hidden. A hand 
placed, as invited, on the screen creates a space in the white light through 
which a spectator can see their own face. The image is only visible as long 
as the spectator maintains contact with the glass. It disappears as soon as 
the hand is removed. Thus the coexistence of body and image is confirmed 
in two ways; firstly by the congruent bodily presence of the spectator and 
secondly by an image of this body which is only revealed by the touch of that 
same body. Thus touch and vision are configurated as interlocking;
we must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut 
out of the tangible, every tactile being in some manner 
promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, 
infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, 
but also between the tangible and the visible (Merleau-Ponty 
The Visible 134).
Despite the image of the body being mediatized and clearly of video origin 
(and therefore subject to the potential elisions and erosions performed by 
mediatization), the touch on the glass is able to confirm the material 
presence, or, as it were, the simultaneous embodied existence of a 
mediatized body. 
The mirror image
Looking Glass, like any other mirror, could be seen as an ‘identity maker’ 
and the work is not merely concerned with displaying a meeting of the 
visual image and the corporeal body. Specifically the work concentrates 
around an image of the face and is therefore resonant of other traditions of 
identity-making namely portraiture. Silverman has remarked of Lacan’s 
description of the visual field “all visual transactions are inflected by 
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narcissism”(3) and indeed Phelan, following Lacan, concurs by stating “all 
looking is an attempt to find a mirror”(25). If all our acts of looking are, to 
some degree, determined by the desire to see ourselves this desire is 
most obviously gratified by our encounter with mirrors and indeed 
originates, according to Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis, in early identity- 
forming encounters. In his theory of the mirror phase, Lacan observed the 
superiority of a six to eight month-old infant’s visual perceptions in 
comparison with its lack of motor coordination and proposed that this 
superiority allowed the infant, when confronted by its mirror image to 
‘misrecognise’ this reflected image as his ‘complete and unified self’ - this 
image produces the illusion of a narcissistic self-idealised unity which 
which is the foundation of the Imaginary. This theory leads Kaja Silverman 
to observe that Lacanian psychoanalysis emphasises the visual above all 
senses and “the ego as a product of specular relations”(14). Faces in 
particular are seen as the source of individual identity. Both mirrors and 
portraits present an image of the face, which according to Lacan, “assumes 
its value as a mirror of psychic expression” (qtd in Bonner 234/5), that is 
faces are able to ‘reveal’ or represent their subjects’ internal character or 
being. Susan Buck-Morss makes a similar observation and quotes Sir 
Charles Bell’s belief that “the countenance is the index of the mind”(386), 
she then elaborates on this idea and sees in the face a meeting between 
the internal psyche and the exterior world;
The expressive face is, indeed, a wonder of synthesis, as 
individual as a fingerprint, yet collectively legible by common 
sense. On it the three aspects of the synaesthetic system - 
physical sensation, motor reaction, and psychical meaning - 
converge in signs and gestures compromising a mimetic 
language (386). 
Thus the face is the intensive site for both the perceptions and expressions 
of an individual’s subjectivity, it is the register of the self. 
Much of my multi-media performance work is directly, though not 
necessarily consciously, formed around the psychic trope of the mirror 
phase in that it expands envisioning forms beyond the infant’s reflective 
mirror into the products of media imaging and out into the specularity of live 
performance itself. Recorded images, live camera relays, photographic 
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portraits of the viewer/performer and electronic mirrors all exhibit an interest 
in the translation of the body, often the face, into an ‘identifying’ image. 
When the body is intermingled with the technological apparatuses of visual 
representation, these performances are inevitably concerned with what 
constitutes a body, its identity and its sense of self; and the live, mediatized 
and recorded images do not merely illustrate psychoanalytic theory, rather 
they enact this theory upon the bodies of both performers and spectators.
The threshold
In The Threshold of the Visible World Silverman presents an interesting 
analysis of ideas concerning the formation of the ego in which she pays 
particular attention to the senses of vision and touch. She maintains that a 
concentration around the visual imago, as provisioned by Lacan, leads to a 
type of ‘incorporative’ identificatory practice which is deemed damaging to 
certain types of ‘others’ within society. In brief Silverman, working from 
Lacan, writes about the méconnaissance (misrecognition) that occurs when 
the infant first apprehends his image in the mirror, this image contains a 
fundamental paradox - being both the same as but also (as only an image) 
different from the infant. This paradox is the origin of the notion of the 
divided self, as in order to conceive of self the infant necessarily has to see 
himself as another. This otherness, however, is occluded by the jouissance 
(jubilation) engendered by the principle of the ‘self-same body’ which only 
sees the image in the mirror as the same as the self; as this image 
presents a ‘whole’ body it therefore establishes the sense of a ‘complete’ 
self. Within wider social interactions this self-same image works to limit 
and contain identificatory possibilities to socially idealised subjects 
because, beyond the mirror and extending into all acts of looking, the 
subject wishes to see only a reflection of its ideal ‘whole’ self in an attempt 
to maintain a (delusory) homogeneous unity for the ego. This type of 
identification is termed idiopathic by Max Scheler, as it performs an 
incorporative ‘engorging’ of ‘the other’ who becomes interiorised as the 
same as the self, and subsequently “repudiates what it cannot swallow - by 
refusing to live in and through alien corporealities” (Silverman 24). 
Silverman believes this description of incorporative ego formation “to be at 
the heart of normative adult subjectivity. Indeed, it provides the very basis for 
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the formation of a ‘coherent’ bodily ego”(23); however she goes on to 
conclude that “The aspiration to wholeness and unity not only has tragic 
personal consequences, but also calamitous social effects”(27). Identities 
deemed socially undesirable remain excluded from idealisation and 
continue to be the target for the displacement of what we do not wish to 
recognise in ourselves, idiopathic identification is a process which 
Silverman describes as motivated by “attempts to personally approximate 
the ideal [which] end in failure and leaves us in a relation of fatal 
aggressivity towards others”(4). Thus Silverman seems to be isolating this 
form of identificatory practice; our requisitioning of the socially prized 
partnered by a failure to identify with non-ideal others, as the origin of a type 
of social violence. Robins, amongst others, has made similar observations 
regarding our relationship to others as constructed by the devices of 
modern warfare and technological visual culture.
Silverman proposes an alternative to this ‘colonising’ account of the 
processes of the psyche, however. She describes another element in the 
formation of the ego which provides a positive identificatory model for our 
interactions with the other. She notes that Lacan’s emphasis on vision as 
the prime constituting force for the ego “has made it extremely difficult to 
theorise the role played there by bodily sensations”(14) and quotes 
Sigmund Freud from “The Ego and the Id”, “Freud maintains that the ego is 
‘first and foremost, a bodily ego’; it is not merely a projection of a surface 
entity, but is itself the projection of a surface”(9).12  From this Silverman 
deduces that “our experience of ‘self’ is always circumscribed by and 
derived from the body”(9) and goes on to identify two other phenomena 
which she believes play an important part in the constitution of the ego. The 
first is that of the ‘sensational body’ which is outlined in James Strachey’s 
notes to “The Ego and the Id”, “the ego is ultimately derived from bodily 
sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may 
thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body”(26). The 
second idea comes from the work of the French psychiatrist Henri Wallon 
whose work formed another basis for Lacan’s own analysis. Wallon 
differentiated between an exteroceptive experience of the body, ie one 
based on vision, and the proprioceptive, which Silverman, quoting Wallon, 
12 Freud’s exact phrasing is; “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego: it is not merely a surface 
entity, but is itself the projection of a surface”(26).
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describes as signifying;
something like ‘the apprehension on the part of the subject of 
his or her ownness’. [...]Proprioceptivity can best be 
understood as that egoic component to which concepts like 
‘here’, ‘there’, and ‘my’ are keyed. It encompasses the 
muscular system ‘in its totality,’ including those muscles 
which effect the ‘shifting of the body and its members in 
space’. [...] It thus involves a nonvisual mapping of the body’s 
form (16).13
Both these theories - the sensational body and the proprioceptive - 
emphasise the importance of tactile sensations of the body, alongside the 
visual, in producing and maintaining the ego.14  The proprioceptive has 
consequences for the exteroceptive as it is via the proprioceptive that we are 
able to “perceive things as exterior [ie beyond our body] and, so, that the 
specular image might be said to be ‘outside’” (Silverman 16). It is through 
the combination of the exteroceptive and the proprioceptive that we are 
brought back to the paradox of the self seen in the mirror as simultaneously 
the same but other from the self. This dualism operating at the heart of the 
self works to problematise notions of a single unified ego and “confirms a 
heterogeneity of the corporeal ego [...] which is inextricably tied to the 
aspiration toward ‘wholeness’ and ‘unity’” (Silverman 20/21). As has been 
noted previously, the aspiration towards egoic unity is displayed in 
idiopathic incorporation rooted in exteroceptive vision; against this 
Silverman positions an alternative identificatory system that originates in the 
proprioceptive and is termed excorporative, creating a heteropathic ‘identity-
at-a-distance’. The proprioceptive maintains that “The visual imago itself 
remains stubbornly exterior, like the original mirror reflection described by 
Wallon, at the expense of an imaginary bodily unity” (Silverman 23). In this 
equation the other remains an other and does not need to be violently 
repudiated/discarded because it no longer threatens the (myth) of the 
coherent ego. To this end Silverman notes in relation to alternative 
identificatory practices;
13 Elsewhere, in Charles W. Bonner’s chapter “The Status and Significance of the Body in 
Lacan’s Imaginary and Symbolic Orders” Wallon’s Proprioceptive is simply interpreted as 
“the proprio-interoceptive {i.e., felt} experience of the body”(236).
14 Didier Anzieu’s The Skin Ego similarly deals with this idea that the surface of the body, 
its skin, plays an integral role in the formation of a bodily ego and this work is also 
referenced by Silverman.
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I am not arguing against idealization - without which human 
existence would be unendurable, and which is the 
precondition for every loving access to the other, whether 
identificatory or erotic - but against the smooth meshing of that 
psychic operation with culturally defined norms. [...] We need to 
learn how to idealize oppositionally and provisionally (37).
This detour into Silverman’s theories and the radical potential of the 
proprioceptive equates with the ideas on touch and the transformative 
benefits of the body cited earlier.15  At the centre of what Silverman proposes 
is a less ‘oppressive’ relationship with the other, facilitated by an 
introduction of an awareness of the body, and specifically its touch, into 
scopic/egoic arenas. Importantly Silverman goes on to note the importance 
of aesthetic texts in the delivery of this different way of being/seeing: 
“idealization is clearly an operation whose roots extend deep into the 
unconscious, it cannot be simply decreed through conscious edict. We 
consequently require textual assistance in carrying out the project I have just 
described”(37). Silverman, writing about the unconscious, makes her 
argument for the value of aesthetic texts as able to “intervene where we 
cannot”(4) and she notes the unconscious’ ability to “bring about a much 
more radical transmutation of values than can conscious revision”, the 
unconscious can reverse normative values and “render a culturally 
insignificant object libidinally resonant, or a culturally significant object 
worthless”(3/4). However this radical re-valuation remains locked within the 
unconscious and Silverman maintains that this re-valuation is potentially 
played out in a conscious ‘re-viewing’ via aesthetic texts. Certain texts, and 
especially visual ones “have the formal and libidinal properties of highly 
charge unconscious memories. They are consequently capable of moving 
immediately to a privileged site within the unconscious. At the same time, 
they are available to conscious scrutiny and interrogation”(4). Therefore 
15 Silverman argues this negatively when she states;
I want to stress [...] that my intent in the last two sections [was] to 
dramatize what it means for a culture to valourize a particular bodily 
configuration at the level of the screen. This valourization precipitates a 
dangerous méconnaissance on the part of certain subjects, which 
prevents them from identifying outside extremely restrictive bodily limits. It 
encourages others to live the irreducibly disjunctive relation between the 
sensational ego and the specular imago in a pathological way, i.e., as 
personal insufficiency and failure. As a result, all kinds of potential 
transformative opportunities are lost (36/7).
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Silverman privileges an aesthetic work “which resists our attempts to 
assimilate the ideal image. [...] and, thus, engages us in an active rather 
than a passive form of idealization”(2). Just as I have previously suggested 
that the multi-media performance Constants II could operate as a 
materialisation of theories concerning vision, touch and the body, I would 
now similarly like to propose that these debates, which have been 
expanded by Silverman, could also be applied to other multi-media 
performance works and in particular my installation piece Looking Glass. 
Re-viewing 
Lacan’s account prioritises the visual over the sensational and 
proprioceptive, but it is in these latter domains that the difference between 
the body and its image can be determined. As Silverman observes;
along with muscular sensation, cutaneous sensation would 
seem to play a particularly privileged proprioceptive role, since 
together these two things are primarily responsible for the 
production of a nonvisual corporeal Gestalt (17). 
It is this nonvisual gestalt, which Silverman calls “the sensational ego”, 
which along with the visual imago constructs a ‘corporeal ego’ around an 
awareness of the self-same/otherness paradox. It is this paradox which is 
recreated in multi-media performance, which through its staging of touch 
and its foregrounding of the body, emphasises the proprioceptive 
contribution to the ego as working in close proximity to the more commonly 
acknowledged self as constituted through the visual imago. The interactive 
installation Looking Glass also realises the importance of both visual and 
sensational perceptions as it refuses the production of an identity without 
both elements. As a mirror it confronts directly the idea that all looking is a 
search for the self; yet this identity cannot materialise without the look and 
touch of the spectator. This idea of the dual search is doubled in the 
installation because not only is a touch required to produce an image on 
the glass but this same image is only partially seen, revealed through the 
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matte silhouetted shape of the touching hand.16 
Vid. 22: Looking Glass - Hand on Glass
The image on the glass therefore provokes a paradoxical relationship with 
its viewer; the image is live and functions as a mirror image and as such is 
misrecognised by the spectator as the same as his or her ‘self’. However, 
the hand on the glass acts to prevent narcissistic jouissance by reminding 
the spectator that whilst they see their face beneath their hand they do not 
touch this same face, the hand senses cool glass not warm flesh thus 
indicating, that without the reversible sensation of toucher/touched, the face 
on the glass is something other than the self, an image alienated from the 
body. In this way Looking Glass works to illustrate the paradox of the self-
same/otherness of portraits and mirror images by staging the different 
sensing elements involved in the formation of a subject’s ego, and thus it 
embodies and envisions the paradox that exists at the source of the 
subject’s sense of self. I would like to argue that Looking Glass constitutes 
an aesthetic work that explores Silverman’s prerogatives; “We need visual 
texts which activate in us the capacity to idealize bodies which diverge as 
widely as possible both from ourselves and from the cultural norm”(37). 
Although the face we see in Looking Glass is clearly our own, by rendering 
this image of the self as partial and fractured through the divisive 
ministrations of touch and vision, the work gives the lie to a sense of a 
coherent bodily ego. As has been suggested by Silverman, an 
abandonment of this ideal ushers in a new order of heteropathic 
identification and the possibility of prizing previously socially non-ideal 
16 Although I have previously quoted Merleau-Ponty in relation to this moment I would 
now, perhaps paradoxically, like to invoke Irigaray’s comment once more; “‘I see only 
through the touching of the light’’. Although the moments of touch and vision coexist 
within the piece, an image only appears because of a touch and in this way the work 
could be seen to realise Grosz/Irigaray’s configuration of an invisible tangible that 
precedes vision.
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others.
On reviewing this work in the light of Silverman, however, I perceive an 
additional nuance that would perhaps extend the efficacy of Looking Glass 
in line with Silverman’s project. Although the presence of what could be 
termed ‘the other of the self’ is confirmed by the proprioceptive touch upon 
the glass, the implications that this self-alienation may have for the images 
of ‘others’ may not be fully realised within this work. Looking Glass does not 
present a body or bodies which “diverge as widely as possible from [both] 
ourselves” because the installation as currently realised works only with the 
reflective mirror image of single specific viewer. Yet it would be possible for 
the installation to operate beyond this initial encounter and therefore draw 
parallels between the other of the self and images of other others. For 
example, after an initial interaction with the piece, the face pictured on the 
glass could gradually change to an image of one of the previous viewers, 
whose face had been recorded during an earlier encounter. The faces of 
‘other’ viewers would then more problematically ‘mirror’ that of the present 
viewer and these others would be both detached from and also aligned with 
the other of the self. If these images could be selected at random to prevent 
a predictable ‘series’ this would confront the viewing self with another other 
and directly engage the viewer with the idea of an ‘identity-at-a-distance’. 
Looking Glass is still a work in progress piece and I intend to rework it with 
this addition, this will, I believe, produce an interaction with the piece which 
will continue beyond narcissistic gratification. The inclusion of the images 
of previous visitors/others will expand the scope and context of the work and 
introduce a more social dynamic to its interface. Such additions will 
emphasise and make overt some of the dynamics which underlie the work, 
such as those that are concerned with ‘difference’ and our relationships 
with others.
The icon
There is a final piece of work that I would like to discuss with regard to 
issues raised in my analysis of Looking Glass. The Turin Machine has 
been previously cited as the precursor of Looking Glass, and to some 
degree it acts as a distillation of a number of the concerns figured in the 
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meeting of performance with mediatized images. In my reviewing of 
Looking Glass I omitted to acknowledge another purpose of the touch of the 
hand on the glass which, once again, retrospectively aligns the work with 
Irigaray’s analysis. For example, Grosz, following Irigaray, proposes that 
“the tangible provides the preconditions and grounds of the visible. [...] the 
tangible is the unacknowledged base or foundation, the source of the 
visible”(105).17  In Looking Glass this idea is made literal as we do not see 
until the hand has contacted the glass - thus touch can be figured as a 
conduit for the visible - something that defines vision. As has been 
demonstrated by Robins, touch has been absented from most modern 
visual encounters, and yet, some critics deem these encounters with the 
visible to be in some senses dependent upon touch. There are indications 
of the interdependence of these two sensations in other earlier 
representational images and it is to images of this order that my piece The 
Turin Machine in part alludes.
Prior to the invention of techniques for mechanical reproduction, it is 
possible to identify another ‘autonomous imaging’ tradition and one 
particularly concerned with portraiture - the religious icon. The objectivity of 
these images derives from an ‘ultimate’ source of objectivity in the sense of 
an omnipotent deity. Many orthodox Christian icons are believed to have 
been painted through the action of divine intervention - God ‘working 
through’ the hand of the icon painter  - or, alternatively, these images have 
no known human origins having been ‘found’ as already completed images 
in remote sites and brought back to become the objects of veneration for 
religious communities.18  What is interesting about the icon as an example 
of an autonomous image is that, unlike photography and other more 
17 This idea is also expressed by Phelan in these terms :“Visibility and invisibility are crucial 
bound; invisibility policies visibility and in this specific sense functions as the ascendant 
term in the binary”(26).
18 Andrii Borovets writes “He [the icon painter] did not think it proper even to sign his works 
because he ascribed his inspiration and creative achievement to grace imparted to him by 
God. This can explain the spreading of legends about ancient icon painters whom angels 
helped in their work” (“Icon Gallery”, Olteanu). Icons not made by human hand are titled 
‘acheiropoièta’ and those made by angels ‘aggeloktistos’. For example there is a Russian 
Icon titled Redeemer Not Painted By Human Hand painted (sic) by Simon Ushakov 1657 
(Russian Icons Index, Mitrevski). An encaustic picture of the Virgin at Méga Spílio 
Monastery in Greece is an example of a ‘found’ image. The picture is said to have been 
found by the shepherdess Eyphrosyne in AD 362 in a cave, and its discovery led to the 
building of the monastery on this site.
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modern forms of mechanical reproduction, having excluded the human 
body from the image making process it then resituates this human 
dimension from the realm of physical production to physical reception. Many 
religious icons function through touch, they are intended, first and foremost, 
to be touched by orthodox believers.19  These icons, despite their name, are 
not primarily objects of visual veneration but transmit the ‘essence’ or 
‘power’ of the individual they depict via a direct physical contact between 
image and spectator. Even in the case of icons which remain untouched, 
this connection is exhibited metaphorically as the icon acts as a channel 
between its original subject and the people who worship before them. The 
images are a charged surface which conduct ‘spiritual power’ from a holy 
body directly into the bodies of believers, and as commented by Michael 
Olteanu “every icon was endowed by believers with a supernatural power 
which had the mysterious and inexplicable ability to link the soul of a mortal 
with God”. In some senses this encounter bears more relation to a meeting 
between two live bodies than to a purely visual one, in that it conveys 
tangible elements of the physical presence of the person which sight alone 
could not communicate. The Turin Machine works this ‘primitive’ logic of the 
‘presence’ of the person as ‘present’ in an image, as well as overtly 
referencing the traditions of icon painting and holy relics and the ‘proof’ of a 
body that these provide. Thus I am able to make a comparison between 
elements of multi-media performance and more exclusively visual forms 
such as icon paintings. Both cultural products hint at qualities of the body 
possessed by the subject and object (divine or human) which cannot be 
experienced solely in the visual domain, and are instead rooted in other 
sensational qualities of the body. 
4.3 The Turin Machine
The Turin Machine is a performance/photography installation originally 
conceived in response to a radio news report which suggested that the 
Turin Shroud was a mediaeval fake that had been created in a pinhole 
19 Judith Herrin makes an interesting observation in “Women and Icons in Early 
Christianity”, she reports “Reading the accounts of [...] early pilgrims, there is an 
overwhelming impression of the importance attached to physical contact; Christians 
sought to touch to kiss and to embrace objects associated with their Founder’s earthly 
existence” (61). One could perhaps conjecture that the later practice of touching icon 
paintings extended from these earlier encounters.
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camera using ‘mediaeval’ photographic techniques.20  The suggestion of 
this research was that a cadaver had been used to form the image of a 
body upon a cloth, or shroud. The cadaver had been hung outside a 
shuttered room in bright sunlight, a small ‘pinhole’ aperture had allowed 
light to enter the room to produce an image upon material coated in light 
sensitive chromium salts. After a day had passed the unexposed salts were 
washed off and the material was then scorched to fix the image of a body. In 
my conception of this work I replaced the dead cadaver with my own living 
body, used modern photographic materials and made the process of 
exposure available to public scrutiny, as well as the final photographic 
product. I was not interested in recreating the purported mediaeval 
processes, rather, I was concerned with mobilising a number of the 
relationships that the original research seemed to provoke. Namely: what is 
the relationship between a body and its image (specifically a mediatized 
image) and what does an image and/or a body ‘represent’ within wider 
social and cultural boundaries? To this end the means of both these 
phenomena - the body and its image - were reduced to a minimum; the 
imaging apparatus was a pinhole camera which functioned without even 
the intervention of a lens; the live ‘performing’ body was restricted to 
stillness as near as was physically possible. It would be hard to conceive of 
a more impoverished meeting of the live and the mediatized.
The work was first undertaken in prototype form as research at Duncan of 
Jordanstone College of Art before receiving funding from the Scottish and 
English Arts Councils and a commission from ‘Arnolfini Live’. Subsequently 
The Turin Machine has toured nationally and internationally and as such 
represents an ongoing piece of practical research.21   The pinhole camera is 
a purpose-built canvas enclosure which hangs within a large wooden 
frame (7m x 3m x 2.5m) and its structure is reminiscent of a circus or a 
seaside attraction. The installation consists of three chambers: a light room 
in which I stand during the performance; a dark room, separated from the 
20 This news report was based on the research findings of two British researchers Lynn 
Picknett and Clive Prince. The details of their claims can be found in the book Turin 
Shroud; In Whose Image?
21 The Turin Machine has been exhibited at Arnolfini Dec. ‘96, The South Bank July ‘97, 
(Nottingham) Now 97, The Cambridge Darkroom Gallery Nov. ‘98, The Museum of Modern 
Art, Stockholm, Dec. ‘98, The Scottish National Portrait Gallery Sept. ‘99 and 
Performance Studies International, Arizona, March 2000.
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light room by a pinhole, which contains a photographic screen to catch the 
light reflected from my body and a third viewing room where visitors stand to 
look into the dark room. Spectators enter the viewing room, one at a time, 
where they lift up a shutter to look into the camera and witness the image 
during photographic exposure. Initially, on looking inside the camera 
nothing is visible, but as the spectator becomes accustomed to the 
darkness an image begins to appear. This 'biological fade up' reveals an 
image of my live body, inverted by the pinhole, hanging in a dark void. The 
body possesses a strange luminescence and exhibits ghostly qualities 
appearing to hover, as it does, on the edges of perception. Due to the lack 
of light the image is never fully visible and moves in and out of focus as the 
eyes try to fix it. The effect of the vision is strange and disorientating and 
creates a wide variety of responses from viewers. After an exposure time of 
approximately fours hours, the performance ends and the photographic 
screen is removed from the camera and developed to produce, in negative, 
a photographic portrait. These portraits are then exhibited within the gallery, 
or the performance space surrounding the camera, and thus a visitor to the 
installation is able to compare the living image seen inside the camera with 
its resolution as a fixed photographic record hung on the walls of the 
gallery. These two contrasting experiences are intended to provoke a 
consideration of the difference between the live and the recorded body. The 
work occurs over a number of days, each day resulting in the exposure of a 
picture or ‘shroud’.
Exterior Slide                     Interior Diagram       Finished ‘Shrouds’
Fig. 5. The Turin Machine - Three views.      
Much like the installation Simulator this work presents real documentational 
difficulties, working as it does at the very limits of vision. Due to the lack of 
light used in the work, the image seen in the camera can only be realised 
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by a photographic emulsion after a four hour exposure. I have answered a 
difficulty in the documentation of the performance by incorporating this 
record into the installation’s overall concept and exhibition - the ‘shrouds’ 
are effectively the only possible record of what occurs within the camera. 
However, any visitor to the camera will realise that this photographic image, 
fixed, negative and totally ‘visible’ bears little resemblance to the inverted, 
positive, ephemeral body seen inside the camera; it is this version of the 
body which cannot be translated into a document or any form of mediatized 
image. (Other electronic methods of image-capture, such as video, require 
the use of an image enhancer which artificially increases the light of the 
video image, thus rendering far more detail and definition to the picture of 
the body seen in the camera than is ‘reported’ by the naked eye). Two 
contrasting presentations of the body are made in The Turin Machine, in 
this way the installation expresses the restrictions and differences effected 
by the body and its various images. Thus this work questions the 
assumption of much mainstream technological visual practices which 
encourage an equivalence between the body and its mediatized image and 
thereby, more often than not, ensure an erasure of the body and the 
supremacy of the image. 
Looking towards other
Like Looking Glass, The Turin Machine is concerned with the making of 
identity - the transferal of body to image, however, unlike Looking Glass, 
touch is not an overt signifying force within this equation. The Turin Machine 
does not confront the viewer with an image of themselves as other 
(rendered so by touch) and in so doing it does not play directly with the self-
same/other paradox of Looking Glass. The Turin Machine is not a mirror, 
instead it provides an antidote to the criticism of self reflexivity that I posited 
in my review of Looking Glass. In The Turin Machine the other is not 
constructed from an image of the self, it is distinguished as different as it 
takes the form of the socially/sexually marked ‘Other’ of the female as 
defined through her body. Touch in The Turin Machine is metaphorical, 
figured by the gradual appearance of an image from out of an invisible dark 
void, in this extreme instance light becomes ‘felt’, viscerally acting upon the 
eyes of individual spectators. ‘Looking towards other’ therefore becomes 
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the subject of the work as it presents a spectator with a ‘visual experience’, 
the first moments of which are confounded by a lack of vision and which are 
then resolved in an image of an other of no apparent normal order or 
conventional representational quality.22 
Previously I quoted Silverman’s insistence that “all visual transactions are 
inflected by narcissism”(3). Put simply, we look in order to see ourselves. 
But this looking is not a one way process and a confirmation of the self is 
received by the returning look of the other, summarised by Silverman when 
she writes “To ‘be’ is in effect to ‘be seen’”(133). This idea has resonances 
with Merleau-Ponty’s observations cited earlier, “he who sees cannot 
possess the visible unless he is possessed by it” (The Visible 134); 
looking takes place in a social domain and inevitably also involves being 
looked at. Phelan, working from a Lacanian premise, and resonant of 
Silverman’s observations on the incorporative ego states;
Identity is perceptible only through a relation to an other - which 
is to say, it is a form of both resisting and claiming the other, 
declaring the boundary where the self diverges from and 
merges with the other. In that declaration of identity and 
identification, there is always loss, the loss of not-being the 
other and yet remaining dependent on that other for self-
seeing, self-being (13).
Once again we see that an emphasis on the other, and our dependence on 
being seen by others, is fundamental to a sense of our own being and 
identity. However, the identity formed in the exchange between self and 
other is fraught with an insurmountable impasse because the self can 
never occupy the place of the other in this exchange, as Lacan writes, “I am 
unable to see myself from the place where the Other is looking at me” (qtd 
in Phelan 15). Like Silverman, Phelan sees the relationship between self 
and other as a potential source of aggressivity and violence;
This relationship between self and other is a marked one, 
which is to say it is unequal. [...] the always already unequal 
encounter nonetheless summons the hope of reciprocity and 
equality; the failure of this hope then produces violence, 
22 When I first undertook tests of this work, Sandy Tulloch, the photography technician at 
Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art, remarked that the image he saw in the camera 
possessed a quality unlike anything he had ever seen before.
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aggressivity, dissent (3/4).  
Phelan’s solution to this also accords with Silverman and concerns a 
realisation of the structure of one’s own identity as paradoxical i.e. 
simultaneously self and other. Phelan elaborates on this notion of one’s 
internal other in the terms of the loss and lack of the unknown, and asserts 
“until one can accept one’s internal other as lost, invisible, an unmarked 
blank to oneself and within the world, the external other will always bear the 
marks and scars of the looker’s deadening gaze”(26); That is, without an 
acknowledgement of the otherness of the self the subject will continue to 
colonise and ‘incorporate’ others as self-same. However, Phelan posits a 
realisation of this psychic operation in somewhat different terms, drawing 
upon theories of lack (figured in the Lacanian phrase ‘not-all’) and the 
invisible.
The invisible
Phelan, like Silverman, extends a Lacanian psycho/linguistic argument into 
theories of vision. Returning to the primal scene of psychoanalysis, she 
notes the ‘lack’ at the centre of being.23  In a search for the self and in order 
to cover up this fundamental lack, the subject uses vision and the other; 
“The process of self-identity is a leap into a narrative that employs seeing 
as a way of knowing”(5), and in an attempt to avoid this experience of loss 
Phelan suggests we are obliged to over-determine the external “visible 
configurations” of others to confirm a sense of ourselves as complete. (This 
is a process which could be seen as akin to Silverman’s incorporative ego 
which constrains the other in service of the self). Phelan then 
problematises the utilisation of vision to shore up the lack of self and notes 
“The physiological understanding of vision [...] is also a theory of loss and 
distortion”(14). Phelan cites the work of Jonathan Crary as dismantling an 
assurance between vision and knowledge by introducing the idea of vision 
as partial and dependent upon the physiology of the body, therefore, “Vision 
23 Toril Moi provides this explanation on the idea of lack in Sexual/Textual Politics: 
The speaking subject that says ‘I am’ is in fact saying ‘I am he (she) who 
has lost something’ - and the loss suffered is the loss of the imaginary 
identity with the mother and the world. The sentence ‘I am‘ could 
therefore best be translated as ‘I am that which I am not’ according to 
Lacan. [...] To speak as a subject is therefore the same as to represent 
the existence of repressed desire: the speaking subject is lack, and this is 
how Lacan can say that the subject is that which it is not (99/100).
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cannot be a guarantee of knowing once one knows that vision is never 
complete”(14). Phelan uses Crary’s example of the after-image cited earlier 
to build a case for an indication of the dependence of vision on the invisible 
which, as a sign of the ‘not-all’ of vision, hints back to the not-all of the self. 
As all seeing, like all being, is infected with loss, vision and representation 
(like Silverman’s ego) are marshalled in a concerted effort to erase this 
presence of lack and do so by constructing “ever more elaborate promises 
to deliver a satisfying and substantial real”(15). Therefore “the external gaze 
is a compensatory way of returning a failed internal gaze”(15). It is this 
failure of the internal gaze which demands that we keep looking at others in 
order to see ourselves; incorporating a sentence from Lacan’s Four 
Fundamental Concepts Phelan expresses this as “Seeing secures only the 
fact that ‘you never look at me from the place I see you’ and the (failed) 
desire for a reciprocal gaze keeps the looker looking”(20/1). 
Phelan’s argument, like Silverman, then develops a more social inflection 
as it opens out into an analysis of the Lacanian terms of ‘the gaze’ and ‘the 
screen’. 
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Fig. 6. Simplified version of the ‘Lacanian’ field of vision
Visual exchange occurs between a subject and an object and is operative 
through ‘the gaze’, the two interlocking triangles in Fig. 6. represent this 
constituting gaze, which could alternatively be thought of as light.24  However, 
it should be noted that the subject’s view of the object and vice versa is 
blocked by a third mediating quantity - the image/screen - described by 
24 “What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is 
outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its 
effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which light is 
embodied and through which [...] I am photo-graphed” (Lacan Four Fundamental 
Concepts... 106).
162
Phelan as “the laws of the Symbolic which define subject and object 
positions within language”(16). Therefore there are a number of notable 
elements to this description of the field of vision; both the subject and the 
object lie beyond the visible constituting light of the gaze and can only 
perceive a ‘version’ of one another via the image forming screen which 
functions both as a mirror to reflect the viewer and a screen to provide an 
image of the object. Working with the screen it is the gaze which creates an 
image which is ‘recognisable’ within a specific social/cultural sphere, 
figured by Silverman as “the ‘unapprehensible’ agency through which we 
are socially ratified or negated as spectacle”(133). Although this diagram 
appears to present a reciprocal exchange between subject and object, 
Lacan acknowledged that this is not in fact the case, as all looking occurs 
within a socially, culturally and politically determined field. This field 
functions at the level of the screen which mediates all visual exchange, 
through endless binary oppositions in which one quality is marked in order 
to obscure its opposite, the most obvious of these being that of sexual 
difference. In patriarchal culture difference is inscribed through the phallic 
signifier therefore the female becomes an unmarked lack; “There is no 
such thing as The woman since of her essence [...] she is not all” (Mitchell 
and Rose 144). This positioning of the female returns us to Phelan’s 
observations on the lack in being/seeing. Phelan suggests that, like the 
after-image which signals the invisible, the female can work as an 
indication of this not-all within a culture which normally works to suppress 
and cover up lack. Phelan now extends her metaphors of invisibility;
Opening up the ’not all’ of vision requires patience with blanks, 
with blindness, and with the non reproductive. To take the 
humility of blindness inscribed with the gaze seriously, one 
must accept the radical impotency of the gaze. This impotency 
underscores the broken and incomplete symmetry between 
the self and the image of the other (18).
This is the crux of Phelan’s argument; the absence at the centre of the self 
is reproduced in our acts of looking and indicated within culture by the 
female and a recognition of a certain ‘partial sightedness’. Phelan claims 
that “if one could face these features of psychic life, a different order of 
sociality might be possible. [...] the not-all of visual representation creates in 
the looker a sense that there is something ‘beyond’ the picture (and the 
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signifying system itself) that is not shown”(25). The social order that Phelan 
alludes to bears a resemblance to Silverman’s vision and equally has 
consequences for our relationships with others. Phelan proposes “If one 
could confront the internal/external other as always already lost one would 
not have to rely so heavily on the image of the external other to produce what 
the looker lacks”(26).
Phelan and The Turin Machine
I have referenced Phelan’s argument partly for the resonances that it has 
with Silverman's analysis and partly because I believe that it illuminates a 
number of my practical art works, in particular The Turin Machine.25  The 
diagram presented in Fig. 7. describes the viewing relations established in 
The Turin Machine:
Fig. 7. The Turin Machine/Lacanian field of vision
Here the ‘object’ is myself as the performing body and the subject(s) is/are 
the individual viewers; the apex of both triangles mark the apertures, the 
pinhole and the shutter, from which the gaze (‘embodied light’) emanates.26  
In the centre of this exchange stands a literal image/screen which interrupts 
25 Much of my work implicates Phelan’s invisible in its scopic terrain, most obviously 
Simulator uses the aftereffect of the after-image and DeliverUs and Constants II both 
foreground pre-visible touch. Simulator in fact can be seen as a reworking of a number of 
structural elements involved in The Turin Machine; both installations create separated 
dark ‘camera’ spaces within a larger gallery set up, and both require individual viewers to 
involve themselves bodily within the work, either by stepping into the installation or just 
placing their head inside. Once inside, the vision of the spectator is ‘troubled’ by extremes 
of light, either darkness and a lack of light or an excessive flash, this disturbance of vision 
is intend to then provoke a re-evaluation of the object viewed and ultimately of the act of 
looking itself. 
26 ‘Embodied light’ rephrases Lacan’s formulation “the gaze is the instrument through 
which light is embodied” see footnote 24.
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the light and allows an image to be formed, for without the photosensitive 
screen no-body would be discernible within the dark camera. The 
mediating screen allows an image of the object (which isn’t the object) to 
be apprehended by the subject and also functions as a mirror for myself 
(that isn’t myself) in the form of a photographic self portrait.27  However, in 
Phelan’s terms, this work also expresses the inequality of the visual 
encounter and implicates the notion of lack which she believes operates at 
the heart of vision and identity. On first entering the camera a viewer 
experiences a form of blindness as no image can be seen in the darkness, 
and the circumspection of vision continues throughout a spectator’s time in 
the camera as the image never becomes totally clear and lucid. 
(Appropriately the image is at its brightest when a viewer looks ‘askance’ 
since this ‘skewed vision’ allows the black and white receptors positioned 
around the periphery of the retina to come into direct contact with what little 
light there is). In this way the body in The Turin Machine begins to invoke 
Phelan’s ‘not-all’ of vision and it furthers this association by doubling this 
not-all through its presentation of an inverted female figure. Because this 
lack is visited upon the viewer (in the form of the visceral action of light upon 
the eyes) and not just inscribed within the presentation of a female body, a 
viewer cannot remain aloof from the absence proposed in the work. Just as 
she or he is bodily enveloped by the Machine they also become psychically 
involved, and the lack of the female becomes the lack of the subject, “This 
incompleteness is fundamental to [...] psychic identity, and to the gaze itself. 
The psychic subject for Lacan, then, is the castrated subject - the subject 
Freud defined as female” (Phelan 18); it is as if ‘to look’ is almost to take 
the place of the female within culture. 
If we return to Silverman’s ideas for a moment and replace the notion of lack 
with ‘other’ we can see that what The Turin Machine stages is a refusal of 
the incorporative identity of the self-same body. Waiting in the darkness the 
spectators’ initial desire to see, ie. to see themselves in the other (the self-
same impulse) is confounded, and they are required to see again.28  And 
27 The ‘reversibility’ of the positions of subject and object should also be noted within the 
installation  - I am object but also subject whilst, were the light to be reversed, the subject 
spectator would also be my object.
28 Adrian Heathfield describes this sensation in The Turin Machine programme notes, “I 
must open my eyes to see what I cannot see” found in Appendix 5. p.280.
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when an image finally appears it as the culturally marked Other of the 
female. Thus from both Phelan’s and Silverman’s perspective the work 
provides a space for a re-viewing of the other and the self in terms which 
differ from the norm. The undocumentable image inside the camera hints at 
the body beyond the screen; paradoxically, within its representational form 
as a live projection onto a screen, this body suggests that it is beyond 
representation, and therefore is constituted as ‘an other’ which can never 
been seen, nor therefore known, and thus assimilated. Ultimately I would 
argue that The Turin Machine presents a ‘psychic truth’ as it stages the 
unknown other or lack at the centre of being, which is enacted by both the 
subject and the object of the piece. In making this lack overt, The Turin 
Machine is able to provide a space for that alternative ‘order’ that both critics 
demand, a blank space which does not demand that it is filled by the other.29
Camera/gaze
In chapter two I quoted Lacan’s metaphor of the camera as the gaze; 
What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, 
is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter 
light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it 
comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which 
light is embodied and through which [...] I am photo-graphed 
(Four 106).
Within the giant camera of The Turin Machine Lacan’s idea is made 
tangible. The screen inside The Turin Machine provides the axial point 
around which the installation pivots, and it creates an image allowing the 
work to have repercussions which extend beyond the specific products of 
visual culture and out into broader social/political life. Silverman has 
identified the screen as the...
cultural image repertoire [which] inhabits each of us, much as 
language does. What this means is that when we apprehend 
another person or an object, we necessarily do so via that 
large, diverse, but ultimately finite range of representational 
coordinates which determine what and how the members of 
29 This paraphrases Phelan’s statement “By declaring our eyes blind and impotent we 
maybe able to resist the smooth reproduction of the self-same. We may begin to be able 
to inhabit the blank without forcing the other to fill it”(33).
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our culture see - how they process visual detail, and what 
meaning they give it (221). 
Silverman's characterising of the screen as ‘a language’ collapses the 
activities of looking and representation, as Undrill writes “Vision partakes in 
the violence of representation” (Bodies in Flight, Bourne & Rye).30   To think 
about everything we see as a type of language, places vision firmly within 
the constraints of culture and subject to the laws and priorities of a given 
society, hence Merleau-Ponty’s assertion; “It is at the same time true that 
the world is what we see and that, nevertheless, we must learn to see it” 
(The Visible 4). Therefore prior to the mediatized representations of camera 
images, there exists a representational aspect to vision itself, this is what 
the screen in the Lacanian field of vision defines. The screen in The Turin 
Machine cannot be perceived (there is not enough light to illuminate it in the 
camera); it is an invisible signifier like those of all mediatized images and 
the opaque screen in Lacan’s description. Because the screen is invisible, 
the ‘representation’ of the visual is not seen, which is why we are able to 
determine the products of cameras and, similarly, our own eyes as ‘real’, 
‘true’ and ‘objective’ whereas, in reality, they are subjective and limited by 
our own enculturated selves. The Turin Machine is a material realisation of 
the camera/gaze metaphor. In it, looking is made indivisible from a moment 
of representation, and this metaphor is further reinforced as the image 
seen on the screen is simultaneously creating a photographic 
representation. The work therefore emphasises the act of looking as 
‘linguistic’, a representational process, and thus extends this implication 
into all looking, recalling Lacan’s formulation “it is the world of words that 
creates the world of things” (Écrits 65). This description of vision as 
governed by language can lead to a depressingly restricted notion of 
seeing, as Barthes notes “today, there is no language site outside 
bourgeois ideology: our language comes from it, returns to it, remains 
closed up in it.” (Sade 10).31  The screen as the “cultural image repertoire” 
reduces the agency of looking, as it suggests that this agency is locked into 
a specific culturally determined language, in the words of Phelan “learning 
30 Silverman’s interpretation of the screen accords with Phelan’s definition previously cited 
on page 163 as, “the laws of the Symbolic which define subject and object positions 
within language”(16).
31 This statement has resonances with Auslander’s observation presented in the first 
chapter of this thesis that “I doubt very strongly that any cultural discourse can actually 
stand outside the ideologies of capital and reproduction"(40). 
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to see is training careful blindness. To apprehend and recognize the visible 
is to eliminate as well as absorb visual data”(13). As has been previously 
detailed, however, both Phelan and Silverman have proposed ways in 
which sight can deviate from this hermetic model and produce 
“circumstance[s] under which we nonetheless manage at times to see 
productively or transformatively” (Silverman 3).
Three-dimensional photography
In her analysis Silverman provides a number of examples of ‘productive’ 
aesthetic texts, including the work of Cindy Sherman and her Untitled Film 
Stills whom she writes about in relation to a theory of the pose. In reading 
Silverman’s description I found startling similarities between her ideas and 
The Turin Machine, but with one crucial exception. Silverman writes about 
the congealing effect that the presence of a camera has upon the human 
body and cites Barthes’ previously quoted description of being 
photographed;
Now, once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything 
changes: I constitute myself in the process of ‘posing,’ I 
instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform 
myself in advance into an image. [...] I feel that the Photograph 
creates my body or mortifies it, [...] the Photograph is the 
advent of myself as other (10-12). 
To support this idea Silverman cites the work of Craig Owens’ as realising 
this preparation of/for stillness as “essentially photographic [...] the fact that, 
in addition to being imitative of a preexisting image or visual trope, it is 
imitative of photography itself”(202). In freezing the body in preparation for 
the photograph, the subject presents a kind of self-conscious doubling of 
the self - they perform ‘self’ for the lens; “The representational force which 
the pose exerts is so great that it radiates outward, and transforms the 
space around the body and everything which comes into contact with it into 
an imaginary photograph”(203).32  Given this previous description from 
Silverman I find it remarkable that she does not then draw parallels with this 
pre-photographic pose and the discipline of performance, particularly 
because she also compares the pose to Roger Caillois’ description of 
32 This ‘performance of self’ has lead Phelan to observe that “All portrait photography is 
fundamentally performative”(35).
168
mimicry in the natural world as ”a reproduction in three-dimensional space 
with solids and voids” (qtd in Silverman 201). This idea of the pose realises 
the degree to which unmediatized performance, though devoid of the 
machinery of representation is still concerned with exactly this. The self-
conscious pose is the root of all performance which, just like Silverman’s 
pose, creates a “representational force” which “conjures into existence, first 
of all, that explicit or implicit frame which marks off all representation from 
the ‘real?””(203).33  Therefore the pose is capable of summoning the screen 
and making overt its operation as a language. By assuming a pose a 
“subject does not wait passively and unconsciously for the gaze to 
‘photograph’ him or her in the shape of a preexisting image. On the 
contrary, he or she may give him - or herself to be apprehended by the gaze 
in a certain way” (Silverman 201). This idea of the pose thus provides a 
certain agency for the subject/object of the gaze who attempts to exert some 
element of control over the image on the screen. Lacan proposed the 
possibility of this agency when he wrote;
The human subject [...] is not, unlike the animal, entirely 
caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. 
How? In so far as he isolates the function of the screen and 
plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask 
as that beyond which there is the gaze (Four 107).
Spectral bodies 
In “Spectral Bodies: Performance, Photography and The Turin Machine”, I 
described the process of performing in the installation, “Within the camera, 
unsure of exactly when I’m watched, I perform my part and become a body, 
an object”(2).34  My body congeals as I attempt a three dimensional 
photograph and thus, in the camera, I perform the representational effect of 
the camera/gaze which is inevitable in the specularity of everyday life. 
33 In “Posing the Question:Wilde, Wit and the Ways of Man” Ed Cohen has written about 
the pose in similar terms; “Thus what posing foregrounds is the imbricated but usually 
concealed work of representation that (re)produces those mimetic effects which are 
habitually  of as ‘the real’”(40)
34 This unpublished ‘artists’ paper was presented in various forms during 1998 to the 
Performance Theory Seminar, Lancaster University, Nottingham Trent University’s Open 
Lecture programme and Napier University’s Department of Photography, Film and 
Television Senior Seminar. A copy of the paper can be found in Appendix 3 (p. 266) and 
the quote is found on p. 267.
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However, I am also very well aware of the limits of this performance; unable 
to spectate myself, I have little conception of what image people receive of 
me or even when they are watching, I am both protected by, but trapped in, 
the screen.35  Silverman is also aware of the limits of this ‘play’ with the 
screen; “the specularized subject has at best only the barest modicum of 
control over how he or she is apprehended by the camera/gaze”(204). Thus 
the pose represents only a very limited form of agency because the object 
has no control over how his or her image is ‘photographed’ or received by 
the watching subject. Nevertheless, Silverman distinguishes between the 
gaze which functions as the symbolic to constitute the field of vision and 
thus preexists the subject and remains unapprehensible, and the look 
which emanates from the subject inside the field and thus is “evidence of a 
desiring subjectivity”(175). Via this distinction Silverman maintains that a 
look, though aligned through the gaze, can operate in spite of the gaze and 
its screen and that there are times when it is possible to look ‘askance’ or 
re-view the screen; 
the eye is nevertheless capable of seeing productively - of 
occupying a viewing position other than that assigned in 
advance, and, so of apprehending its object under radically 
different terms. However, it is often only retroactively, through a 
Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, that it manages to 
assume this ‘deviant’ viewing position (222/3). 
To this end Silverman proposes the work of Cindy Sherman as an example 
of an aesthetic text which mobiles such a ‘look’, “since these images are so 
hyperbolically ‘about’ the gaze as camera, their solicitation of us to look 
again, differently, can perhaps best be understood as an invitation to 
‘rephotograph’ the women in them”(223). Because Sherman’s photographs 
are about photography itself Silverman maintains they “open up to us the 
possibility of looking again, from a new vantage point, and so of both 
subjecting the initial act of perception to critical scrutiny, and apprehending 
the object via different representational parameters”(223). These “different 
representational parameters” encourage an identification between subject 
and object/viewer and photograph through the principle of the ‘good 
enough’, it is because the women Sherman ‘becomes’ in her photograph’s 
35 My inability to look at myself accords with Lacan’s previously quoted assertion “I am 
unable to see myself from the place where the Other is looking at me” (qtd in Phelan 15)
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“fall so far short of approximating their ideal imagos that we identify with 
them”(224). Thus these photographs produce “a new kind of pleasure. This 
pleasure follows from a more improvisatory relation to the ideal”(225). This 
can be seen to fulfil Silverman’s aim of establishing different non-ideal 
identificatory possibilities, thus these photographs become “an assertion of 
the look’s potentially transformative powers”(227).
4.4 The Body Beyond
Yet I perceive a problem in Silverman’s analysis which stems from the 
media from which she chooses to select her exemplary aesthetic texts. 
Despite an emphasis upon the sensational body, The Threshold of the 
Visible World only examines recorded mediatized practices for examples of 
the “productive look”. In this way I believe Silverman's account to be 
circumscribed by some of the representational logics and material 
practices she seeks to deconstruct. In her text Silverman writes about the 
way “the photograph severs a moment from the temporal continuum and 
‘carries’ it away to another domain”(148). These static images are then 
subject to the processes of revision which she identifies as the origin of a 
productive look. Yet Silverman further notes, as I have also done in a 
previous chapter, that “This capture permits a piece of the real to escape 
the vicissitudes of time, but only at the cost of a kind of death”(149). As I 
have argued in chapter three, in this mediatized version of ‘death’ time is 
not experienced as loss and the body is protected by being excluded. In 
contrast to this I argued that performance, through its staging of the body in 
time and space, maintained a sense of time and the body as lost; an idea 
succinctly expressed by Herbert Blau - “it is the actors mortality which is the 
acted subject, for he is right there dying in front of your eyes [...]. That’s his 
body, doing time” (qtd in Mellencamp 143). Through this experience of loss, 
originating in the mortal body, both spectator and performer embody the 
concept of lack, hence a disquieting relationship with the Other is ushered 
in. In live performance individuals experience a direct contact, or a type of 
touch and through this touch, as Lingis and Silverman (amongst others) 
acknowledge, we are brought into an awareness of the other/Other (both 
within and without ourselves). This other is beyond sight and exceeds 
representation, it therefore occupies the realms of the ultimate alterity and 
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the unknown. 
Silverman/Sherman’s photographs, as moments frozen in time, do afford a 
form of re-viewing but also present a fait accompli and thus a resolution 
and enclosing of their productive images, which is in danger of 
reestablishing some of the stabilities of the conventional camera/gaze. 
Because they are static and fully visible, these images represent a fully 
visible plenitude and therefore do not implicate that which lies outside the 
gaze, and cannot create a ‘tangible’ sense of the radical unknown of the 
other. Therefore static photographic images will always tend towards a self-
same viewing relationship, as these ‘untouchables’ can never realise, to 
the same degree of alterity the unknown other, and cannot therefore 
problematise, to the same extent, the “involuntary acts of incorporation and 
repudiation” (Silverman 184). But what of non static photographic images 
such as film and video? Do these exhibit similar normative stabilities but 
disguise their ‘stasis’ through a ‘masquerade of vitality’ in the form of 
movement? The principle of their origin (captured light/reproductive time) 
remains the same as a photograph and these texts may, likewise, be 
resolved and neutralised, thus they could equally be forms which do not 
implicate the body and cannot therefore operate as a gateway to the other. 
Yet, in contrast to this formulation, Vivian Sobchack has constructed an 
argument that utilises phenomenological theory to determine the film 
experience as intimately bound up with the body and “embodied 
existence”.36 
Sobchack writes that, “More than any other medium of human 
communication, the moving picture makes itself sensuously and sensibly 
manifest as the expression of experience by experience”(37). This is a large 
claim to be sure, and immediately has resonances with my early writing on 
the necessity of reinscribing the body and hence experience back into 
modern technological mediatized discourses. Sobchack elaborates on her 
position by explaining that film uses the embodied language of existence 
eg. seeing, hearing, moving as the basis for its articulation;
the film experience is a system of communication based on 
bodily perception as a vehicle of conscious expression. It 
36 Sobchack's account is found in the chapter “Phenomenology and the Film Experience” 
in Viewing Positions ed. Linda Williams
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entails the visible, audible, kinetic aspects of sensible 
experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and haptically (41). 
Because these articulatory means are shared by its viewer in a “shared 
space of being, of seeing, hearing, and bodily and reflective movement 
performed and experienced by both film and viewer”(41) Sobchack is then 
able to characterise the cinematic encounter as intersubjective;
Indeed, it is this mutual capacity for and possession of 
experience through common structures of embodied 
existence, through similar modes of being-in-the-world, that 
provide the intersubjective basis of objective cinematic 
communication (38).
To this extent Sobchack therefore constructs the film text as an other subject 
which shares the same embodied and enworlded characteristics as the 
viewers themselves, “direct experience and existential presence in the 
cinema belong to both the film and the viewer”(41). Sobchack elaborates on 
this intersubjectivity by noting that the film encounter is identical to our ‘life’ 
experiences as they are constituted through the address of “the expressed 
perception of an anonymous, yet present, ‘other’”(40). Reminiscent of 
Lacan’s figuration of the field of vision, Sobchack’s analysis constructs film 
as an ‘other’ that functions like all of life’s others, that is “the concretely 
embodied situation of the film’s vision also stands against the viewer. It is 
also perceived by the viewer as a ‘There, where I am not,’ as the space 
consciously and bodily inhabited and lived by an ‘other’”(41). Thus, in 
sympathy with Lacan’s observations (reiterated by Silverman and Phelan) 
on our dependency on the other for our sense of self, Sobchack goes on to 
describe the experience of watching a film in these terms; “Watching a film 
is both a direct and mediated experience of direct experience as mediation. 
We perceive a world both within the immediate experience of an ‘other’ and 
without it, as immediate experience mediated by an ‘other’”(42). Sobchack 
singles out film as a privileged form of communication within culture, due to 
its unique ability to make public “direct experience as mediation”, to make 
overt the linguistic basis of intersubjective experience. She writes:
A film presents and represents acts of seeing, hearing and 
moving as both the original structures of existential being and 
the mediating structure of language. [...] It presents and 
represents to us and for us and through us the very modes 
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and structures of being as language (42-44).
The interdependence of language and being has been demonstrated by a 
number of theorists cited within this document. Yet Sobchack, in continuing 
her phenomenologically inflected analysis, notes Merleau-Ponty’s 
separation of language into two layers;
Before the aspirations, differences, and systems of exchange 
articulated in and by what we call ‘natural language’ [...] we are 
always first immersed in the more primordial language of 
embodied existence. [...] long before we constrain ‘wild 
meaning’ in discrete symbolic systems, we are immersed in 
language as an existential system. In the very movement of 
existence, in the very activity of perception and its bodily 
expression, we inaugurate language and communication (43).
It is worth noting that Sobchack's argument does not suggest that this 
“primordial” embodied language lies outside language per se, indeed 
previously she has clearly asserted, “signification and significance [are] as 
immanent, as given with existence”(39). Thus it is impossible to separate 
language and being in order to be outside language and this is why, as 
Merleau-Ponty states, “because we are in the world, we are condemned to 
meaning, and we cannot do or say anything without its acquiring a name” 
(Phenomenology xix). However Sobchack, like many of the other writers 
quoted, suggests that this language of the body has a radical edge, and in 
her configuration this embodied language opens out the possibility of a split 
or gap between a fully constituted ‘natural language’ of the symbolic and 
“the radical origin of such a logic in lived-body experience”(39). Cinema and 
an examination of cinema is therefore important, as it allows an analysis of 
“the structures of communication as they radically emerge in the structures 
of being”(39), in the hope that this analysis “points to and describes that 
radical and existential ground for both a theory of sign production and a 
theory of meaning as they are always entailed in the lived-body 
experience”(50).
Ultimately Sobchack’s argument is concerned with the study of film itself, 
and calls for a theory of “semiotic phenomenology’” which “attempts to 
describe, thematize, and interpret the structures of communication”(39) as 
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they emerge in “the expression of experience by experience” which is the 
film text. Such an approach, Sobchack believes, will allow film theory to 
transcend what she characterises as the ‘totalizing’ theories of 
poststructuralism,
What contemporary film theory stresses and decries in its 
variations on the metaphor of the mirror [ie poststructuralism] 
is the totalitarian transcendence of either psychic or 
ideological structures over the signifying freedom of individual 
viewers in their concrete, contingent, existential situation (47). 
Thus Sobchack valorises the embodied experience of individual spectators 
as able to provide the possibility of variation and deviation from the 
operations, in Lacanian terms, of the screen and the gaze which determine 
“signification and significance [as] always predetermined by apparatus and 
ideology”(48). In so doing Sobchack posits, once more, the question of 
agency for the body and carries forward the same hope that is expressed, in 
different terms by Phelan and Silverman: that of the body as radical and 
transformative.
Intersubjectivity revisited
However, I believe that Sobchack’s examination of the film/spectator 
interface is problematised, in much the same way as Silverman’s account, 
by the very forms it attempts to deconstruct. Yet, precisely because of this 
(and informed by both Silverman and Phelan) her analysis enables me to 
construct a productive argument for my own mediatized performance work.
Sobchack’s is a theory of the living body grounded in a recorded mediatized 
text. On this basis I would like to contest the claim that, “More than any other 
medium of human communication, the moving picture makes itself 
sensuously and sensibly manifest as the expression of experience by 
experience”(37). I wish to demonstrate that performance, as a living mode 
of expression, and in particular multi-media performance, is able to fulfil the 
conditions that Sobchack has deemed to be the unique properties of the 
filmic experience. Furthermore, over and above film, multi-media 
performance is capable of realising “the expression of experience by 
experience” because its ‘text’ is the origin of experience itself - the living 
175
body.
There would seem to me to be a fundamental problem with identifying the 
cinematic exchange as intersubjective, because crucially film lacks a 
conscious body or “embodied existence”. Sobchack states “Cinema thus 
transposes [...] those modes of being alive and consciously embodied in 
the world that count for each of us as direct experience”(37). Two points are 
critical here; Sobchack’s use of the word “transpose” indicates the limit of 
the film experience. “Consciousness” according to Merleau-Ponty “is being 
towards the thing through the intermediary of the body” (Phenomenology 
138/9). The signifiers of direct experience (seeing, hearing, moving) are only 
reproduced by a film and are not brought into the world on a moment to 
moment basis in the way that direct experience is constituted by the living 
body. Direct experience also consists of an awareness of being seen, 
being heard and being moved, or more importantly touched and these are 
sensations that the bodiless film object cannot embody. A film may mirror 
aspects of our everyday experience of existence which take place through 
the ‘expressed perceptions’ of others; it is also reasonable to characterise 
the film text as an other which “stands against the viewer”, nevertheless, an 
evaluation of the nature of the film text’s ‘otherness’ allows a differentiation 
to be constructed between it and the otherness of a living human subject. A 
film is not a living being and therefore, I would contend, it is unable to be 
constructed as a fully formed other or, equally, a ‘complete’ subject. In this 
scenario therefore the cinematic exchange cannot be described as inter-
subjective.
A film, as a subject, lacks embodied existence as constructed in exactly the 
terms of Sobchack’s own argument. Following Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack 
writes “In an unprecedented way, the cinema makes visible and audible the 
primordial origins of language in the reversibility of embodied and 
enworlded perception and expression”(37) and Sobchack maintains “that 
the act of viewing as the commutation of perception and expression is both 
an intrasubjective and intersubjective performance equally performable by 
filmmaker, film and spectator”(51). It is the simultaneous and reversible 
acts of expression and perception that create the ‘centred’ body of 
phenomenology - Sobchack quotes Merleau-Ponty, “Here, where the world 
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touches”, “Here, where the world is sensible; here, where I am”(37). But it is 
precisely the means of achieving this ‘centred’ body that the film cannot 
enact. Expression and perception are not reversible qualities of film, as 
Sobchack’s opening declaration testifies, a film can only express, it is not 
capable of perceiving. Merleau-Ponty writes “In order to perceive things, we 
need to live them. [...] I perceive with my body.” (Phenomenology 325/6). 
Film has no body, it can show perception taking place on its screen but the 
screen and the film itself cannot perceive the presence of its other - the 
audience and without this reversibility “those modes of being alive and 
consciously embodied in the world” it cannot be a subject but only 
represent a subject. A film does not posses full, centred being because it is 
not capable of experiencing experience because it cannot embody 
language; a film, like all mediatized experience, is an impoverished form of 
encounter, its language is fixed in time and travels only one way as an 
outwards expression. Therefore, although a film can draw attention to the 
language of embodied existence by displaying it upon a screen, it cannot 
embody this language itself. This embodiment would seem crucial to 
Sobchack’s intersubjective argument, as “direct experience and existential 
presence in the cinema belong to both the film and the viewer”(41), but how 
can a film possess “existential presence”? As I have stated on a number of 
occasions, a film as a recorded medium only exhibits a recovered 
relationship with present time, its present presence is always 
circumscribed by its re-presentation of time and space. This in turn 
determines the film’s lack of a body in Merleau-Ponty’s formulation; “Just as 
it is necessarily ‘here’, the body necessarily exists ‘now’; it can never 
become ‘past’” (Phenomenology 140). Likewise a film cannot be 
‘existential’;  it has no capacity for experience, as it does not posses this 
present temporally and spatial dependent body; “I am not in space and 
time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines 
with them and includes them. The scope of this inclusion is the measure of 
that of my existence” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 140). Susan Stewart 
also notes “the body of lived experience is subject to change, 
transformation, and, most importantly death”(133) and death could be 
construed as a defining characteristic of existence. Recorded media (film) 
cannot experience death being, as has been previously demonstrated, 
already dead; therefore it cannot be a “body of lived experience”. Thus in 
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terms of a “mutual capacity for and possession of experience through 
common structures of embodied existence, through similar modes of 
being-in-the-world” a film cannot “provide the intersubjective basis of 
objective cinematic communication”(38).
Subjects of vision
In considering performance to work as a type of touch, I wish to establish a 
dichotomy between Sobchack’s description of film as “embodied existence” 
and what I perceive to be live performances’ “capacity for and possession of 
experience”. Via Sobchack’s own arguments I can figure live performance, 
with its live performing bodies of performers and spectators, as an 
incontrovertibly intersubjective encounter. If we regard the performance 
encounter once more in terms of language we see that the objects (the 
performers) as live, human presences are inevitably embodied, and as 
such are capable of both expression and perception. There is an 
interchangeable symmetry, a crucial reversibility, as with touch, between 
these object/others and the spectators as watching-subjects; both can 
share an “existential presence” and both are capable of expression and 
perception. Therefore performance, not film, is a “shared space of being, of 
seeing,hearing, and bodily and reflective movement”(41). Rather, a film 
conforms more to Merleau-Ponty’s description of a ‘thing’; “the thing holds 
itself aloof from us and remains self-sufficient. [...] It is then hostile and 
alien, no longer an interlocutor, but a resolutely silent Other” 
(Phenomenology 322). A film, whilst it can be other, will always remain this 
silent object/other, and thus it cannot be framed as a subject like the other 
in the performance. Thus only a performance event occurs between 
subjects, a subject who, as described by Merleau-Ponty, “has his body not 
only as a system of present positions, but besides, and thereby, as an open 
system of an infinite number of equivalent positions directed to other ends” 
(Phenomenology 141). This indeterminate, “infinite number” of possibilities 
is what determines the intersubjective encounter, and importantly it marks 
this intersubjectivity as a volatile domain in which the object, as an other 
subject, cannot be fixed. 
Therefore, unlike film as ‘the other’, and all recorded mediatized 
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expressions, the human interchange of performance presents 
subject/objects which can at any time potentially exceed their ‘texts’. This is 
what Sobchack suggests as a possibility of the lived body and the reason 
she calls for a semiotic phenomenological examination “to describe, 
thematize, and interpret the structures of communication as they radically 
emerge in the structures of being”(39). However, any study that wished to 
make an examination of the way that language emerges in being might be 
better served by analysing a cultural form which stages a truly 
intersubjective exchange. Although Sobchack would like to construct the film 
exchange as “not merely objects for vision, but also subjects of vision”(51) 
because a film, like photography, is locked in a recorded stasis and 
destined to fixed repetitions it cannot fully constitute a subject. Thus the 
previous description of the “subjects of vision” would be much better suited 
to performance where both parties in the communicative equation are in a 
fluid, changeable and interchangeable exchange. This is the condition of an 
embodied language which comes into being in subjects present in a 
specific time and space, and in response and relation to the similarly 
unstable present embodied languages of others. 
I should like to make one further claim in respect specifically to multi-media 
performance. Sobchack states “Watching a film is both a direct and 
mediated experience of direct experience as mediation”(42), this ability to 
signal both “the original structures of existential being and the mediating 
structure of language”(42) therefore allows a film to be “a medium that 
articulates the unified, if ever changing, experience of existence, that 
expresses the original synonymity of existence and language, of perception 
and its expression”(44). For the reasons detailed above I would argue that 
film cannot articulate the experience of existence, it has no body and ‘the 
other’ it represents is not of the same order as those experienced through 
an encounter between living bodies. Film can represent an experience of 
existence but it can not be that experience. Sobchack requests a theory for 
language as it emerges in being, and multi-media performance proves to 
be an interesting intermediary in this respect. As a performance, it 
embodies in both performer and spectators “lived-body experience”, as 
defined by Sobchack as “the activity of embodied consciousness realizing 
itself in the world and with others as both visual and visible, as both sense-
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making and sensible”(39). As media, multi-media performance stages the 
moment when the ‘wild meaning’ of these bodies meets the ‘natural 
language’ of “discreet symbolic systems”. As a form, multi-media 
performance, the camera/gaze metaphor made overt, is able to make 
apparent “direct experience as mediation” whilst maintaining the 
transcendent potential of the lived body. Therefore to repeat Sobchack’s 
words “It points to and describes that radical and existential ground for both 
theory of sign production and a theory of meaning as they are always 
entailed in the lived-body experience”(50). This I believe is what makes 
multi-media performance unique as a cultural form and the reason that I 
take issue with Sobchack’s analysis. It seems to me that multi-media 
performance “makes itself sensuously and sensibly manifest as the 
expression of experience by experience”(37). It is able to do this because it 
maintains the duality of being and language by performing language - by 
presenting re-presentational media and the body as indistinguishable - “the 
original synonymity of existence and language”. As a cultural form it does 
not diminish or collapse one part of this equation into the other and 
therefore, more that illustrating a theory of embodied language (as film 
does) it enacts the possibilities of embodied existence on its 
indistinguishable performers and spectators, “to change it [the world] into a 
spectacle, to make visible how the world touches us” (Merleau-Ponty 
“Cézanne’s Doubt” 19).
Making visible how the world touches
In spite of a valorising of the body and particularly the touch of the body, 
Silverman limits her analysis to specific mediatized texts. Because her 
mediatized texts alienate elements of time and/or space, the 
present/presence of the live body is therefore also necessarily evacuated, 
and without the body there can be no indication or manifestation of touch 
and its transformative potential. Finally, I would argue that it is via the live 
body that we can be brought into an appreciation of touch, either literally or 
metaphorically, and thus back to an awareness of the presence of ‘others’ 
as such. What the ‘touch’ of this body is able to communicate more 
effectively than mediatized images is the unknown - the (invisible) body 
beyond the body you can see. Work which maintains a sense of this body 
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therefore also maintains a sense of the fundamental difference of the other, 
and provides a refusal of the self-same image. This unknown also hints at 
the lack in vision, which echoes the lack at the centre of being which Phelan 
finds so powerful, and is the basis of her argument which champions the 
live body of performance.37 
Tangible visions
The ‘living cameras’ and live bodies of multi-media performance together 
create “three-dimensional photographs” - instantaneous subjects and 
objects - thus they maintain the efficacy of the camera/gaze metaphor to 
expose the operations of culture/language/representation within the field of 
vision without collapsing this process into a final ‘photographic’ product. 
The Turin Machine is a living camera, and inside the installation all the 
instabilities of the living other are visited and its final photograph is realised 
as always different from, and never equal to, this body. Likewise other 
examples of my multi-media practice can be seen as ‘living cameras’, 
literally through the use of a live camera relay and/or by their insistence on 
staging moments of ‘representation’. These moments are layered by 
distinctions drawn between the unmediatized, the live mediatized and the 
recorded; distinctions which can only be made by the ‘touch’ of the live body 
but all of which are mediated by a language of visual representation. I do 
not wish to posit the body as an antidote to the representational frame or to 
essentialise it as an unrealisable and unified Real behind the visible, but I 
do think that it can work within the economies of visual representation to 
hint at something beyond them and thus expose their limitations. Within 
visual representation, mediatized and mediated, the live body is the most 
productive indication of the Other, whilst alive it transgresses and 
transforms all the reductive stabilities of the image which Robins criticises. 
The vital flux of a living body prioritised by performance means it is a cultural 
form which can talk about embodied experience, pleasant and unpleasant, 
including: pain, the unavoidability of death, the brutality of time, the 
unknown, lack of control over others and the loss (lack) of the self. In active 
collaboration with the lens, this body is able to metaphorise our 
psychological functioning by exposing the representational aspects involved 
37 This argument is the basis of Phelan’s chapter “The Ontology of 
Performance:representation without reproduction” in Unmarked pp. 146-166.
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in all acts of looking. Thus multi-media performance can provoke a 
consideration of the ways in which image ‘technologies’ are embedded in 
our selves, as well as wider social formations, and how these work to either 
control, suppress or ignore the productive and transformative aspects of 
life’s others.
4.5 Summary
At the start of this chapter I briefly examined a number of theories that 
impacted upon notions of vision and touch; particularly those of Merleau-
Ponty and Irigaray. Both theorists, as Grosz has made clear, (re)establish a 
significance for the body in acts of looking and associated epistemic 
practises, and introduce the notion of a correlation between subject and 
object in sensational encounters. I characterised performance as a form of 
‘touch’ and multi-media performance was figured as a meeting between 
disembodied vision (via its mediatized elements) and embodied touch 
realised by its performing/spectating bodies. These two contrasting 
quantities worked to problematise conventional subject/object separations, 
and usher in aspects of ‘the other’ and ‘the unknown’ into the 
representational equation.
On examining my practice in these terms, I determined that touch was used 
as a distinguishing moment in a number of my multi-media performances 
as a means of activating a difference between the live body and its 
mediatized image. As this work seemed, in part, to be constructed around 
the subject/object dialectic, I began to expand on these notions in terms of 
human subjectivity and particularly the role of images in ego forming 
processes. In this respect I noted that much of my work was constructed 
round the physic trope of the mirror phase, and that it was concerned with 
the creation of an identifying image, often in a contrasting relation to the 
body and sense of self. In the light of Silverman’s analysis, I suggested my 
piece Looking Glass staged disembodied vision as concomitant with 
embodied touch, and that, in Silverman’s terms, it formed a potential 
‘productive’ aesthetic text which refused the idea of the self-same and 
replaced it with an ‘identity-at-a-distance’, and thus a less oppressive 
relationship between self and other.
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Looking Glass also acted as an illustration of Irigaray’s notion of a tangible 
which precedes vision. I went on to look at other specific instances of a 
concomitance of vision in touch in other identity forming image practices, 
and in particular my performance/photography installation The Turin 
Machine. My analysis of The Turin Machine was informed by Silverman and 
Peggy Phelan. Following Lacan, Phelan identifies ‘lack’ or ‘not-all’ to be at 
the heart of human subjectivity and, like Silverman, cites vision as the 
means by which ‘the other’ and particularly the image of the other is used to 
shore up this absence. However, this activity is fraught with difficulty; the 
‘looker’ (subject) and ‘looked at’ (object) are figured as interdependent 
within the social domain, but this interdependence does not necessarily 
signal an equal reciprocity of vision. Indeed Phelan and Silverman are able 
to demonstrate how all looking occurs within an unequal field, in which the 
screen as the mediating force of language makes visible only some 
elements of culture at the expense of the invisibility of others, and thus the 
‘lack’ of the subject extends into all acts of looking. I described The Turin 
Machine in terms of these references, and was able to identify that it 
operated as a manifestation of the Lacanian metaphor of the camera/gaze 
to implicate the screen in all subject/object relationships. In The Turin 
Machine the act of looking is confounded, as the spectator initially 
encounters darkness and the lack of an image; after a period of time the 
image of the culturally determined Other (the female) appears but is never 
fully visible. The lack of the object/other is visited upon the subject in a 
corporeal experience of vision which is ‘not-all’, and therefore this notion of 
lack is implicated in both the subject and object. In Looking Glass 
proprioceptive touch was used as the means by which to indicate the 
otherness of the self. Although touch is not an overt signifying force within 
The Turin Machine, this idea is expanded into a social (subject/other) 
domain and the tangible is implicated along with the invisible as the 
unrepresentable quantities through which vision/being functions.
I then examined The Turin Machine in terms of the pose which Silverman, 
via Owens, posits as a pre-photographic (performative) moment, which like 
the invisible/tangible, summons the presence of the screen in the viewing 
equation. The pose raised questions of agency and in my own work I 
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described experiencing the limits of my control within The Turin Machine as 
I tried to create an image of myself. Although I knew my external visible 
image to be largely determined by the action of the screen and the gaze, I 
believe I am also able to destabilise these imperatives by working the 
identity-forming moment within a live scenario. In contrast to 
Silverman/Sherman's static photographic pose, I believe the live pose 
within the camera to be more effective, as it mobilises an experience of time 
and space as lost alongside an impoverished partial image which is never 
resolved or replete. These conditions of image-forming/viewing, I 
suggested, circumvented the self-same equation that all static, 
photographic images tend towards. In the live mediatized domain, a 
productive chain of resonances is provoked which, starting with an 
experience of loss, ushers in the other as unknown and hence activates the 
transformative potential of alterity alluded to at the start of the chapter. 
Yet the limits of the photograph as a productive text were identified as a 
result of its stasis - its death - which evacuated the body from 
representation. Therefore a question remained concerning moving 
recorded mediatized images. Vivian Sobchack’s account has privileged the 
relationship between film and the body, and she characterises the film 
encounter as an intersubjective exchange. Such a form, she maintains 
allows an examination of structures of communication as they emerge in 
structures of being. Like Phelan and Silverman, Sobchack posits the body 
as a radical/transformative entity, capable of problematising or 
transcending these structures of language epitomised by the metaphors of 
the screen and the gaze. However, I was able to use Sobchack's analysis to 
expose once more the limits of the recorded moving image. Language, as it 
emerges in being, occurs within the ’centred’ body in present time and 
space; whilst a film is able to represent embodied language, it does not 
possess a body, and it is not able to activate the radical potential of an 
embodied language between its viewer and text. Thereby multi-media 
performance was championed in the terms of Sobchack’s own argument 
as able to show the relationship between “direct experience as mediation” 
as synonymous with the radical living body. ‘Living cameras’ such as The 
Turin Machine make overt the operation of the screen/gaze by doubling the 
representation of the body via the camera lens. Thus this work is able to 
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demonstrate the mediation of all experience by language, but also, by 
staging the body under the lens as alive, evasive, incomplete, a living 
camera also maintains the efficacy of the radical body. This body cannot be 
separate from language and the screen, but it can allude to that which lies 
beyond representation. I understand that through my work it is possible to 
implicate the structures of language that operate in all levels of experience, 
and yet by continuing to work that body in a live present domain, I am able to 
maintain a sense of what lies beyond the linguistic. Therefore paradoxically 
I am able to work in the field of the visible to allude to the significance of the 
invisible, tangible other.
185
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUDING SPECULATIONS
5.1 The Attributes of Multi-Media Performance
My first conclusion in drawing together this body of research originates in 
my reflexive practice; these individual art works do not deal with discrete 
issues, instead my multi-media performance and associated installation 
work revisit a number of preoccupations, and circle round issues without 
necessarily providing a sense of closure. In this way the work itself 
resembles the living body with which it is ultimately concerned. 
In chapter one I posited a series of questions to be further expanded in the 
thesis, the primary one being - what interrogation, if any, can multi-media 
performance make of contemporary, media driven, society? This question 
was supplemented by the proposition that work which staged a meeting 
between the live body and mediatized images provides an insight into the 
languages and consequences of a mediatized culture. As a means of 
providing answers to these questions, I can now identify a number of 
attributes which are activated by aspects of my multi-media performance 
practice. First and foremost, this multi-media performance and installation 
work features the body at the centre of visual representations. This ‘re-
embodied image’ provokes a number of consequences for ideas about the 
body and the representing image, which, in turn, implicate other 
conceptions concerning, the self, the ‘real’ and the o/Other, (all factors 
which participate in shaping human behaviour on a wider social/political 
level).
In much of my multi-media performance the activities of bodies are united 
with the production of images, whether this be in the domain of the literal 
production of images, for example, via a live camera, or in terms of 
reception where the spectator is implicated within the performance and thus 
made aware of the constitutive power of his or her looking. By placing the 
production of (mediatized) images in closer proximity to the bodies which 
produce them, and are subsequently constituted by them, this work figures 
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an inter-relational dependency which is sometimes denied when these 
forms are presented as single, isolated disciplines. Not only is the body 
figured as reliant upon the production of an image for a sense of identity but, 
inversely, camera images are seen as dependent on the bodies which lurk 
behind and in front of their lenses. Whereas it is possible to conceive of the 
body (as an indication of the agent of the self) as subjective and partial, this 
is less common in terms of the camera and mediatized images; thus multi-
media performance problematises the objective status of mediatized 
images by qualifying the notion of the ‘autonomous’ camera. Both image 
and body are rendered within the domain of the subjective, and thus the 
subject is implicated within the object and vice versa. Just as body and 
image are figured as interdependent this work logically prevents the 
reduction of this binary; the body and the image are staged as coexistent, 
neither one nor the other. Within the staging of this dialectic there are 
moments of similarity and moments of difference when the body is 
collapsed into its image and contrastingly extracted and separated. These 
processes oscillate within a performance or remain unresolved within an 
installation, so that it is possible to say that this work prevents the 
succession of the body by its image and the subsequent exclusion of the 
body from mediatized images. However, although multi-media performance 
reinstates the body within mediatized representations, it does not attempt to 
reverse the body/image hierarchy enforced by conventional media practices. 
Neither medium of expression takes precedence over the other and instead 
both are complicated by subtle division into a series of configurations of the 
body/image (the live body, the live mediatized body, the recorded body). This 
‘performance’ does not claim the body as the origin of meaning and value, 
as some form of defensive stance in response to a perceived threat of 
encroachment by the mediatized image, rather, by establishing the body as 
significant within these images it reclaims a certain status and agency for 
the body. To the extent that this multi-media performance work is not a 
feature of mainstream culture it signals an alternative to conventional 
representational practices, and presents a different approach that 
foregrounds the body as a significant element within representation. In the 
form of ‘re-embodied images’, multi-media performance presents a 
reunification of vision with experience, and, in so doing, suggests qualities 
of experience encapsulated by the body which are vital to a construction of 
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the sense of self. In addition, it foregrounds an understanding of the 
relationship between the self and external other (including moral and ethical 
implications) which can be absented from other forms of mediatized visual 
representations. 
Reclaiming the ‘real’
Work which encourages a distinction and yet maintains a contingency 
between the body and its camera-image evokes a philosophical dilemma in 
terms of a definition of the ‘real’. It is this dilemma that was played out in the 
formal experimentation of many performers and video artists during the 
nineteen sixties and seventies. Multi-media performance problematises the 
notion of the omnipotent camera and exposes the limitations of the lens. 
Likewise, this work also figures the body and the act of looking as a form of 
partial blindness. Therefore neither practice - the gaze of the camera nor the 
look of the eye - can be established as providing ‘complete vision’ and thus 
delivering a fully formed, independent and external ‘reality’. This failure of 
both camera and eye complicates the ‘real’ which is now qualified and 
made conditional. The consequence of this disruption of vision and 
knowledge does not remain within a purely philosophical domain, but 
impacts politically upon culture in terms of the construction and control of 
what is taken to be ‘real’. In chapter three I looked at the ways in which a 
variety of cultural practices construct and maintain a relationship with the 
‘real’ and work to exclude the body and death from particular scopic 
regimes. These ideas, manifest in specific envisioning objects, could then 
be effective in political and social interactions, for example, in the execution 
of war. I posited that the live body posed a problem to these traditional 
scopic regimes and the means by which they maintain their ‘reality effect’. 
The body introduced death and loss back into a notion of what constitutes 
the ‘real’, and to the extent that these are excluded from most 
representational equations, the ‘real’ became a contested and shifting 
ground. Other critics have noted the effect of the performative upon the 
notion of the ‘real’. For example, Butler asserts that gender “is real only to 
the extent that it is performed” (qtd in Diamond 4). The body, in that it enacts 
a reality, therefore provides, once more, a threat to the notion of an external 
a priori ‘real’. 
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In pondering the power of the reality-effect of the lens in relation to the ‘real’ 
live body I established some grounds for a different and significant ‘real’ 
from that provided by ‘real’ mediatized texts. I did so by identifying elements 
of sensational experience normally excluded from purely visual 
representations - such as touch. These heterogeneous sensational 
encounters with a live present ‘other’ enabled a productive meeting which 
was denied and disguised by conventional mediatized practices. In an 
attempt to reclaim or reformulate the ‘real’, Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of 
‘reality’ allows me to understand the difference between the bodily ‘real’ and 
the mediatized ‘real’, combined in multi-media performance. For Merleau-
Ponty reality is a multisensory live encounter;
what I call experience of the thing or of reality - not merely of a 
reality-for-sight or for-touch, but of an absolute reality - is my 
full co-existence with the phenomenon, at the moment when it 
is in every way at its maximum articulation, and the ‘data of the 
different senses’ are directed towards this one pole 
(Phenomenology 318).
This “absolute reality” is also determined by an inseparable interlocking of 
significance and existence which then allows Merleau-Ponty to construct a 
difference between a picture (mediatized representation) and reality per se;
Like the thing, the picture has to be seen and not defined, 
nevertheless, though it is a small world which reveals itself 
within the larger one, it cannot lay claim to the same 
substantiality. We feel that it is put together by design, that in it 
significance precedes existence and clothes itself in only the 
minimum of matter necessary for communication. The miracle 
of the real world, on the other hand, is that in it significance 
and existence are one, and that we see the latter lodge itself in 
no uncertain fashion in the former.” (Phenomenology 323)
Multi-media performance stages both these ‘reals’ as concurrent - the 
mediatized ‘real’ and body ‘real’ - but because it does so within a live 
domain between the bodies of performers and an audience, it also 
prioritises the “coexistent” and “maximum articulatory” aspects of Merleau-
Ponty’s ‘real’. Thus it emphasises and empowers the body as the site in 
which significance and existence coexist, and in so doing some of the 
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epistemic power normally reserved for the mediatized ‘real’ can be 
reclaimed and transferred back to the living body.
Specularity and subjectivity
As I have noted in chapter four, multi-media performance materialises the 
metaphor of the camera/gaze and places this idea under scrutiny through 
an interaction between performers/spectators and mediatizing 
technologies. In so doing multi-media performance draws attention to the 
logistics of looking within mediatized culture and particularly the notion of 
representation within this equation. Silverman notes “There can never have 
been a moment when specularity was not at least in part constitutive of 
human subjectivity. [...] ever since the inception of cave drawing, it has been 
via images that we see and are seen”(195). Subjectivity has specular 
foundations and hence is bound up with representation. Work which 
foregrounds looking and the different mechanisms of representation stages 
the concomitant elements of being and seeing, and via its exploration of the 
constitutive forms of human subjectivity is inevitably involved in a broader 
field of social and political issues. There are various ‘bodies’ within multi-
media performance both mediated and mediatized; at times during this 
work similarities are constructed between the mediatizing gaze of the 
camera and the mediating look of a spectator, in the selecting and 
discarding of objects of vision, for example. In this way the camera provides 
a parallel with the processes of physiologically and psychologically 
determined vision, and all ‘seeing’ is rendered as subject to forms of 
mediation (in the sense of Raymond William’s “intervening or intermediate 
agency”). Understanding the part that representation plays in ‘seeing’ 
reflects back on Derrida’s assertion as quoted in my opening chapter, “the 
theater of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which 
life is unrepresentable” (Writing 234). This “unrepresentable” cultural 
practice, even within the environs of unmediatized performance is now seen 
as an impossibility, a fact paradoxically clarified by Derrida when he writes 
“Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence, has always already 
begun to represent itself” (Writing 249). Representation in this formation 
equals language and language provides meaning to the extent that 
existence cannot take place outside language. This reshapes Derrida’s 
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earlier quote, which like Phelan’s invisible, hints at qualities which exceed 
representation and because of this can never be represented. Once all 
seeing (perception) is performed through a representational screen it also 
becomes more or less culturally determined, and, once again, this 
problematises the notion of a neutral, pre-given reality and the power of the 
lens or eye to deliver this external ‘real’. The ‘real’ becomes a negotiated 
terrain acted upon by numerous social, political and cultural factions and 
claimed by a number of competing representational frameworks. 
If one accepts that representation occurs at all levels of expression and 
perception, not just in specific aesthetic, cultural objects and texts (Phelan 
calls these “representations of representations”), what then becomes 
necessary is an exploration of how different representational structures 
function - what these structures actually ‘represent’, and the different ‘reals’ 
that they construct. Such an exploration allows Phelan to create her 
distinction of performance as “representation without reproduction”. For 
example how do cameras and recording technology alter our conception of 
time and space? Rather than a passive submission to the operations of the 
gaze and the screen, and the ideology embedded within linguistic systems, 
multi-media performance attempts a deconstruction and separation of 
different modes of representation. Auslander’s assertion; “I doubt very 
strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the 
ideologies of capital and reproduction" maybe theoretically correct, but as a 
statement it discourages any attempt to discover the degree to which 
particular discourses simply reproduce or critically problematise this 
ideology. Multi-media performance, as well as collapsing the gaze of the 
camera and the look of the spectator, also provides moments when these 
are not aligned and differ radically from one another. In so doing it is a 
cultural practice which is able to make distinctions within different types of 
representation, and thus open out a space to discuss the constitutive 
factors of human subjectivity. Importantly, this space demonstrates the 
possibility of separation between an individual’s mediated look and a 
camera’s mediatizing gaze, by presenting moments at which a schism 
occurs between the two. Subjectivity in this instance is figured as a 
combination of specular conditions, some of which are confirmed by the 
lens and others which are often divergent. The position and desires of the 
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individual spectator may not be maintained by the camera and indeed could 
well contradict this gaze. In this way multi-media performance exposes a 
separation between media discourses (the mediatized image) and 
‘mediated looking’ - both are subject to controls, but the latter functions 
through the more unstable conscious/unconscious subjective body and 
thus presents moments at which this subjectivity can differ from dominant 
hegemonic (mediatized) discourses. Therefore in the background to this 
work is a belief in the radical body and its non-conforming look. It is this 
body which multi-media performance alludes to and activates.
Self and other
In terms of the attributes of multi-media performance, much emphasis has 
been placed on the notions of the self and the other constructed by this 
work. In multi-media performance the encounter between the subject/object, 
self/other does not take place within static and fixed positions but in a fluid 
and mobile domain. In this cultural formation the object returns the gaze 
thus rendering all subjects objects and vice versa. Specifically I have made 
a case for how this work can illustrate various aspects of the formation and 
maintenance of the ego and functions to expose the self/other paradox by 
stressing the necessity of both visual and tactile sensations in the 
constitution of an identity. This theory, as realised and enacted in multi-
media performance, replays the coexistence of the body and its mediatized 
image and disallows the supremacy of one sensational realm (the visual) 
above the other (the tactile); in so doing, therefore, it contradicts the 
conventions of technologically mediatized representations which are, 
unsurprisingly, also the identificatory practices of ‘normal’ adult subjectivity. 
Instead the cultural event of the multi-media performance proposes an 
irreconcilable fluctuation between the visual and the tactile, and stages a 
form of ‘bodily contact’ which ensures a powerful sense of the other. This 
materialisation of the other as Other is also figured in terms of irreducible 
alterity, the unknown or lack, and is posited as a constituent element of the 
self. Therefore such multi-media performance works to figure the gap or 
void at the centre of subjectivity, the acknowledgement of which provokes 
profound consequences for our conception of ourselves, and which, in turn, 
reflect upon our conceptions of others. Indeed both Phelan and Silverman 
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have written about the importance of maintaining both a sense of the other 
which is inextricably linked to an acknowledgment of the other within the self 
in order to sustain less oppressive and violent identificatory practices.
5.2 Reproduction V Mediatization
In my opening chapter I introduce the debate concerning multi-media 
performance’s social and political potential. These debates arose partly 
from my review of the theories of Philip Auslander and Peggy Phelan. I will 
close my analysis with a brief resume of this major debate which influences 
the field of performance practice.
Auslander objects to Phelan’s identification of live performance “as a social 
and politically oppositional discourse [based on] ontological differences 
between live and mediatized representations”(159). Yet I would argue that 
this quote reveals the extent to which Auslander misunderstands Phelan’s 
central thesis. Phelan makes her argument for performance specifically 
through an analysis of ‘reproduction’. To the extent that she invokes the 
mediatized she does so only in terms of the recording, (reproductive) 
dimensions of media. Auslander’s use of the term ‘mediatized’ indicates 
only “that a particular cultural object is a product of the mass media or of 
media technology”(5); hence, for example, he is able to mistakenly 
characterise the microphone as “the apparatus of reproduction” (“Liveness” 
199).1  Thus Auslander fails to make a distinction between mediatized 
elements which occur live and therefore are concurrent with present time 
and space, and those which originate from a recording carrier base and 
thus reproduce a past time and space. There would seem to be a crucial 
difference between these two versions of the mediatized as was explored in 
detail by the performance and chapter two case study Constants II. A live 
camera image remains, to a certain degree, in a similar domain to that of 
the living body; it is time and space specific and though reduced and 
1 Auslander makes this observation in “Liveness: Performance and the Anxiety of 
Simulation” in Diamond’s Performance and Cultural Politics. However, a microphone does 
not reproduce, it picks up sound and converts it into an electrical signal. The apparatus of 
reproduction in this equation would be what ever recording device was attached to the 
microphone to record these signals. The same differentiation can be made for a camera - 
a camera alone does not reproduce - it mediates, represents or collects images, and 
allows an image to be reproduced only once this has been stored on tape, film or digital 
disk.
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fragmented by a lens this action (as is demonstrated by the camera/gaze 
metaphor) is not a reproduction but merely repeats a mediation of the body 
that occurs within sight itself. Moreover this live mediatization can at times 
be subject to scrutiny and understood within a context of process, where the 
camera can be seen to be fallible and subject to human operations, even 
when the object beneath the lens evades complete capture. As long as the 
image remains within this live domain it can be imbued with connotations of 
subjectivity and otherness that ultimately place it within a more fluid, 
unstable, productive cultural reservoir that, like the living body, invokes the 
possibilities of difference, flux and change. In contrast to this, however, the 
recorded image, exemplified by the recorded body, severed from its specific 
time and space, remains limited and destined to reproduce on each 
occasion the identical and the same.
Auslander argues for a dissolution of differences between the live and 
mediatized, but even though there may be examples of live and mediatized 
forms which mingle or mimic one another, this does not mean that there 
are absolutely no differences between them. Indeed it might explain a 
difficultly in identifying differences between the live and the mediatized, but a 
merging of forms does not in itself constitute a reason to cease “to make 
ontological distinctions”. Somewhat paradoxically, Auslander himself 
seems to acknowledge this when he calls for a discourse to examine the 
live and the mediatized.
Because live performance is the category of cultural production 
most directly affected by the dominance of media it is 
particularly urgent to address the situation of live performance 
in our mediatized culture (2).
Another flaw in Auslander’s argument comes from his complaint, “I doubt 
very strongly that any cultural discourse can actually stand outside the 
ideologies of capital and reproduction that define mediatized culture or 
should be expected to do so”. Yet nowhere in her work Unmarked does 
Phelan suggest that this is the position which performance occupies. 
Indeed in her careful working of Lacanian theory, Phelan maintains an 
awareness of all pervasive language, its alliance with dominant social and 
political frameworks of power and the way it structures the subject. Phelan’s 
argument is more subtle that Auslander’s totalizing vision and invokes a 
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poststructuralist position which sees the subject as both constituted and 
constituting, where the field of language is made more plastic by the 
introduction of aspects which expose the logics of the speaking subject and 
introduce alternative and less culturally validated forms of identification and 
articulation. Thus Phelan never proposes the possibility of linguistic 
expression outside dominant ideologies, rather she explores the values 
implicit in their production as a way of establishing a complex agency for the 
subject which can, in turn, act in contradiction to some of these logics.2 
5.3 The Productive Body
Phelan’s attempt to construct performance as a politically radical form 
(refuted by Auslander) is a project aspired to by other theorists and is 
attributed to other cultural forms. Between them Silverman, Berger, Sontag, 
Robins, Buck-Morss and Heathfield, amongst others, all propose ‘aesthetic’ 
strategies to engender what are variously termed ‘productive’, ‘resistant’ 
and ‘transformative’ texts. To this extent Phelan’s writing can be seen within 
the context of a wider progressive agenda, which identifies certain pervasive 
and oppressive qualities within culture and seeks to find ways to undermine 
or expose these. Elin Diamond makes a similar claim in her introduction to 
Performance and Cultural Politics and singles out performance as 
especially productive in this endeavour; “Performance [...] is precisely the 
site in which concealed or dissimulated conventions might be 
investigated”(5). Diamond makes her argument in response to Butler’s 
observations on the performativity of everyday life described as “a reiteration 
of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status 
in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a 
repetition”(12). Diamond notes that because performance foregrounds the 
body, its inevitable performativity provides a platform to examine what is 
normally hidden in the performative; “that risky and dangerous negotiation 
between a doing (a reiteration of norms) and a thing done (discursive 
conventions that frame our interpretations)”(5). Therefore, as a cultural 
practice, performance is able to highlight the moments when social 
2 In both Phelan and Silverman’s accounts, the unconscious is seen as a vital constituent 
in bypassing and reworking culturally-inscribed positions, and both theorists also provide 
descriptions of the various means by which ‘aesthetic texts’ can work to implicate the 
domain of the unconscious which as prelinguistic is also, to a certain extent beyond 
ideological infection.
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conventions/language become embodied - announced, enacted, made 
real. (This was the project put forward by Sobchack as the basis for an 
examination of film discourses and which I criticised on the grounds of the 
recorded text’s inability to be spontaneously performative). Because the 
implications of performativity reach far beyond the practice of performance 
and out into the practices of everyday life, observations made within the 
cultural sphere may well be transposed into broader social and political 
fields.
Throughout this text the body has variously been posited as ‘radical’, 
‘productive’ and ‘transformative’. These figurations are supported in the 
theories of, amongst others, writers such as Grosz and Theodor Adorno. In 
the introduction to Bodies That Matter Grosz writes;
Bodies are not inert; they function interactively and productively. 
They act and react. They generate what is new, surprising, 
unpredictable. [...] bodies [...] always extend the frameworks 
which attempt to contain them, to seep beyond their domains 
of control (xi).
This is where the radical body meets the performative as a reiteration of 
norms and why the fundamentally unstable and indeterminate body can at 
times diverge from and elude these conventions. It is via the body and its 
imperfect repetition of these norms that we encounter Adorno’s “negative 
dialectic” - the idea that “no pattern or concept is ever ‘totally congruent and 
isomorphic with the experience it purports to denote’” (qtd in Carlson). 
Importantly Adorno juxtaposes the idea of human activity with that of 
reproduction;
human behaviour [...] is characterized above all by the fact that 
the qualitatively new appears in it [...] it is a movement which 
does not run its course in pure identity, the pure reproduction 
of such as already was there, but in which something new 
emerges (qtd in Buck-Morss “Origin” 54).
Therefore the performative body foregrounded in performance can show 
moments of performative repetition where the body provides the possibility 
of agency and innovation, and slips away from or disrupts the social and 
cultural conventions inscribed in the linguistic. Within this configuration we 
can now identity Auslander’s failure to differentiate between repetition 
196
(which includes live mediatization) and reproduction as a fatal error. Without 
an understanding of the difference between these two activities a 
separation between the body and its recorded mediatized image cannot be 
distinguished, and, furthermore, the origin of the radical, productive body - 
its imperfect repetition - cannot be appreciated.
5.4 Living Cameras
Thus far I have invoked arguments for the efficacy of performance, but what 
of multi-media performance and my belief that it might provide some form of 
interrogation for contemporary society? Previously I questioned whether my 
multi-media performances’ use of mediatizing (reproductive) technologies 
might operate to exclude the progressive power of performance’s (the 
body’s) “representation without reproduction”. However, upon review I find 
that my work intensifies Phelan’s project rather than dissipating or negating 
it, because it is able to figure the very ubiquity of representation. No critic 
has as yet specifically addressed the form of multi-media performance in 
terms of its combination of the productive body with its mediatized image.
As an extension of the cultural practice of performance, multi-media 
performance continues to foreground the performative body, but it also 
juxtaposes this body with its reproductive image. The similarities and 
differences between these versions of the body are complicated by being 
shown as both mediatized live and mediatized recorded, thus not only is the 
body foregrounded but so too is the image and the act of viewing the body. 
The lens doubles the mediating look of the spectator and thus the specular, 
representational aspects of all looking/all being are emphasised. This 
image at times conforms to and at times diverges from the body it 
‘represents’. By staging the body as both divergent and convergent with its 
images, multi-media performance figures both sides of the performative 
equation; that is, the body’s imperfect repetition (as always potentially 
different) and the reproductive discourse of social/cultural conventions and 
norms (as always the same). Because multi-media performance presents 
both the live body and the reproduced body through this contrasting 
juxtaposition, it is able to show moments when the live body diverges from 
its reproductive presence and thus highlight the body’s vital difference. 
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Multi-media performance, because it maintains the body in tandem with the 
mediatized image constantly makes overt these moments of slippage and 
therefore is able to demonstrate and activate, more productively than purely 
mediatized texts or performance per se, some sense of the non-conforming 
resistant body which reaches beyond representation. 
Grosz has written of “the body as the threshold or borderline concept that 
hovers perilously and unpredictably at the pivotal point”(23). I find this to be 
an apt description not just of my performance/photography installation The 
Turin Machine (where the body image acts as a pivot and literally does 
hover at the edges of perception), but much of my multi-media performance 
and installation work. This work maintains the body as coexistent and 
unreconcilable with its image. The electronic freeze in Constants II, the 
pose in The Turin Machine and the (future) frozen face in Simulator illustrate 
moments when the repetitive live body is qualitatively different from the 
reproduced image body. Touch in Looking Glass and in the ghost sequence 
in Constants II, perform a similar rupture where the image cannot be 
conflated with the body, being or the self. In creating these moments of 
difference between the live body and imaged body, I allude to invisible 
qualities which go beyond the representationally (conventionally) visible, the 
performative qualities of a living body. Many of these moments are staged 
within living cameras: the pinhole Turin Machine and box camera Simulator, 
or amongst live relay cameras: Looking Glass and Constants II. Thus the 
consequences of this ‘invisible’ are both enacted upon, and are in turn 
enacted by, the bodies of the audience. These living cameras clearly have 
significance for bodies which exist in a predominantly recorded mediatized 
culture and offer the possibility of another way of seeing and another way of 
being.
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APPENDIX 1
CHRONOLOGY OF PRACTICAL WORKS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES
1997
May
Appointed postgraduate assistant at Department of Photography, Film 
and Television, Napier University.
June
Assistant directed Ruby 16mm Short Film (First Reel scheme)
July
The Turin Machine performance/photography installation performed at 
the South Bank, London.
October
Drafted research proposal including provisional scheme of practical 
projects.
November 
The Turin Machine performance/photography installation performed at 
Now ‘97, Nottingham.
Attended Slipstream Conference, Photo ‘97, York
Submitted research proposal
December 
Pieces of the True Cloth - a documenting artifact for The Turin Machine 
made for inclusion in Shattered Anatomies: Traces of the Body in 
Performance, a box publication. Edited by Adrian Heathfield, published 
by Arnolfini Live.
1998
Jan 
Draft practical project proposals
February
Made research visit to MITES (Moving Image and Touring Exhibition 
Service) for technical advice on practical projects.
Gave paper “Spectral Bodies” at Performance Theory Conference, 
Lancaster University.
Guest lecture at Nottingham Trent University on The Turin Machine.
March
Gave paper “Spectral Bodies” at research seminar, Department of 
Photography, Film and Television, Napier University.
Guest artist lecture at Edinburgh Art College.
April
Practical research towards Sarcophagus/Looking Glass live video 
mirror.
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May
Presentation of Looking Glass live video mirror as work in progress 
project, Department of Photography, Film and Television, Napier 
University.
Attend research conference Napier University
Bodies in Flight initial meeting concerning Constants, multi-media 
performance project.
June
Initial documentation of Looking Glass
Writing up Looking Glass
Site visit to Crail to document the Torpedo Attack Trainer.
Exhibition of The Turin Machine shroud/photographs at the Mortuary 
Chapel in Arbroath organised by the Hospitalfield Arts Trust.
July
Devising and rehearsals of Constants, multi-media 
performance/installation in collaboration with Bodies in Flight.
Work in progress multi-media performance/installation Constants shown 
at Bonington Gallery, Nottingham.
August
Edit of Looking Glass video documentation
Documentation of Constants work in progress version.
Write up of projects and finalise documentation.
September
Research exhibition, KJP Gallery, Department of Photography, Film and 
Television, Napier University.
Conclude project writing and documentation.
Devising and rehearsals for Constants: A Future Perfect multi-media 
performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight (2nd phase 
rehearsals).
October
Devising and rehearsals for Constants: A Future Perfect multi-media 
performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight.
Constants: A Future Perfect multi-media performance in collaboration 
with Bodies in Flight, premiered, Bonington Gallery, Nottingham.
Attend Root ‘98, Hull.
November
Constants: A Future Perfect performed at Arnolfini, Bristol.
Constants: A Future Perfect video documentation.
The Turin Machine photography/performance installation presented at 
The Cambridge Darkroom, Cambridge.
Writing up Constants:A Future Perfect documentation.
December
The Turin Machine photography/performance installation at the Museum 
of Modern Art, Stockholm, Sweden.
Edit of Constants: A Future Perfect documentation.
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1999
January
Guest artist lecture Edinburgh Art College
February
Initial meeting with Awarehaus Theatre re Stoker - multi-media theatre 
piece.
Attend Performance Theory Conference, Warwick University.
March
Begin work in collaboration with Awarehaus Theatre on multi-media 
theatre piece Stoker.
Attended ‘Breakers’ new technology course at MITES, Liverpool.
April
Attended Performance Studies International (PSi5) conference at 
Aberystwyth University, Wales.
Stoker multi-media theatre piece premiered at the Lemontree, Aberdeen
May
Stoker multi-media theatre piece run at the Lemontree, Aberdeen.
Video documentation of Stoker
Began work on Simulator installation.
Writing up Stoker
June
Working on Simulator installation.
Exhibition of Simulator installation in ‘The Shed’ group show, Collins 
Gallery, Glasgow.
Video documentation of Simulator
July
Continuation of Simulator installation exhibition in ‘The Shed’, Collins 
Gallery, Glasgow
Initial meeting Scottish National Portrait Gallery regarding The Turin 
Machine  performance/photography exhibition.
August
Edit of Stoker video documentation
Edit of Simulator video documentation
Working in preparation for Scottish National Portrait Gallery exhibition.
September
The Turin Machine performance/photography installation at The Scottish 
National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh.
Start devising rehearsals for DeliverUs, multi-media performance in 
collaboration with Bodies in Flight.
October
DeliverUs multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight
devising and post-production work.
DeliverUs multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight 
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premiered Arnolfini, Bristol
Video documentation of DeliverUs 
November
DeliverUs multi-media performance in collaboration with Bodies in Flight 
presented at Bonington Gallery, Nottingham.
Writing up DeliverUs documentation.
Write up practical projects into case study notes
December
Write up practical projects into case study notes
2000
January
Wrote article multi-media work in DeliverUs for documentational insert 
for Live Art Magazine.
February
Preparation for The Turin Machine at Performance Studies International, 
(PSi 6), Arizona.
March
Attended performance art symposium at Talbot Rice Gallery.
The Turin Machine performance/photography installation presented at 
Performance Studies 6 International, Arizona State University, Arizona.
April
DeliverUs rework with Bodies in Flight.
June
DeliverUs multi-media performance on tour to; Green Room, 
Manchester, Roadmender, Northampton and The Wickham Theatre, 
Bristol.
September 2000.
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CASE STUDY 1. THE TURIN MACHINE
Project Description
The Turin Machine is a Performance/Photography installation which uses a 
giant pinhole camera to create life-size photographic portraits of the artist. 
The camera consists of a canvas structure supported by an external 
wooden frame, inside are two chambers and a wooden viewing booth is 
attached to the end wall which looks into the second chamber. In the first 
chamber stands the artist, brightly lit, facing a wall which contains a small 
aperture. Through this aperture the light enters the second dark chamber 
and collects upon a large photosensitive screen consisting of polyester 
coated with a photographic emulsion. The light which falls onto the screen 
forms an inverted positive image of the artist. This process can be watched 
by an audience from the adjacent viewing room which contains two viewing 
windows one high, the other low, to accommodate for the different viewing 
heights of children, people in wheelchairs and standing adults. After a 
period of time the screen has been exposed to enough light to allow a 
photograph to be created.
During the exhibition the audience enters, one at a time, into the camera to 
view the process of exposure and in doing so witnesses the act of “taking a 
photograph”. Initially on entering the camera nothing is visible but as the 
spectator becomes accustomed to the darkness an image slowly fades up.  
This spectral picture hangs inverted within the void of the camera and is 
possessed with a luminescence which exhibits ghostly, magical qualities. 
The effect of the vision is strange and disorientating appearing to hover, as it 
does, on the edges of perception; it is unlike any other visual image and 
unique to a pinhole camera. After a performance time of approximately fours 
hours, the screen is removed and the image developed revealing, in 
negative, a picture of the artist. These portraits are then exhibited within the 
gallery or performance space to complete the performance/installation 
process. The work occurs over a number of days, each day resulting in the 
exposure of a picture or ‘Shroud’,
The research and development of the “The Turin Machine” was begun at 
Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art in Dundee where it was first 
presented as part of the staff research show ‘Media Circus’ in March 1996. 
Based on this initial work the project then received public funding and was 
staged at the Arnolfini in December 1996. At exhibitions the work has been 
very enthusiastically received with many people commenting on the 
extraordinary quality of the image and the intimate viewing circumstances 
which throw into collision notions of performance and exhibition. The 
installation presents the viewer with an immersive environment creating a 
visceral and emotional experience which is simultaneously underpinned 
with layers of conceptual logic. Because of the nature of the piece the work 
is simultaneously a performance and a photograph and as such explores 
fundamental concerns that lie within the act of image making. Indeed the 
relationship between the live and the recorded is pivotal to the meaning of 
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the work and uses mediaeval technology to confront us with the very 
contemporary issue of what constitutes and distinguishes between the real 
and the representationally or ‘virtually’ real.
As a cross art form piece “The Turin Machine” can quite appropriately be 
presented within a performance space, gallery or some such similar area 
which affords a degree of control over lighting. Access to nearby darkroom 
facilities is preferable but it is possible to work in other spaces which have 
running water available. Accessibility has also been considered and the 
work has been designed to be viewable by people of all ages including 
those in wheelchairs. As the installation can only be viewed by one person 
at a time our experience at the Arnolfini and elsewhere shows that a 
contemplative, unmarshalled space which allows an audience to come and 
go freely is beneficial, preferably within the context of a larger exhibition or 
festival. Ideally the work should be open to the public over a number of days, 
three being the minimum, and has a duration of between four to six hours a 
day depending on the viewing requirements of the organisers. The 
performance occurs in two hour blocks with a one hour break in between so 
a typical daily timetable would be 12-2pm, 3-5pm, 205. 
EXHIBITION RECORD
Premiered Arnolfini, Bristol, December 1996
The South Bank, London, July 1997
Now '97, Nottingham, October 1997
Root '98, Kingston upon Hull, October 1998
Cambridge Darkroom Gallery, Cambridge November 1998
Museum of Modern Art, Stockholm, November 1998
Scottish National Portrait Gallery, September 1999
Performance Studies International, Arizona, March 2000.
May 2000.
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CASE STUDY 2. PIECES OF THE TRUE CLOTH
Artist’s contribution to the performance publication Shattered Anatomies 
Shattered Anatomies is a box which contains a collection of critical essays 
and documenting artifacts by a wide range of performance practitioners and 
academics. My own contribution to the box was constructed around creating a 
document for The Turin Machine. This had to be an object that had a 
resonance with the original work as well as being a record of the event. The 
document was made as a work in its own right and created with an 
understanding of the implications of recording for the original performance 
moment. Each performance of The Turin Machine produces a record of the 
event in the form of a negative life size photograph, therefore the production of 
a record was already integral to the work and tangibly linked through time and 
light to the performance. In this instance the e record is a consequence of the 
performance and as a negative is as unique as the moments (four hours) of 
its creation, there is therefore an element of critique around the notion of the 
record integral to the work. The problem then became one of meaningfully 
reproducing this event and the understanding of record-making which was 
integral to it across a large number of editions. Each performance produced 
only one shroud and I had been asked to provide 600 documents I wanted to 
find away to multiply this effect whilst retaining an integrity between the 
documenting artifact and the performance event. Photography, in contrast to 
performance, is a medium of mass reproduction, as the ‘shrouds’ were 
negative the obvious way to increase their number was to photograph them 
but I wanted to maintain a critique of the photographic process which 
problematised the idea that a photograph = the original object. Therefore I 
documented three finished shrouds, a triptych to maintain a resonance with 
religious artifacts and because the performances normally occur over three 
days. These were photographed on medium format transparency film 
because a reversal film maintains a contingency with the object which it 
depicts via the fact that it has been in direct contact with the light reflected by 
that object. This is exactly the e same relationship that my body has with the 
shroud photograph in the original Turin Machine camera. The transparent 
triptych was then bound in the ‘skin’ of one of the three shrouds used in the 
documenting photograph. In this way literally layers of documentation where 
created. The completed documenting artifact was presented in a plastic snap 
seal ‘evidence’ bag thereby providing a broader cultural reference which 
indicated that ‘evidence’ was what was being contemplated. Between the 
clear plastic bag and the bound photograph was text on transparent acetate, 
text which provided the ‘authority’ written information . The text gave the title of 
the piece and explained that this was documentation from/of The Turin 
Machine, below this were three lines of text describing the basic process of 
the performance;
206
A giant pinhole camera
A four hour performance/exposure
A photograph/shroud
From this text it should have been possible to establish how the images in the 
transparency had been created and therefore understand something of the 
dynamic at play within the original work. It was also necessary to view the 
transparency 1. through the text and 2. through a piece of an original 
performance shroud. In this way as a spectator you came into contact with 
images of the body which had been created by similar means but had very 
different relations to that original body. The transparency framed on film 
exhibited the completeness of a document but this was visually interrupted by 
being viewed through a fragment of the original performance moment 
embodied on and by the cloth shroud. The three photographed shrouds had 
been divided into 600 in order to be distributed between the boxes this 
fragmentation of the original reflected the incompleteness of a document 
which attempts to capture the totality of a performance, an incompleteness 
which is denied by normal documenting procedures which wish to maintain a 
transparent integrity with their original object outside of the unique moment of 
time and space so essential to performance.
April 1998
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CASE STUDY 3. LOOKING GLASS 
Work in progress presented at Napier University Department Photography, 
Film and Television May 1998.
The origins of this work lie in ideas that I had for a much larger piece which 
was formulated in response to The Turin Machine. Like The Turin Machine 
the work was intended to pivot around constructions of identity and in 
particular to articulate the irreconcilable schism between notions of self with 
images of the self. I felt that The Turin Machine was potentially flawed as it 
all too easily replaced the live body with an apparently mediated one and in 
this way made the originary presence of the live body uncertain. (This 
relates back to other work Constant II and DeliverUs where the image, to 
some extent, effortlessly negates the body).  Some visitors to the Machine 
apparently remained unaware that the object which produced the image 
was alive, I therefore wished to make a piece in which the fact of the live 
body would be inescapable. I was also interested in equating the look with a 
touch in order to emphasis the action of light as visceral and our looking as 
active, from this position looking becomes something which constructs an 
image and spectating is removed from the realm of the passive and neutral. 
This argument about spectatorship also relates back to notions of the self 
as the image is no longer god-given but is the product of interpretation, an 
action which is fundamentally controlled by the self and simultaneously 
defines the self.
Looking Glass is a scaled down version of a piece of work provisionally 
titled Sarcophagus. Sarcophagus worked through the dynamics of The Turin 
Machine in a slightly altered form; in this instance the image forming 
medium was light in combination with electronic video. A body would lie 
‘entombed’ in close proximity to an audience and could be seen through a 
glass screen which was activated by touch. This hypothetical configuration 
did not however resolve the live dilemma. The body was reproduced to the 
audiences via an electronic camera and video projection it would therefore 
look in conventional imaging terms ‘reproduced’ and seem even further 
removed from the body as real and present than the spectral presence in 
The Turin Machine. There were also other problems with this idea 
concerning the technical practicalities of the piece which demanded 
contradictory optical positions as the body, the camera and the projection all 
interrupted one another. I decided to scale down the idea and more 
significantly to replace the image of the live performer with the live image of 
a spectator. The liveness of such an image would be undeniable as the 
spectator themselves would embody this fact.
Thus the presentation of the body is reconfigured as the presentation of the 
face (the head). The face, as the primordial signifier of identity, is the 
obvious element of the body to use in a work which discusses identity. The 
face is the principle site of communication and expression of being, it is 
also the place where our reception of others is concentrated. Because of my 
work on the Turin Shroud I had been doing some reading around relics and 
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religious icons and I was interested in the way that these representations 
performed a different function in comparison to conventional everyday 
representations. These reproductions maintained an efficacy with the body 
by re-presenting the original in contrast to the way that ordinary 
representations seemed to be orientated around absence, replacing the 
original with a likeness which recalls through similarity. By its very nature a 
representation replaces the absent original (is this where the negating 
power of the image extends from?) whereas a relic presents part of the 
original and therefore is constructed through presence. Icons tended more 
toward the operations of conventional likenesses particularly to a non 
orthodox viewer however it is important to remember that icons are not 
primarily visual mediums. Although an icon is an image not the part of the 
original object (eg. hair, bone etc.) the power of the picture is communicated 
first and foremost by touch not by what it represents. Icons are intended to 
be touched and it is through this touch that the holy spirit of the figure 
depicted maybe felt by the worshipper. Therefore the icons are imbued with 
the spirit of the person depicted (like a fetish) and this is communicated to 
the spectator through touch, icons, unlike ordinary portraits, are not 
constructed around absence but around a sense of the spirit in the present. 
Relics present a material phenomenon of the body in the present, icons 
translate the spiritual phenomenon of that body as still active and powerful 
into the present. Ordinary pictures invoke a sense of presence merely 
through a visual similarity to the original but cannot pretend to extend any 
element of the effective power of the original body constructed as they are 
around its absence. For this reason I would conclude that relics and icons 
are more akin to performance as an artistic form that to the fine arts of 
painting and sculpture. 
Looking Glass is an electronic mirror which is activated by touch (actually in 
the prototype version I made this was not strictly true due to certain technical 
limitations however the principle was proved possible). On entering a 
darkened gallery space a viewer is confronted by a small sheet of glass 
mounted on a wall like a mirror or picture. The glass is blank and glows 
steadily, lit from behind by light from a projector. The floor immediately in 
front of the glass is lit by a small spotlight and an instruction beneath the 
glass reads “Please Touch”. As a spectator approaches the screen nothing 
is visible but if, as invited, they place their hand upon the screen an image 
appears. The hand on the screen creates a space in the white light through 
which a spectator is shown their own reflection. The image is produced by a 
live camera which points at the spectator, it is only visible as long as the 
spectator maintains contact with the glass and it disappears as soon as the 
hand is removed. This physical connection with the screen is vital in order to 
maintain the sense of the presence of the image in the present, this is 
important because the screen image looks mediated and therefore carries 
suggestions of past construction and manipulation - touch establishes the 
image as live and direct and by this immediate association with time 
therefore a ‘true’ representation of the moment. 
Part of the interest of the work exists in its narcissism, the confirmation of 
existence this brings and the spectator’s interest in studying themselves. 
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The image which is given back to a spectator is not exactly a mirror image 
being actually the production of a lens and projector therefore the image on 
the screen is more like the resemblances provided by photographs. 
Therefore a spectators relationship with the Looking Glass image is similar 
to that confusion experienced when confronted with a photography of 
oneself, each image has to be negotiated in terms of the twin ideas that 
‘this is me’ and ‘this is what I look like’ and ultimately incompatibility of 
these two statements. Perhaps it is possible to argue that the photograph, 
located as it is in the past, can be more easily collapsed into the notion of 
the self. Perhaps photographs can come to represent the past self because 
a past self is a lot less complicated a construction than the present self? 
Particularly because we are used to photographs performing this identifying 
function in terms of official documents and records of who we were (such 
documents can, by their very nature only be related to the past self). We also 
use images of ourselves taken in the past to constructed an imaginary 
image of what we look like - it is only when we are confronted with a live 
image of what we look like that the image/self image dilemma is provoked.
Our image as a metonym for ourselves is increasingly proliferated by 
modern visually orientated technical culture, our image is increasingly 
reproduced outwith the original being and any problematic which may arise 
from this practise is forgotten for the sake of convenience. Looking Glass 
arises from an anxiety around the relationship of the idea of the self to the 
image of the self and does not see these two selves as synonymous. I 
believe the problematic is illustrated in two ways, one of which is similar to 
the prioritising of mediated experience above immediate experience and the 
other of which concerns control. To reduce an experience or a person to a 
single sensory encounter (in this instances visual) necessarily removes a 
degree of complication from the phenomena of self as being or being as 
other. Work, such as multimedia performance, attempts to resituate this one 
dimensional visuality into the multi sensory complex that is performance - a 
medium more perhaps akin to our direct experiences of life. The other 
problematic concerns the production and control of images, many of which 
are created without our knowledge and distributed beyond our immediate 
spheres of influence (I am thinking particularly of surveillance but this would 
also be true of the internet, institutional and government identification etc.) 
The profligacy of the identifying image is a relatively new phenomena and 
increases with exponential speed each year, Looking Glass is an attempt to 
restore the creation and distribution of images back to the original subject, 
the spectator makes a living portrait or a performance portrait which only 
has existence in the single time and space of the here and now. The 
question is does this type of image therefore accord with our notions of 
ourselves or do we now required to be pictured by others, covertly or overtly, 
in order to construct a sense of ourselves?
September 1998.
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CASE STUDY 4. CONSTANTS: A FUTURE PERFECT
Initial description of work in progress performance presented at Bonington 
Gallery, July 1998.
This project has been undertaken in two stages, the first, a research and 
development period was presented at the Bonington Gallery in Nottingham 
in July as the show ‘Constants’. The show used two performers, 
choreography, text, live and prerecorded video projection and a sound track 
to explore the aging process and created a looping installation which was 
open to the public. My particular area of responsibility was the way that 
media was to be used in the show; that is what the content of such work 
would be and the way that this would be integrated into the performance as 
a whole. The working methods were collaborative which means that 
decisions and discussions range beyond specific individuals areas of 
responsibility and the final show can be shaped by the whole working 
group.
The earliest discussions about this work took place between myself and 
Simon Jones the writer and director of ‘Bodies in Flight’. It was initially 
proposed that the research work period should concentrate on the sound 
and video elements however this idea was wholly unsuitable for my needs 
as I was primarily interested in integrating the video with the performance so 
any separation of ‘technology’ and ‘performers’ in the working process 
would have been unproductive. Early on there was the sense that the work 
should surround a space possibly with performers working around an 
audience who would be seated in isolated blocks thus transformed from 
witnesses to participants. Likewise it was felt that the video imagery would 
have to fill this space providing several points of focus rather than the single 
one associated with proscenium arch staging, cinematic forms etc. The 
piece was focussed around memory and an old woman at the end of her life 
and with this as an impetus I proposed picture images which followed the 
performers or were carried around by the performers as external 
visualisations of memory. Using the performer’s bodies and clothes as 
screens would be one way of ensuring a greater coverage of the space and 
splitting the audiences focus. I was keen to use micro projections or small 
screens or monitors to avoid the domineering effect of large video projection 
and to place the media at a human scale. I also wanted to provide the 
performers with small cameras which could be carried about in the space 
and used to generate live images to be mixed with pre-recorded ones. 
There was also originally a notion about time as compressed by age and 
memory which it was felt could be illustrated well by video. Electronic 
images could exist in a multi layered form indicating a compression of time 
and by concentrating on the textures of the immediate present ie a 
performers skin express the profound depth of bodily experience and our 
experience of time.
Before any practical work began a whole group meeting was convened 
(including Sara Giddens, choreographer and Darren Bourne, composer) at 
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this meeting it was decided that ‘memory’ was a problematic central 
concern leading possibly to a banal illustrative dynamic for the work. Instead 
a shift  of emphasis was decided on in which age and the experience of 
aging became the motivating principle for the work. This it was felt was a 
more productive subject for creative invention and one that worked 
constructively against the predominately ‘youthful’ orientation of most 
performance work. Also at this meeting the relationship between lived 
experience and mediated experience was discussed again, the possibility 
of using a combination of live and prerecorded video sources was 
elaborated on, along with the opportunities this provided to introduce a 
variety of time scales and points of view into a performance space.
Before we began a two week ‘work in progress’ production period I was 
required to write a paragraph for a funding application on the role of the 
media within the work which outlined my intentions prior to the rehearsal 
period:.
The imaging technology used in this show will be integrated with the live 
performance on an unprecedented scale. The emphasis will be on 
fragments and detail; a number of glass screens will be placed amongst 
the audience denying the possibility of a single totalizing image. The 
images on these screens will be mediated both by the performers 
themselves and an operator who will sit amongst the audience, share the 
performing space and become another dynamic within the live action. The 
performers will use live DVC cameras to visually interrogate and illustrate 
one another, staging images as directed and requested. The pictures 
produced from this interaction will be projected in real time to the scattered 
glass screens providing the audience with surface visual detail not directly 
available to them from the performance space. At times these performed 
camera images will be mixed live with pre-recorded video, the recorded 
images will match the live feeds but depict action that is not directly 
occurring in the space thereby creating an uncanny moment by provoking 
temporal and spatial confusion. As well as illustrating detail the small video 
screens will frame whole bodies and body parts to populate the space, 
playing with scale and perspective which alternatively contrasts and mirrors 
that of the live performance. The performance space will become an arena 
in which the various mediating forms, image, music, text conspire to stage 
the dichotomy of old and young. Each form, though spatially unified, 
separating out to tell its own story in its relationship to this dynamic of 
beginnings and ends.
STAGE ONE REHEARSALS WEEK 1.
The first rehearsal period took place over two weeks (6-18th July) at the 
Bonington Gallery in Nottingham. I had equipped myself with 3 DVC 
cameras, 3 projectors and an MX50 vision mixer. Early on it became 
apparent that the configuration of the space played a vital role in how the 
media could be used and therefore what form it could take. I ran initial 
workshops to explore real time keys (an idea that had emerged out of a 
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previous research project ‘Looking Glass’) and tested out a glass screen. 
The gallery in Nottingham is large and has white walls which meant I could 
also use these as projection surfaces and bright luma key background for 
large full body key effect. An afternoon was spent looking at the various 
effects which could be created by using one performers body as a Matte key 
shape for the other performer and how the addition of various mixer effects 
changed the perception of the action as performed and simultaneously 
projected. We were working with Sheila Gilbert an actress in her seventies 
and Patricia Breatnach a recent graduate from Nottingham Trent University.
I had envisaged a space scattered with glass screens but it became 
apparent that this was not a practical option as each screen required a 
separate projector and we only had three projectors at our disposal. As the 
space was so large even with three projectors it was difficult to break away 
from concentrating attention around the projected images. I tried a variety of 
spatial arrangements, grouping the chairs in a clump and placing small 
glass screens within this or exploding the space by scattering chairs placed 
in twos around it and projection through these onto the walls. Ultimately a 
combination of elements was decided upon; four pairs of chairs were 
placed around the space allowing room for performers and audience to 
move behind them and a place for any action which was to be performed 
sitting down, a large projection filled the far end wall of the gallery, opposite 
the entrance and a smaller glass screen was hung a few meters in front of 
this providing a concentrated, smaller version of the projection upon the 
wall. In this way the images demanded a frontal focus but as much of the 
action occurred throughout the space and often juxtaposed in relation to the 
positioning of the images a split of audience focus was achieved. The 
performance was also promenade so it was possible for people to move 
about the space to adjust their viewing position. 
Once I had established that it was possible to create key images 
successfully over a large scale this became the possible basis for the live 
video material within the show there was also however a matter of pre-
recorded material. Some of this was generated in text and choreography 
work done early on in the rehearsals. I recorded Sheila’s hands and feet 
performing repeated habitual gestures which took the form of a miniature 
dance, I also shot Patricia’s limbs interrupting a blank white frame as it 
were as glimpses of her dance. There were also head moves and turns 
which corresponded with various text sentiments. As well as this I wished to 
look at the compression of time as demonstrated by a static face shot for an 
hour then digitally fast forwarded revealing ticks and anomalies a perfect 
metaphor for the compression of time. During all this filming I occasionally 
caused the focus to drift and worked with dynamic flashes of light to briefly 
illuminate a subject. I was also fortunate in that all shooting took place 
within the gallery itself so if necessary I could maintain a spatial continuity 
between live and pre-recorded material. Much of this material was 
concentrated around the face and head as the focus of identity and the most 
obvious site of aging; head and body parts were fragmented and 
disappearing as had been debated during previous pre-production 
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meetings.
POST PRODUCTION
At this stage (four days into the rehearsal process) a final content and 
structure for the show had not been determined so the editing process 
became one of deciding what material worked most successfully 
imagistically and it terms of the mood and effects we had previously 
discussed. The final edit master could not conform to some preordained 
plan but had to maintain a flexibility in order to be able to fit in with changes 
and decisions created by the devising process that was continuing in my 
absence. A review of the rushes quickly established what material was 
usable in these terms. The fast forwarded faces and the detailed hand 
gestures had the most potential dramatically and maintained an openness 
in terms of meaning which at this stage was beneficial but they also 
seemed to represent two opposing strands of video material; one manic, 
the other slow and serene, constantly disappearing into a black background 
void. It was felt that these two opposing time frames were very appropriate 
for the show in that they represented the two different experiences of time as 
demonstrated in old age - the external slow and apparently calm time 
combined with the internal where time is rapidly compressing in on itself 
making a separation between past and present impossible After 
experimenting with a number of types of fast and slow motion as created by 
the DV cameras in playback I dubbed a combination of these effects onto 
Beta. I also used some head movement shots from Sheila and some 
extemporised material I had got by letting the camera run on but I could see 
no place for other material I had taken of Patricia. I then constructed 3 short 
video sequences based on the hand ‘dances’. The logic behind the 
construction of these choreographed gestures was that sequence would 
move from fragments and parts of gestures to more a focussed routine until 
the full movement sequence was shown completely. One sequence in 
particular used a gesture which had been fractured into pieces by being 
speeded up and was then slowed down back down using Avid to maintain 
this fractured look and give an ‘out of time’ feeling. All this material was 
worked very impressionistically partly driven by previous group discussions 
but partly by my own visual sense and therefore to some extent the material 
was a limited and determined by the shooting methods and techniques I 
had employed.
The faces of Sheila and Patricia which had been shot to match in scale and 
eye line provided the potential for superimposition therefore making a 
metaphoric relationship between the two performers concrete by visually 
collapsing young into old. I could also superimpose a number of layers of 
the same face on top of one another to give the idea of multiple coexisting 
timeframes. I cut two speeded up sequences approximately 10 minutes. in 
length one of CU’s of Sheila and the other of Patricia and I also made up 
two more complex sequences; a manic fast cut sequence made up of 
ECU’s and flashes of Sheila’s face and another sequence which 
superimposed this over the CU version. Digital editing makes working 
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these sort of combinations quick and easy but effects like long 
superimpositions are better suited to analogue suites were a fine degree of 
control can be exercised as the signals are mixed in real time. Therefore at 
the end of the post-production stage I had a number of short sequences 
and A and B roll tapes of faces which I planned to combine together in an 
analogue SVHS suite. I had potentially conceived of the large wall projection 
containing a combination of superimposed faces which became more 
manic before moving  into a concluding sequence made up of Sheila’s 
static face illuminated by a passing light which slowed down until it reached 
an end point. The smaller central glass screen would contain more oblique 
descriptions of a women through the hand dances interspersed with 
moments of layered manic faces. Though because I had not cut definite 
Master Edits I was able to have the luxury of returning for a day into an 
analogue suite when I had a more precise idea of the contribution needed 
from the media for the final show.
REHEARSALS WEEK 2
Once I returned to Nottingham I spent a day with the video material before I 
was able to resolve the exact nature of the media and its combination with 
the other performance elements. An overall structure was absent and as 
often happens with group devised work no one individual felt able to 
determine the shape of the show in its entirety. For my own sake I produced 
an inventory of the potential media available for use. As well as the rough cut 
sequences there were the live media experiments such as the large scale 
key and smaller hand keys (from ‘Looking Glass’ installation), close up 
details provided by performers manipulating cameras, freezes, strobes and 
the possibility of performers matching pre-recorded video action particularly 
with the faces material. I realised that it was possible to create a 
performance which had a media dynamic that moved from live to pre-
recorded over twenty minutes and that at times there should be a confusion 
as to whether one was watching live work or recorded. The show could 
begin  with Patricia dancing behind the glass projection screen while her 
dancing figure was re laid via a DVC camera to the mixer to make a key 
shape which was filled by CU pictures created by Sheila who was pointing 
and moving a camera around her face and body. This key was 
simultaneously framed in small scale by the projection onto the glass 
screen placed between the audience and Patricia whilst Sheila was sited 
behind the audience on the end wall thus creating a split focus which used 
the whole performance space. The other key effect used featured just 
Sheila’s hand upon the glass screen which made a key shape to reveal an 
image of her face projected on the same screen. When a strobe effect was 
added to the fill image, ie Sheila’s face looking at herself through her hand, 
the suggestion of pre-recording or a trapping of the image in someway 
could hint at a possible pre-recorded element which was snot yet present in 
the early stages of the show. Then the performers could align themselves in 
opposite corners of the space and by being monitored by cameras create 
two live images of faces which gradually disappear into the pre-recorded 
face sequences which they matched. The show could end with the recorded 
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faces which fade slowly to black. Although this structure was conceptually 
neat the hand sequences remained underused so it was suggested that 
these interrupted the four main movements like ‘knee plays’ in Noh theatre 
and accompanied similar stage action thus usefully providing time to 
reconfigure equipment for the next major sequence. A two minute segment 
at the beginning of each loop also allowed time for all the equipment to be 
reset for the start of the cycle. It was also decided that the two screens 
should share identical video images but by bringing up lights on the back 
wall the large projection could be more or less obscured by being washed 
out.
Once this structure was agreed upon it was necessary to spend a day in an 
online cutting a show tape that would run in the correct order to the correct 
timings for each section. It was also in the online that the final mixing of the 
superimposed faces occurred to make it easy for the performers to match 
with their stage action. Final placements for equipment, tripods, projectors 
and screens were fixed and technical run throughs proved that the 
sequence was workable.
PERFORMANCE
It had been decided prior to rehearsals that technical operators would work 
within the performance space as it was felt this was suitable to the work in 
progress nature of the show and the degree to which the technical elements 
played a major part in contributing to the overall effect of the work. The twenty 
two minute show cycle was repeated over a period of four hours with a half 
hour break. During this time I was responsible for cueing and operating the 
media.(To establish an idea of the shows contents please view the 
accompanying video documentation and refer to cue sheets and 
photographs).
POST PERFORMANCE
As I was involved in ‘performing’ the show it is difficult to make an objective 
analysis of its effects and the audiences behaviour. Most people seemed 
very engaged with the work choosing to stay for at least one cycle of 22 
mins. and more normally two. This I think indicates that the work occupied 
an interesting space in terms of theatrical and spectatorial conventions, 
clearly more than an installation the work accumulated meaning over a 
period of time which meant that it was necessary to watch for longer than 
one might normally when watching an installation type gallery piece. 
However neither was it a piece of work that required devoted attention for 
over an hour such as a straight forward performance piece, rather it was an 
intermediary form. I expected people to move more in the space but perhaps 
because the performers used much of the room the audience tended to find 
a position usually around the periphery and maybe only move once or twice 
to shift their point of view. The audience were also invited to sit in one of the 
pairs of chairs of which there were four. This meant that the space next to 
them could be used at times by a performer who would sit next to them and 
216
merely by proximity an audience member would become enveloped and 
implicated into the work. The blurring between audience and performer was 
emphasised by the promenade nature of the performance, on entering the 
gallery it must have been initially difficult to distinguish between the 
performers and spectators this gave the performance a pleasant sense of 
inclusion as there was no demarcated performance space. If I were to 
speculate on the success of this initial work in progress I would imagine 
that its apparent popularity was due to a combination of poetic text, sensual 
imagery and its unusual treatment of an unusual subject. The subject of old 
age is certainly a universal though little discussed and perhaps the 
performance combined text, imagery and space in away which emphasised 
this universal dynamic. Specifically within my experience people react well to 
video used within performance, it can provide a visual variety and poeticism 
and remove an audience from the kind of insistent pressure of attention that 
a live performance demands by creating a reflective, mediated and therefore 
more assured space.
I was most interested in the ‘live’ media particularly the first key and the 
superimposed live faces which then blended with pre-recorded material. I 
particularly enjoyed the complexity of the large key which created a number 
of different viewing positions, and used the live cameras to create an image 
in which the elderly performer space was contained within the younger 
performers body. This allowed a number of strands of expression to co-exist 
within the performance where the stage action synthesised by the media 
combined to create an additional stage image and layer of meaning. 
Likewise the performers positioned themselves in opposing corners of the 
space as part of continuous stage action but once in position fixed cameras 
reproduced their faces as a projected image and allowed a live mix to be 
performed which extended into a matching pre-recorded sequence. The 
moment of transition between the live and recorded faces was difficult to 
identify covered as it was by long dissolves so the notion that the present 
had become the past only emerged once the sequence had become 
visually complex and the performers had moved away. The sections which 
used the ‘knee plays’ to accompany stage action seemed to me to be a 
simple juxtaposition between the action played out live on stage whilst at the 
same time being shown in a projection which meant the media could never 
work beyond the illustrative, reinforcing the live action but never contributing 
an additional meaning. Conversely the second smaller key which used just 
a hand to produce a face was a productive use of media. The notion of 
revealing the face through the hand worked well as a metaphor for the 
writing of identity or the creation of self but once the face had become 
established as visible perhaps other stage action should have 
supplemented the sequence in order to develop this. However a key is not 
an effect that is used very often in a live context (I have never seen it used 
before) and is productive both because it is unusual whilst managing to 
integrate stage action with camera mediated projection therefore moving the 
images beyond a purely illustrative relationship with the performance. 
Personally these are the moments I find most successful when it was 
impossible to determine a separation between a live performance and its 
217
mediated visual effect because it places an audience into a new space in 
terms of the definition and experience of ‘the live’.
QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In terms of my research it is this cross over area between the live and the 
recorded that I am most interested in as these liminal moments seem to 
provoke questions about the experience and interpretation of the live and the 
recorded by placing them in close proximity. For the second phase of the 
work I would like to use more live camera’s combined with material which 
has been pre-recorded in such away as to make that transitional moment 
difficult to identify. This means possibly working with a number of live 
camera sources (up to six?) on set pieces which can then lead in or out of 
matching recorded material or using all six cameras as potential key 
sources. One idea could be to have fixed cameras stationed about the 
space to coincide with moments in the performance, these ‘televisual’ 
images are relayed to nearby screens like a continuous commentary but 
always providing the potential that what is on screen is not also occurring 
live within the space but is a pre-recorded tape. Thus two time frames are 
always potentially present within the performance the pats and the present 
equivalent in some ways to the way that time is experience at the end of a 
life. If, within this context, we then also use sequences which retain a clear 
recorded/live division, such as the ‘knee plays’, this might undermine the 
simple illustrative nature common to much multi-media performance where 
the theatrical is accompanied by the cinematic as two separate strands of 
expression.
 
I would also like to discard the large scale projection and the glass screen 
although I realise a lot of the success of the media’s effect is due to its 
spectacular nature. I would rather work with a number of small CCTV 
monitors which would allow me a good coverage of the space but keep a 
spectators focus fix over a variety of discreet areas rather than one large 
‘cinematic’ space. I also think the black and white monitors might also 
contribute to the notion that everything that is being watched is occurring in 
real time as they give the sense of surveillance equipment rather than 
entertainment technology. I will continue to work with the MX50 as it gives a 
flexibility of image choice and manipulation within the performance space I 
will perhaps work with a switcher that allows me to feed either camera 
images direct to the monitors or to intercept this feed and manipulate it via 
the MX50 before showing on TV screens. We will also continue to work with 
the operators in the space, there should be little sense of seamless 
magical technology as this again means the media seems less ‘live’ and 
ideally the sound score will be worked more intrinsically with the images ie 
if text is spoken it is seen as spoken.
September 1998
CONSTANTS - A Future Perfect
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in collaboration with Bodies in Flight premiered Bonington Gallery 
October/November 1999 
This work developed from an earlier work-in-progress piece Constants I that 
was produced at the Bonington Gallery, Nottingham in July 1998. 
Constants I was presented to the public as a durational performance 
installation and from it I was able develop a number of ideas and 
conclusions (see Appendix 7 MPhil).  My initial responses to the work in 
progress naturally concerned the relationship between the mediated and 
live elements of the show. In Constants I I had used live cameras for the first 
time and the images that these cameras produced (projected onto one 
large and one small screen) seemed to occupy an interesting halfway point 
between the live and recorded in the show. I decided that I would like to use 
more live cameras and combine the images these produced with 
prerecorded ones in such a way that it would be difficult to distinguish a 
difference between the two, or, at the very least, that the transition from the 
live to the recorded would be unseen. 
The images produced by a camera can be relaid live, but equally they can 
be recorded and played back and from the resulting image it can be virtually 
impossible to identify the originating source. If the carrier base of the 
recorded image is of sufficient quality to mimic the pictures produced by a 
live camera, and these same images match at the point of reception, the 
difference in time between the production of these images is difficult to 
distinguish.  Television works with this collapsed difference the whole time 
(cf Williams do more work about this instant time of TV see Warwick notes). 
If I was to produce images whereby the live mediated and the recorded were 
indistinguishable this also presented me with another possible dynamic for 
the Constants II production; that of highly treated and very obviously 
recorded material transposed into the performance environment. Instead of 
restricting the media contribution to recorded material the use of live relay in 
a performance space potential allows the media to transpose elements of 
the live into the media work and sets up an internal dynamic binary within 
the multimedia itself.
In Constants II wanted to work with a number of small monitors distributed 
through the space rather than the one or two media focal points created by 
the large and small scale projections. This dispersal of screens through the 
space was intrinsic to the idea of an undirected, or rather fragmented, point 
of view for the audience throughout the piece. Initially I imagined that these 
monitors would be black and white which, along with live cameras, I thought 
would reference CCTV and therefore create the effect of realtime 
surveillance.  However I finally worked with black and white live cameras 
which created the same effect but also left me the option of using colour in 
the piece. In Constants I technical operators had worked in the performance 
space and it was decide to continue with this configuration to contribute to a 
sense of moment by moment spontaneity rather than images, sound and 
light  magically appearing from an unknown undefined elsewhere.
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Following on from the CCTV idea I investigated the possibility of CCTV 
cameras and found that the best option was to buy black and white PCB 
cameras and adapt them for use by the performers. These cameras were 
small enough to be carried around and could be mounted virtually anywhere 
and produced surprisingly good 480 line resolution pictures. The signals 
from these cameras reached my central control desk via 30 meters of cable. 
The cameras had a wide angle of view and good focal range and worked 
down to a  I lux light level, in addition two, of the four cameras I made, had 
simple condenser microphones attached which allowed the cameras to 
double occasionally as microphones for the performers 
The final show contained four levels of media intervention:
1. Live camera relay. 
2. Show recordings (made during the time of the performance).
3. Recent recordings (made in the performance space prior to an audience 
arrival). 
4. Prerecorded material. 
Therefore it could be said that the show used four different orders of media 
image moving from a unity with the live performance through ever widening 
degrees of separation between the time of the image production and its 
reproduction in the performance space: minutes, hours, days, weeks or 
even months.
ACT 1
TIME AND THE ELECTRONIC PANOPTICON
“But ...this constant instant...stupefies her and wipes out now” 
There are small black and white cameras in all four corners of the 
performance space and via these cameras we watch Sheila’s progression 
around the perimeter walls. Sheila moves from long shot into close up as 
she approaches each corner, as each camera is reached the image cuts to 
the next camera. This has the effect of rendering the figure constantly visible, 
at the point where Sheila might pass beyond one camera’s point of view the 
image is modified by a switch to the next camera in the circuit and she must 
begin her journey again. As the performance space is a uniform colour and 
has roughly two matching long walls and two shorter end walls it is difficult 
to locate Sheila’s exact position within the space and, because of this 
similarity of context, it is also hard to determine Sheila’s precise position in 
time;  she appears to be stuck in a repetitive loop. The pictures are 
oppressive and trap the figure in an endlessly visible circle - a panopticon.  
Sheila is contained by the walls but also by the screens as her image is 
constantly made visible to the audience by the cameras. 
This action, which begins the show, occurs around the edges of the 
performance space which has been divided into three areas: the four walls 
and empty perimeter ‘track’ enclosing a circular ring of audience, monitors 
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and operators in the mid part of the space, which is in turn clustered round 
an empty circular central hub. Therefore when Sheila begins to walk around 
the walls, first clockwise then anti clockwise, the audience is required to 
twist and turn in their seats if they wish to keep Sheila in view at all times. 
The audiences view is further complicated as Patricia stands and begins to 
progresses across the space to an opposing external wall. In this 
configuration it is not possible to watch Sheila and Patricia simultaneously. 
Almost immediately the audience are then presented with a third focus for 
their attention as Sheila’s mediated image appears on the televisions 
screen.
Eight television monitors are interspersed around the seating so that it is 
possible for each member of the audience to see at least two and up to four 
monitor screens. All eight screens show identical images. The audience is 
therefore deliberately presented with a space in which the objects of their 
attention, televisions and performers, have been dispersed and thus 
attention  diffused. Because each television has been positioned to face a 
small section of the audience these screens therefore provide a convenient 
and comfortable view. This view is also the most ‘consistent’ because, 
unlike the performers, the televisions do not move around in and out of  eye 
lines. Therefore is quite natural for a large part of the audiences attention to 
concentrate around the images on the screens. This exchange of focus 
from the live to the mediated is eased by the understanding that the images 
on the screens are concurrent with the action, they are live images and 
present the same space, time and action, they are in simple terms the 
same. This transferal is also encouraged by the positioning of the cameras 
which allows a view of  Sheila’s face as opposed to the profile seen from 
the audiences direct point of view as well as the positioning of the screens 
which provide images front on for audience consumption. Irrespective of the 
fact that the cameras provide an angle of vision which in no way replicates 
their own the audience is prepared to substitute their direct but often 
incomplete view of the action for the mediated version. This transferal is 
made because the screens appear to present more information in a more 
comfortable form. 
However, almost as soon as the televisions become a consistent focal 
point the information provided by the screens becomes problematised. 
From the first moment that live images have been visible on the screens 
these images have also been sent simultaneously to a digital video 
recording deck. It is then possible to substitute the live images for this 
digital video information which has been recorded only seconds previously. 
Because the space and image quality is identical and the action repetitive it 
is difficult for an audience to deduce the split that has now been made 
between the live action and the screen image. The difference is made more 
obvious when Sheila pauses to deliver some text at which point her screen 
self continues to promenade. However it is necessary for an individual to 
alternate his or her point of view from screen to ‘stage’ in order to ascertain 
this difference. Therefore early on in the piece a warning occurs which hints 
at the problems of conflating mediated screen images with unmediated 
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direct experience of the performers. In this instance the mediated has an 
unstable relationship with time and can almost invisibly slip from the live 
present into the recorded past.  Although the media ‘parcels’ and thus in 
some ways makes the performance more easily accessible the 
performance seen on the screens may not be the same as the one 
occurring in the live space. This particular staging strategy emphasises the 
live as more frustrating in terms of its more partial focus but it also presents 
a space where it is always and only possible to discern the present.
“You were in some groove and you got stuck”
 NO REPETITION ONLY ADDITION IN THE LIVE
It could be thought that the ever presentness of performance, though the 
source of its effect, is also in some way oppressive - the “constant instant” 
that traps and stupefies. Although Sheila’s live actions are repetitive they 
always progress through time as we watch them. It is only by adding into 
this live moment the replay of time afforded by recording technology that we 
can genuinely create the sense of repetition, that sense of a needle stuck in 
a groove. The media allows us to work with two co-existing time frames and 
represent an experience of time that we can never normally have in live 
performance.
(In addition it is exactly this coexistence which it is impossible to recreate in 
documentation as one of the two essential dynamics - the live - is absent 
therefore work which operates by exploring two or more time frames is even 
more compromised when reproduced as documentation than other live 
performance work)
ACT 2
“To not be. To be no more. To be never again. A simple and entire not be.”
As Sheila delivers these lines she stops and for the first time addresses the 
camera thus creating on the screens a conventional front on talking head 
shot. This signals the move from Act 1 into Act 2 and marks a significant 
shift in the performer/technology relationship in the piece. The address to, or 
rather through, the camera indicates an understanding of the operations of 
technology within the space and therefore an acceptance or willingness to 
interact with these. In the corner of the room Sheila offers herself in a 
fragmented, disembodied form to the audience. At this point the screen 
image takes precedence over the live figure in the corner and the TV 
becomes a substitute or alternative performer. Then, following the rules of 
classic continuity editing we cut to the next character, Patricia, in a matching 
shot  and a fractured dialogue begins. The image stays with Patricia who 
remains in the corner of the room while Sheila begins to walk amongst the 
audience, we therefore hear Sheila’s dialogue off camera and see Patricia’s 
reaction shots in another classic screen convention. 
222
“She’s so full of it she can hardly move” 
<<PAUSE>>
However, rather like the moments of replay in the first act, as we begin to be 
lulled by the screen we are reminded of the difference between the 
mediated  and the unmediated as Patricia’s face is frozen on the words 
“She’s so full of it she can hardly move”. Unlike the repetition of time 
afforded by tape in the first Act this is a momentary pause, a hiatus, a glitch 
where time gets stuck and doesn’t run on. This type of interruption could be 
created by a freeze in action by a performer but, I would argue, is never 
convincing; however proficient the freeze a body seethes with life and the 
audience understand this idea on a visceral level because they share in this 
experience of a body. A performers freeze can reference a <<PAUSE>> but it 
can never actually be one. Electronics, like photography, can create pauses 
which are altogether more convincing because the stilling of time is their 
raison d’etre. When a freeze frame is activated on an vision mixer it holds 
1/25th of a seconds worth of time and repeatedly sends this same 
configuration of frequency out through its circuitry. True this image is 
‘created’ every 25 times a second but it contains no signs of life such as 
movement or change, no change occurs in the resulting picture until the 
mixer is given an alternative command. 
The live mediated image is restored with Patricia’s next line as she picks up 
the camera and begins to move into the audience arena. However the 
image retains elements of its electronic interruption in the form of a slight 
strobe. Technically this means that instead of seeing a new frame every 
1/25th of a second a few frames of picture information are repeated and 
then update to the next available frame which is repeated and so on. This 
gives the image a strobed, slightly jerky effect as the eye does not quite 
receive enough new and different information to allow the persistence of 
vision to create the illusion of real time movement. This effect creates a 
slight separation between Patricia’s actual movement and the version of 
this movement we see on the screen. As Patricia walks she talks and we 
see her framed face, the performer is absorbed into the camera and onto 
the screen which again stands in for the performer and the strobe makes 
the figure appear to glide in a slightly unearthly manner. Though the 
movement is occurring live and we may wish to see the screen view as the 
version the mediated nature of our vision is emphasised by the addition of 
the strobe and the strange quality it brings to the image. The effect that the 
strobe creates and the way that the performers choose to use the cameras 
to address one another in the space hints at another dynamic for the media 
within the show, that of the medium, a concept that is more fully developed 
later on in the piece.
At the end of the dialogue Patricia has moved to sit facing a television in an 
empty chair at the edge of the hub, the camera is placed in front of her on 
top of the television. This arrangement of camera and screen is an 
interesting one. Up until this point the camera has acted as a conduit for an 
image which is reconstituted on the screen, although Patricia has 
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addressed her words to the camera our reception of her words has 
occurred around the screen. Therefore the performer seems to have 
addressed us solely via the screen. The camera’s role in this delivery is as 
a medium in the true sense of the word (cf Williams for keyword definition) 
and has remained virtually invisible. Only when the screen’s point of view is 
shared by the camera does Patricia direct her address to the television. The 
strobe and freeze effects emphasise the electronic, mediated nature of the 
image but only when the camera and the screen are placed in close 
proximity do we understand that the space of the screen and the space of 
the lens, though physical different, are the same. This metaphysical spatial 
unity, like the co-existing layers of  time presented in multimedia 
performance, is not be found in the logics of the pure live here space 
remains separated and differentiated and time is always only present and 
linear. 
“I feel you. In me now. More than I see you, hear, touch you. In my bones”
The collapsing of space and the layering of time afforded by media 
apparatus also allows a simple simile to be illustrated between the old 
woman and the young woman in the piece. The piece involves no other 
performers and its central axis stages the young and old in relation to one 
another, as well as suggesting a mother/daughter relationship there is also 
the implication that the performers represent the same person at different 
points within a lifespan. This idea can be realised visually by freezing 
Patricia’s seated figure and then allowing Sheila to assume the same 
position. The images of the two women can be intermingled using a partial 
dissolve on a vision mixer and their bodies can momentarily inhabit the 
same space at apparently the same time. This unification of young and old 
occurs an number of times through out the piece. It is seen at the end of the 
camera dance sequence when both performers mirror one another's 
actions by throwing back their heads, on the screens this action is seen 
simultaneously by the layering of two camera images. Also, towards the end 
of the work in a period which leads into the final recorded image sequence, 
Sheila and Patricia both frame their faces with a matching eyeline allowing 
me to manipulate the dissolve function to create a third, ever changing, 
amalgamated face which ebbs and flows between Sheila and Patricia - a 
Shericia or Patila. However it is at such moments that the precise visibility of 
such an idea often appears to render the media’s contribution to a work 
redundant as if it is almost too illustrative and crowds out that reflective, 
creative aspect of spectating that an audience of live performance can 
engage in. 
CAMERA DANCE - OR THE CAMERA AS BUTCHER                                Compliment not replicate
Patricia passes Sheila a cigarette and then leaves the audience ring and 
walks back into the corner. The camera, united in its point of view with a 
television, shows Sheila watching Patricia until she reaches the corner 
when the image cuts abruptly to a close up on Patricia from the corner 
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camera reminiscent of the frame for the earlier dialogue sequence. The 
camera=screen conflation is ruptured and screen space and the originating 
picture space of the lens are separated within the performing space once 
more. However the choreographed sequence that follows develops and 
emphasises the difference between all these three spaces; the screen; the 
lens; the stage. Until now in the performance the cameras have either been 
strategically positioned to show observational type long shots or have 
framed the face in hand held close ups. Both these views have purported to 
show the audience a totality of information, the lens has not been obscured 
nor the frame interrupted. Patricia now holds the camera at arms length and 
begins to dance with it, the images produced move with her gestures, 
momentary pauses hold and frame parts of the body before moving on. The 
dance is choreographed for the camera and the images created are 
completely different from those we experience when directly watching the 
same live action. The screens become dynamic, the images alternate 
between rhythmic abstraction and moving cameos of different body parts. 
The view the camera gives us is the view from Patricia’s right hand, as it 
were from inside the dance, and this view is partial, fragmented and fleeting. 
In this way the liveness of the mediated image is not problematised by the 
addition of an electronic effect but instead the physical restrictions imposed 
by the optics of a lens are emphasised. When we watch Patricia dance we 
see a whole body, the camera only shows us parts, the two views in close 
proximity can compliment but cannot replicate one another. It is difficult to 
ascertain if one view has ascendancy over the other. I suspect that because 
the dance was choreographed primarily to create interesting televisual 
pictures that this was the method that the audience  used to watch the 
majority of it but no doubt, due to the dynamism of a physical,moving body in 
close proximity, the live version will also have been watched with particular 
reference to the media.
The fallibility of the media image is further emphasised by the concluding 
gesture of the dance which has Patricia frame her hand before drawing it 
back and bringing it down on top of the lens causing the image to black out. 
This is an interruption to our view caused neither by electronic effect or a 
restricted field of vision. The performer causes the screen to go blank and in 
doing so a clear power relationship is established which is very different to 
the omnipotent all seeing ‘eye’ of the camera in the first Act. And just as at 
the start of the second act the direct address to the camera acknowledges 
‘the lens as mediator’ within the space the gesture of obliterating is really 
the logical conclusion to this realisation and it is a powerful act within this 
live/ mediated constellation.
Sheila watches the dance on the television in front of her. The sight, which 
occurred on a number of occasions throughout the piece, of an old woman 
watching the telly caused a number of the audience to remark on another 
dynamic within the work; that of the outside world mediated to the elderly via 
the television set. Because I tend to use a television monitor as a tool of 
visual expression I sometimes forget to see it as a cultural object however I 
had deliberately gone for a low-tech look by sourcing small colour portable 
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televisions. I had therefore unintentionally created this rather bleak 
reference of an old woman separated from the world and watching it on her 
television.
OBJECTIFY YOUR LOVE
“Here I am. The object. Opened out. Just for you. Use me up”
The scene which follows the dance cuts away from Patricia’s black out to 
Sheila sitting staring at the television. Once again television and camera 
point of view are united. Sheila’s image is joined by Patricia in a partial 
dissolve while they perform a united head gesture before being resolved to 
Sheila for the beginning of her dialogue. Patricia stares intently at the 
television in front of her while on the opposite side of the hub Sheila speaks 
into her camera/television. This staging gives the clearest indication yet of 
the ‘camera as intermediator’ between the performers as well as mediators 
for the audience. It is the first time that they have both sat and focused on the 
televisual images mirroring the audiences attention to the screens. 
The objectifying power of the lens is well documented and in this section 
Sheila clearly acknowledges this when she says “Here I am. The object.” On 
an one level Sheila equals the television, through her mediated image she 
has become the television set as an object as well the object of the camera. 
It is the ability of the lens to segment, parcel, and reproduce that give it its 
objectifying abilities and it is these that Sheila acknowledges and 
encourages, using her image to present or ‘make a present’ of herself - 
“this gift for you”. Her acceptance of this object-like quality conferred by the 
mediated image leads us into the next sequence which uses, for the first 
time in the show, a piece of distinctly recorded televisual material.
PRERECORDED HANDS - FORENSIC  LENS
”Where does time go. It vanishes and stretches. In my bones.”
The sequence that now plays across the screen is made up of a variety of 
hand movements which blur in and out of focus. Sheila performs these 
moves in her lap concurrently with the images but it is clear from the 
difference in image quality and camera angle that the hands on the screen 
are not the hands in performance - although they are both Sheila’s hands. 
The hands and the face are the most visible and therefore ‘representative’ 
part of a person. The emphasis on hands, in sympathy with the earlier 
emphasis on the face, identify Sheila the performer. The hands also signal 
both the giving and taking of a gift, indeed Sheila has concluded her 
previous speech by bring her hands into the camera frame in a gesture of 
supplication. However the recorded hands allow us to concentrate on a new 
element within the performance by dwelling on the texture of Sheila’s elderly 
flesh. Although Sheila moves in close proximity to the audience the forensic 
nature of the camera allows us to study the surface of the recorded 
performer in a detailed way that is not available to us in the live moment. 
The hands are isolated against a black background and disembodied by 
the tight framing of the shot. The flesh is marked with age and any extended 
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reflection upon this surface inevitably lead to thoughts of mortality, 
particularly because Sheila has just reminded us, ”Where does time go. It 
vanishes and stretches. In my bones. And very soon that's all there'll be left 
of me. Which will be not me”. Because this is a prerecorded sequence I 
have been afforded the luxury of a degree of image manipulation which is 
not available with live mediated images and just as the text suggests 
thoughts of mortality the images play a similar role. The pictures breakup 
and swim in and out of focus retreating into the dark only to reappear once 
more.  Within the picture surface parts move before others and only unite 
momentarily to form a complete hand before disintegrating again. The two 
aesthetics of disintegration and disappearance in this context reference 
death. In this way the recorded past, when replayed in the live present is 
able to reference the near future when the body of Sheila, as the older 
performer, will be absent.
THE GHOST IN THE MACHINE - Multimedia as a haunted space.
“As a dream comes through the crowd and announces “Here I am”.That 
different an order of being. Your being here. That different a logic”.
As the prerecorded hands sequence ends Patricia picks up a camera and 
carries it across the hub to Sheila’s television. Because the camera is 
pointing at the television this causes the image to feedback providing a 
conveniently  indistinguishable point at which to substitute live images for 
recorded ones. The image on the screen continues to accord with Patricia’s 
camera moves as she lifts the camera above Sheila’s head, but from this 
moment on we know that we are now seeing images that cannot possibly 
be live. The picture continues to move over Sheila’s head and then cranes 
rapidly up to give a bird’s eye view of the space complete with performers 
and furniture but no audience. The high angle camera hovers tracking 
Sheila and Patricia’s progress round the chairs. The position of the 
performers in the recording matches their live positions on the stage, and 
as they walk round the camera swoops and dives down hunting through the 
empty chairs and pausing in front of each television in brief interrogation. 
The camera moves somewhat erratically in ways that would be impossible 
for a body and the resulting images are intended to suggest a third invisible 
presence, a spirit which haunts the performance. This televisual spectre is 
the subject of the ensuing dialogue,  and marks another shift in the way that 
media is used in the performance.
In some senses this ‘ghost’ is just a simple visual trick which references 
typical horror film type imagery with its use of eccentric camera moves at 
unnatural speed to create the illusion of a third presence in the space. But 
the audiences experience of these images, in combination with the live 
action and dialogue of the performers is somewhat more complex. 
Significantly the camera now presents a novel point of view. Previously the 
camera image has been inhabited and/or controlled by a performer, it has 
been embodied, but this new point of view comes from an impossible 
space far beyond the body. Hovering meters above the ground the camera 
is now separated from the body, disembodied and without a body it can only 
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be a spirit. 
As an audience we know that the ‘ghost’ is a camera trick but because the 
images it produces show us a space which is identical to the one we 
inhabit it is easy to imagine that this camera presence, because it shares 
the same space, also shares the same time - it is present in the present 
(there has been an attempt in the screen image to disguise the transition 
from the present to the record).  However the pictures on the televisions are 
potentially rendered ‘unbelievable’ by the absence of an audience, the 
space consists mainly of empty chairs, clearly a recording has taken place 
prior to the entrance of the audience. However I think that this contradiction 
between the picture space and the live space is overcome by constructing a 
variety of logics; the invocation and manifestation of a spirit indicated by the 
text and media images suggests that we are in a magic space, one that is 
supra-natural. If individual members of the audience do not see themselves 
as present in that particular version of reality, that is the reality of a spirit 
world, then it is quite plausible for their presence not to be represented and 
equally, because this world shares the same space as their existence in the 
live stage space, that it is possible for these two worlds to coexist. Similarly 
we understand that cameras can produce pictures that see beyond and 
differently from the human eye (the forensic lens), therefore the 
‘ghost/camera’ only sees what he  is programmed to see (from the text the 
presence is a male one), what interests him. Perhaps, more literally, this 
selective vision is also understood to be a common convention of the 
supernatural.  One other element contributes to these logics. On a more 
psychological level as individual spectators we tended not to be perceive 
our own selves watching therefore ‘we’ are absent from our own 
perceptions of the space.  
Using one, or all of these schemes, it is therefore perfectly acceptable that 
the audience is not present in the televisual representation of the space 
whilst a tangible realisation of the coexistence of spirit and material world 
can be maintained. Perhaps this is the multimedia equivalent of the ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’ used in the literary arts. The representation of the 
third or the Other that media affords works in contrast to it’s more invisible, 
omnipotent operations either as an observational device such as the CCTV 
style monitoring of the first Act or as a conduit that delivers Sheila and/or 
Patricia to the television screen. Therefore, as well as this ability to channel 
information and direct attention, media has the potential to invoke and make 
tangible that which is physically absent from the performing space. Media 
can act as the ultimate medium summoning the immaterial into the material 
and the past into the present. “That different an order of being. Your being 
here. That different a logic”.
THE HAPTIC AS PERFORMATIVE OR DOUBTING THOMAS
The ‘ghost’ comes to rest on top of a television set looking back over an 
empty chair. As Sheila walks towards this same chair a matching view from 
a live camera is partially dissolved with the recorded so we then see Sheila 
standing over the empty chair. Patricia continues to journey around the 
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audience appearing in the television picture to come toward the empty chair 
and sit in it. But this version of Patricia is a recording and as she sits her live 
figure comes into view and sits on top of her recorded self. Sheila has 
placed her hand on Patricia’s shoulder but at first it passes through the 
insubstantial recorded version. The idea of the ghost, which was 
represented through a point of view, has now been transferred and inhabits 
the figure of Patricia, who in her recorded version, now embodies it’s 
insubstantial qualities. It is only when live Patricia occupies the seat that 
Sheila can reassure herself of her presence by touching a solid body. As if 
acknowledging the insecurity of this ghostly time space Patricia answers 
Sheila’s touch by reaching up and laying her hand on top of  Sheila’s. It 
seems that due to the past deceptions of the visual sense this physical 
contact is the only way the performers can establish their real time 
coexistence in the same physical environment. The touch acts not only as a 
reassurance of the presence of another but also serves to establish the 
presence of the self in the space. It is ultimately a performative gesture 
which enacts a reality.
VIDEO REWIND- THE PRESENT CANNOT SUSTAIN
The first moment of physical contact between the performers is surprisingly 
moving but as Patricia’s hand reaches Sheila’s in this gesture of 
confirmation the mediated image begins to rapidly rewind showing all the 
recent screen history of the performance, live and recorded, in discrete 
blocks of digital breakup. This sequence is motivated by the understanding 
that the power of the performative gesture - a touch - cannot be realised on 
the screen (a metaphysical space of tricks and deceptions) it can only be 
effective (as true and real) in the live moment. The sudden separation 
between stage space and screen space is particularly potent in relation to 
the earlier understanding encouraged by the ghost sequence of the two 
spaces as contiguous. This rupture causes the media element to, as it 
were, unravel. In a sense this is a malicious act which attempts to assert 
the superiority of the record onto the live. What the playback shows is the 
fragility of this live moment by replaying to an audience images and actions 
that were, moments previously, live but, by the relentless progression of 
time, have now been rendered past. It demonstrates that the present cannot 
sustain.
ACT 3
“The light is cruel. Not as life is cruel. That harbours malice. Whereas the 
light is without heart. Even a negative one. Cos light is constant.”
During the rewind transition from Act 2 to Act 3 Patricia has placed a chair in 
the centre of the empty hub and  Sheila now sits in it. She holds a camera 
close to her face and begins to speak. The televisions show pictures from 
Sheila’s live camera but the movements are not as controlled and the face 
not so well framed as it has been previously. There is a strange lag to the 
highlighted areas of the image and parts of Sheila are momentarily left 
behind in a superficial disintegration reminiscent of the earlier recorded 
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hands sequence. When Patricia begins to speak we cut to her live camera 
which tightly frames her mouth however within the darker areas of this 
picture the images from Sheila’s camera continue to show. This is a live key 
effect and allows parts of Sheila’s image to emerge from the image of 
Patricia. It is different in its effect from the earlier unities created by partial 
dissolves here Sheila is not layered with Patricia but incorporated into her, a 
separation between the two is harder to distinguish and shifts with every 
variation in the light. Patricia’s final speech concerns the nature of light and 
identifies it as the ‘constant’ in contrast to the human “But us. We are the 
inconstant, fragmentary things. We bleed. We spin and burn. And give 
everything to light, unstinting. Its lustre. Its hues. Its dusks and its dawns. Its 
loveliness to behold.”  This speech forms an unorthodox liturgy concerning 
the universal properties of light and set lights ‘persistence’ in contrast to our 
own temporal human frailty. Any visual media is dependent on light to 
reproduce its subject, human or otherwise.  What multimedia performance 
can do is stage an equation between light, perception and existence by 
picturing this action electronically at one remove. Therefore what remains of 
a person once they have gone from the world except photographs, films, 
video recordings? These are not the person they are all just versions of 
trapped light hence “The light is cruel” but in the absence of a body the 
record proves an existence. A luma key, like most camera images can only 
function with light, it determines the difference between light and dark, if 
there is no light there will be no image and the performer will be invisible, no 
longer present and consigned to the darkness.
At the end of Patricia’s speech she draws the camera away to frame her 
face and Sheila does likewise to create a picture of the amalgamated face 
referred to earlier in this document. This image of a unified Sheila and 
Patricia allows a seamless bridge into identical prerecorded video material. 
The face moves back and forth between Patricia and Sheila until Patricia 
disappears from the mix and we are left with just changing images of Sheila 
which begin to layer and mix with others. There is a sense of dissolution 
and disappearance as the images swim in and out of blackness. As if she 
can guess what these pictures hint at Sheila holds up her hand to me, the 
video tape operator and with this gesture pauses the show in order to 
deliver her penultimate speech. 
“....So maybe me like so. Me gets so small it cannot be seen, 
cannot be felt in the room. And keeps turning in on its own 
deep space, keeping me me, as this flesh fails, must surely 
fail, and you pronounce me dead and cry for me.......”
However, during the pause the persistent light, like insistent time, continues 
unrelenting and while Sheila delivers her speech the paused black and 
white image of her face gradually acquires colour across all the television 
sets. After the monochrome of all the previous images the colour has the 
effect of  heightening the visual rhetoric of the piece and signals a climatic 
moment. This idealised in colour ‘lifelike’ picture is ultimately appropriate for 
the moment at which the image is about to supersede it’s object.  Sheila, 
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always one to acknowledge the inevitable, starts the flow of images again, 
the live camera is now redundant in her lap and she retreats into a repeated 
spoken mantra while her image and recorded voice take over. The recorded 
is here again able to do something fluid with the dynamics of time that live 
performance alone would be unable to manage. Although Sheila is still 
present in the space the ‘dynamism’ or ‘drama’ of that arena now lies 
clearly within the domain of the recorded. This then looks forward to a future 
moment in time beyond Sheila’s death where she will no longer be present,  
her presence will only be indicated by her re-presence in records. This use 
of media is the inverse of the earlier ghost sequence; the record, so often 
associated with the past, is now used to invoke a future state where we are 
all preserved in the perfected form of our recorded image - a future perfect.
CR November 1998
SUMMARY
Live cameras -
Liminal mode between Record and Live - the mediated
Difficulty in distinguishing between Live camera and recorded 
camera as source of image. Allows an internal dynamic within the mediated 
material between live and recorded which reflects wider stage dynamic.
The Electronic Panopticon -
CCTV aesthetic = Live?
Live TV as Live performance; functions in identical time and space
The All seeing camera eye totality of vision as opposed to partial audience 
vision
The lens as objective and objectifying how is this different from the eye?
The panopticon interrupted -The camera view as partial, fragmenting not 
totalizing camera dance
3 orders of cameras
Objective, subjective (as inhabited by a subject), The Other (spirit). The 
camera acts as omnipotent, bodied and disembodied is able to represent 
an immaterial presence. Up until the ghost sequence the mediation has 
been ‘invisible’ the ghost makes the invisible visible draws attention to the 
continues presence of the invisible in the space. In this way recalls the past 
as tangible which is what all recorded images do in performance reinvokes 
the past.
Records as Future
Often thought that records recall the past into the present and only 
performance is concerned or can reference the future as constantly moving 
into the future.
However the hands and end recorded sequence work in contradiction to the 
usual equation as they manage to reference future  ie absence of Sheila.
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Present as past
Video rewind sequence emphasises fragility of present not moving into 
future but always being past.
Reduced to light
Media reduces the human body to light.
The Haptic as performative and beyond media to establish present 
presence. This gesture is delivered via a screen and in order to understand 
it we have to occupy two opposing viewing strategies simultaneously 1. the 
image is the action therefore mediation as invisible 2. The gesture 
presented as different from the mediated. The Haptic might be close to 
providing a definition for the live - how does the touch of the photograph 
(Barthes see Drever on sound) compare to the touch of the live - can any 
reproduced record be Haptic cf Looking Glass (mirror image).
Time
Media and time in unstable relationship or Fluid
Surface anomalies introduction of the electronic displacement of time in a 
strobe effect able to discern the mediated from the live as not equivalent. 
The live cannot repeat only the record repeats THE LOOP is a function of the 
record can only be created in a live space through the rerecord.
Likewise can only PAUSE in mediated or recorded (live can reference pause 
like it can reference loop but it cannot be these things in time) causes a 
dualistic experience of time 
Sense of time as conditional on space consistency in space causes 
confusion of perception of time.
Live space as only additional (not repetitive) because of this it is the only 
space in which the PRESENT can be clearly discerned/identified therefore 
the  relationship between live and the recorded become a bit like that 
between waking and dreaming or the conscious and unconscious. 
Collapsing Space
Camera lens as surrogate performer (disembodied Bodies) collapses 
spaces of stage/camera/screen to deliver parts of the performer to the 
screen.
Collapsing space or layering via partial dissolves afford the collapse of 
bodies into each other 
In the live space remains separate and discernible undissolvable
Life as mediated
Sheila sits and watches TV references a reality beyond that of the 
performance our experience of the present.
Media affords the multiplication of time and space frames within the present 
of live performance in a way that is impossible for the live. This multiplicity of 
frames is our experience of the present outside of performance however in 
the performance the creation and difference between these frames are 
sometimes emphasised or dramatised in contrast to the way they seem 
hidden in everyday life. Is the exposure of the effect of media on our 
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perception of time and space the efficacy of multimedia performance?
November 1999.
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CASE STUDY 5. STOKER 
in collaboration with Awarehaus Theatre, Aberdeen premiered The 
Lemontree Aberdeen April 1999.
Stoker was a produced by the Aberdeen based theatre company Awarehaus 
and was designed as a piece of multimedia theatre. The project was funded 
by a grant from the combined arts fund of the Scottish Arts Council and I was 
asked to join the collaborative team as the media artist. Despite the 
experimental potential indicated by its funding and proposed ‘collaborative’ 
working structures the project originated from a theatre model and for this 
reason much of its processes retained elements of ‘traditional’ theatre 
practice. The piece was text based, the work originated from a script written 
by the playwright John Harvey. Although the script was written in consultation 
with the director Tina West and myself it was not constructed along with 
rehearsals as a devised text might be nor was it substantially revised once 
rehearsals began. It was a requirement of the production process that the 
final text had, more or less, to be in place by the start of rehearsals. One 
reason for the preeminence of the text was due to the use of ‘actors’ rather 
than ‘performers’ in the realisation of the piece. Actors come from a 
particular training and background in theatre which demands that the text be 
a fixed certainty from which they can extract a ‘psychology’ to form the basis 
of their ‘character’s’ performance.
Technical roles were broken down into the conventionally distinct areas of a 
composer, a designer, a costume designer, a writer, a director and in 
addition to this the less usual media artist. The production progressed 
through a series of production meetings which occurred prior to and 
alongside rehearsals again the usual working model of traditional theatre. 
Because the practices of theatre tend to originate from the demands of the 
script and working roles are separated into different skill bases this can 
lead to a degree of inflexibility in working methods and this in turn has 
consequences for what can be realised on the stage. This is particularly 
pertinent for a discipline such as multimedia for which very little precedent 
exists in terms of working practices in theatre. Integrating media into a text 
based theatre production can often be a process of compromise and 
negotiation because only a limited understanding and experience of 
multimedia exists within a production team. For these reasons the majority 
of my media contribution to Stoker is in the form of illustration, that is to say 
there is very little interrogation of the workings of the media itself within the 
piece. 
The action of the play occurs in the same place, Cruden Bay, over three 
different time periods, the 1890s, 1950s and the present day. The cast 
played a variety of characters from these different time periods and the 
media performed a useful role by  distinguishing between the three different 
moments through the use of three different filmic textures.  All present day 
images were originated on DVC Pro, whereas all past events where shot on 
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film, either 16mm or S.8mm. 
Three over arching strategies were developed for the integration of media 
into the play and all three used various Victorian imaging phenomena as 
their starting point.  A large cyclorama hung at the back of the stage and onto 
this white backcloth various scenes were front projected from a bright LCD 
video projector. These images dominated the stage creating flat 
‘environments’ in which action took place. I called these projections 
Dioramas after the nineteenth century invention which originated in the 
practise of scenic stage painting. A diorama presented a panoramic life-like 
painted landscape or interior and then staged the ‘drama’ of the depicted 
space by manipulating the light behind the scene cloth in such a way that 
the picture appeared animated.  Therefore my projections, like the 
conventional painted backdrop of theatre, created a context for the action 
and used light, like a diorama, to move and change these  ‘landscapes’  to 
suit the shifting contexts of the play.
Downstage from the cyclorama, in front of a scaffold gantry, hung two 
smaller projection frames covered with sharks tooth gauze which, 
depending on the direction of the light, allowed action to be viewed through 
them or images to be projected onto them. The projections for these 
screens originated from four synced carousel slide projectors (two for the 
stage left screen and two stage right)  a stage left back projecting LCD and 
a stage right front projecting LCD. All these projectors were more or less 
hidden from view by masking or props. I called these two screens 
Daguerreotypes. The screens were intended to reference early photography 
and were used to present artificially aged portraits of the cast as well as 
archival photographs reproduced on slides.  The screens hung in portrait 
format but did not conform to the conventional 35mm ratio instead I used an 
idiosyncratic ratio which was slightly over square a size determined by the 
set and ideally reminiscent of the early days of nonstandardised 
photographic formats. Finally the arrangement of the screens, one centre 
stage left the other centre stage right was an attempt to suggest the 
glasses-like stereoscopic viewers popular in the Victorian age used to 
create a three dimensional photographic effect. The original idea for these 
screens was that, through the use mirrors it would be possible to present 
live actors framed in the screens and that it would be difficult to distinguish 
between this live action and similar recorded images projected onto the 
same screens.
One further strategy involved an onstage projector. This projector was 
originally intended to be peripatetic and free to move around the stage 
projecting onto various screens and surfaces. This idea originated from the 
notion of the magic lantern, a glass slide projecting device used in music 
hall and domestic parlours to present an evenings entertainment. 
Concurrent with the invention of the magic lantern occurred the invention of 
another Victorian reproductive device - the phonograph - an object actually 
used by Bram Stoker to write his books. An old phonograph was included in 
the play and it was this equipment which hid the onstage projector thus 
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conflating the idea of recorded image and recorded voice. We wished to 
establish a relationship between the idea of the ‘undead’ vampires in Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula and the ability of recording devices to represent that which 
is now absent and ultimately to recall the dead. Mechanical recording was a 
new phenomena to the Victorians and these photo and phonographic 
representations “drawn by natures own hand”1 must indeed have made their 
subjects appear as ‘undead’ witness for example the nineteenth century 
practice of mortuary portraits. However the onstage projector proved to be 
less flexible than originally conceived so a fourth LCD projector was 
installed under the front row of the seating in order to project on screens set 
directly centre stage.
The play began with a prologue but as soon as the main action began a 
small television placed high up stage right on the scaffold gantry began to 
play Murnau’s classic 1920s masterpiece Nosferatu. The film had been 
slowed down to match the duration of the play and it ran throughout the 
action rather like a channel icon in the top left hand side of a cable 
broadcast. The idea of this continuous image was to signal the power of the 
Dracula myth which ran through the piece (the lead character is obsessed 
by the book) but also to indicate a broader awareness of culture as a 
process; Dracula is already the subject of innumerable stories, films, 
pictures etc. and via the film we were able to indicate a sense of the play’s 
contribution to this cultural weave. The pervasiveness of the Dracula myth is 
due in large part to Bram Stoker’s book and in keeping with this cultural self 
consciousness we wished to acknowledge Stoker as a writer as well as 
theatre as a site where writing is staged. Therefore, with the use of rope and 
tape, the white cyclorama and floor were made to look like a ruled blank 
page. At the beginning of the show, across the back ‘page’ of the cyclorama, 
words began to appear, typed from a typewriter, writing up a passage from 
the book. At the same time on stage the character Stoker begins to type so 
the projected images seem to be a direct result of this activity. Whilst Stoker 
types three women who form the Chorus read. The stage was covered in 
text, saturated by it and peopled with the act of reading and writing, thereby 
the stage is acknowledge as a place of storytelling. As we inhabit a 
(western) culture we are also infused by it, our responses and 
interpretations are determined by it and any experience of the play Stoker 
would be affected by this prior knowledge. By drawing attention to the act of 
storytelling, showing a text developing word by word, we emphasise how 
myths and stories circulate and the stage becomes a site which presents 
the operations of culture itself. 
The typewritten words begin to dissolve into a wide shot of present day 
Slains Castle as the modern day Renfield character begins to speak. The 
ruined castle gradually dissolves into a shot of the beach at Cruden Bay, 
illustrating the subject of the onstage dialogue. These giant panoramas at 
first appear to be static, like a painted backdrop, but in reality they are 
actually projections shot and then replayed in real time; trees move, birds fly, 
rains falls. These images, originated on digital video rather than film, create 
a separation between the spaces of fiction in the play and that of fact, as 
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well as indicating contemporary rather than past contexts. These are 
images of real places shown in real time - Cruden Bay is a place north of 
Aberdeen where Bram Stoker wrote Dracula. Due to the particularly charged 
relationship that products of the lens have with realism these projections, 
like the later use of archival images, add a ‘documentary’ potency into the 
overall fiction. The present day is styled as factual and therefore ‘real’ in 
contrast to the potentially fictional and constructed world of film.
The play is punctuated by readings from Stoker’s Dracula  - the live action 
equivalent of the constant presence of Murnau’s Nosferatu. a reminder of 
this story which permeates our world and those created on stage. The act of 
reading is as important as that of writing in the formation of culture and it is 
one that is repeated regularly by the actors. Each passage from the book is 
accompanied by a short S.8mm film depicting a boy sat on a beach reading 
which is projected onto the stage left Daguerreotype. The film is intended to 
reference 1950s and 60s home movies and represents Renfield the child 
absorbed by Dracula whilst on holiday at Cruden Bay (this reading is an 
activity which has already been described at the beginning of the first 
scene). The film illustrates this fiction with all the appearance of a real 
1950s home movie and allows a comparison to be made between the 
present day Renfield and his childhood self ultimately providing a 
psychological explanation based in past childhood experience for his 
contemporary behaviour. 
Scene 2 begins with another large scale projection which shows a turbulent 
sea breaking at the base of cliffs. Renfield is recounting how Stoker would 
walk the cliffs at Cruden Bay in search of inspiration. The projected image 
creates a context for Renfield’s speech both by illustrating a past context for 
the Victorian Stoker  as well as Renfield’s present location on the same cliff 
top. (Renfield is trying to write a biography of Stoker and he is walking along 
the same cliffs in search of inspiration.) However, as well as representing 
an external scene, they also serve to illustrate an internal, mental one. The 
restless and chaotic waves represent a state of mind, suggesting that 
Renfield is a troubled man. On closer inspection it is possible to note that 
the video picture does not progress in realtime but is a loop made of the 
same wave breaking repeatedly. If we were to read this projection on a 
metaphorical level the reoccurring wave might indicate that Renfield is a 
character that has somehow become stuck, fixated with a particular moment 
in time.
Scenes 3 and 4 used no media and depicted Stoker’s death and then 
Lucy’s death taken from the novel Dracula. Scene 5 reconfigured the 
diorama idea on a smaller scale. The scene was set at the reception area 
of the Kilmarnock Arms Hotel, the hotel which Bram Stoker stayed in whilst 
writing Dracula in Cruden Bay and now the site of a meeting between 
Renfield and a young girl called Lucy. The actual reception area of the 
present day Kilmarnock Arms was projected onto a large sheet hung,centre 
stage, directly behind the actors. Again the realism of the image cut through 
the dramatic fiction placing it into a recognisable external reality. However, 
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like the cliff top scene, time as represented in the projection did not 
progress  but looped the same minute throughout the duration of the scene. 
Unlike the waves though this loop was harder to detect as the reception 
area consisted of a static ‘cabin’ and chairs, only a small clock hanging 
above the cabin indicated this loop as its hands did not move beyond the 
same minute. With recorded images the progression of time can only be 
indicated by movement within the picture, if there is no movement events 
appear trapped indicating a different more ‘unnatural’ order.
Scene 5 also took place in the Kilmarnock Arms Hotel but is set in Stoker’s 
room in 1896. Bram Stoker was the theatrical manager for Sir Henry Irving’s 
company based at the Lyceum Theatre in London. Fact and fiction collide as 
Stoker recounts his first meeting with Irving. Stoker’s description of this 
encounter is illustrated with a number of archival slide images of Irving in 
various costumes striking poses ending with a photograph of his portrayal 
of Mephistopheles. Stoker had hoped that Irving would play Dracula on the 
stage and thereby ensure Stoker’s reputation as a writer of fiction. As 
Stoker’s monologue invokes images of Irving we see him realised as a real 
historic figure in one of the daguerreotype screens. A maid then enters to 
confess to breaking one of the wax cylinders that Stoker has been using to 
dictate his book Dracula and Stoker demonstrates the phonograph to the 
maid.  As he plays back passages he has spoken which now form parts of 
the book an image apparently plays out of the phonograph horn and onto 
the stage right daguerreotype. These images accompany the words and are 
taken from the film Nosferatu. Although this is technically an anachronism 
(the film having been made in the 1920s not 1896 the year that Stoker wrote 
his book) the black and white film provides a visual equivalent to the crackly 
voice which emanates from the phonograph and are the closest that it is 
possible to get to a moving image of ‘Victorian’ filmic quality.  This device 
uses the same film which plays at on a television on the side of the stage 
and projects it directly within the stage action thereby momentarily suturing 
the film into the body of the play. The phonograph sequence also illustrates 
of the concept of the ‘undead’ -  Bridget “But, who? Who is.. who was...” 
Stoker “Who was? Indeed. Who was? For when they who speak are dust 
their voices will live on - undead.” In this context it is possible to make the 
connection between Stoker’s undead and the resurrectional qualities of the 
new recording technologies available at the end of the nineteenth century.
 
The scene ends with the reading of an unusually sensuous passage from 
the book. In this instance the reading is not accompanied by the S.8mm boy 
but uses an extract from Murnaus’s film in a continuation of the images 
used during the phonograph sequence. Taken out of context the film 
sequence appears to present a woman in the throes of sexual ecstasy 
(although interestingly the image is actually depicts a moment of near death 
when Dracula clutches at Mina’s heart). This sequence establishes a mood 
for the following scene which recounts an early sexual encounter between 
the young Renfield and Margaret, a maid from the Kilmarnock Arms Hotel 
which marks a moment of trauma for the boy. Margaret has been swimming 
naked and is chanced upon by Renfield whereupon she asks him for a kiss. 
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This action is recreated by a projection of Margaret emerging from the sea 
projected onto the figure of Lucy, the young woman whom Renfield has 
already encountered in the hotel reception area. This projection stands in for 
Renfield’s literal projection onto the figure of Lucy his preoccupations 
concerning Stoker and events surrounding his first reading of the book 
Dracula. The appearance of Lucy at Cruden Bay begins to trigger memories 
which finally culminate in Renfield’s breakdown at the end of the play and 
this particular encounter with Margaret is the start of a chain of events which 
eventually leads to the maids suicide as witnessed by Renfield. The 
projected image of Margaret onto Lucy therefore mimics the confusion 
which develops in Renfield's mind between present day Lucy and 1950s 
Margaret. 
The play develops through a series of encounters between Renfield and his 
therapist, Stoker and various Cruden Bay luminaries, and is interspersed 
with readings from Dracula. Renfield carries with him a series of note books 
and in one he has written an account of Margaret's death by drowning which 
he reads to his therapist. The passage has a poetic, impressionistic quality 
and is accompanied by a short video sequence projected onto the stage left 
daguerreotype. The pictures are a series of abstract underwater stills which 
dissolve into each other,  the light of this projected sequence is interrupted 
by Lucy who stands behind the screen causing her body to be silhouetted 
within the scene. The media adds a distanced, dream-like quality to the 
account of a trauma remembered and, like the prose attempts, to recreate 
Margaret’s last images at the moment of death. The silhouette within the 
projection also substitutes Lucy as the body of the absent Margaret.
The different time periods which until now have remained separate and 
discrete scenes now begin to merge as an evening of Victorian charades is 
played out while simultaneously Renfield recalls a reoccurring dream. 
Projected across the cyclorama at the back of the stage a drowning 
sequence, shot from a subjective point of view is played, centre stage Stoker 
mimes a scene from his book to a small audience and downstage, in the 
foreground Renfield sits recounting his dream. This confusion of stage 
spaces marks Renfield’s increasing confusion and  inability to separate 
dream from reality as well as fact from fiction. The projection begins as a 
direct illustration of the images in his dream but as his account becomes 
symbolically peopled the images no longer illustrate his words and present 
a frenzied sequence of underwater movements accompanied by furious air 
bubbles until the image slowly comes to rest framing a gently swaying piece 
of seaweed. The images are reminiscent of the earlier drowning sequence 
and indicate that Renfield’s dream is an unconscious product of his 
obsession with Margaret’s suicide. By placing these dominant images 
behind the fantastical charade scene the media illustrates layers of 
Renfield's consciousness dominated by this moment of death which is 
confused with the morbidity of the fiction Dracula and by extension Stoker 
and Cruden Bay.
Coincidentally modern day Lucy is in Cruden Bay to attend a funeral. 
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Renfield has started to stalk her and the funeral we see is Renfield’s 
version made up of a conflation of the present day, Margaret’s funeral in the 
1950s and that of the character Lucy from the book Dracula. The stage is 
dominated by a realtime diorama projection of the kirkyard at Cruden Bay 
whilst the cast process across the gantry dressed in Victorian mourning. 
Renfield has a fantastical conversation with Lucy which concludes as Lucy 
merges into his memories of Margaret and turns towards him with 
Margaret's face projected over her mourning veil. The projection of one 
character onto another is the same device as was used in the earlier scene 
between Renfield and Lucy and it is this earlier encounter on the beach 
which Renfield again recalls during the funeral. However on this occasion 
the projection of Margaret shows just her dead face, pale and bloated from 
drowning. This moment of horror triggers the plays denouement when the 
three separate worlds (the 1890s, 1950s and present day)  finally collapse 
into an inseparable confusion which is combined with passages of the 
book in a staging which replicates Renfield's manic state.
The final scenes take place in Slains Castle by night, the model for 
Dracula’s castle in Bram Stoker’s book and the place where Margaret 
drowned herself. Renfield is enticed to up the castle by ‘voices’. A large 
diorama plays but unlike the fixed opening view of the castle the image now 
moves, swinging from side to side, mimicking Renfield’s point of view as he 
approaches the castle. The dialogue is made up of fractured broken 
sequences from different characters and different times. Into this mix 
another smaller daguerreotype projection is added which plays beneath the 
diorama showing first a seascape beneath the castle then a boy reading. 
This projection remains more objective describing with images that have 
reoccurred throughout the play first a realistic context (the churning sea 
beneath the castle) then a past moment in Renfield's childhood. These 
images end as the camera approaches the entrance to the castle and the 
diorama image freezes at the point of entry. Here for the first time Stoker 
directly addresses Renfield, crossing from one time into another as 
Renfield leaps from the gantry to the stage. This leaps signals Renfield’s 
final descent into madness. The large projection follows his jump down and 
drops into the castle and begins to hunt around its ruined interior, the space 
is confusing and the camera moves are frantic and desperate. On the stage 
left daguerreotype screen a slide sequence of Victorian pornography begins 
to be projected while a short scene in a gentlemen's club is played by the 
actors on the gantry above. The diorama projection freezes and the video 
image shows empty window recesses in the walls of the castle looking out 
to sea. These window recesses create temporary frames for a short speech 
by Stoker to Renfield and is a device which is repeated through out the 
remainder of the scene. The manic hunt round the castle continues and a 
slide dissolve sequence begins on the stage right daguerreotype, this 
shows individual portraits of the cast which slowly age and merge into 
Victorian daguerreotype images. A picture of  Stoker’s wife Florrie appears 
in on the opposite screen whilst an actress sings a sentimental song. The 
scene continues in a series of short dialogues and freezes and the picture 
of Florrie is replaced by a moving image sequence. This sequence is made 
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up of fast cuts between material that illustrates the imagistic preoccupations 
in the show; typing hands, graveyards, crashing waves, dead Margaret’s 
face. Finally the diorama projection reaches the centre of the castle and the 
camera looks up to the sky and begins to turn. Renfield is left sat on the 
gantry gibbering whilst the sky whirls round him in a perpetual endless loop, 
the cast retreats, and the other projections  fade.
The media in scenes 13 and 14 serve to represent Renfield's psychological 
state but they also directly illustrate subjects referred to on stage; Renfield is 
drawn towards the castle just as the camera is; the chorus describes the 
waves beneath the castle - “Breathing, yes. In and out like the waves far 
below” “And falling into the darkness of the sea” and in the small 
daguerreotype screen we see the waves; Renfield reads a passage from 
Dracula and we see the young Renfield reading the same book as a boy on 
the beach.  However once the diorama moves into the castle the other 
images on the daguerreotype screens attempt to work on a more allegorical 
level. The ‘naughty slide’ sequence followed by the portrait of Florrie 
attempts to illustrate visually an idea which is only hinted at in the text of the 
play - that of the contradiction between two Victorian ideals of womanhood. 
This is a contradiction which persists into the present day and is 
exemplified by the female characters in Stoker’s Dracula who are either 
desiring vamps or loyal angelic wives. This contradiction was discussed 
early on in the writing process as a possible source for Renfield’s 
breakdown however I think that its inclusion so late on and within the 
already confused context of the final scene means that it is questionable 
whether the images alone are able to convey this idea of underlying social 
hypocrisy. On the other daguerreotype screen another allegory is played out 
as the actors are dissolved and transformed into aged Victorian 
daguerreotypes. This slide sequence attempts to represent the idea of the 
undead by rendering each ‘live’ actor into an uncanny deathly ancient 
portrait.
Scene 15 establishes Stoker back at his writing desk this time 
accompanied by a large static diorama of the final page of Dracula in a 
staging reminiscent of the opening sequence. Thus the end of the drama is 
synchronous with the end of the book and we are reassured that “Hard work 
it maybe but the admirable thing about fiction is its triviality. A good yarn. 
What more can I create and what more can a reader demand”. And all that 
has past on the stage is safely confined to the realm of fiction.
Technical Note:
The moving images for Stoker were editing and projected from the digital 
editing system Avid. In the past I have completed my post production for 
multimedia performance projects on Avid and then transferred the material 
to tape for playback. However having the use of a nonlinear editing system 
in the theatre during the production week of the show gave me an 
unprecedented degree of flexibility in the production of visual media. 
Normally, at some point in the post production process, a decision has to 
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be made concerning the material which is to be used in the final 
performance. With Avid I could keep these options open and rearrange 
sequences, recut, add in new material or remove extraneous parts even 
change material between performances. Had the production been of a 
different, more experimental order it would even have been possible to 
improvise to a degree within the performance.
Previously, because of the need to output to tape, it has been necessary to 
work with approximate timings for media sequences. These timings are 
usually gathered in rehearsals and are often partly determined by 
guesswork. With Avid  the sequences could be cut to more accurate timings 
which were determined by runs in the theatre space. The duration of 
sequences could even be altered between performances if timings 
changed from night to night. Not only did I have an increased flexibility in 
timings  but also in the positioning of images within the stage space. 
Normally if one wants an image to hit a certain place on stage this becomes 
an almost impossible process of calculating original camera angles, frame 
position, projector position, projection ratios etc. With Avid it is possible to 
adjust a frame ratio and/or the overall position and scale of a picture so that 
it can coincide exactly with the actor, set etc. This allowed me to align the 
landscape horizons exactly with the gantry platform and position projected 
figures directly onto actors.
 
Because the final sequences all ran from external hard drives not tape this 
meant that accessing different material could happen almost 
instantaneously which made cueing sequences in rehearsals and 
performance infinitely easier.  Technical rehearsals were also much quicker 
as I could move around material without waiting for tape to wind on. It also 
meant that cueing during the show became easier because of the visual 
representation of material in a timeline.  A timeline represents a particular 
section of material as a graphic symbol and a blue cursor line runs along 
this as the material in the time that it takes to play out. Therefore the position 
of a particular sequence is visible in relation to the overall material and the 
playback progress through it in time is marked by the blue cursor. This 
makes different sections obvious and moving between them merely a 
question of clicking a mouse. This ease of movement also meant I could 
delay or speed up sequences to fit with the speed at which the actors 
performed on stage. By using a mixer to fade to black I could then jump 
quickly and seamlessly to the next sequence and therefore I was able to 
work to the actors rather than, as has happened in the past the actors 
having to work to the timings of a prerecorded media sequence. Operating 
from Avid gave me a degree of spontaneity which is already present in live 
performance but which is difficult to transfer to any media process because 
of its prerecorded nature. A non linear disk based system allows the media 
in a multimedia performance to come closer to the spontaneity of a live 
event.
September 1999
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STOKER SUMMARY
HIERARCHY OF FORMS -in the beginning was the word.
Stoker essential text based theatre, Structure determined by a classical 
narrative flow based in individual psychological. Dominance of text requires 
all other staging elements to be subservient therefore media primarily 
illustrates in order to deliver the text. Meaning does not originate in the use 
of media neither does the media contribute to overall meaning outside of 
the domain of the text ie. does not interrogate or contradict itself or the text.
FILMSTAGE not multimedia performance
Due to illustrative role media primarily 1. creates ‘objective’ 2D contexts (the 
scene), 2. creates ‘subjective’ 2D contexts (states of mind). These are the 
conventional modes by which the moving visual image (media) operates to 
present a narrative, tell stories etc. exemplified by classical Hollywood films. 
The stage action, setting etc. are determined by the text and the media 
images work in the same mode in this context as they would in a film. QED 
Filmstage.
REACTIONARY REALISM
As we are in film mode realism is potent in this mix. Realism is what 
images can bring to the ‘melodrama’ of the stage. This is exactly the charge 
that existed at the birth of film (as an extension of photography) and is the 
same charge that early multimedia theatre practitioners (Meyerhold, 
Piscator) wished to transfer into the theatre. Stoker rehearses this same 
equation except that now film/tv is the dominant storytelling medium we 
expect stories to be told via a lens. This is how fiction is delivered. Therefore 
does the use of media in theatre make the process of theatrical story telling 
more akin to an audiences expectations of how a story/fiction should be 
told?
Different filmic textures to identify different time periods/fictional spaces.
Victorian devices: explosion of imaging devices at end of nineteenth century 
coincides with the writing of Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula. Loose historical 
equation between forms and fiction.
Dioramas: the Victorian VR equivalent of the reproduction of a life-like 
environment. Panoramas create objective and subjective 2D contexts for 
action of life-like characters/real life actors. Is Realism a move towards the  
live? 
Daguerreotypes: Frames for temporary living portraits and archival material. 
Stereoscope reference an attempt to summon the 2D into the 3D stage. cf. 
Crary/Silverman.
Phonograph: on an ontological level recorded image and sound as the 
same phenomena. Realism of these re-presentations suggests the 
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immortality of records - equivalent to Stoker’s horror of the immortality of the 
undead?
Media as sign of ‘external’ culture represents other forms/other stories into 
the hermetic world established on stage. ie: use of Nosferatu on TV. Can be 
the world in relation to this world of the stage. Does the inclusion of media 
allow the stage to become a site which exposes the operations of culture cf. 
Brecht.
Making writing real or bearing the device. By making writing visible as an 
activity the visual image can expose the written word as the device behind 
this apparent spontaneous stage action emphasises fiction as a construct. 
Media as FACT. Theatre as FICTION. Factual dioramas - realtime 
contemporary spaces. Factual S.8mm - looks historically real as holiday film 
in real place. Factual slides - archive photographs of real historical people. 
Filmstage as charged by the real.
The Loop (Waves, Kilmarnock Arms) in this context references internal 
mental state in relation to time rather than a broader experience of time ie 
that which is proposed in Constants II.
Progression of time in recorded images only indicated by movement. In the 
live the progression of time is felt by internal movement. Therefore when 
movement stop in recorded images this stops the real and puts these 
images into an order we do not recognised and therefore perceive as 
different/unnatural/uncanny/strange.
The record as resurrectional (relates back to the immortality of the undead) 
when a tape sound or image is played the presence is summoned into the 
present. 
Physic projections literal projections. Using the body as a screen. Using the 
body as a screen for another person signals confusion of identities. The 
projection fantasies/idealisms cf.Lacan. In Stoker confusion only occurs on 
level if the individual protagonist does not extend into space sanitised 
contained by emphasis on individual
Media as the dream. illustrator of the e unconscious and by extension 
trauma. Need to research more the relationship between moving images 
and dreams why/do they occupy similar spaces?
Media as allegorical? Victorian porn/Stoker’s wife or perhaps more 
successfully the casts descent into daguerreotypes these dissolves like 
time lapse stage the drama of passing time concentrate time.
Flexibility of disk based nonlinear playback systems equates to the live or 
provides an increased degree of spontaneity which suits the working 
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processes of the live and could suit the content of a performance 
(improvisation) if required ie the way a DJ might drop samples into a mix?
November 1999.
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CASE STUDY 6. SIMULATOR 
‘The Shed Show’ Collins Gallery June/July 1999
I first came across a Bombing Simulator or Torpedo Attack Trainer (TAT) on 
a visit to a second world war airfield in Crail, Fife in 1997. The abandoned 
building enclosed a vast 340’ curved concrete cyclorama and its interior 
space was as impressive as its exterior was nondescript. Further research 
into the history of the building revealed a number of preoccupations which 
made the structure an interesting starting point for a possible piece of work.
Initially it was difficult to discover much about the function of the Trainer, who 
had built it and exactly how it had worked, therefore some of my early ideas 
were based on conjecture and assumptions which in time proved to be 
incorrect. It is interesting to note how this work has evolved in relation to my 
understanding of the original and with specific reference to the Simulator 
piece exhibited in 1999. In retrospect I am still researching the device and 
the installation shown in The Shed show marks a particular stage in this 
progress and is not a final and definitive response to the building. Indeed 
analysing this work in relation to my earlier ideas it is possible to see how 
concepts and ideas are refined by the necessity of producing an end 
product for an exhibition deadline.
The Torpedo Attack Trainer was developed during the second world war to 
train Naval Airmen in the bombing of shipping traffic. Designed by theatre 
specialists Percy (Peter) Corry and Humphrey Watts, the Simulator used an 
epidiascope to project the model of a war boat which moved across a 
curved cyclorama. The scene was made more realistic by a painted 
seascape and a variety of lighting effects which mimicked different weather 
conditions and times of day. The pilot, seated in an aeroplane cockpit, 
followed the moving target and rehearsed the actions of tracking, diving and 
bombing a ship. The position and perspective of the ship altered in relation 
to the pilot’s movements but once he had fired the imaginary torpedo the 
Simulator froze and lit up allowing instructors to calculate the trajectory of the 
bomb in relation to its target. Once this had been determined the Simulator 
then played on to show whether the pilot had made a successful hit or not. 
One of the interesting features of the TAT is its relationship to theatre. The 
Trainer created its ‘theatre of war’ with an emphasis the visual domain 
using  technology more usually employed in the theatre of the day. The 
curved cyclorama ensured that the pilot’s entire field of vision was enclosed 
by the simulated image. The image of a ship at sea was seen, as it were, 
from the cockpit of an aeroplane, the perspective and position of this 
projection altered in relation to the trainee pilot’s manipulation of his 
controls. Great attention was paid to the realistic depiction of every aspect of 
the scene; the sea was animated by a cunning combination of stage paint 
and moving lights; the effect of different types of weather on ambient light 
conditions was also simulated with a vast array of different lighting filters. 
Daylight and nighttime attacks were also imitated including the reproduction 
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of a flare effect used to light up a target at night. To my knowledge the 
cockpit in which the pilot sat remained motionless and no acoustic element 
was used to recreate the attack experience. Therefore it is possible to say 
that the TAT relied totally on the visual sense to recreate, to the best of its 
ability, the actual experience of torpedoing a ship. However the relationship 
between theatre and the TAT extends beyond that which is demonstrated in 
the skills of scenic painting and variable lighting used to recreate an 
environment it is also present in a wider cultural sense. The Trainer, like the 
theatre, recreated a ‘life-like’ arena in which specific sociopolitical 
preoccupations  are revisited and interrogated.
Nowadays we would see the realistic recreation of events in time and space 
to be the project of Virtual Reality (VR). We would expect the efficacy of this 
‘reality’  to be delivered technologically through an appeal to a combination 
of senses; imagistic realism, acoustic equivalences and approximations of 
touch. In relation to this synthesis the TAT’s simulation appears crude and 
unsophisticated but the Trainer has a different and altogether more 
immediate relationship with the real which comes not from its structure or 
how it functions but its existence within a particular historic moment. After a 
brief training in the TAT a pilot would repeat the actions he had rehearsed in 
the all too real arena of war with its attendant possibility of death. And it is 
this possibility of death that allows a separation to be determined between 
the virtual and the real; even if all sensory experiences could be recreated, 
death (as the end of sense) would remain the one encounter that it would 
only be possible to experienced in real life. If the TAT is a prototype VR 
machine the ‘virtual reality’ of the device should be seen in terms of this 
contingency that it has with death, a contingency which operates in time, the 
shared time of war, and not the ‘virtual reality’ of a graphically accurate 
recreation of a space. 
When standing inside the redundant space of the TAT we see a space 
devoted to spectacle and this emphasis on the visual triggers other 
responses. The giant curved cyclorama takes the shape of an enormous 
inverted eyeball, its blank walls a retinal screen ready to receive projected 
light. I realised that this projection would have to move to present an 
effective target and early on I thought that aerial surveillance films had been 
used in the Trainer. This caused me to consider film and ultimately 
photography in relation to the bombing simulator and in particular the 
explosive moment of flash photography which seemed to equate with the 
moment when a torpedo reached its target ship. The shared taxonomies of 
war-making and photography have been well rehearsed; a ‘target’ that is 
‘sighted’ by ‘aiming’ ‘cross hairs’ and ‘shot’ by a ‘trigger’ and then this 
moment of capture being signalled by an explosive/exposing ‘flash’ of light. 
The spectre of death also haunts this linguistic relationship, death is the 
probable result of the trigger’s release as it is metaphorically with the 
camera’s shutter. A photograph deprives it’s subject of life by removing it 
from the continuum of time and rendering it a motionless image. (cf 
Sontag.) Historical buildings, such as the bombing simulator also perform a 
similar function to photographs, both extend from the past into the present 
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and provide an access back into history. Therefore I not only saw the TAT as 
an extension of the project of theatre I also saw it as a space where the 
language and metaphors of recorded image making, could be activated.  
Originally I intend to make a large time based installation that reflected the 
actual scale of the bombing simulator. It would use a combination of still 
and moving images, a live presence possibly a performer, some sense of 
an explosive moment to cause a white out and memories in the form of a 
soundtrack made up of aural histories. I wanted to recreate the curved 
screen and project onto it in an enclosed space, a blinding flash would be 
triggered by audience members entering the room causing an image of the 
same audience to be projected onto the screen. This basic idea continued 
to be modified; the cyclorama was replaced by four separate screens, four 
CCTV cameras and a hidden vision mixer operator. The screens would 
display black and white archive war footage and this would be interrupted by 
a flash of light triggered by the operator, in the aftermath of the flash these 
images would be replaced with frozen pictures of the audience which would 
gradually fade back into the war time footage. The flash which exposed the 
viewing audience to themselves was intended to insert a frozen image of 
the audience into the historical continuum as represented by the film and 
thereby incorporate the audience into an event that they could no longer 
regard as separate and historically distinct. This construction of implication 
through the image seemed simplistic and inelegant so I considered 
replacing the archive footage with the actual training films that I thought had 
been used in the TAT.  In this equation, if indeed it was possible to trace the 
films, the image of the audience would have been brought into contact with 
history by witnessing their own image inserted within the visual operations 
of the Trainer rather than the crass representations of ‘history’ as signalled 
by archival footage. 
The project continued to develop throughout 1998. I recognised that the 
importance of the original structure as an architectural space had to be one 
of the key factors of interest in the piece and revised my plans back to 
involve a curved projection surface. The phenomena of the space seemed 
so powerful that creating a work outside of the original seemed potentially 
pointless, yet the difficulties of gaining public access to the TAT were 
insurmountable. However I wanted to create some indication of the 
shocking contrast between the anonymous barn-like exterior and the 
carefully crafted ruined interior. I tried to imagine ways of transposing the 
building into another space by using 1:1 scale projections and location 
sound recordings intermingled with fragments of testimonies from  people 
who worked at Crail during the war. Initially an audience would be presented 
with an exterior view of the Trainer and only when the flash went off would 
the image change to the interior temporarily granting the audience access 
into the space. These interior images would be layered to include theatrical 
sea and sky effects, a ship silhouette, archival footage, as well as pictures 
of the audience. Therefore in this scenario access to the interior triggered by 
an explosive moment would be equivalent to access to the past.
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The scale of the project still posed a problem for its realisation. On the 
basis of my interest in the building I had been asked to contribute to a group 
show called The Shed. When confronted with the need to realise a piece of 
work with a limited production budget in a shared space I was obliged to 
modify my plans yet again. I was not able to enclose a part of the gallery yet 
in order to make a separation between interior and exterior I wanted to 
present the space of the bombing simulator as enclosed and separate. 
Indeed the phenomena of the building seemed of prime importance to the 
work but it was not practical to use the actual space and any reproduction of 
it would potentially render the power of the space impotent - what was 
needed was a simulacrum. 
As part of a theatre production process a designer often builds a model of 
the set enclosed in a model box, a miniature version of the theatre space, 
which shows the set in its wider context. I decided to adopt much the same 
strategy. Such a device would place the Trainer on a manageable scale 
whilst maintaining an integrity with the original space as well as providing a 
suggestion of the theatre which had already been demonstrated to be a 
determining factor within the construction of the bombing simulator. By 
Spring 1999 I had established the idea of producing an ‘identical’ working 
model of the TAT enclosed within a model box. The outside surfaces of the 
box would be covered with photographic images or projections of the 
present day exterior of the Trainer, inside the image of a model ship would 
travel around a miniature curved surface. The individual spectator would be 
obliged to part a curtain which covered the front of the model box to see the 
model simulator inside. After looking in for a moment they would be blinded 
by a flash which would cause the lights in the model to dim and reveal on 
the small screen their own face staring back at them frozen in time. 
I finally came to construct Simulator in May and June of this year, by this time 
the idea had slightly changed again. The structural similarity between a 
model box and an old fashioned box camera occurred to me and it is 
necessary to peer inside both devices, partially inserting one’s head, to see 
an image. These similarities allowed me to make pertinent the connection 
that I felt existed between the bombing simulator and photography. 
Therefore instead of referencing the exterior of the building with images on 
the sides of the model box I decided instead to make the box resemble a 
large wooden camera positioned on a tripod with a black photographers 
cloth covering the front. Inside the box was a simplified version of the TAT; I 
constructed the tauroidol shape of the  cyclorama by resin casting around a 
lawn mower inner tube after this was finished it was painted with a sea 
horizon line like the original and fixed to a miniature planked floor with 
supporting struts. Through a gap in the miniature cyclorama a viewer would 
look directly across to a spot lit silhouette projection of a warship shining 
down from a simple projector consisting of a zoom lens and low wattage 
light mounted on the lid of the box. Out of sight behind the cyclorama were 
hidden two speakers and a Metz photography flash gun. A soundscape had 
been constructed from long durational recordings made on location in the 
Trainer and this played on a long loop cycle so that when a viewer inserted 
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their head into the Simulator they were surrounded by sounds heard in the 
actual simulator. After a period of approximately six seconds the flash gun 
would go off triggered by a pressure pad located under a mat in front of the 
Simulator  which a spectator was obliged to stand on. The flash gun was 
located directly behind the warship silhouette on the screen and the flash 
was masked with the shape of a cross hair gun sight. When the flash went 
off, if the viewer was looking directly at the boat, they would be temporarily 
blinded and this cross hair image would be left as a retinal afterimage. On 
exiting the Simulator this impression might remain temporarily overlaying 
their normal sight with a small floating cross hair image.
The major change in this version of Simulator is in this use of a cross hair to 
create a retinal afterimage which replaces the idea of presenting a viewer 
with a frozen image of themselves. I discarded this mirroring idea after 
considering its technical and artistic implications; the electronics within the 
Simulator were already surprisingly complicated, the flash had to be 
adapted to work from a mains power unit, the trigger and delay were 
temperamental and although I built miniature amplifiers to power the 
speakers these never functioned without an interfering mains hum and had 
to be replaced with a standard amplifier. To project a picture of the viewer 
would have involved a camera, a projector, an image grabber (either 
installed on a computer or within a vision mixer) and a dimmable lighting 
system all which would have had to work from the same or a related 
triggering system. Lack of time and resources made this idea difficult to 
realise but ultimately I discarded it because I did not like the relationship it 
established between the Trainer and the viewer, it seemed too simplistic. I 
was unsure if people would be able to make any productive connections 
between the projection of the boat followed by that of their own face, the 
narcissism of the encounter seemed too cyclical and enclosed and only 
suggestive of the act of looking without any consequence which might 
suggest a broader historical or cultural context for the work. 
The cross hair retinal afterimage had the advantage of being technically 
simpler to realise in a short space of time but more positively it created a 
literally active relationship between viewer and object. Retinal afterimages 
had been an idea which had occurred when I first encountered the Trainer 
and they interest me as the bodies biological equivalent of the recorded 
image. The spectator is physically implicated in the functioning of the 
Simulator and an equivalence is drawn between the pilot sighting his target 
and the spectator’s act of looking. The flash provoked by this looking causes 
the obliteration of the image suggesting the destruction of the object by the 
gaze. The protagonist in this obliteration, the gaze is revealed as a cross 
hair impression which remains after the explosion of light,  the spectator in 
the rupturing moment of the flash becomes the gunner-pilot and this 
identification remains for a short time outside of the model. 
In this Simulator looking is imbued with dangerous properties. When a 
viewer lifts the black cloth to look inside at the model they might imagine that 
their looking is a neutral, innocent act but the flash explosion does a sort of 
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violence to both object and subject and forces an alternative order of vision. 
This could suggest a number of wider concerns and responses. The 
Simulator might stage the Lacanian idea that articulation obscures and 
destroys its object (is this figured by the gaze which in its comprehension 
places the image/object into language?). Or it might suggest the historical 
connections between vision and the execution of war following on from 
Virilio’s analysis of the technical operations of battle which have developed 
through evolving visual technologies. The flash of the photographic flash 
gun may provoke reflection on the operations of the media in relation to war 
particularly the way that war, in the later part of the twentieth century, has 
been reported and thereby politically controlled by predominantly visual 
media ultimately leading to a fundamental change in the nature of what we 
understand war to be (Baudrillard The Gulf War). Or the violence of the flash 
could suggest the violence of photography itself which removes its subject 
from time and distances a viewer from the time and space of the actual 
event (Sontag). This separation and distance whilst allowing us access into 
history also removes us from an actual engagement with the subjects and 
images depicted. The separation caused by vision and the mediated image 
allows us to perform actions which otherwise might present themselves as 
too real and complex. When the world is reduced to a series of images and 
simulacrum we can exert a degree of control over it and behave accordingly; 
drop bombs, land planes, perform surgery, torpedo ships.... 
However although I believe this version of Simulator is an improvement on 
earlier ideas it is not without its problems. If the spectator did not look 
directly at projected ship it was impossible for the flash to create an 
afterimage on their retinal. Ideally the ship should have moved across the 
screen introducing a dynamism suggestive of life and ensuring that the 
spectator would have followed the image. This image should also have 
disappeared from the screen at the moment of flash in order to reinforce the 
idea of obliteration and the projection should have then recovered ready for 
the next viewer. Unless people realised that the installation represented a 
real construction it is possible that it could have appeared as a slightly trivial 
shock effect with little purpose or broader rationale. The wider implications 
suggested by the work relied on a knowledge of the existing structure, its 
function and purpose as only then would an equation be drawn between the 
installation and the concerns that I saw as active within it namely war, vision, 
images and death. I did provide a panel of explanatory text which described 
the TAT and some thoughts on image making however this was placed on a 
wall a small distance away from the installation and it is possible that it was 
not read. 
It was difficult to judge reactions to the piece or make any objective 
statement as to its effect. I suspect that it was, in some respects, an 
unfriendly piece of work. The installation had a certain daunting appearance 
- a large box on a giant tripod with an electrical mains adaptor placed 
underneath, the inside was hidden and required the cloth to be lifted and 
head placed inside. The sound inside was strange and distorted, the image 
dim and almost immediately the viewer was shocked with a bright flash of 
light. However acknowledging this potential difficulty for a viewer the 
251
installation was also executed with a sense of craft to indicate deliberate 
care particularly in the construction of the model. However overall the 
meaning of the work, like its subject, is potentially quite sombre and 
therefore appropriately does not function by appealing to a sense of 
aesthetic pleasure or familiarity from its audience. Therefore there is a 
degree of difficulty in its reception which was at odds with some of the other 
works in the gallery. 
The Simulator that I finally exhibited in The Shed show had, in effect, 
replaced the portrait of the viewer with the retinal afterimage effect and in 
doing so emphasised the dynamics of viewing (image taking) over those of 
image making. As a consequence the work had a potentially ambiguous 
relationship with the practices of photography and theatre making (although 
of course the viewing process is as important as the making process in 
these two fields.) However I had intended to emphasis the space of the 
simulator and the event of the photograph both as activities which 
rehearsed for a moment of absence and death. The TAT does this by 
maintaining the appearance of the world but simplifying elements of its 
space, the photograph by showing us in the world but also free from it - 
separated from time. Both are approximations, devoid of complexity and 
available for manipulation and control. However it is conceivable that the 
final installation was still too orientated around the gaze and that this 
distracted an audience from focussing on the purpose of the bombing 
simulator and the camera. In the moment of the flash explosion the 
audience is unwittingly identified as the pilot which precipitates a collapse 
between looking (image taking) and trigger pulling (image making). This in 
turn obscures a cause and effect relationship and no distinction is made 
between the two activities. This collapse appears to be done to the 
audience rather than provoked by them and therefore they might be resistant 
to constructing any trajectory between image making and taking. Therefore 
the work was premised on an audience performing what might be 
considered an over ambiguous mental leap in order to appreciate what I 
had considered to be the works axial encounter namely vision as the 
negotiator between the object - its image - its absence and death. Perhaps 
Simulator failed to stimulate ending it’s encounter with a blinding negating 
flash of light which neither illuminated or provoked reflection. In retrospect 
some form of photographic image produced by this explosion might have 
encouraged connections to be made between the bombing simulator as an 
object and the recorded image, theatre and the rituals of death.
CR September 1999
SUMMARY
Connection between TAT and Theatre: 
1. technical execution illustrates a uniformity with 2. Cultural function - as an 
arena for playing ‘life scenario’s’. 
Connection between TAT and Photography (recorded image making)
1. Taxonomies uniformity of language underlies uniformity of purpose 2. to 
negate death 3. to deliver death?
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                   DEATH                                
Theatre > Simulator < Photography 
Equation activates Barthes comments in Camera Lucida relationship of 
photography to theatre and theatre to death rituals.Simulator/Photography 
reduce world to its images introduce possibility of control (Virilio) and 
thereby negation of death.
The presence of death is the ultimate distinguishing force between the 
virtual (simulations/images) and the real (as the experience of death is 
beyond the senses).
Death as a definitive moment - the making of images/ reproductions of the 
real to escape this inevitability.
Simulator/Theatre/Photography all forms of death ritual.  All forms of 
fragmenting and replaying external reality (life) but when realised they all 
prepare us for our absence, they deliver a moment of death.
LANGUAGE FLASH
Exposing/exploding - moment of revelation/articulation (what, if any, is the 
difference?) which reveals/destroys it subject. How does this build into my 
death trajectory. The flash signals a simulated moment of death which is 
not death (the actual object not achieved) Simulator/Theatre/Photography all 
illustrate operations of living in or entry into language. Lacan?
BITS AND BOBS
Virilio - control of life through vision: images and simulations.
Baudrillard - War as (vision) media event. 
Retinal afterimages - body records
December 1999.
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CASE STUDY 7. DELIVERUS 
in collaboration with Bodies in Flight, premiered Arnolfini Oct. 1999.
DeliverUs was a multimedia performance event which I produced in 
collaboration with Bodies in Flight (see Constants I and II). The text for the 
piece was written by Simon Jones, it was choreographed by Sara Giddens 
and devised by the whole company, I was responsible for developing and 
delivering the media component of the work. The performance was 
presented in-the-round with two tiers of seating arranged round a ground 
level performance ‘pit’ of 2 x 2.5 metres. One television was located on each 
of the four sides of the pit, positioned underneath the seating blocks, facing 
into the space. Apart from a short prerecorded sequence which was 
projected onto the floor all the media images for the performance were 
shown via these televisions and were produced by two live colour cameras 
which two performers controlled within the space.
The performance was intended to illustrate a particular relationship that 
‘being’ has to ‘language’ and it choose to use the state of ‘being in love’ as 
the dynamic ground for its observations. The piece figured love as a state 
that is both resistant to the world but also inevitably an expression of it. The 
work mapped through a trajectory which began with the lovers as an 
undifferentiated singular entity cossetted in their own private world (the pre 
linguistic) and gradually opened up through the operations of language 
(verbal and visual) into the separated self and other functioning within the 
wider world. Language is the way in which we can be in the world and the 
body is the site of its articulation where our relationship with the world is 
made manifest through behaviour (speech and action). The body is also the 
site of reception where the world is received and connected and then re-
articulated. Live performance as a discursive arena provides a site of 
intensity, like love, where perceptions and expressions are heighten, they 
are both spaces which concentrate an experience of the world and provide 
alternative scenarios and possibilities for the self. To a lesser extent the 
visual media plays a similar intensifying role within this equation; the 
cameras fragment and isolate body parts, expressions, movements and 
broadcast them to the television screens available for extra scrutiny. As well 
as staging the communion between the lovers the work, as a performance, 
figured the performers as messengers, conduits who communed with the 
wider audience. The audience were asked to sit on opposite sides of the 
stage from one another, splitting couples, friends and families and this 
division by the space of the stage emphasised the performances liminal, 
intermediary function.
The show was constructed in three parts and the first part was intended to 
be representative of an inchoate state. The two performers lay together, 
folded round one another inseparable and apparently oblivious to the 
external world. The two cameras were hidden between their bodies and 
therefore produced darkness making the television screens appear blank, 
the hidden cameras and the blank screens meant that there was no 
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evidence of any media contribution to this spectacle. This invisible 
blankness is equivalent to a non existence; there is no articulation and 
therefore the lovers are not present in the world. Only when Mark stands up 
do the audience see the cameras and as the cameras are seen they also 
begin to see illustrating this childish equation of vision with presence (fort 
da). Mark runs on the spot and he is apparently oblivious to the camera 
which is hung over his shoulder which relays abrupt and jerky pictures of the 
ground. When Mark returns to Polly their bodies meet and the camera 
image once more goes blank. The rest of this opening sequence consists 
of a live image from Polly’s camera, the camera is moved and blanked by 
the performers bodies, held in Polly’s hand and manoeuvred about as part 
of a caress. Despite being held in the hand the camera appears to be totally 
undirected, absorbed into the bodily actions of the performer who is 
unaware of it as a separate object. Therefore the resulting images are 
rather inconsequential, blurred, dark, out of focus, extreme close ups of skin 
and fabric - as it were images of the body from the body, made irrespective 
of, or oblivious to, the normal demands of meaning and structure provided 
by a lens and a screen. As an audience we look to the television screens to 
provide us with information but all this camera shows is fleeting visions of a 
bodies surface undifferentiated and ill defined. The lens is not yet 
fragmenting and defining the space but is one with the body, disappearing 
into darkness and only occasionally alluding to the possibility of articulation. 
This is an attempt to create for the camera an equivalence to the inchoate 
prelinguistic attitude that the performers embody, the two bodies are 
inseparable and the images cannot establish their difference. 
However at the moment an image becomes visible on the screen, however 
obscure, a separation has been made in space between the performers 
bodies and the image of the performers bodies.  The camera becomes 
another way of articulating, attaining the body, another medium in the 
delivery of a message. The camera is absorbed as best it can be into the 
architecture of the body; Mark flinches as Polly places her cold camera/hand 
on his warm flesh, as an audience we can empathetically feel the touch by 
seeing and hearing the action but there is no imagistic equivalent for this 
touch, the literal touch of the camera to the body merely provides another 
view of flesh retreating from the lens and this alone elicits no empathetic 
reaction. It maybe stating the obvious to say that there cannot be an image 
that is a touch but the consequences of this tautology are that you cannot 
have an image that is a body as this would require some form of 
transubstantiation (which is why Turin Shroud is interesting as it attempts to 
perform this body/image transmutation).
The attitude of the performers to their camera’s takes a profound shift as a 
bridging device between the first and second parts of DeliverUs.  Polly 
declares “Let love deliver us to the world” and as Mark replies “Deliver 
us....from....” Polly lifts her camera to frame them both, they smile and look 
up into the camera at which point the image on the screens freeze in a 
cheesy ‘lovers snapshot’ pose. Polly’s deliberate gesture is the first time 
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that the presence of the cameras has been acknowledged and not only are 
the performers now aware of the cameras as separate objects but they are 
also aware of their effect and purpose. The image is carefully framed to 
present a composition of ‘the couple’, the picture is recognisable not just 
within the context of the performance but outside of this as a typical product 
of ‘photography’. The meaning of the image is communicated both by the 
close proximity of the two smiling faces of the lovers but also by the 
similarity of this configuration to other photographic depictions of lovers. 
This is the first time that the cameras have shown us the face and it is also 
the moment where the media image shifts into defined articulation - 
language - through its appeal to a broader cultural language of the recorded 
image.
Mark then begins to use his camera to picture Polly. To begin with Polly 
playfully resists this image taking in a game of hide and seek; Mark scans 
the camera along the length of Polly’s body but each time it reaches her face 
she turns away in a refusal to be captured. However despite her resistance 
these moments of refusal are caught and held on the screens as a series 
of blurred freezes. These freezes are actually created by the video operator 
hidden from view, however they do not allude to this third external agent. 
This is because the performers now work the cameras with a compositional 
confidence that implies a strong intent, the audience is focussed into the 
space and the performers appear to control this space, therefore as they 
determine the images we now see on the screens with a self confident 
awareness, we assume that they must control all aspects of the mediation 
of the image including its stasis. Mark’s tracking and momentary 
entrapments of Polly provide a sense of taming, or familiarisation with the 
effect of the lens upon the body. This short sequence is resolved as Polly 
turns to meet Mark’s gaze which is also that of the camera’s to create a 
similar ‘lovers clinch’ snapshot. Polly then begins to allow Mark to film her 
face and now the camera lingers on her visage, fetishising the face as the 
identifying icon of the lover, the site of intense identification. Used in this way 
the camera begins to represent differentiated bodies allowing Mark to create 
and regard Polly as an ‘other’ and separate from him. It is the performance 
equivalent of Lacan’s mirror phase and a replay of the infant’s primal 
encounter with the world as separate and different from the self.
The screen images create a confusion of looks within the space. Mark 
addresses Polly but cannot look at her face because he sits behind her in 
an embrace, however via the camera the four screens manifest Polly’s face 
to the audience. Mark looks out to the screens around the perimeter of the 
pit, Polly looks up at the camera, Polly’s televisual image looks out at the 
audience, the audience look between the performers, the screens, and the 
audience; there is not one central focal point in the space. However during 
these moments an imaginary focal point is created which figures the 
dialogue as an exchange of looks between the lovers. This is possible 
because both the words and the images in the space are directed toward 
Polly as the sole the object of Mark’s attention in contradiction to the multiple 
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viewpoints existent in the space. Therefore a strange synthesis occurs and 
we imagine that the dialogue somehow takes place between the lovers - 
face to face. 
Just as the camera has introduced this idea of differentiation between the 
lovers Mark retreats, through the text, back to the earlier undifferentiated 
phase of part one as he describes the unity of lovemaking. Mid point through 
this speech he forgets to direct the gaze of the camera and the screen 
image drifts off into nondescript darkness which also reminiscent of the first 
phase. The visual structuring and articulation of the world effected by the 
camera would be in contradiction to the totality and uniformity which Mark 
now recalls. Appropriately enough Mark also closes his eyes while he 
delivers this speech thereby paralleling the blindness of the camera and 
reinstating the blank of the opening sequence as the image and effect of the 
originary moment. 
Polly extracts herself from Mark’s lapsed embrace and moves across the 
space while he remains lost in his reverie. The screens remain a blank. 
After a moments pause Mark returns to the present and establishes a new 
position for himself beneath a camera which he attaches to a light. Once he 
is in position the blank screens cut from black to an image of Mark’s face 
smiling up at the camera while he smokes a cigarette. Polly lies on her 
stomach with her back to Mark facing one of the four television screens 
which bear his image. This is the first time that the screens have been 
acknowledged as part of the viewing equation and Polly addresses her 
following speeches to the mediated image rather than immediate Mark. 
Therefore both as looked at and looker Polly has so far been established 
as passive in relation to Mark’s active constructions first of Polly’s face and 
then his own. As Polly eulogises about her lover’s face she touches the 
television screen in a partial caress indicating a collapse of screen into 
object. In this configuration touch of the image is seen as equivalent to 
touch of the body but the body has been contracted to the face and the 
power of the face as a signifier is proved by the maintenance of its effect 
through it’s mediation. The face is the site of expression, articulation, it is 
also the site of difference between the one and the other, looked at and to 
this extent always perceived as an image and something separate from the 
self. As an image the mediated portrait, particularly one made in real time, is 
able to maintain its status as a powerful signifier because it is akin to our 
unmediated perceptions and interpretations of the other as orientated round 
the facial image and in this scenario the media does not act as a form of 
reduction upon the object of its gaze.
Having responded to Mark’s image constructions Polly now begins to 
control the  screen space herself. She scans the camera over Mark using 
the resulting images to illustrate her text in a series of freezes - “Tom’s toes, 
or Dick’s cock or Harry’s heart”. But the camera is doing more than 
illustrating her words it is also enacting the sentiment of the speech in 
which Polly compares her attempts to define her love as equivalent to the 
violence of the pathologist’s knife which defines through separation. This 
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notion is extended by the action of the lens upon the body and demonstrated 
visually on the screens where each body part is briefly emphasised by a 
freeze. Polly’s textural and visual advances into the separation of self and 
other are then temporarily halted when she joins Mark in an embrace 
producing another ‘snapshot’ image of togetherness that temporarily 
reinstates the lovers as a single united entity set against this separation. 
These punctuating snapshots are revisited through this section as a form of 
reassurance against the growing realisation of the difference between the 
two, the image is like the body of the mother who is returned to in between 
acts of ever more distant exploration. (fort da).
Throughout Polly’s speeches Mark has remained locked in the gaze of the 
camera, his compulsion now becomes narcissistic as he turns his head to 
regard his own image in profile on the screen beside him. This introduces 
another dynamic into the discourse on love, which is the love of the self. 
Concurrently in the text Polly admits to a degree of self consciousness 
during lovemaking which looks for the signs and expressions of love which 
reinforce the self as loved by the other. This attention toward language and 
articulation reinforces the self as separate in contradiction to the romantic 
idea of the inchoate unit remembered by lovemaking where the self is 
abandoned, collapses into, and becomes undistinguishable from the other. 
(Narcissism a function of being in language loneliness of separation?). 
Polly attempts to break Mark’s fixation with his own image by removing the 
camera from the light and dragging it along the ground. Mark, desperate to 
maintain his relationship with the lens twists and crawls along the floor to 
keep within the camera’s view. Polly inverts the camera and Mark’s image 
appears upside down, Mark corrects this image by inverting himself playing 
to the camera. Polly slowly raises the camera from the floor to high above 
her head and the image retreats from Mark as he remains benignly 
prostrate beneath the lens. Polly’s actions emphasise the narcissism of the 
closed circuit loop of self-love and can be seen as a jokey attempt to 
interrupt this self regard and draw Mark’s attention from the camera back to 
herself. 
Part two ends as Polly draws the camera back down to Mark’s body and he 
covers the lens making the screens go blank once more. In the intervening 
darkness another change occurs in the media space, the screen is split in 
two by the unseen video operator. Until this point the screens have only ever 
carried a single image although there have always been two possible 
camera images. Now, when the performers uncover the lenses, half of both 
camera images are shown on two halves of the screen. The separation of 
the lovers is now made tangible upon the screens, and although the lovers 
on stage are, once more, enfolded in an embrace each performer occupies 
their own distinct screen space.
Polly’s next speech is delivered as a series of asides alternating between 
the two cameras which are held by the performers at arms length extending 
out of the embrace. This time, although the look is directed once more to the 
lens, we do not feel that this gaze is directed towards the lover but outwards 
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towards us, the audience and beyond this to the world. This effect is created 
by the text in relation to this new bipartite screen image;
 “all proper to this love
where you have no place
because you are the third
outside the one and its other
you the other other”
The lovers are physically contained by the two frames of the screen but the 
text refers to a third and Polly stares into the lens and out of the televisions 
as an address to the audience. Until now the other has been constructed as 
the figure of the other lover but the logical consequence of this trajectory, 
which moves from the unified self/other through to the differentiated self and 
other, at some point inevitable admits the external world into the internal 
world of the lovers.  In this sense the media now represents this worldly 
presence in its construction of a third point of view which no longer reflects 
back in a closed circuit of love but broadcasts beyond the two. At the end of 
Polly’s speech the lovers construct a third conglomerate face by uniting the 
two halves of their face. This ‘funny face’ is a visual joke but the humour also 
belies an irony beneath the construct as the single, ‘unified’ lover is now 
seen as absurd, a position which the differentiated lovers cannot return to it, 
the face is an example of dramatic irony because the gesture indicates a 
knowing awareness of the separated self and as such represents the loss 
of primal innocence. As the camera is acknowledged as an interloper so 
automatically is the audience and this performance which until now has 
been an intensely private spectacle is suddenly aware of itself as watched 
by something outside of itself.
As part three admits the presence of the outside world with this comes a 
refinement in the presentation of expression. The face is no longer 
interrogated as the site of meaning instead the operations of language - 
visual and textual are staged. Polly sits in a corner and begins to write and 
she shows the results of her pen’s effort in close up screen left, screen right 
Mark creates an extreme close up of his mouth miming speech - while Polly 
writes Mark speaks - but he soon tires of this and becomes distracted once 
more by his own image taking the camera closer to his face and into his 
mouth in an attempt to picture the roots of his vocal expression. Like their 
screen images the performers are positioned in opposite corners of the 
space, however Mark extends his foot and reaches into Polly’s frame, 
attempting to disrupt her writing with his toes in a childish play of attention 
seeking to call her away from her worldly expressions and back to him. She 
responds by grabbing Mark’s intrusive foot and writing on it and then 
proceeds to write on different parts of his body demonstrating that his body, 
his existence as lover, can only be articulated through the language of the 
external world. These two differentiated spaces and visualisations of the 
action introduce a sense of time to fracture this hermetic world which was, 
until part three, “this my only here-and-now love”. Mark examines his new 
written labels (all of which express hopes and claims of ownership) by 
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orientating different parts of his body towards the lens of the screen left 
camera while Polly explicates her actions through the text, framing her 
speaking mouth screen right:
“and all the time everything I name is not my own.
This isn’t the first time that this flesh has been written on.
I brand you with other peoples labels. 
I distinguish your parts with others’ sense of discretion.
and I claim you as my own with their name for love”
The introduction of the past as the defining force within the present inevitably 
brings with it the possibilities of the future. This leads into a series of 
hypothetical supposes constructed around future scenarios of loss, the 
complete separation of the self from the other. Screen right shows Polly’s 
speaking mouth and screen left Mark’s face, eyes closed. The supposes 
are located in the future and as part of the evocation of this non present 
time. Polly closes her eyes and imagines the absence of Mark delivered 
through the loss of her sight of him, a construction reminiscent of the earlier 
fort da game (Mark’s presence in the space is already questionable as, with 
his eyes closed, he appears to be asleep). To invoke her vision she lowers 
the camera and obscures the lens to produce a blank. Mark, eyes closed, is 
still pictured on the right of the screen but next to him is an empty blank, he, 
like Polly sees nothing, he is pictured without her and she is absent from 
him; “suppose, when I can’t see you anymore, that is, when you’re no longer 
here....suppose”. Mark opens his eyes as Polly restores a picture to her 
camera, he turns his head to face her presenting on the screen his ear in 
close up juxtaposed with Polly’s mouth. Now the annunciation and reception 
of messages is figured on the screens, however as well as this the dynamic 
of time has been layered into the images by the addition of a subtle strobe 
on Polly’s half of the screen. The action of Polly’s mouth no longer matches 
perfectly with the live version, the live relay images are also no longer in the 
“only here and only now” the camera as a manifestation of language 
introduces the possibility of minute delay, a slippage between present and 
past. Mark sits up and in doing so reveals in his camera Polly in a long shot, 
from this position we also see the television behind Polly now pictured on 
the screen and spiralling off into an endless deferred feedback, the 
cameras show two different versions of the same moment, constantly 
manifolding and expanding outwards from a single unified point of origin. 
Mark sits back and on one screen his head obscures half the image, he is 
literally on the screen regarding the screen image of his now distant love 
rendered in long shot. With his head over the left hand side of the screen he 
then turns the camera to provide a view of himself watching himself, the 
screen and camera’s point of view are shared, while his real head watches 
his image head watching. At the end of her speech Polly pulls the camera 
back to frame, like Mark, her whole face. The image of their two faces side 
by side marks some sort of resolution. Each individually is given there own 
separate space within the screen and this space, through the icon of the 
face is clearly identified, defined as distinct from one another. Mark then 
ventures some of his own supposes and his speech is accompanied by a 
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confusion of looks between the two performers as the live space is 
contradicted by the screen and a look away becomes a look toward and vice 
versa. 
On the conclusion of Mark’s speech Polly stands up and leaves the camera 
frame and this momentarily empty space is frozen by the vision mixer and 
from then on screen left presents no new information but this empty space. 
There is now a radical rupture between the screen and the stage. Apart from 
the occasional freeze and moments of black out the camera has always 
presented live images which were concurrent with the action on stage. Now 
we see Polly dance in the performance pit but the camera does not show us 
this instead we see an empty space, the stage and the screen worlds, 
following the shows determining trajectory, are separated. Mark has turned 
his back on the stage and lies with his face underneath the seating unit, the 
camera pointed towards him. A strobe effect is now added to his screen 
right image as he begins to speak further fragmenting the stage and screen 
worlds. At the end of his speech he sits up to face into the pit thus clearing 
the cameras frame and now this empty screen right image also freezes. In 
retrospect much of the action of the bodies on stage in the third section as 
been devoted to creating ever more elaborate images for the camera 
appropriately enough as it is this is the section which is most concerned 
with the articulation of the self through language, however the lovers are 
now left facing one another surrounded by neutral empty images.
The penultimate speech is delivered by Polly and is an exultation of “the 
lovely inbetween” which reinstates the value and pleasure of the present 
over the disappeared past and the hypothetical future. The dull screens 
repel attention and send it back into the here and now of the performance 
space a space which is now unencumbered by the efforts of the cameras to 
interpret and express. The speech is an acknowledgement of the self as 
constituted as present in the world through language and furthermore is an 
acceptance of this equation which means that the world (others) will always 
exceed the control of the self a concept that is figured by the abandoned 
screens - “they cannot make that other world in their own impossible 
image”. This sentiment makes the mediated image redundant within the 
conventions of this particular staging so an alternative is sought of an utterly 
different order as an expression of the final denouement.
From a projector hung in the lighting rig an image is projected onto the white 
floor of the performance pit. The sequence shows the lovers in a 
choreographed series of couplings and embraces, which gradually layer 
and multiply. The sequence has been shot from above and exactly matches 
the proportions of the space and the scale of the performers. The video 
begins by projecting it’s matching recorded figures onto the bodies of the 
live performers who lie apart from one another in the space. The live bodies 
shift and turn on the floor as if  asleep creating spaces and patterns with the 
projected images. The sequence is intended to invoke all the lovemaking 
that has occurred between the lovers - it is a recapitulation and celebration 
of the “lovely inbetween”. The projection on to the bodies on the floor gives 
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the image a three dimensional quality and perhaps because the live bodies 
lie inert and prone the animated projected versions seemed to be more live 
and present than the alive and living versions. As a recording the sequence 
emphasises it moments as past but as a projection onto and amongst the 
live ‘sleeping’ bodies of the present it is also an evocation of the future, an 
idealisation or a dream. If one stages the act of sleeping in a live space and 
simultaneously show some visual images an equation is made between 
these pictures and the unconscious subject, they are seen as illustrative of 
the unconscious state. In this sense the multimedia performance space 
can be defined as a dream space. Both spaces cause a confusion of past 
and future by using past recordings, memories to construct imaginings and 
future scenarios in the present.
With this projected sequence a fundamental shift has occurred in the status 
of the media within the piece. The image is sourced as a recording and the 
action shown on the stage is of a past event, it has been treated and 
manipulated by a post production process which has allowed the time of the 
past event to be layered and concentrated, the picture is diffused into the 
space as projected light onto a single large screen located on the floor. All 
these factors make this media of a totally different order from that of the live 
camera relay broadcast to four identical screens. The live cameras in the 
show are intended to be seen as instruments of expression, the visual 
equivalent of text and the spoken word they are part of a language which 
articulates being. Outside of this live realm the recorded images of cameras 
can become symbolic meaningful by what they present and devoid of any 
signification as a linguistic construct. In the live scenario we are constantly 
shown the efforts of construction by the performers, in the recorded domain 
the construction is rendered invisible. 
The projected sequence ends with a bright flash of light which bleaches out 
the picture like the introduction of reality into the symbolic. The lovers are left 
with the everyday, the space is not longer a site of intensification instead the 
dissipation of normality must be demonstrated. The televisions are all blank 
except one that Mark plays Nintendo on while Polly sits and brushes her 
hair, both actions are intended to epitomise mundanity. There is of course a 
difficulty in establishing an ending to the everyday as by its nature it is 
continuous so Mark’s last word can only emphasis this lack of finality 
.....“and?”
Note:
Watching the performance and in rehearsals I found myself often returning 
to and prioritising the televisual image over the live body (similar 
phenomena in Constants II). Therefore I could conclude that the information 
of the body becomes subordinate to that of the camera, the image exceeds 
the physical presence. I imaging that this is because 1. we expect 
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unproblematic information to be delivered via the media as this is our usual 
encounter with it (film/television) and 2. because the media image 
simplifies by fragmenting and allows for scrutiny by freezing. In contrast the 
body to some extent resists the gaze or complicates it by always being 
complex and in flux so that the gaze slips off it or round it. Multimedia 
performance can illustrate this difference in the visual encounter with the 
body and its image but it is necessary for the two to simultaneously coexist 
in order to construct this comparison (see Turin Machine)
December 1999
DELIVERUS SUMMARY
Media as an operation of language situated, like all expression as an 
interpreter/negotiator between the self and the world.
Multimedia Performance as a site where the consequences of the self as 
articulated through languages can be staged and particularly manifolds and 
complicates this definition of language to include the visual.
The camera/screen concentrates visual attention
SIGNIFYING NOTHING
Blank screen/eyes closed = invisible = no articulation = no presence in the 
world = illustrates the originary moment = absence.
The fort da equation of visibility with existence dramatised by the e camera.
UNDIFFERENTIATING THE DIFFERENTIATED or vice versa
Images from the body eg. the hand’s pov as inconsequential because they 
are not determined by sight and not structured by the logics of visual 
communication. The language of the body as different from the language of 
the lens.
DOUBTING THOMAS or the impossibility of Transubstantiation
The first image separates the body from its image and therefore this image 
begins to become or suggest articulation and reference language.
This image is not the body - this is emphasised in the performance through 
a moment of touch which is visually untranslatable (cf Turin Shroud as 
attempt to collapse body into image)
 SNAPSHOT or the lovers clinch
First the media image separates then it begin to articulate. The snapshot 
references certain convention within the specific and external visual 
language of media communications.
Performers originate these articulations demonstrate an understanding of 
composition, grammar of the lens, determine pictures.
However as soon as phenomena come into language they become 
complicated layered with the direct articulations of the body, vocal 
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expression of the body, visual images of the body.
FACE 2 FACE
Text works to reconfigure screen and stage space. Text addressed to Polly 
not delivered to her face but the encounter is pictured in the imagination as 
occurring face to face due to the shared object of the direction and focus 
camera and text though this is neither shown on stage or screen.
TRANSUBSTANTIATION ACHIEVED or The Face Persists.
Polly’s caress of the screen collapse of screen and object in contradiction to 
assumption that the body cannot be the image. How does this occur? Is it 
because the face is always already an image/object the site of articulations 
of difference between self and other therefore the media image does not 
reduce but succeeds in genuine reproduction because the mediated form is 
the form by which we experience the face as objectified by our own 
unmediated gaze.
Media in this show does not illustrate a context for stage action (see Stoker) 
it is the action, it does what is being described in the text it stages itself as a 
linguistic form it is like the theory within the e the text, the theory is within the 
image it visual embodies the concept(s).
CLOSED CIRCUIT LOVE Narcissism
How does narcissism fit into the defining trajectory? Is the fixation with the 
self as love object a function of the separation from the Mother an attempt to 
establish another familiar other?
The lens becomes an umbilical chord once the effect of language is 
realise/achieved it cannot be given up - the fear of not being articulated 
would lead to oblivion means the self would be confined to blind oblivion 
non existence.
SPLIT SCREEN - Screen space is psychic space in part three.
THE OTHER OTHER
Media as the world/audience another example of how the media works with 
the text to deliver the concept in its reference to the third and its gaze 
deflected to the audience.
Camera is exposed as interloper watcher interlocutor going beyond the 
other and breaking the enclosed circuit..
SIGN OF THE TIMES
Space defined admits time why should time enter when space become 
differentiated?
Signs of time in strobe and freeze. This camera language is recordable and 
admits possibility of slippage between past and present. Present has to be 
translated, mediated before it can be stored (almost not in TheTurin 
Machine)
Part three media calls attention to different methods of language via c/u’s of 
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writing, reading, speaking, hearing.
Camera can picture distance which cannot be created in stage space where 
bodies are always in close proximity but the distorting lens renders a figure 
into a distant long shot.
EMPTY SPACE
impossibility of achieving, possessing, controlling images of the other leads 
to the abandonment of this type of live visual articulation of the present.
UNCANNY, Multimedia Performance as a DREAMING
A crossover of the recorded into the live (like ghost in Constants II) matching 
images record and live but because record is more animated seems more 
present and live weird probably also because of Dreamtime effect which 
makes images extension and visualisations of the unconscious.
Multimedia Performance and dreams use past to construct futures in 
present.
The record multiples time and space by layering in post production and then 
layers this into the present of the performance.
The record can be symbolic unlike the live mediated image which will 
always reference itself as a construct and therefore never fully be able to be 
purely symbolic.
The body as resistant to the gaze unlike the mediated which is presented for 
the gaze, the information of the body becomes subordinate to that of the 
image.
September 1999.
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APPENDIX 3.
Research Seminar, Napier University, 5th March 1998. 
SPECTRAL BODIES: PERFORMANCE, PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE TURIN 
MACHINE.
The Turin Machine could be described as a performance/photography 
installation, that is to say it is a work which combines elements of both 
performance and photography to create something which is neither one form 
or the other but somewhere in between. (Slide 1) The Turin Machine is a 
large tent-like structure, 7m long by 3m wide and 2.5m high made of canvas 
and wood. The tent creates a self contained light tight space within the 
environs of the larger gallery or performance area.(OHP 1) The Machine itself 
contains 3 distinct sections. The first being a light chamber in which the 
subject of the performance/photograph stands brightly lit. The second is a 
dark chamber - the actual camera itself- in which the light from the subject is 
caught on a screen and forms an image. The third chamber is a wooden 
viewing booth attached to the end of the tent in which the spectator stands to 
look at the captured image. Each chamber is joined by a small hole which 
allows the performance/photograph, in the form of light, to progress from one 
room to the next. In the light chamber light is reflected off the body and 
through a tiny pinhole into the dark chamber where it travels through the 
darkness until it hits an opaque screen which collects the light causing it to 
form an image. A spectator in the viewing booth, on the other side of the 
screen, then lifts a small shutter to look into the dark chamber at the image 
which is back projected onto the screen.
What I have described then is a giant pinhole camera in which the normal 
external ‘daylight’ scene of photography is absorbed into the architecture of 
the camera and is replaced by the artificially lit body of a performer. This new 
scene is watched, as it were, through a viewfinder by an audience. This is the 
performance. However The Turin Machine does not just mimic the optics of 
the camera (or the eye for that matter) to make a stage for performance it 
also mimics the mechanics of the camera to produce a photographic record. 
This is possible because the screen within the camera is coated with a light 
sensitive photographic emulsion. The six hour duration of the 
performance/photograph is determined by chemical time - that is the time it 
takes to have exposed an image onto the cloth screen.
However, just like a piece of film, the screen whilst it stays in the camera 
remains blank, the light that has been caught and concentrated has not been 
revealed or fixed. It is only later when the screen is removed to a 
photographic darkroom and coated with developer that an image is 
revealed.(Slide 2) However via this process of transformation the image has 
been changed from an inverted positive, as seen in the camera, to the 
reversed negative. This is the photograph. These life-size negatives hang in 
the performance or gallery space immediately surrounding the camera, more 
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records of a process than photographic portraits, they people the space and 
provoke a realisation of the difference between the interior and exterior 
image.(slide 3)
During the performance/photograph the audience is asked to enter the 
camera one at a time. Initially on entering the viewing booth and lifting up the 
shutter nothing is visible, but as the spectator becomes accustomed to the 
darkness an image slowly fades up. This image is always present in the 
camera but it is only when the eyes have reached the physical limits of their 
vision does it become visible. What appears is a body, a spectral presence 
which hangs inverted within a void possessed with a luminescence that 
exhibits ghostly, magical qualities. All sense of proportion and distance 
between the viewer and image is lost as this figure “swims” in the darkness. 
The image is indistinct and black and white, an image produced by a lack of 
light and its qualities are unique to a pinhole camera. Interestingly the more 
directly you look at this apparition the less you can see, but by averting your 
eyes and looking askance is it possible to hold the momentary image which, 
having appeared, constantly hovers on the edge of disappearing again. 
Within the camera, unsure of exactly when I’m watched, I perform my part and 
become a body, an object. My role requires very little effort except that of 
standing still and reflecting light off my skin to make an image. This stillness 
makes me doubt the veracity of my performing - can there be “theatre” in so 
little articulation - so much just being? And while I doubt this I also know that 
as soon as my image becomes spectated that it can only be a type of theatre 
that is being watched. The presence projected onto the screen is not that of 
the prerecorded reproductive order of film, photography or video but a 
presence which is in the process of becoming a record.
Because of this presence which is shared by spectator and performer in the 
present this is performance and only when I emerge from the darkroom with 
my negative does this work become photography.
I think it might be useful at this stage to explain the origins of The Turin 
Machine. By naming the work The Turin Machine I am clearly making 
reference to the holy relic - the Shroud of Turin. It has been suggested that 
the Turin Shroud is not in fact the burial cloth of Jesus Christ but is actually a 
Mediaeval forgery. Research in both South Africa and in this country has 
indicated that the shroud was produced in a pinhole camera using light 
sensitive salts to fix an image. The idea is that a statue or cadaver was 
placed outside a darkroom in bright daylight and its image was formed on a 
linen cloth inside the room by the light passing through a small opening in a 
window shutter. This image was then caught and fixed using Chromium 
salts. Irrespective of the accuracy of this research the idea invokes a number 
of reflections as to the mechanics and motives of image making or 
representation in our culture.
The relic, like the photograph provides proof of the existence of a person or 
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object and it does this by exhibiting a connection with the subject pictured. In 
most relics this connection is a material one in that they present a part of the 
now vanished subject usually in the form of a fragment from the body - bone, 
skin or hair. The Turin Shroud provides this connection via an image 
supposedly scorched onto cloth by the divine body in the heat of resurrection. 
Unlike the fragments of conventional relics this image provides a whole body 
but it can only do this through a material connection which is now in the past.                
This image stands in for the absent body. The image on the Turin Shroud is 
the body and the force of the presence of that body is transferred through this 
index. This indexical relationship is exactly the relationship that photography 
has with its absent objects, it is what Barthes refers to as photography's 
‘Noeme’ or Sontag’s description of a photograph as a footprint or death 
mask. These ideas suggest that photographs bear the imprint of the object 
they represent in a way that means the representation of the object, the sign, 
effortlessly replaces the object itself. For this reason alone it is quite 
plausible to call the Turin Shroud a photograph.
The consequences of the indexical nature of photography have been well 
rehearsed particularly in terms of the visual rhetorics of empirical truth. And 
photography still has a status with the real that despite recent technological 
advances remains relatively unchallenged. Although I am aware of the 
debates surrounding hypereality and the technologies of digital imaging it is 
not really these philosophies that I am interested in but rather the 
relationship that photography has with performance in its re-presentations of 
presence.
Proof, be it via relics or photographs, works by reinvoking the presence of the 
now absent body. Roland Barthes’ work Camera Lucida functions partly as 
an extended obituary for his mother in which the family album is ransacked 
until an image is discovered which causes him to declare “there she is”. 
Similarly through the image on the shroud of Christ in death believers can be 
assured of his continuing existence. These stories of redemption are no 
accident they accord with our most primitive needs as some would figure 
them. It is only via a sacrificial death and the rigor mortis of records that we 
can acquire everlasting life and by revisiting these photographic relics as 
viewers we can be momentarily released from the cold grip of mortality. By 
imagining (and imaging) a world without end we also wish for everlasting 
life, a world of always us - a continuous present of constant being.
The way presence is invoked in photographs is quite different from the 
presence of performance and the key to this difference is the relationship 
each medium has with time.Whereas a photograph acquires its presence 
from representing a past moment the presence of performance comes from 
the passing moments of present time. Photography can only give us a body 
as reproduced image, if we want to experience the body as a corporeal, 
material entity then it is to the present time of performance that we must look. 
Often in performance it is the body which is the primary site of signification for 
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the work and because it is a body and not the pre-authored text of theatre it 
inevitably means that the language of this body is and can never be fixed in 
relation to time. Because of this transience, which is the transience of life 
itself, it could be said that, on one level, the body in performance will always 
reference this - that is, what it is to be a living body, to be alive, to be.This is 
nicely summed up by Herbert Blau’s classic quote “it is the actors mortality 
which is the acted subject - that’s his body doing time”
There seems to me therefore to be a hierarchy of presence within artistic 
expression which concerns all material objects but is perhaps most clearly 
demonstrated by the relationship that photography and performance have to 
the body. In performance the total corporeal living body is materially present, 
in a photography the presence of the body originates in a past moment, it is 
re-present, and has a material relationship that has been alienated from the 
original body. Relics live somewhere in between this trajectory of the material 
real and the alienated real in that they extend a fragment of the corporeal 
body into the present. This hierarchy of expression becomes a hierarchy of 
experience and has consequences for ways in which we can sense the 
body. It is as if some Faustian pact has been agreed. We can only 
experience the material living body in the present any other invocation 
demands either a fragmentation and/or a fixing of the body thereby depriving 
the body of the thing we sought the most - its life - its material presence. This 
is the sacrifice, we can fix images of the body in order to possess, control 
and recall the body to give it everlasting life but this fixed image is not the 
body we want - the body of constant being.
The Turin Machine is an attempt to act within this impasse. By working within 
these layers of presence and re-presence I’m trying to make a photograph 
which lives, to fix myself in life. The actual body in the camera is hidden from 
view it cannot be beheld, it is not possessed. As the light moves away from 
the body it begins, inevitably, to be changed, because it is literally distanced 
from the corporeal. It is inverted through a pinhole and as it travels through 
space becomes refracted, dimmed and disappears so by the time the body 
forms an image on the screen it is vastly impoverished, without colour and 
barely visible.Although I am doing my best to fix my body by remaining 
motionless I can but continually fail. The image of the living body seen in the 
camera bears only traces of life in its spectral qualities, its opacity and 
luminescence, but it lacks definition and precise detail. It is an image which 
is neither exactly living or dead.
Because of its ghostly presence as an image the body constantly eludes 
complete possession by the eye. If I, like the spectator, want to stabilise this 
sign in order to possess it clearly I can only do this outside the realms of the 
camera.
I have to remove myself and the screen from the camera thereby breaking the 
material relationship with the image and my body. The recorded image which 
first appears in the photographic darkroom is different from the one 
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experienced in the camera.(Slide 4) Most notably it has become negative and 
although the edges of the picture remain blurred and unfocused a female 
body is easily discerned. The surface of the screen, which remained unseen 
in the camera now takes on a life of its own and reveals a whole set of 
different material realities irrespective of the body which it represents.(slide 
5) These are concerned with the chemical necessities of photography, brush 
strokes from the application of emulsion, (slide 6) spots and blemishes from 
variations in concentration, these marks of process have replaced marks of 
presence. At the beginning of each new day the previous days attempt is 
hung in the gallery above or around the machine These negative spectres 
haunt the work which becomes increasingly populated with my failed 
attempts to fix myself in life. These images are the only records of the body 
within the camera, a body which has been irrevocably transformed by the 
process of recording. The only word for these images are shrouds, a cloth 
which binds the body, which is all that can remain of my now absent 
presence.
It might be possible to relate these ideas of a sensing hierarchy of presence 
to psychoanalytical ideas about the orders of language.
The shroud that binds is the bound sign which gains its articulation at the 
expense of alienation from the object it can only represent.
The essential difference of the performing arts from other types of artistic 
expression is in this domain of the unbound, fluid sign of the live body which, 
because it is continually present, cannot be fixed. As Derrida declared in 
Writing and Difference “whatever can be said of the body can be said of 
Theatre”. Realising this difference, it has been the preoccupation of some 
theatre and performance practitioners to develop a performance language 
which accesses the potential of this unbound sign. A theatre of pure 
presence which works through a non-representational language. I’m thinking 
particularly of projects such as Artaud’s ‘Cruel Theatre’ of which Derrida said 
“it is life itself in the extent to which life is unrepresentable”. But I think there is 
a problem with this idea and for the same reason that I am unable to fix 
myself within my camera this idea of a non-representational language of 
pure presence is an impossibility.
What I have discovered in my camera is that I can say nothing of or with the 
body but that I can only say things about the body in its relations, via light and 
a screen. Strangely this is something that Derrida also realised when he 
wrote “Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence has always 
already begun to represent itself”. That is presence in order to announce 
itself has to be articulated and in doing so is already in language and is 
automatically representation.
This is classic Lacanian stuff, it is the Real-impossible perpetually held at 
arms length by our existence within the symbolic order, fixed and forever 
yearning to be otherwise. Lacan’s theories also have inevitable 
consequences for ideas of the subject who therefore cannot be defined 
through the real but only by the relational signifiers of language.The Turin 
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Machine acknowledges the futility of language to capture the real and in 
doing so stages the consequences of this failure for the definition of the 
subject .
Within the western world, and elsewhere I imagine, women already know in 
a corporeal sense the difficulty of seeing the body as a signifier of Being or 
self identity. In a patriarchal culture where difference is already inscribed 
through the male the presentation of the female is always problematic. 
Perhaps this is why I stand in my camera trying to fix an image of myself, for 
myself. An identity which can exist outside of this culture. Another element in 
the process of cultural visibility is the way that the body is not only inscribed 
into language but read within language as well. And again I think women as 
the ‘looked at’ within culture may have a different awareness of the 
importance of this act. Perhaps this accounts for my feelings as I stand, 
object like, in the camera that this female body is not my own and because of 
this, even as I make my body visible, I comfort myself with the thought that it 
cannot tell you everything about me.
It is in order to highlight the act of reading that the viewing conditions within 
The Turin Machine are quite extreme, and in order to draw comparisons and 
equivalences between reading and writing certain physical relationships 
between the looker and the maker are recreated.(OHP 2) Both activities of 
image making and image watching are mediated by holes, a pinhole or a 
shutter, a framework if you like without which there would be no image.
Likewise both activities are interrupted by a screen which while providing an 
image prevents the subject from seeing the object directly and visa versa. 
This framework and screen are the operations of language and while they 
can reduce my being to my body they also protect my sense of self.
In collapsing these two activities I’m suggesting that there is a 
correspondence between the act of making and the act of looking and that 
the gaze of the spectator mirrors my “gaze” as creator and that these 
processes can be plotted at either end of the same spectrum. In much the 
same way that presence and represence fluctuate along the same 
continuum in performance. What is unusual about The Turin Machine in 
terms of performance however is that within the camera chamber it is this 
oscillation that is given expression, this is the subject, the body of the 
machine, and by constructing such physically literal viewing relations I’m 
asking both myself and my audience to embody this idea. Because who 
while standing in the camera can say where the live presence ends and the 
representing image begins? Or to put it another way in my camera Being is 
located somewhere in between the meeting of the material body with its 
constructed image.
In The Turin Machine this concept is realised as a physical exertion upon the 
body of the viewer most obviously in the being/not- being of the spectral 
image. Because of this it is possible that the work provokes an analysis of 
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the motives which lie behind the processes of looking and making. Not least 
because, unlike the irrepressible visibility of everyday life by entering the dark 
viewing booth you have declared a commitment to see which in the first 
moments of darkness are confounded. Therefore when you are finally 
rewarded with a vision its as if you are possibly seeing things for the first 
time, looking with new eyes. As you waited in the darkness you travelled to a 
new place, where, for a moment, you are allowed to glimpse a different order 
where Being is not a fixed identity but something which is constantly shifting.
I might be in danger of overstating the transformative powers of my machine 
but not being able to be a witness to myself I can only be encouraged by the 
reactions of others which seem to be strongly felt. People describe a 
disorienting, signless void which contains an image of unearthly qualities the 
nature of which they have never seen before.
It is a space which is very different from the space outside the camera which 
the place of fixed language here the spectre can only exist in the negative blur 
of a so called portrait. This is the only life the body can have outside of the 
camera.
In The Turin Machine I produce an identity by placing a screen between 
myself and the viewer, without the screen the viewer would stare into a black 
hole and I would have no photograph. The screen allows me to 
represent/identify myself but because this visibility occurs not solely within 
the reproductive logics of the representational field but also within the unified 
field of performance - oscillating between presence and represence - the 
identity made can only be an insubstantial one. By making an image which is 
not all there I am suggesting that real being, like Lacan’s Real-impossible, 
can never be realised, made wholly visible and that in this absence what 
must be understood as Being is located within this fundamentally unstable 
half life of the spectre.
Because this identity is so fleeting, so unlike the brash fixed images of true 
representation, what is absent can only be guessed at, speculated... This 
accounts for the hallucinogenic experiences of some of the visitors to the 
camera who describe curious visions of multi-limb hydra, spinning figures 
and fractured body parts. Of course these visions immediately become 
fictitious outside the camera when the viewer is confronted with the 
photographs of a corpse-like figure made by stillness over time. However 
this demonstrates that in the absence of the customary visual exchange the 
spectator fills in the picture, driven by the desire to see and to be seen, to 
ultimately reassure themselves of their role as a viewer, another being. This 
reassurance of being is the motivation behind making and looking. 
If one for the reasons we make and look is to reassure ourselves of our own 
being The Turin Machine provides a space where the consequences of the 
interrelationship between being and language can be made manifest.It is the 
similarity of these processes of making and looking which are made literal in 
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the machine provoking the conclusion that whatever is true of the body made 
in the camera might also be said of the body who does the making. Both are 
partial and illusory
The ghost in the machine I believe makes effective the problem of 
representing the female. It is only by making a space that attempts to be 
separate from the representational economies of the symbolic order do we 
draw attention do its rules of fixed, visibility which are the rules of patriarchal 
culture which exclude the Female and make her invisible. In The Turin 
Machine these rules of fixed proof are shown to be a fallacy as the body as 
Being which can be proved through the fixed negative bears no relation to the 
Being as body experienced in the camera. The camera has been described 
as womb-like and maybe it is a Female space where neither the viewer nor 
the witnessed can fix themselves and therefore as we cannot fix ourselves 
we cannot begin to fix and control, the external visible configurations of others 
This is a strength that the Female has in culture, to turn disadvantage to 
advantage because who wants to fix, possess or own, the terms of that type 
of visibility are too dear and importantly they are not the terms that I 
understand from my experience of being. And it is not because I am excluded 
and can’t play within these economies that I don't, I will not disappear or 
become invisible. The Turin Machine is a real machine which is exhibited in 
real places and people come to stand and watch in it. If the audience were 
unmoved by the spectacle they experience in the camera I would doubt what 
Phelan calls “the radical contingency of the physic and the material real”. But 
I believe people are moved, they are surprised, perplexed, soothed, afraid - a 
whole range of human emotions are released by a simple optical trick. And 
one of the reasons they are moved I think is that they are seeing something 
which they recognise to be true in themselves. The ghost-woman hints at 
another way of seeing/being which has to be suppressed in order to see and 
be seen. Its a type of knowledge that can only be embodied and it is 
something that I also realise as I pose in the camera. I stand bleached by the 
light and you stand invisible in the dark and we both know that what we can 
see is not all there is.
March 1998
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APPENDIX 4.
STILL IMAGE ENLARGEMENTS
Fig. 1. Torpedo Attack Trainer, Crail: Exterior and Interior        275.
Fig. 2. Torpedo Attack Trainer, Crail: Effects diagram        276.
Fig. 3. Dioramas: Ground Plan and Typical scene        277.
Fig. 5. The Turin Machine: Exterior and Three ‘shrouds’        278.
Fig. 5-7. The Turin Machine: Field of Vision diagram        279.
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Torpedo Attack Trainer
Fig. 1.TAT, Crail, Exterior and Interior Stills.1999.
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Torpedo Attack Trainer
Fig. 2. Diagram of Second World War, Torpedo Attack Trainer.
276
Dioramas
Fig 3. Ground Plan of the Diorama, London 1823 & a typical Diorama scene
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The Turin Machine
Fig. 5. The Turin Machine: Exterior View and Finished Shrouds
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The Turin Machine
Fig. 5-7. The Turin Machine: Internal Diagram
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